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Writers of very different persuasions have relied on arguments about self-ownership; in recent years, it is libertarians who have rested their political theory on self-ownership, but Grotian authoritarianism rested on similar foundations, and, even though it matters a good deal that Hegel did not adopt a full-blown theory of self-ownership, so did Hegel's liberal-conservatism. Whether the high tide of the idea has passed it is hard to say. One testimony to its popularity was the fact that G. A. Cohen for a time thought that the doctrine of self-ownership was so powerful that an egalitarian like himself had to come to terms with it; but he has since changed his mind. I have tackled the topic of self-ownership glancingly elsewhere, but have not hitherto tried to pull together the observations I have made in passing on those occasions. The view I have taken for granted and here defend is that self-ownership is not an illuminating notion—except in contexts that are unattractive to anyone of libertarian tastes.

Recently, Eric Mack, Edward Feser, and Daniel Russell have argued that self-ownership justifies a constraint on the use of property such that an owner's use of property may not severely negate the ability of others to interact with the world. Mack has labeled this constraint the self-ownership proviso. Adopting this proviso promises right-libertarians a way of avoiding the extreme implications of a no-proviso view, while maintaining a consistent and cohesive position (in contrast, arguably, to Nozick's understanding and endorsement of Locke's proviso). Nevertheless, I argue that self-ownership cannot ground the constraint on property use that Mack, Feser, and Russell think that it can.

SELF-OWNERSHIP IS THE MORAL PRINCIPLE THAT ONE OUGHT TO BE LEFT FREE TO DO WHATEVER ONE CHOOSES SO LONG AS NON-CONSENTING OTHER PERSONS ARE NOT THEREBY HARMED, IN SPECIFIED WAYS. THE PRINCIPLE IS FOUNDATIONAL FOR ONE TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM RUNNING FROM LOCKE TO NOZICK. THIS PAPER AIMS FIRST TO CLARIFY THIS PRINCIPLE, IN PART BY CONTRASTING IT WITH A KINDRED PRINCIPLE OF 'SELF-BENEFIT', AND SECONDLY TO DEVELOP ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTIFIED PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP. THESE IMPLICATIONS ARE MORE MEAGRE THAN IS USUALLY SUPPOSED. THE PRINCIPLE IS INDETERMINATE IN WAYS THAT UNDERMINE ITS CLAIM TO ADEQUACY. FINALLY, FURTHER REASONS FOR REJECTING THE SELF-OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE ARE SUGGESTED.

Self-ownership is the moral principle that one ought to be left free to do whatever one chooses so long as non-consenting other persons are not thereby harmed, in specified ways. The principle is foundational for one tradition of political liberalism running from Locke to Nozick. This paper aims first to clarify this principle, in part by contrasting it with a kindred principle of 'self-benefit', and secondly to develop its implications for justified private property ownership. These implications are more meagre than is usually supposed. The principle is indeterminate in ways that undermine its claim to adequacy. Finally, further reasons for rejecting the self-ownership principle are suggested.

1. The present paper is a continuation of my "Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality," which began with a description of the political philosophy of Robert Nozick. I contended in that essay that the foundational claim of Nozick's philosophy is the thesis of self-ownership, which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, consequently, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others. To be sure, he may not harm others, and he may, if necessary, be forced not to harm them, but he should never be forced to help them, as people are in fact forced to help others, according to Nozick, by redistributive taxation. (Nozick recognizes that an unhelping person may qualify as unpleasant or even, under certain conditions, as immoral. The self-ownership thesis says that people should be free to live their lives as they choose, but it does not say that how they choose to live them is beyond criticism.)

AbstractLeft-libertarianism is a version of Lockean libertarianism that combines the idea that each person is the full rightful owner of herself and the idea that each person should have the right to own a roughly equal amount of the world's resources. This essay argues against left-libertarianism. The specific target is an interesting form of left-libertarianism proposed by Michael Otsuka that is especially stringent in its equal world ownership claim. One criticism advanced is that there is more tension than Otsuka acknowledges between private ownership of self and equal ownership of the world. This emerges once one notices that self-ownership should not be conceived merely in a thin, formal way but also as a thicker substantive insistence on wide individual freedom. A second criticism is that in other respects the formal idea of self-ownership that Otsuka and other left-libertarians embrace is an extreme doctrine that merits rejection.

Abstract:I argue that agent-centered options to favor and sacrifice one's own interests are grounded in a particular aspect of self-ownership. Because you own your interests, you are entitled to a say over how they are used. That is, whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice. This is not the only plausible argument for agent-centered options. But it has some virtues that other arguments lack.

The principle is foundational for tradition of liberalism running from Locke to Nozick. Aims to clarify the principle, in part by contrasting it with a kindred principle of 'self-benefit', and to develop its implications for justified private property ownership. Implications are more meagre than is usually supposed. The principle is indeterminate in ways that undermine its claim to adequacy. (Abstract amended)

A question that has recently attracted considerable attention is this:What is the nature and significance of thenormativerelationship a person bears to herself (where the self is understood to include the whole embodied person)?On one view, it is held that persons areself-owners: as Locke put it in one of the more famous passages in theSecond Treatise:[E]very man has apropertyin his ownperson: this no body has any right to but himself. Thelabourof his body, and theworkof his hands, we may say, are properly his.

Locke's defense of private property rights includes what is called a proviso— "the Lockean proviso"—and some have argued that in terms of it the right to private property can have various exceptions and it may not even be unjust to redistribute wealth that is privately owned. I argue that this cannot be right because it would imply that one's right to life could also have various exceptions, so anyone's life (and labor) could be subject to conscription if some would need it badly enough. Since this could amount to enslavement and involuntary servitude, it would be morally and legally unacceptable.