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Competition in political debate is not always sufficient to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Yet little is known about the factors that shape the persuasiveness of political arguments. In this article, I consider whether cognitive biases influence the perceived strength of political arguments, making some arguments more persuasive than others. Lessons from neurobiology and recent political psychology research on emotion lead to the expectation that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political arguments that evoke loss aversion via a fearful response—even in the face of a counterargument. Evidence from two experiments corroborates this expectation. I consider the normative implications of these empirical findings and potential avenues for future research.

Central to the best-known classification of Political Arguments is a distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles, upon which this paper bases alternative representations of the dynamics of political debate. These are discussed with specific reference to the possibility that want-regarding goals are served less well by British planning decisions than if ideal-regarding arguments were permitted. The representations provide a limited explanation of how such a situation might come about and be maintained. Initially they draw on Downs' models of voting and party competition, but explore alternatives because of: (1) the possibility that some assumptions needed for a Downsian representation cannot realistically be made about political arguments; and (2) the probability that factors other than verbal arguments enter into planning decisions.

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of 'reasonable rejection'. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice. Adapted from the source document.

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of 'reasonable rejection'. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice.

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of 'reasonable rejection'. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice. Adapted from the source document.

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of 'reasonable rejection'. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice.

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of 'reasonable rejection'. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice.

This essay develops my keynote address on the topic of creationism and science education, delivered at the conference Religions, Science and Technology in Cultural Contexts: Dynamics of Change , NTNU, Trondheim (2012). Debates over evolution in science education take place in a political context where liberal and conservative visions about the purpose of education come into conflict. Comparing the history of creationist pressures on science education in the United States and Turkey highlights the broad contours of these competing visions. The current conservative ascendancy in both countries, however, makes it difficult to reach any consensus on the practical benefits of including evolution in mass science education. This paper is one of a collection that originated in the IAHR Special Conference "Religions, Science and Technology in Cultural Contexts: Dynamics of Change", held at The Norwegian University of Science and Technology on March 1–2, 2012. For an overall introduction see the article by Ulrika Mårtensson, also published here.

AbstractTo stretch an argument means to make a political argument that is slightly (but not glaringly) invalid. I add to existing research, which focuses on the analysis of facts and stark binary views of validity by introducing the concept of argument-stretching, which identifies subtle violations of the validity of arguments. Using this conceptual foundation, I outline an impression-formation theory to explain the impact of argument-stretching on public opinion. I suggest that people spontaneously form negative impressions of stretched arguments, and that they add these impressions to a cumulative tally of satisfaction with the argument. Finally, people translate the negative effect of argument-stretching on their account satisfaction into reduced support for the politician who stretched the argument and the policy justified by it. I confirm the hypothesized direct effects of argument-stretching on policy support and politician support in three experimental studies, and I also find evidence for the mediating effect of account satisfaction.

Moral foundations theory posits that there are five foundations of morality from which Americans make political decisions: 1) Care/Harm, 2) Fairness/Reciprocity, 3) Ingroup/Loyalty, 4) Authority/Respect, and 5) Purity/Sanctity. Previous research finds that liberals primarily endorse foundations 1 and 2, while conservatives primarily endorse foundations 3, 4, and 5. To examine which moral values are most persuasive to liberals and conservatives, political arguments aimed at decreasing support for an issue were reframed to appeal to foundations 1 and 2, or to foundations 3, 4, and 5. Results indicate thatconservatives might be persuaded by arguments grounded in ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity values, but might not be persuaded by arguments grounded in care/harm, or fairness/reciprocity values. Liberals might be persuaded by arguments grounded in any of the five foundations. Moderates were the only group that showed no evidence of persuasion.