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Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.

Modern political and democratic thinking is broadly dominated by liberal constitutionalism. Precisely, in post-colonial constitutions, one witnesses the preoccupation with the idea of constitutionalism. However, at the same time, the extent to which politics informs the working of a Constitution has made it difficult to distinguish between the regular politics and the politics that guides constitutionalism. In this list, populism also threw challenges in the path of constitutional–democratic governance of a polity; however, lately, things have taken a sharp shift. The emergence of legal autocrats espousing strategies to undermine constitutionalism has raised questions over the liberal constitutional project and what sovereignty means. Although Hungary and Poland are often flagged as textbook examples of autocratic legalism, it does not mean that established democracies have insurance from the same. The USA under Donald Trump showcased the vulnerabilities of democracy to the autocratic pull despite having a long history of democracy and a tradition of robust institutions. Given this backdrop, the immediate challenge is to determine how constitutionalism could be rejuvenated whilst safeguarding fundamental rights. In this paper, we examine India's recent political and legal developments and attempt to read them through autocratic legalism. Given this, the judiciary has the potential to tame this autocratic march, given its constitutional mandate. In this, we propose that the evolving jurisprudence of constitutional morality (CM), despite its patent limitations, would not just address the constitutional malaise but would, as a result, deepen constitutionalism.

Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.

R v BM is the latest case to consider the exceptions to Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). The exceptions allow an action causing injury that would be a criminal offence to become lawful if the person injured consents to the action. The outcome of this judgement is that body modifications are categorised as medical procedures (and therefore subject to the medical exception only) and new exceptions should not be developed on a case by case basis, instead allocating development of the exceptions to Parliament. Two implications follow from the BM judgement. First, it provided a limited definition of body modifications which are now categorised as medical procedures. Second, their Lordships have restricted further development of the lawful exceptions to offences against the person. This is a lost opportuni-ty for developing the common law exceptions to the OAPA through an autonomy-based lib-eral judicial interpretation.