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Moral heuristics are methods that serve the purpose of reducing the effort associated with moral desion making. The purpose of this article is to create a prescriptive model of moral heuristics usage. It provides that the heuristic's efficiency depends on the problem that we are solving by using heuristics, the environment in which they are used, and the moral standard of the decision-maker. Accordingly, for the effective use of heuristics, it is necessary to, first, use heuristics that are relevant to problem situations; second, heuristics should be used in the environment in which their effectiveness is established; third, the choice of heuristics should be determined by the moral standard of the decision-maker.

Argues that war demands rules & it is possible to be ruthless & still observe them. Military history has proven that those who exercise restraint, proportionality, discrimination, & legitimacy have an advantage over those who don't. Augustine believed that the limiting principal in war is what makes peace possible & is the reason for ethical codes on the battlefield. It is maintained that it is possible to fight morally for a better kind of peace even if war remains entrenched in the international system for some time to come. Other matters discussed include how the post-modern condition is defined by risks, insecurities, & control problems; the impact of the heritage of classical Greece & Rome on today's situation; the fear that is programmed into the War on Terror; the reemergence of religion in the discourse of international politics which holds the promise of a more pluralistic dialogue but has also given rise to fundamentalist violence; & the importance of never justifying inhumane acts. J. Lindroth

Flawed arguments often recur in debates on U.S. security policy long after their weaknesses have been exposed. In this article I argue that certain political misconceptions and fallacies resist counterargument because they are reinforced by particular reasoning shortcuts known as "cognitive heuristics." Although heuristics save time and mental work, they can lead to error because they are based on violable assumptions. I discuss seven different cognitive heuristics and the particular security fallacies they perpetuate — from the domino theory to the idea that deterrence requires force matching. Finally, the scope and limitations of such psychological explanations will be discussed.

Common visual heuristics used to interpret marginal effects plots are susceptible to Type-1 error. This susceptibility varies as a function of (a) sample size, (b) stochastic error in the true data generating process, and (c) the relative size of the main effects of the causal variable versus the moderator. I discuss simple alternatives to these standard visual heuristics that may improve inference and do not depend on regression parameters.

AbstractFindings from the literature of flood risk management have suggested that heuristics increase exposure to flood risks. This article models some of these conventional heuristics. The main finding emerging from survey data is that not every heuristic significantly correlates with the decision of households to not take protective actions. Flood experience, as it has been corroborated in the literature, turned out to be the main driver among residents living in flood‐prone areas in Southeast Queensland, Australia, to take protective actions against flood risks. More specifically, households who featured perceived negative flood experiences were more likely to take out flood insurance, retrofit or raise their property, and relocate. This survey analysis is supported by the Theory of Ecological Rationality. It suggests that flood mitigation policies should create models that mimic real‐world decision‐making processes to gain further insights into how flood experience affects risk perception and decision‐making under uncertainty.