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In the last decade, the US has executed more juvenile offenders than all the nations of the world combined. The only other countries that still execute offenders under 18 are Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Saudi Arabia and Iran

AbstractThis article posits and explores the concept of comedic hermeneutical injustice: a type of hermeneutical injustice that disadvantages members of marginalized groups in the arena of humor-sharing. First I explain the concept of comedic hermeneutical injustice: that agents who are hermeneutically marginalized are less able to successfully participate in the sharing of humor. Then I suggest that, to prove the existence of such an injustice, two things need to be shown: first, that hermeneutically marginalized groups do suffer some disadvantage in how well their attempts at humor are received, and, second, that this disadvantage amounts to a significant harm.In proving the existence of a comedic disadvantage, this article notes that all jokes require some epistemic content to be shared between joke-teller and joke-hearer. Thus, since being hermeneutically marginalized obstructs one from sharing knowledge with proximate speakers, hermeneutical inequalities can lead to inequalities in the sharing of humor. To show that this constitutes a significant disadvantage, the article observes the various ways that sharing humor successfully can serve agents' social interests. It concludes by noting some idiosyncrasies of comedic hermeneutical injustice, relative to other forms of epistemic injustice, and situating it within the wider framework of humor's general social-ethical influence.

To find out what is in one's own best interest, it is helpful to ask one's epistemic peers. However, identifying one's epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of 'Masses' and 'Elites'. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker.

After briefly reconstructing the debate concerning care and justice, this article highlights the difference between liberal ontology and epistemology, and the epistemic and ontological assumptions of care ethics. It explores the importance of social epistemology and epistemic injustice for care ethics and links care ethics to an ecological and horizontal epistemology. It justifies forgoing the construction of a systematic theory of justice à la Rawls, endorses an idea of justice that gives priority to injustice and sees democracy as a precondition for a caring society.

L'objectif de cet article est d'expliciter les différentes distinctions conceptuelles (injustice de premier et second ordres, objective et subjective, à la première et à la troisième personnes, commise et subie) à partir desquelles la question de l'injustice et son rapport à la souffrance sont analysés dans Souffrance en France . Il s'agit ainsi de mesurer l'originalité de l'analyse de la banalisation de l'injustice sociale en la comparant à d'autres approches du rapport souffrance/injustice. En conclusion, la question de l'actualité de cette analyse est posée à la lumière de ce qui peut être décrit comme une résurgence du sentiment d'injustice.

In much of the world, there are concerns over the abysmal wages among the less advantaged and the many victims of racial and gender discrimination. Though tax credits to single mothers with low wage income provide support and contribute to the development of their children, there are still cruel signs of poverty among working people: malnourishment, poor health and substance abuse. Less appreciated, many a low-wage worker must pass up a job offering meaningful work because it pays even less. And without a "good job" these workers cannot have "the good life." Such outcomes in any advanced economy are grim signs that something is wrong: The problem is not "inequality" here. There is a high degree of injustice.

Theoretical tools aimed at making explicit the injustices suffered by certain socially disadvantaged groups might end up serving purposes which were not foreseen when the tools were first introduced. Nothing is inherently wrong with a shift in the scope of a theoretical tool: the popularization of a concept opens up the possibility of its use for several strategic purposes. The thesis that we defend in this paper is that some public figures cultivate a public persona for whom the conditions of the notion of testimonial injustice might be taken to apply, and this situation is exploited to their advantage, as a means to advance their political agendas. More specifically, they take advantage of this to generate situations of crossed disagreements, which in turn foster polarization.

What is Structural Injustice? is the first edited collection to bring together the voices of leading structural injustice scholars from politics, philosophy and law to explore the concept of structural injustice which has now become a central feature of all three disciplines and is considered by many to be a 'field of study.' The volume features specially selected original and essential works on structural injustice. The volume provides a range of disciplinary, ontological and epistemological perspectives on what structural injustice is and includes feminist and post-colonial theories to interrogate how structural injustice exacerbates and reproduces existing inequalities and relations of power. This book aims to become a touchstone text for those interested in the different ways we can understand structural injustice, how it manifests, how it relates to other forms of injustice, who is responsible for its redress and the different ways we might go about it. This book will appeal to a wide audience of students, both undergraduate and postgraduate, as well as the general academic population, experts on structural injustice, interested practitioners in politics and members of the public.

"This book presents a comprehensive overview of modern conceptualizations of justice in India. It analyses how these concepts relate to traditional theories of justice-in Marx, Ambedkar, Gandhi and Rawls as well as social realities in India. The book critically analyses theories of justice in India from a theoretical and comparative framework. It brings together contributions by well-known scholars to explore a range of questions and dilemmas around justice which have been brought about by a widening disparity between the powerful and the marginalized. The volume engages with the inadequacies of tautological theories of justice and fairness which fall short of adequately articulating the institutionalized forms of injustices and inequality facing citizens in modern society. It also explores exceptions and deviations from transcendental and universalist assumptions of contemporary theories of justice; studies movements and expressions of dissent; and alternative structures and paradigms of conceptualising justice. This book will be useful for scholars and researchers of political theory, political sociology, political studies, sociology, social theory, post-colonial theory and exclusion studies"--

"This book presents a comprehensive overview of modern conceptualizations of justice in India. It analyses how these concepts relate to traditional theories of justice-in Marx, Ambedkar, Gandhi and Rawls as well as social realities in India. The book critically analyses theories of justice in India from a theoretical and comparative framework. It brings together contributions by well-known scholars to explore a range of questions and dilemmas around justice which have been brought about by a widening disparity between the powerful and the marginalized. The volume engages with the inadequacies of tautological theories of justice and fairness which fall short of adequately articulating the institutionalized forms of injustices and inequality facing citizens in modern society. It also explores exceptions and deviations from transcendental and universalist assumptions of contemporary theories of justice; studies movements and expressions of dissent; and alternative structures and paradigms of conceptualising justice. This book will be useful for scholars and researchers of political theory, political sociology, political studies, sociology, social theory, post-colonial theory and exclusion studies"--

What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and ongoing political struggles. Recent work in the theory of recognition—particularly the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists—can help to identify and correct the shortcomings of these approaches. I offer a critical appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three characteristics of Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of political struggles. I propose that a theory of epistemic injustice can better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of such struggles by acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions.