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Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 149-164
ISSN: 0951-6298
Bargaining with Bainimara: The Price of Judicial Appointment in Fiji
In: Proctor, 29 6: 27-30, 2009
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Judicial Appointment, Accountability and Constitutional obligation of Judges in India
In: Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry (TOJQI) Volume 12, Issue 7, Month 2021: 573-592
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Institutional Design and External Independence: Assessing Judicial Appointments in Latin America
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
Does Patronage Matter? Connecting Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 665-690
ISSN: 1744-9324
Abstract.The federal government's power to appoint judges has come under increased scrutiny in recent years. While many suggest that partisan affiliation, gender and professional background may be influencing the Canadian appointment process, and some have called into question the fairness of such influences, little attention has been directed at determining whether these characteristics influence the outcome of cases. This paper studies decisions made by the Ontario Court of Appeal between 1990 and 2003 and uses a unique measure of partisan affiliation in an attempt to answer the question: do characteristics which play a role in the appointment process influence judicial decision making.Résumé.Ces dernières années ont vu une augmentation de l'attention donné à l'autorité du gouvernement fédéral en ce qui concerne la nomination judiciaire. Il y en a plusieurs qui suggèrent que l'affiliation partisan, le sexe, et l'expérience professionnelle des candidats judiciaires sont tous des caractéristiques qui peuvent influencer la procédure de nomination. Encore d'autres ont remis en question l'équité d'un choix basé sur ces influences. Cependant, la question qui n'a pas reçu beaucoup d'attention jusqu'à maintenant est si ces caractéristiques influencent le résultat des affaires juridiques. L'article qui suit examine les décisions rendu par le Cour d'appel de l'Ontario entre les années 1990 et 2003, employant une mesure unique d'affiliation partisan, avec le but de répondre à la question : Est-ce que les caractéristiques qui peuvent jouer un rôle dans la procédure de nomination influencent les décisions judiciaires?
Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality against the Backdrop of Judicial Appointments in South Africa
The South African Judicial Service Commission (JSC), considered to be exemplary for its independence, plays a pivotal part in judicial appointments. Yet the Commission has long been marred by tensions that have lately erupted into a full-blown conflict between those who could here be referred to as the transformationists, on the one hand, and the liberals, on the other. The transformationists, who may generally be regarded as falling within the sphere of influence of the ruling elite under the African National Congress (ANC), are bent on pursuing the policy of transformation. Hence they insist that the composition of the bench must reflect the national population profile and on individual judges' pursuing the ruling party's ideological goals. The liberals reject this as a threat to judicial independence and the professional competence of the judiciary. On close analysis the clash is based on incompatible interpretations of judicial independence and impartiality. This article is a critique of these interpretations against the backdrop of an assessment of what these notions can reasonably be expected to achieve. It is argued that the liberals are harbouring unrealistic views about judiciaries, believing them to wield power which may even extend over matters of political significance, powers on a par with or even outweighing those of the political branches. However, on proper analysis it is clear that the judiciary is in fact, firstly, inherently weak and dependent on the support of the political branches; and, secondly, it is integrated into the ruling elite with whom they share the same ideological assumptions without any inclination to oppose them. Hence, the impartiality of the courts, when it comes to politically sensitive issues, is distinctively politically (regime) relative and ideologically conditioned. Ironically the transformationists have bought into the liberals' erroneous belief in the potency of the courts (in the above-mentioned sense) and they fear, without foundation, for the political risks the courts might be posing to the ruling elite. This fear is based on an exaggerated vision of the far-reaching consequences that they ascribe to judicial independence and impartiality, believing it to render the judiciary a formidable political force on a par with the political branches. The transformationists would therefore go to extreme lengths to secure an amenable judiciary. This is exemplified by their rather improper insistence that the best candidates need not be appointed, thus compromising even the (limited) independence and impartiality which courts, on a realistic assessment, should have. In doing this the transformationists show a serious lack of appreciation of the distinctive professional nature of the judiciary, whose independence, impartiality and effectiveness are rooted not in political might but in the exceptional professional competence of the incumbents on the bench, who should be drawn from the best candidates the legal professional can produce.
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Reassessing judicial independence and impartiality against the backdrop of judicial appointments in South Africa
The South African Judicial Service Commission (JSC), considered to be exemplary for its independence, plays a pivotal part in judicial appointments. Yet the Commission has long been marred by tensions that have lately erupted into a full-blown conflict between those who could here be referred to as the transformationists, on the one hand, and the liberals, on the other. The transformationists, who may generally be regarded as falling within the sphere of influence of the ruling elite under the African National Congress (ANC), are bent on pursuing the policy of transformation. Hence they insist that the composition of the bench must reflect the national population profile and on individual judges' pursuing the ruling party's ideological goals. The liberals reject this as a threat to judicial independence and the professional competence of the judiciary. On close analysis the clash is based on incompatible interpretations of judicial independence and impartiality. This article is a critique of these interpretations against the backdrop of an assessment of what these notions can reasonably be expected to achieve. It is argued that the liberals are harbouring unrealistic views about judiciaries, believing them to wield power which may even extend over matters of political significance, powers on a par with or even outweighing those of the political branches. However, on proper analysis it is clear that the judiciary is in fact, firstly, inherently weak and dependent on the support of the political branches; and, secondly, it is integrated into the ruling elite with whom they share the same ideological assumptions without any inclination to oppose them. Hence, the impartiality of the courts, when it comes to politically sensitive issues, is distinctively politically (regime) relative and ideologically conditioned. Ironically the transformationists have bought into the liberals' erroneous belief in the potency of the courts (in the above-mentioned sense) and they fear, without foundation, for the political risks the courts might be posing to the ruling elite. This fear is based on an exaggerated vision of the far-reaching consequences that they ascribe to judicial independence and impartiality, believing it to render the judiciary a formidable political force on a par with the political branches. The transformationists would therefore go to extreme lengths to secure an amenable judiciary. This is exemplified by their rather improper insistence that the best candidates need not be appointed, thus compromising even the (limited) independence and impartiality which courts, on a realistic assessment, should have. In doing this the transformationists show a serious lack of appreciation of the distinctive professional nature of the judiciary, whose independence, impartiality and effectiveness are rooted not in political might but in the exceptional professional competence of the incumbents on the bench, who should be drawn from the best candidates the legal professional can produce.
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Is Virginia's Judicial System Too Elitist? Political Culture, Judicial Appointment, and Reform Measures
In: Regent University Law Review, Band 29, Heft 133
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Judicial Appointments Mechanism in India and Independence of Judiciary - A Critical Analysis
In: National Capital Law Journal, Band 16
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Working paper
Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality Against the Backdrop of Judicial Appointments in South Africa
In: Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Band 17, Heft 5
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Does Patronage Matter? Connecting Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 665-690
ISSN: 0008-4239
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Drama or Serenity?: Upcoming Judicial Appointments at the Slovak Constitutional Court
2018 is shaping up to be one of the most important years in the history of the Slovak Constitutional Court (SCC). Nine of the currently sitting 13 judges will see their non-renewable terms expire in February 2019. The new appointments have the potential to be shrouded in drama, as they will take place against the background of a constitutional and political power struggle over SCC appointments between the President and the government, as well as broader judicial malaise in the country.
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