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Abstract Indirect traumatic optic neuropathy (ITON) refers to optic nerve injury resulting from impact remote to the optic nerve. The mechanism of injury is not understood, and there are no confirmed protocols for prevention, mitigation or treatment. Most data concerning this condition comes from case series of civilian patients suffering blunt injury, such as from sports- or motor vehicle-related concussion, rather than military-related ballistic or blast damage. Research in this field will likely require the development of robust databases to identify patients with ITON and follow related outcomes, in addition to both in-vivo animal and virtual human models to study the mechanisms of damage and potential therapies.

Abstract
The status of indirect discrimination is ambiguous in the current literature. This paper addresses two contemporary and related debates. First, for some, indirect discrimination is not truly a distinct kind of discrimination, but it is simply a legal construct designed to address distributive inequalities between groups. Second, even if one accepts that indirect discrimination is a distinct type of discrimination, the connection between the two kinds of discrimination, direct and indirect, is debated. For some, they are distinct act-types, while for others, indirect discrimination should be conceived as a side effect of prior cases of direct discrimination. In this paper, I argue that indirect discrimination is a distinct act-type that can take place without being connected to prior instances of direct discrimination.

Many believe that indirect discrimination is unjust as such, because, by definition, it involves the imposition of disproportionate disadvantages on the group of discriminatees. In this article I ask two questions: 1) What does it take to disadvantage a group, and 2) which groups are relevant for the purpose of determining whether a given practice is indirectly discriminatory? I argue that it is difficult to answer these two questions in a way that aligns both with the way in which we normally think about indirect discrimination and the view that indirect discrimination necessarily clashes with the moral concerns that we normally think render indirect discrimination morally objectionable. In the last part of the article, I explain why the article's negative main claim – that indirect discrimination is not unjust in itself – does not entail that we should refrain from reducing or prohibiting indirect discrimination.

Abstract: In private law doctrine, suggestions have been made to introduce a terminology relating to the phenomenon of horizontal effects of EU law that is different from the terminology used by EU lawyers. That terminology is designed better to accommodate the specificities of private law. By subtly changing the word order, private lawyers aim to cover under the label 'direct horizontal effect' only those cases in which EU law can be invoked with the consequence of directly affecting or modifying a private law relationship. Invoking European law to review national law in terms of its compatibility with European law is defined as 'indirect horizontal effect'. This essay discusses the unfortunate consequences for legal practice of using two different sets of terminology, almost identical in wording, but substantially different in scope. A number of disadvantages of the terminology advocated by private lawyers are addressed, also in the light of the case law of the European Court of Justice. Finally, a suggestion is made to arrive at a uniform terminology attempting to accommodate both private law and EU law sensibilities.