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AbstractWhile cowardice is sanctioned by military law in most countries, the impact of cowardice on modern warfare and security politics is low. This might be the reason why cowardice—as notion, phenomenon, and topic—has widely been neglected in security studies. However, for quite some time, we have witnessed a revival of the word as an accusation and pejorative term that is frequently applied by Western government representatives to describe the enemy in armed conflicts. The expression of a "cowardly attack" has become quite common in political communication after attacks against Western forces in violent confrontations. Thereby, cowardice is transformed from a possible weakness of the own forces to a particular strength of the enemy. This article aims at presenting some reflections on the notion, meaning, and functional role of cowardice in situations of violent international conflict, as well as on the use of the term as a speech act in recent governmental security communication. A particular focus will be put on the normative implications of the revival of the governmental cowardice-rhetoric.

The end of the Cold War brought with it a changed perception of human individuals on the types of threats to their security. Thus, issues related to nonmilitary dimensions of security have replaced those of a military nature, butnot eliminate them. We can say with certainty that in the beginning of XXI century, dangers and security threats tend to be more diffuse, less predictable and multidimensional. Unlike traditional military threats emanating from aknown opponent, they can not be countered either by increasing military spending and troop deployment or closing the borders. For these reasons, the need for increased international cooperation, many of those dangers andthreats can not be resolved within the traditional national security.Keywords: security; social security; human security; non-military; good governance; bad governance.

The relationship between PO & foreign policy decisions is explored. It is stated that nat'l decision-makers need to know more about both domestic & foreign PO. Nat'l strategists must become increasingly concerned with the soc-psychol'al effects of their policies on both enemies & allies. PO surveys in this context must focus on 3 major points: (1) the pol'al feasibility of a specific military strategy; (2) its pol'al results; & (3) otherwise unanticipated possibilities, eg, sudden reversal of opinion & the revelation of underlying trends & imminent changes or instabilities. Predominant US strategic security issues are examined & specific res designs are suggested for specific topics. A hyp'al model for an exploratory survey to determine the relative pol'al feasibility for US decision-makers of 2 alternate military responses to limited aggression is established: (a) limited strategic retaliation, & (b) tactical local defense. A table illustrates survey indicators, estimated weighting factors, & costs for the US. The figures are explained & analyzed Various approaches to such a survey are discussed, & the importance of measuring the pacifist opinion as to number, distribution, intensity & sources is pointed out. Several major problems were encountered in sketching out illustrative survey designs. They include: (i) making policy alternatives intelligible to mass publics; (ii) the `uncertainty principle' in which observation changes what is being observed; (iii) the choice of identifying military strategies by their `normal' costs or by their most unpleasant possible results; (iv) finding reliable definitions for such concepts as `pacifism,' & distinguishing between interpersonal influence & the impact of events as factors changing the intensity & distribution of public att's toward military alternatives. M. Maxfield.

Cover -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. The Two Germanies: Cold War and Détente -- 2. West Germany and the Collective Defence of Western Europe -- 3. Soviet Military Power in Europe -- 4. Signals of Hope -- 5. Talks about Talks -- 6. Talks upon Talks -- 7. The Elusive Goal -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.