Suchergebnisse

Examines influence of judicial decisions on social policy in various constitutional courts, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights; 10 articles.

A new judicial politics of legal doctrine has the potential to resolve foundational dilemmas and reconcile long-standing and counterproductive scholarly divisions by bringing together legal concerns and political science priorities. This doctrinal-politics approach highlights a relatively new formal apparatus known as the case-space model, and it invokes close ties between theoretical and empirical work and between the study of judicial behavior and actual legal practices and institutions. The case-space model is an adaption of standard policy-space modeling, tailored for the distinguishing features of judicial policy making. It allows for ideological differences between judges while expressing those differences in terms of legal rules that partition fact-filled legal cases into different dispositions. I explore the intellectual origins and primary contributions of the approach, focusing on how legal policy is affected by collegiality (the multi-member nature of appellate courts) and hierarchy (the multi-level division of court systems).

In twenty-five different experiments conducted on over 2,200 judges, we assessed whether judges' political ideology influences their resolution of hypothetical cases. Generally, we found that the political ideology of the judge matters, but only very little. Across a range of bankruptcy, criminal, and civil cases, we found that the aggregate effect of political ideology is either nonexistent or amounts to roughly one quarter of a standard deviation. Overall, the results of our experiments suggest that judges are not "politicians in robes."

A new judicial politics of legal doctrine has the potential to resolve foundational dilemmas and reconcile long-standing and counterproductive scholarly divisions by bringing together legal concerns and political science priorities. This doctrinal-politics approach highlights a relatively new formal apparatus known as the case-space model, and it invokes close ties between theoretical and empirical work and between the study of judicial behavior and actual legal practices and institutions. The case-space model is an adaption of standard policy-space modeling, tailored for the distinguishing features of judicial policy making. It allows for ideological differences between judges while expressing those differences in terms of legal rules that partition fact-filled legal cases into different dispositions. I explore the intellectual origins and primary contributions of the approach, focusing on how legal policy is affected by collegiality (the multi-member nature of appellate courts) and hierarchy (the multi-level division of court systems). Adapted from the source document.

Focusing on the intersection of politics and law in six western European countries and in two supra-national bodies, the contributors here aim to debunk the myth that judges are merely ""la bouche de la loi"" and analyze similiarities in policy-making of the judiciaries from one nation to the next

Sammlung von Beiträgen über das Verhältnis von Rechtspolitik, Gesetzgebung und politischem Entscheidungsprozeß in Großbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Niederlande, Belgien und der EG. (AuD-Ber)

In twenty-five different experiments conducted on over 2,200 judges, we assessed whether judges' political ideology influences their resolution of hypothetical cases. Generally, we found that the political ideology of the judge matters, but only very little. Across a range of bankruptcy, criminal, and civil cases, we found that the aggregate effect of political ideology is either nonexistent or amounts to roughly onequarter of a standard deviation. Overall, the results of our experiments suggest that judges are not "politicians in robes."