Suchergebnisse

Examines racism in the right-wing militia movement; some focus on alleged connections to Republican party campaign activities, 1996; US.

This article demonstrates how an integral element of the fabric
of governance on the eastern Indonesian island of Lombok, and many
other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, are non-state local security
arrangements, such as night watches and militias. These groups play a
significant role in the local infrastructure of security and law enforcement.
Consequently, this article challenges a common assumption by
legal scholars, and many other observers of Indonesia, that state-based
institutions such as the police are the exclusive, and only legitimate, mode
of law enforcement in Indonesia. Through an ethnographic engagement
with the idea of law enforcement on Lombok, I seek to broaden these
assumptions about legitimate modes of statecraft. These non-state entities
fill a void in the Indonesian law enforcement architecture that the state
is unable or unwilling to fulfil (or potentially finds it more practical to
delegate to local non-state institutions).

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs' impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs' impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.