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This study tests the effectiveness of naming and shaming by transnational advocacy networks in reducing the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. I argue that naming and shaming should force perpetrators to reduce the severity of these ongoing atrocities in order to shift the spotlight, save their reputation, reframe their identity, maintain international legitimacy and domestic viability, and ease pressure placed on them by states or IOs. I test whether naming and shaming by NGOs, the media, and IOs significantly reduces the severity of the killing. Ordered logit analyses of ongoing genocides and politicides from 1976 to 2008 reveal that naming and shaming by Amnesty International, the Northern media, and the UNCHR have significant ameliorative effects on the severity of the most extreme atrocities. Transnational advocacy networks have the potential, through naming and shaming, to lead to life-saving changes in these murderous policies. Adapted from the source document.

Researchers have identified naming and shaming as a strategy used by the international community to reprimand state leaders for their repressive actions. Previous research indicates that there is variation in the success of this tactic. One reason for the heterogeneity in success is that leaders with an interest in repressing opposition but avoiding international condemnation have adapted their behavior, at least partially, to avoid naming and shaming. For instance, some states choose to create and utilize alternative security apparatuses, such as pro-government militias (PGMs), to carry out these repressive acts. Creating or aligning with PGMs allows leaders to distance themselves from the execution of violence while reaping the rewards of repression. This analysis explores this dynamic. In particular, I examine how naming and shaming by Amnesty International and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights influences the creation of PGMs to skirt future international condemnation by the offending state for all states from 1986 to 2000. I find that countries are more likely to create PGMs, especially informal PGMs, after their human rights abuses have been put in the spotlight by the international community.

Shame is an emotion that is the cornerstone of International Relations (IR) human rights scholarship but remains undertheorized from an explicitly emotional perspective. Given the dubious and unsettled efficacy of human rights "naming and shaming" campaigns, in this article, we outline the theoretical and methodological contours of a research agenda designed (1) to uncover the emotional content of naming and shaming and (2) to pay greater attention to how nonstate actors, especially human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), evoke and experience shame, thus engaging in "emotional diplomacy." Drawing on theories of emotions in IR and political psychology, we present a thicker account of shame by highlighting the individual and social origins of shame, discussing different varieties of shame, and by distinguishing between emotions that are often conflated with shame. We end with a discussion of the methodological tools suitable for pursuing this agenda, using examples of prominent human rights NGOs.

AbstractInternational 'naming and shaming' campaigns rely on domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) for information on local human rights conditions. To stop this flow of information, some governments restrict CSOs, for example by limiting their access to funding. Do such restrictions reduce international naming and shaming campaigns that rely on information from domestic CSOs? This article argues that on the one hand, restrictions may reduce CSOs' ability and motives to monitor local abuses. On the other hand, these organizations may mobilize against restrictions and find new ways of delivering information on human rights violations to international publics. Using a cross-national dataset and in-depth evidence from Egypt, the study finds that low numbers of restrictions trigger shaming by international non-governmental organizations. Yet once governments impose multiple types of restrictions, it becomes harder for CSOs to adapt, resulting in fewer international shaming campaigns.