Suchergebnisse

Die Arbeit zielt darauf ab, ein tieferes Verständnis darüber zu schaffen, wodurch die Verwendung von Performance-Informationen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung bestimmt wird. Ausgehend von einer Literaturrecherche zu den wichtigsten theoretischen Erklärungen für die Verwendung von Performance-Informationen wird ein Analyseraster entwickelt, anhand dessen der Grad der Informationsverwendung in der Verwaltung operationalisiert wird. Anschließend wird eine Fallstudie über die Berliner Sozialhilfeverwaltung durchgeführt. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass verschiedene Verwaltungsakteure desselben Politikbereichs heterogene Präferenzen besitzen und sich folglich auch ihre Erwartungen an Performance-Informationen unterscheiden: Da beispielsweise die Sozialämter in den Berliner Bezirken hauptsächlich im "operativen Tagesgeschäft" involviert sind, richtet sich ihr Hauptaugenmerk auf Kennzahlen, die diese Perspektive abdecken. Demgegenüber liegt etwa auf der Landesseite das Augenmerkt der Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen mehr auf den Kosteninformationen, da hier die Steuerung über die Globalsummenzuweisung an die Bezirke erfolgt. Es lassen sich verschiedene Indizien finden, um die Verwendung dieser Daten erklären zu können. Es wird festgestellt, dass der Schwerpunkt bislang eindimensional auf den Finanzdaten liegt. Die Verwendung lässt sich vor allem durch die subjektive politische Brisanz bestimmter Daten sowie durch die Einstellung der Führungskräfte gegenüber einer performance-basierten Steuerungsphilosophie erklären. ; While there is a vast number of (often prescriptive) literature on the organization of performance management systems and the potential perils and pitfalls, little is known about how performance management is actually "lived" in the context of the German public administration. This contribution sheds light on the question how performance information is used in the social welfare administration of the German capital city of Berlin. After narrowing down the most important terms and concepts, a literature review on theoretical aspects on performance information use is carried out in order to develop an analytical framework. Afterwards, performance information use is illustrated with a case study whereby a triangulation of methods (analysis of official documents and expert interviews) is applied. The findings are that first and foremost financial information is used. It depends on the administrative level (central financial administration, central social administration and administration in the city districts) which kind of performance information actually is used most often. A further result is that the variance in the use of performance information can be explained best with the factor of available knowledge – both on professional and on technical side. Due to the severe financial situation Berlin is facing and because of an overrepresentation of cost accountants with a background in business studies, a chance for policy change is seen only to a very limited extent.

AbstractA main rationale of performance information is to empower citizens to make informed decisions by presenting them with unambiguous information about the performance of institutions. However, even objective, clear, and unambiguous performance information is subject to biased interpretation depending on whether the information is consistent with the prior beliefs held by those who receive the information. Integrating the theory of motivated reasoning with the literature on performance information, the authors hypothesize that performance information that is inconsistent with prior beliefs is less likely to be interpreted correctly than belief‐consistent information. Using randomized survey experiments in which respondents were presented with quantitative performance data, the authors show that subjects systematically interpret performance information in ways that conform with their prior beliefs. The findings question the assumption that providing performance information automatically increases knowledge about government performance, let alone improves political decisions.

The article asks what governments can do to motivate citizens to engage in co-production. Based on the broader public administration literature we develop a general explanatory model of citizen co-production motivation. In our empirical study we focus especially on the impact of performance information on citizen co-production motivation. We test our model using data from a randomized survey experiment in which some but not all citizens were presented with information on local government school performance. The analysis shows that performance information influences citizen satisfaction with public school services and in turn also has some but weak impacts on their motivation to co-produce.

The article asks what governments can do to motivate citizens to engage in co-production. Based on the broader public administration literature we develop a general explanatory model of citizen co-production motivation. In our empirical study we focus especially on the impact of performance information on citizen co-production motivation. We test our model using data from a randomized survey experiment in which some but not all citizens were presented with information on local government school performance. The analysis shows that performance information influences citizen satisfaction with public school services and in turn also has some but weak impacts on their motivation to co-produce.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges federal agencies face in producing credible performance information, focusing on: (1) a governmentwide perspective on the credibility of agencies' performance information based on GAO's assessment of agencies' performance plans; (2) the challenges agencies face in producing credible performance data; and (3) how agencies can use their performance reports to address data credibility issues."

Performance information is crucial to effective management. Computer‐based information systems (CBIS) now play a significant role in the effective delivery of information to senior managers. Executive information systems (EIS) are emerging as popular tools to assist organisations in their strategic decision‐making processes. This trend has spread from the private to the public sector, and is now evident in Australian government organizationsThis article draws on the findings of a survey into the uses and benefits of CBIS and EIS, from a sample of Australian local government organisations. The study shows that lessons from the private sector are being heeded by system developers in public organisations, leading to successful EIS projects, or at least improved CBIS. The study indicates that EIS, which were originally developed for profit‐oriented private companies, are now seen as appropriate for many public sector organisations, providing effective delivery of information to senior managers. Survey results indicate that improved information systems give executives a more accurate picture of their organisation's performance and so provide support for improved strategic decision‐making. In addition, EIS are seen by respondents as offering significant benefits not only to managers but also to the rest of the organization.

Do citizens respond to policy-based information signals about government performance? Using multiple big datasets—which link for the first time large-scale school administrative records and individual validated voting behavior—I show that citizens react to exogenous school failure signals provided by No Child Left Behind. These signals cause a noticeable increase in turnout in local school board elections and increase the competitiveness of these races. Additionally, I present evidence that school failure signals cause citizens to vote with their feet by exiting failing schools, suggesting that exit plays an underexplored role in democratic accountability. However, performance signals elicit a response unequally, with failure primarily mobilizing high propensity citizens and encouraging exit among those who are white, affluent, and more likely to vote. Hence, while performance signals spur a response, they do so only for a select few, leaving many others behind.