Suchergebnisse

chapter 1 My Philosophy of Law The Law in Philosophical Perspectives: My Philosophy of Law, L.J. Wintgens (edition), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp.47-67. -- part Part One: Legal Reasoning -- chapter 2 Principled Decision-making and the Supreme Court Columbia Law Review, 63, 1963, pp. 35-58. -- chapter 3 A Note on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law Justification, J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), New York University Press, 1986, pp. 124-40. -- chapter 4 The Logical Force of Arguments by Analogy in Common Law Reasoning Duke Law Magazine, 3, 1985, pp. 34-6. -- chapter 5 Aesthetics and Legal Reasoning: A Strand in American Legal Duke Law Magazine, 2, 1984, pp. 5-8. -- chapter 6 Preliminaries to the Study of Procedural Justice Law, Reason, and Justice, G. Hughes (edition), New York University Press, 1969, pp. 71-101. -- chapter 7 Substantive Interpretation and Common Law Elaboration Archiv für-Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft, 53, 1994, pp.23-35. -- chapter 8 The Legal Analog of the Principle of Bivalence Ratio Juris, 16, 2003, pp. 450-68. -- part Part Two: Legal Theories -- chapter 9 Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America - Major Themes and Developments Journal of Legal Education, 36, 1986, pp. 441-80. -- chapter 10 Kelsen and the Concept of 'Legal System' Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, 47, 1961, pp.355-86. -- chapter 11 Holmes's Jurisprudence: Aspects of its Development and Continuity Social Theory and Practice, 5, 1979, pp. 183-207. -- chapter 12 Retroactive Legislation and Restoration of the Rule of Law Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 1, 1993, pp. 169-92. -- chapter 13 The Cultural Defense Ratio Juris, 15, 2002, pp. 146-58. -- chapter 14 Responsibility Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (eds), Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 221-35. -- chapter 15 Faux Pas Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 13, 2005, 103-22. -- part Part Three: Rights -- chapter 16 Towards a Theory of Human Rights The Monist, 52, 1968, pp. 512-49. -- chapter 17 Obligations to Future Generations The Monist, 56, 1972, pp. 85-99. -- chapter 18 The Significance of Rights Language Philosophical Topics, 18, 1990, pp. 53-64. -- chapter 19 The Primacy of Welfare Rights Social Philosophy and Policy, 1, 1984, pp. 119-36. -- chapter 20 Rights, Performatives, and Promises in Karl Olivecrona's Legal Theory Ratio Juris 18, 2005, pp. 16-29.

In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Cass R. Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Whether discussing abortion, homosexuality, or free speech, the meaning of the Constitution, or the spell cast by the Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In this Second Edition, the author updates the previous edition bringing it into the current mainstream of twenty-first century legal reasoning and judicial decision-making focusing on the many relevant contemporary issues and developments that occurred since the initial 1996 publication.

Objectivity in law and jurisprudence /Mark Van Hoecke --Can legal theory be objective? /Jaap Hage --The impossibility of an outsider's perspective /Pauline C. Westerman --Objective legal reasoning : objectivity without objects /Matti Ilmari Niemi --Legal certainty as an element of objectivity in law /Juha Raitio --Objective rules of argumentation /Bertjan Wolthuis --Easy cases and objective interpretation /Niko Soininen --Can inalienable rights provide an objective foundation for law and morality? /Maija Aalto-Heinilä --Objectivity and the law's assumptions about human behaviour /Peter Cserne --Kaleidoscopic cultural views and legal theory : dethroning the objectivity? /Jaakko Husa --Translators and legal comparatists as objective mediators between cultures? /Caroline Laske --Legal science challenged by cultural paradigms : "subjective objectivity" in legal scholarship /Mustapha El Karouni.

This paper aims to explore the functions of the theory of legal argumentation (TLA) on Constitutional States and will especially focus on the political and self-reflective functions of the TLA within the framework of a neo-constitutionalistic legal theory. The first part of the paper includes a definition of the TAL and an analysis of its main functions. At the end of the paper the author provides the bases for the development of a neoconstitutionalistic legal theory.

Legislatures have positive legitimacy to make law because of the power of the people who elected them. Throughout the world, however, unelected judges also make law. What, if anything, gives such judges positive legitimacy to make law? This paper demonstrates, through two superficially simple game theoretic models, that judges' positive legitimacy is based on the power of people. Courts' legitimacy has the same basis as legislatures'. Since the French revolution, the ultimate arbiter in the social fight is the strongest faction, the majority. A group of people communicates its type to society at the ballot box. On the basis of the ballot count, society makes concessions to the terms dictated by the majority. Under what circumstances would an individual ever be able to dictate terms to society? This paper demonstrates that the court system allows a single individual to act collectively with other similarly situated individuals spread out through time. This paper argues that this group is able to communicate its type to society through legal reasoning. Courts are insulated from the political process because unelected judges are supposed to be beholden to a temporally disconnected group, rather than to contemporaneous constituencies.

This course book serves an undergraduate course in introduction to legal reasoning. It is designed to initiate students in the legal methods of case law analysis and statutory interpretation, prompting students to take a critical distance from the wielding of the methods. It helps students acquire or refine the techniques of close reading, analogizing, distinguishing, positing related fact patterns, and criticizing judicial and legislative exposition and logic. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1091/thumbnail.jpg