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The comparative study of political polarization has been central to current debates on the global crisis of democracy. It has been built on uncertain conceptual foundations, though. Established uses of the concept lack a distinctive semantic core as multiple meanings compete against each other. On the basis of a broad reading of the comparative literature, I seek to circumscribe the use and reconstruct the core of political polarization as an instance of extraordinary democratic conflict. In a first step, I delineate the basic parameters of debate by distinguishing between cluster-analytic and conflict-analytic approaches and by specifying the generic type of political conflict that characterizes the polarization of democratic polities. In a second step, I argue for political intolerance as the defining trait of both ideological and social polarization. In a final step, I introduce a third, democratic dimension into the debate: the breakdown of basic democratic trust that leads actors to view their adversaries as "enemies of democracy." Such perceptions spell the end of democratic consolidation. When played among "democratic enemies," democracy stops being "the only game in town."

This thesis analyzes whether polarization is occurring in congressional committees, both the House of Representatives and the Senate standing committees, from 1970-2010. Sean Theirault's (2006) research of polarization on the floor of Congress is the foundation for identifying similar results in the standing committees. In addition, committees will be separated into three different types: regional, national, and power. These types are based on previous categorizing strategies by Glenn Parker and Suzanne Parker (1979), Keith Krebhiel (1990), Garry Young and Valerie Heitshusen (2003), and Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins (2007). The separation of committees is to find if some committees polarize more than others over time. DW-Nominate scores will be utilized to find the median of each political party in these committees. In addition, David Jones's (2001) theory of political gridlock presents the basis for analysis at the committee level to find if polarization is affecting the number of bills being reported out of each committee. THOMAS, an online branch of the Library of Congress, is the database that provides the bills reporting in and out of the committees. The result has provided evidence the congressional committees are becoming polarized throughout the time period in this analysis, especially in the House of Representatives. In addition, the higher the level of polarization in the committee, the lower the percentage of bills being reported back out of the committees. Polarization is occurring in the congressional committees and might be playing a bigger factor on politics within the committees than on the floors of Congress.

AbstractIn this study using household data, we aim to track the trends in regional income polarization in Turkey and focus on the extent of and trends in regional income disparity. With the help of classical and newly developed indexes and decomposition methodologies, we estimate the polarization level, temporal trends and the decomposition within and between regions of the western and eastern regions in Turkey. We also analysed the impact of being in the east or in the west on income polarization, controlling for other individual and household characteristics. To shed more light on the underlying mechanisms behind the polarization between two regions, we performed an ordered logit regression.

Partisan affective polarization, measured with feeling thermometer ratings, has increased gradually in the United States over a long period. This article describes how affective polarization and its composite parts, rival-party and own-party feelings, have changed over time. It identifies three analytically distinct processes: sorting, which entails a change in group composition; entrenchment, or an increasing gap between aligned and misaligned copartisans; and fortification, a general change in party feelings across partisan subgroups. While scholars often emphasize the importance of sorting, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis of ANES data shows that entrenchment and fortification explain a larger share of these thermometer trends. Furthermore, asymmetries between the two major parties exist: the lion's share of colder rival-party feelings among Republicans is centered on race, while Democrats' rival-party feelings grew similarly cold regardless of their race, religion, or ideological extremity. In addition, the gap in party feelings between well and poorly aligned Democrats appears to have decreased over time. Finally, data from two ANES panels suggest that the same partisans' feelings are growing colder, not that partisans with warm rival-party feelings are switching parties. These findings have important implications for the study of affective polarization and suggest avenues for future research.

Michael Wallace reports a very pronounced curvilinear relationship between a new measure of the polarization of the state system and warfare during 1815-1964. He suggests considerable caution when interpreting the results and urges replication. This is a replication. Given the original cautions, the additional ones made here, and the results of a reanalysis, the conclusion is clear. There is no relationship—linear, monotonic, or nonmonotonic—between polarization and the number, severity, or magnitude of international wars during the period 1815-1976.

We offer a theory of polarization as an optimal response to ambiguity. Suppose individual A's beliefs first-order stochastically dominate individual B's. They observe a common signal. They exhibit polarization if A's posterior dominates her prior and B's prior dominates her posterior. Given agreement on conditional signal likelihoods, we show that polarization is impossible under Bayesian updating or after observing extreme signals. However, we also show that polarization can arise after intermediate signals as ambiguity averse individuals implement their optimal prediction strategies. We explore when this polarization will occur and the logic underlying it. (JEL D81, D82, D83)

THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT WILL TAKE OFFICE IN 1997 FACES THE DIFFICULT TASK OF RE-ESTABLISHING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IT MUST DO SO AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASED POLARIZATION BETWEEN THE PROTESTANT COMMUNITY, WHICH LARGELY FAVORS CONTINUED UNION WITH BRITAIN, AND THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY, WHICH GENERALLY WANTS CLOSER LINKS WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC. INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ARE WAITING TO SEE IF A COMBINATION OF THE NEW WESTMINSTER GOVERNMENT, THE SECOND CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT FORMED AFTER THE REPUBLIC'S 1997 GENERAL ELECTIONS CAN PERSUADE THE PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WILL ENSURE LASTING PEACE.

AbstractThis article aims to explore the views of the Turkish elite on the state of polarization in Turkey. By identifying four political frames—namely, harmony, continuity/decline, conspiracy, and conflict—that selected Turkish political and civil society elites use in discussing the phenomenon of polarization in the country through their contributions to a workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews, the article finds that there is a considerable degree of polarization among the Turkish elite regarding their views on the presence of polarization in Turkey. Moreover, this overlaps with the divide between the government and the opposition in the country. An analysis of the justificatory arguments employed in constituting the aforementioned frames shows that, while those elites who deny the existence of polarization seek its absence in essentialist characteristics of society, in reductionist comparisons with history, or in internal/external enemies, those who acknowledge polarization's presence look for its roots in political and institutional factors and processes. The article highlights how, given the denial of polarization by the pro-government elite and the substantial gap between the two camps' justificatory narratives, the currently reported high rates of polarization in Turkey can, at best, be expected to remain as is in the near future, barring a radical change in political constellations.

Population changes are leading TX to becoming a majority-minority state, especially with the increase of Hispanics. TX has become a GOP stronghold, & the GOP is increasingly cohesive, & conservative, winning all statewide offices in both 1998 & 2002, plus control of the legislature in 2002. Religious fundamentalism is clearly evident in the GOP, but many distance themselves from the Christian Right. Ideological differences between the parties have increased, largely because Democrats are more liberal. GOP activists are upbeat, while Democrats appear dispirited, although less so than in 1991. 6 Tables, 7 References. Adapted from the source document.

Esteban & Ray formalize the argument that conflict is likely to be more intense when individuals in a society are divided into two clearly identifiable groups where differences within groups are considerably smaller than differences between groups. They show that such polarization increases conflict, and they introduce a theoretical basis for its quantitative measurement. This article applies Esteban & Ray's (ER) measure of polarization to two international distributions: the world income distribution and the distribution of political systems. The article discusses extensions of the ER measure that render it independent of the number of groups in the system, and investigates empirically whether any of the three types of polarization are associated with conflict in the form of militarized interstate disputes. The results are rather inconclusive, despite the fact that some of the micro-level regularities consistent with the polarization and conflict argument have solid support in previous studies.

This article provides a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the occurrence of conflict and its severity, and clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases. The analysis helps in ordering the various definitions, and in providing explanations for the empirical observations on the relationship between conflict, on the one hand, and polarization or fractionalization, on the other. The behaviour of players in conflict is described as a game, and equilibrium payoffs to all players are computed. The status quo is characterized by a set of political institutions that channel the different opposing interests and turn them into a collective decision, with a second set of payoffs. Groups rebel against the status quo political institution whenever the latter set of payoffs is dominated by the former. When society is highly polarized, the potential cost of rebellion is extremely high, and this cost may serve as the guarantor of peace. So, in highly polarized societies, the occurrence of open conflict should be rare but its intensity very severe, whenever it happens. On the other hand, highly fractionalized societies are prone to the occurrence of conflict, but its intensity will be moderate. It matters, therefore, whether one studies the intensity of conflict, conditional on conflict breaking out, or the likelihood that conflict actually occurs. Specifically, it is shown that: (i) measures of fractionalization and polarization tend to run in opposite directions, (ii) the onset of conflict critically depends on the political system in place, (iii) the occurrence of conflict and the intensity of conflict also tend to move in opposite directions, (iv) the relationship between polarization or fractionalization and conflict is non-monotonic and (v) the intensity of conflict depends positively on the degree of polarization.

"Gatekeeping, Technology, and Polarization" published on by Oxford University Press.