Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decision-making process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extention of the QMV implies increasing preassure for the national policy-making. Benefits of this extention are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Articles offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithu­anian EU agenda in this respect.

This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decision-making process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extention of the QMV implies increasing preassure for the national policy-making. Benefits of this extention are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Aarticles offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithuanian EU agenda in this respect.

This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decision-making process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extention of the QMV implies increasing preassure for the national policy-making. Benefits of this extention are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Aarticles offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithuanian EU agenda in this respect.

This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decision-making process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extention of the QMV implies increasing preassure for the national policy-making. Benefits of this extention are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Aarticles offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithuanian EU agenda in this respect.

This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decision-making process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extention of the QMV implies increasing preassure for the national policy-making. Benefits of this extention are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Aarticles offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithuanian EU agenda in this respect.

Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.

The main objective of the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in 2003, was to reform the institutional structure of the EU in order to facilitate the accession of ten new member states, an undertaking which was previously planned to have been accomplished by the Amsterdam Treaty. Nice, however, failed to make significant progress […]
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