Democratic Peace – A Principal-Agent Approach
In: Ruhr Economic Paper No. 453
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In: Ruhr Economic Paper No. 453
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Working paper
In: The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 481-487
ISSN: 1680-4333
A review essay on a book by Jan-Erik Lane, Comparative Politics: The Principle-Agent Perspective (London: Routledge, 2007).
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption.
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In: European political science: EPS, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 481-487
ISSN: 1682-0983
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 339-352
ISSN: 1460-3667
The principal-agent framework is a rapidly developing approach to the analysis of contractual relationships within the private sector. We argue that it should be a promising approach to the analysis of public policy commitments as well. As a matter of fact, it allows the statement of a number of basic public policy problems in terms of an integrated framework. The making and implementation of public policy involve fundamental contractual problems referred to as asymmetric information, moral hazard, bounded rationality and adverse selection. The Niskanen bureau model is a principal-agent model, but its general result is much more limited than previously recognized, which may be shown by employing the same mathematical structure as Niskanen himself uses.
In: Voprosy Ekonomiki, Heft 3, S. 118-130
The point of the article is studying basic problems of the firm institutional theory - opportunism behavior problem in a principal-agent relationship system on the firm level. The article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of opportunism as economic category, definition of basic forms of inside opportunism and estimation of their influence on performance of firms of the Ural region. Factors that influence the level of opportunism are classified.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 8, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
We consider the problem of when to deliver the contract payoff, in a continuous-time principal-agent setting, in which the agent's effort is unobservable. The principal can design contracts of a simple form that induce the agent to ask for the payoff at the time of the principal's choosing. The optimal time of payment depends on the agent's and the principal's outside options. We develop a theory for general utility functions, while with CARA utilities we are able to specify conditions under which the optimal payment time is not random. However, in general, the optimal payment time is typically random. One illustrative application is the case when the agent can be fired, after having been paid a severance payment, and then replaced by another agent. The methodology we use is the stochastic maximum principle and its link to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Principal–Agent Analysis and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Representation, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 369-378
ISSN: 1749-4001
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In: Prinzipale und Agenten in Zwei-Ebenen-Spielen, S. 77-98
In: FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 628
SSRN
Working paper
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 481-487
ISSN: 1680-4333
In: Crime, law and social change: an interdisciplinary journal, Band 27, Heft 3-4, S. 207
ISSN: 0925-4994