Suchergebnisse

If the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic & political models, then K. J. Arrow's (Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, 1963) impossibility theorem for social welfare function continues to be valid. Specifically, if the space of alternatives is R****, n(greater than or equal to) 3, where each dimension represents a different public good, & if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, & strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, & nondictatorship. 1 Figure. HA.

Using the Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) as a micro foundation, we create a decomposable index to evaluate the unfairness of representation in electoral districts. Using this index, we decompose the factors of such unfairness into apportionment and districting. We explore the situations of New Zealand, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada. We then provide an integer solution that minimizes the index of the apportionment, which can be obtained by the divisor method (Balinski and Young, 1982) using a logarithmic mean. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Using the Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) as a micro foundation, we create a decomposable index to evaluate the unfairness of representation in electoral districts. Using this index, we decompose the factors of such unfairness into apportionment and districting. We explore the situations of New Zealand, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada. We then provide an integer solution that minimizes the index of the apportionment, which can be obtained by the divisor method (Balinski and Young, 1982) using a logarithmic mean.