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Multilevel governance describes the diffusion of authority away from the central state. In this contribution, we recount how an archaic term, governance, became part of the vocabulary of political science. We then outline three building blocks of a postfunctionalist theory of multilevel governance. The first is that multilevel governance is cooperation to provide collective goods at diverse scales. The second is that the form governance takes depends on the sociality of the participants. The third is that conflict over community enables or impedes multilevel governance.

Research shows that electoral systems, gender quotas and a country's socio-economic development affect women's legislative representation (WLR). Less attention is paid to the effects of the rise of regional political arenas and multilevel politics on WLR. Due to less costly and competitive electoral campaigns, women can have easier access to regional legislatures. We argue that this relationship is mitigated by the distribution of competences between the different levels of the political system and that decentralization's effect on WLR at the regional level is dependent on the regions' political power. To test this, we use an original dataset on WLR in 383 regional parliaments in 19 European countries from 1970 to 2018. Results of the three-level models show that more political authority vested into regions leads to a lower level of WLR in the legislatures of the more politically powerful regions in comparison with not only the regions possessing less authority but also with the national parliament. Possible explanations for this effect, such as the attractiveness of these positions to the mostly male political elite and, consequently, increased costs and competitiveness of electoral campaigns, are suggested.

Renate Mayntz (Hrsg.): Negotiated Reform: The Multilevel Governance of Financial Regulation. Frankfurt am Main: Campus 2015. 9783593505510

In the current economic and social crisis affecting Europe, dialogue is of great importance. The reaction of the EU to the present situation is evident from various discussions and documents. Following the ambitious Lisbon Strategy, a document created during a period of economic growth for most of the Member States, we now have before us the Europe 2020 Strategy. In this article, the author explores the contents of this strategy in light of the implementation of its goals of multilevel governance.

AbstractThis article makes four claims: First, tax systems at the national, regional and global level are regulatory systems. They can and should be studied as that. Second, taxation is an important extension to regulatory scholars' empirical field of inquiry. It is a hard case to test prominent theories of new, softer modes of governance. Third, in the era of liberalization and globalization tax governance exhibits similar institutional changes as regulatory governance. It has changed (1) from national to multi‐level governance, (2) from public and direct to indirect with increased involvement of private actors, and (3) from hierarchical and coercive to cooperative and responsive. Fourth, since the global financial crisis, the new sites of tax governance have increasingly been involved in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance and have become more politicized. These claims are substantiated by reference to the contributions to the special issue that this article introduces.

AbstractResearch shows that electoral systems, gender quotas and a country's socio‐economic development affect women's legislative representation (WLR). Less attention is paid to the effects of the rise of regional political arenas and multilevel politics on WLR. Due to less costly and competitive electoral campaigns, women can have easier access to regional legislatures. We argue that this relationship is mitigated by the distribution of competences between the different levels of the political system and that decentralization's effect on WLR at the regional level is dependent on the regions' political power. To test this, we use an original dataset on WLR in 383 regional parliaments in 19 European countries from 1970 to 2018. Results of the three‐level models show that more political authority vested into regions leads to a lower level of WLR in the legislatures of the more politically powerful regions in comparison with not only the regions possessing less authority but also with the national parliament. Possible explanations for this effect, such as the attractiveness of these positions to the mostly male political elite and, consequently, increased costs and competitiveness of electoral campaigns, are suggested.