Suchergebnisse

For too long, considerations of state formation in India have divided on the colonial threshold of history, and the British regime in the subcontinent has been treated as completely different from all prior states. The most important reason for this seems to be that the historiography of the British empire was created by those who ruled India; it was therefore a kind of trophy of domination. Other reasons include the vast and accessible corpus of records on the creation of the British colonial state, the recency of its emergence, and the foundational character of the colonial state for the independent states of the subcontinent. Continuity of the British colonial state with its predecessors is acknowledged only in the case of the Mughals owing, in part, to the prolonged process of separation of the Company's government from its Mughal imperial cover before the Mutiny. Thus, long after they had ceased as a governing regime, the Mughals were considered by contemporaries and subsequently by historians to be the old regime of India.

This paper is an attempt to tackle the theory of war as a tool of state formation. Though I use the tools of my discipline to refute the theory in its contemporary manifestation, the paper is motivated by a theological belief regarding the sinfulness and depravity of war. I begin the paper by thoroughly exploring the benefits of strong states from a comparative historical perspective, since this has been critical to the theory's revival. Then I will discuss the theory that war makes strong states, looking first at the work of Charles Tilly, the best-known theorist in the area of European state formation, then at Jeffrey Herbst's application and expansion of the Tilly thesis in the African context. In the second section of the paper, I will articulate the Mennonite perspective regarding both war and the state and discuss why the idea of war as a tool of state formation is fundamentally problematic from a Christian and Mennonite perspective.1 I will also justify a rejection of the revival of the war and state formation theory from the viewpoint of comparative political science.

Contrasted are the social & political structures of India & Pakistan. While these countries share a heritage of subjugation to the British & to previous Mughal rulers, their present forms are very different: Pakistan since 1947 has been controlled by the military, whereas India has developed a stable government of participatory democracy. This difference is attributed to the lack of an independent industrial capitalist class & the presence of a strong landed class in the northwestern region of "British India." The military bureaucracy that has shaped modern Pakistan is examined in its historical formation, & the historic weakness of the commercial structure is analyzed. D. Dunseath.

Governments in developed nations today collect high tax revenues and spend vast amounts on security, regulation, infrastructure, and social programs. Yet developed nations were in no way born with effective state institutions. What explains the emergence of the modern state? And, why did capable states first form historically in Western Europe? Proper answers to these questions are key to our understanding of modern forms of governance, including parliamentary democracy.

Armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine has been a rallying cry of the Palestinian national movement since its emergence in the 1960s, but its results have never been more than marginal. Instead, military groups have served a primarily political function, offering Palestinians in the diaspora organizational structures for political expression and state building. However, the nature of the PLO as an exile entity attempting to unite a disparate diaspora has necessarily resulted in an authoritarian leadership wary of the administrative, civilian, and social organizations needed to form a state. Ultimately, the political patterns that developed during the armed struggle impede as much as aid the realization of an independent Palestinian state.

The formation of the Riau Islands Province (RIP) in 2002 is argued to be part of a broader trend of pemekaran (blossoming) that saw the creation of seven new provinces and more than 100 new districts throughout Indonesia after the fall of the New Order. This article argues that the main motivation for these subnational movements was a combination of rational interests and cultural sentiments. In the case of RIP, rational interests involved struggles over unfair distribution of power and resources, including the way development under the control of (mainland) Riau Province had been detrimental to the peripheral and archipelagic people of Riau Islands. Cultural sentiments also played an important role, as the people of the Riau Islands considered themselves as "archipelagic Malays" and heirs of the great Malay-maritime empires of the past, as opposed to "mainland Malays" who were mostly farmers. Since becoming its own province, RIP has been performing well and has surpassed Riau, the "parent" province, in multiple aspects including human development, poverty alleviation, and government administration. Ultimately, the formation of RIP is argued to be a natural process in a large, diverse, and decentralizing country like Indonesia, where cultural identities are being reasserted and local autonomies re-negotiated. Despite the usual hiccups such as capacity gaps and corruption, the formation of the Province has been positive in achieving a balance between keeping the country intact while allowing local stakeholders a substantial level of autonomy.