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Description based on no. 1; title from cover. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The debate over federal regulation has long been at the center of political contests. But surprisingly, the degree of agreement about regulation is considerable. No serious commentator denies that regulation is essential to ensuring well-functioning markets; protecting the health and safety of workers and families; and preventing fraud, corruption, and theft. Smart regulation is what makes cars safe to drive, lakes and rivers safe to swim in, and food safe to eat. At the same time, every serious commentator recognizes that poorly designed regulations can be detrimental; they can stack the deck in favor of special interests, prevent competition, and inhibit innovation.

The Internet poses grave new threats to information privacy. Search engines collect and store our search queries; websites track our online activity and then sell this information to others; and Internet Search Providers read the very packets of information through which we interact with the Internet. Yet the debate over how best to address this problem has ground to a halt, stuck between those who call for a vigorous legislative response and those who advocate for market solutions and self-regulation. In 1995, the European Union member states began to build a third approach into their data protection laws, one in which government and industry work together to develop and enforce privacy rules. This "co-regulatory" model could provide a way to transcend the frozen U.S. debate. But it has received little attention in the United States and almost no analysis in the law review literature. This Article identifies the threats to online privacy; evaluates whether the two main alternatives—government regulation, and the market/self-regulation—can adequately address these threats; surveys the theoretical literature on co-regulation; and, finally, describes and analyzes the statutes through which E.U. member states have implemented the new approach. It provides the first comprehensive analysis of these laws in a U.S. law review and develops an original way of categorizing and understanding them.

Lobbying regulation is a public policy approach capable of enriching participatory democracy while decreasing the dangers of corruption sometimes associated with lobbying. Here we present some insights into the state of lobbying regulations around the world today for scholars, practitioners and for society at large. We discuss the challenges in terms of defining lobbying and its regulation both academically and legislatively. We explore the broad context of lobbying regulation and the range of lobbying registers that have emerged over the years. The motivations for the introduction of lobbying regulations are also considered. The chapter finishes by comparing and classifying the robustness – the level of transparency and accountability – of contemporary lobbying regulations found in various jurisdictions. We will see from this chapter that lobbying regulations constitute part of the broader category of transparency regulations that aim to strengthen confidence in public institutions and enhance democratic accountability.

This response refutes point (i) in the Ayres comment's abstract. It argues that at its heart responsive regulation is about seeking strategies that will render regulation more relational when it counts. This is possible even in domains like tax compliance where 99 per cent of the routine regulatory action occurs without face-to-face encounter. A number of critiques in the special issue are embraced. While practitioners who reject civic republican values can learn from the responsive regulation literature, regulation conduces to tyranny if it is not explicit in a value commitment to reducing domination in the world. Concern that the republican elements of the argument have been insufficiently prominent in subsequent writing of the authors is therefore embraced. Freedom as non-domination requires a transnational regulatory vision for strategies with transnational leverage that reduce domination globally, not just nationally. A paradox advanced is that the largest regulatory errors of recent history on the global stage are best corrected by micro relational strategies invented with a global imagination for crafting micro-macro linkages. Adapted from the source document.