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Indonesia has been actively seeking to improve its status and has gradually developed a trinity of national–regional–world status, consisting of independent status, regional leadership status and middle power status. In the context of China–US strategic competition, Indonesia is more sensitive to the consolidation and pursuit of its status. In response, Indonesia not only inherits the traditional diplomatic policy of "rowing between two rocks" and refuses to take sides between China and the US, but also tries to lead the ASEAN countries to develop a "third way" in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper analyzes Indonesia's perception of and response to China–US strategic competition from the perspective of status politics, arguing that status politics plays a key role as the underlying logic of Indonesia's "free and active" diplomacy — maintaining close relations with both China and the United States at the material level can enhance Indonesia's economic and military status, and maintaining autonomy at the social level can gain international recognition of its status.

Introduction -- Defining Power and Influence -- Framework for Assessing Chinese Influence -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Inputs -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Intervening Factors -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Outputs -- Case Studies of Chinese Influence-Seeking -- Historical Influence Case: Finland in the Cold War -- Overall Findings and Implications.

This volume has three parts: the first focuses on cyberspace itself; the second on some of the major forms of malevolence or threats that have become one of its defining characteristics; and the third on possible responses to these threats. One of the most significant features of cyberspace, however, is that it is becoming a risky place for the entire spectrum of users: nation-states, nongovernmental and transnational organizations, commercial enterprises, and individuals. Yet it is a space of opportunities—for benevolent, neutral, and malevolent actors. Moreover, the authors identify and assess the challenges and threats to security that can arise in cyberspace because of its unique nature. In the final section, the authors discuss a variety of responses, with some suggesting that the most favored options being pursued by the United States are poorly conceived and ill-suited to the tasks at hand. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1004/thumbnail.jpg

Abstract
Despite much attention on "strategic competition" between the USA and China following the declaration of China as America's "strategic competitor," the concept's meanings, origins, as well as different analytical and political functions remain poorly understood. The present article fills this lacuna by conducting a conceptual study of "strategic competition" that traces the concept and its evolution over time. The article finds that there was never a singular or universally applicable meaning of "strategic competition". When the concept first appeared during the détente era, politicians and scholars referred to the reality of needing to curtail "strategic competition" between the USA and the Soviet Union, and seek cooperative relations, such as through arms reduction treaties. In the late 1990s, the label "strategic competitor" became central to political efforts by the Bush administration to justify their pursuit of military power, deterrence, and American hegemony. Since the Trump administration in the late 2010s, "strategic competition" became a goal to pursue in US-China relations rather than something to be managed. Not recognizing the historical evolution of the term and its many different variations is analytically poor and politically dangerous, and impedes the development of a modus vivendi between the two great powers.

This book examines the nature and consequences of strategic competition between the US and China, which affects the global security landscape and the emerging security architecture across the broader Asia-Pacific region. The author illustrates the evolution of Sino-US security interactions from the anti-Soviet alliance, to temporary marginalization, to eventual strategic competition and examines cases that could potentially escalate into greater conflicts. The analysis offers tantalizing glimpses into both the dangers and promising opportunities presented by this strategic fork in the road, m

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy notes that the United States faces "an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations." In the ensuing months, much has been made of the security-related aspects of this return to great power competition — including Donald Trump's role in the decline of the existing arms control architecture, responses to Russia's annexation of Ukraine, and China's use of subconventional — or "gray zone" — military operations in the South China Sea. What this analysis tends to miss, however, are the economic dimensions of strategic competition. To address the question of how insights from international political economy and security studies can be usefully combined to examine strategic competition, we examine how economic statecraft increasingly takes the form of economic policy beyond sanctions regimes. We argue that economic statecraft has become an increasingly central aspect of geostrategic consideration and consider how economic statecraft is being transformed in the current era.