Suchergebnisse

Examines the history of political parties in Mexico and political change.

The governing party in Malaysia, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), has operated a single-party-dominant regime since the country's independence in 1957. This type of regime lies between closed authoritarian systems on one side, and fully competitive, multi-party systems on the other. Using some insights offered by T. J. Pempel, this report documents the ways in which the UMNO has se national agendas, bargained with coalition partners, recreated followings and mobilized voters in order to perpetuate its dominance, even while respecting at least semi-democratic procedures. The report considers challenges to this political dominance, as well as the ways in which the UMNO has met them over time.

One of the more positive international trends as of late has been the transformation of several countries from authoritarian-based dictatorships and single party systems into multi-party democracies characterized by peaceful political transitions. In this volume, a group of experts are gathered to analyse this progression on a comparative level. The scholars examine previously right-wing regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, former Communist states in Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and single party-dominant democracies in Italy, Japan, Mexico, and Israel. The essays reveal how the dramatic collapse of the USSR functioned as a crucial catalyst in allowing pent-up domestic pressures for change to emerge in a less charged international environment. In addition, the chapters study the historical and current evolution of these countries, focusing on their success in developing long-term pluralistic structures, and gauging whether these recent trends are more overnight fads than long lasting advancements.

'Cognitive locks' are ideational path dependencies in policy making (Blyth, 2001). This article argues that one source of cognitive locks is the presence of single party dominant regimes. Single party dominant regimes exist where a single party has managed to control the process of executive formation for an unusually long period of time. Because of their long tenure in executive office, dominant parties are often in positions to implement strong cognitive locks on their political societies. Not all cognitive locks are the same, however. Rather, how the dominant party behaved, either as a 'distributional coalition' or as an 'encompassing organization' (Olson, 1982) and how it subsequently incorporated 'voice' (Hirschman, 1970) to accommodate multiple interests, strongly influence the scope of the dominant party's cognitive lock. These observations are utilized in two brief case illustrations derived from well-known cases of single party dominance.

Leading theories of transitions from single-party dominant systems begin with economic crisis, the party's loss of patronage resources, and elite-level defections. The multiparty elections that are then held exert no independent effect, but instead register neutrally the party's decline and the democratization of politics. This article, however, shifts attention from the dominant party to citizens and elections in noncrisis conditions. It argues that citizens assess on key dimensions the dominant party's legitimacy or worthiness of support. Further, where they grow critical of its policy outputs, they scrutinize more closely its conformity to procedures. And as they anticipate that their voting preferences will be thwarted by electoral manipulations, they vote in protest, perhaps producing a "liberalizing electoral outcome." Elections, then, do not simply indicate the dominant party's decline. By deepening alienation, they help citizens to cause it. Analysis is set in Malaysia, long an exemplar of single-party dominance, but recently a case in which the government was dealt a striking electoral setback.

Leading theories of transitions from single-party dominant systems begin with economic crisis, the party's loss of patronage resources, and elite-level defections. The multiparty elections that are then held exert no independent effect, but instead register neutrally the party's decline and the democratization of politics. This paper, however, shifts attention from the dominant party to citizens and elections in non-crisis conditions. It argues that on key dimensions citizens assess the dominant party's legitimacy or worthiness of support. Further, where they grow critical of its policy outputs, they scrutinize more closely its conformity to procedures. And as they anticipate that their voting preferences will be thwarted by electoral manipulations, they vote in protest, perhaps producing a "liberalizing electoral outcome." Elections, then, do not simply indicate the dominant party's decline. By deepening alienation, they help citizens to cause it. Analysis is set in Malaysia, long an exemplar of single-party dominance, but recently a case in which the government was dealt a striking electoral setback. (JCSA/GIGA)

Leading theories of transitions from single-party dominant systems begin with economic crisis, the party's loss of patronage resources, and elite-level defections. The multiparty elections that are then held exert no independent effect, but instead register neutrally the party's decline and the democratization of politics. This paper, however, shifts attention from the dominant party to citizens and elections in non-crisis conditions. It argues that on key dimensions citizens assess the dominant party's legitimacy or worthiness of support. Further, where they grow critical of its policy outputs, they scrutinize more closely its conformity to procedures. And as they anticipate that their voting preferences will be thwarted by electoral manipulations, they vote in protest, perhaps producing a liberalizing electoral outcome. Elections, then, do not simply indicate the dominant party's decline. By deepening alienation, they help citizens to cause it. Analysis is set in Malaysia, long an exemplar of single-party dominance, but recently a case in which the government was dealt a striking electoral setback. Adapted from the source document.

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data from Vietnam, we demonstrate that single‐party regimes, in particular, forsake information on overall regime support and strength of opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.

In recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasized the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the 'perils' facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). We observe unipartisan governments just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single-party cabinets by minority presidents? We employ cross-sectional time-series analysis to address this question. We test hypotheses relating to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non-formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.

AbstractIn recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasised the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the 'perils' facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratisation in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). Unipartisan governments are observed just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single‐party cabinets by minority presidents? Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis is employed to address this question. Hypotheses are tested that relate to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non‐formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.

Researchers have demonstrated that local institutional contexts such as organizational networks and leadership cohesion explain the lasting support across developing countries for elite parties originating from former authoritarian regimes. But variation in the emergence of party competition in rural underprivileged populations that were once strong supporters of the regime party requires a thorough examination of local power structures. Analysis of aboriginal societies in Taiwan, based on interviews and ethnographic research, demonstrates that the type of authority structure guides how power relations organize communities and how local elites attain their status. In indigenous communities where inherited hierarchy determines social prestige, chiefs and headmen have retained control of contemporary politics. In contrast, in villages without preexisting hierarchies, big men need to build political influence on personal grounds, which creates room for contestation and the emergence of internal competition for political allegiance. Regression analyses provide further support for these findings and imply that authority structures mediate local communities' linkage with the party and the state during democratization.