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Abstract Tax planning is one example of the use of regulatory loopholes. On the other hand for the Fiscal Authority, carrying out tax avoidance practices as a form of tax planning will have a negative effect on the Government and, for this reason, the Government makes fiscal corrections as its remedial. Many also hide their assets in tax heavens countries. This is so that the assets they have are not taxed. Tax heavens countries are usually small countries that apply very low taxes, some even do not impose taxes at all. However, the government has prepared an Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) data exchange plan that occurs in 2018, certainly will make tax evaders unable to run away from the pursuit of the tax authorities, even if they have to flee to tax heavens countries (tax heavens). Keywords: tax heavens, tax planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) Abstrak Perencanaan pajak adalah salah satu contoh penggunaan celah peraturan. Pada sisi lain bagi Otoritas Fiskal, melakukan praktik penghindaran pajak sebagai bentuk perencanaan pajak akan membawa efek negatif bagi Pemerintah dan, untuk itulah, Pemerintah melakukan koreksi fiskal sebagai remedialnya. Banyak juga yang menyembunyikan asetnya di negara-negara tax heavens. Hal ini bertujuan agar aset yang mereka punya tidak terkena pajak. Negara tax heavens biasanya merupakan negara kecil yang menerapkan pajak yang sangat rendah, bahkan ada yang tidak mengenakan pajak sama sekali. Namun, pemerintah telah menyiapkan Rencana pertukaran informasi data perbankan secara otomatis (Automatic Exchange of Information/AEoI) yang terjadi pada 2018, dipastikan akan membuat para pengemplang pajak tidak akan bisa lari dari kejaran otoritas pajak, sekalipun mereka harus kabur ke negara surga pajak (tax heavens). Kata kunci: Tax Heavens, Tax Planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI)

Household-specific growth rates of the tax base imply that the timing of tax collections determines the distribution of tax burdens and wealth across households. Changes in financial policy do not only shift taxes across generations, but also within cohorts. Insitutional deficit constraints settle tax shifting conflicts in favor of individuals with high income growth. With distortionary taxes, policy makers trade off the wealth effects of financial policy and the efficiency cost of household-specific deadweight burdens. I apply the incidence analysis of financial policy to two examples: The financing of the German unifications, and the timing of tax collections over the U.S. business cycle.

The watchword of the policy feedbacks approach to political analysis – that politics shapes policy – suggests that the way in which taxes are designed may influence how the public feels about various levies: their support for those taxes, their perceptions of fairness, and their willingness to pay them. Hypotheses about the design features of different taxes Americans pay, including tax regressivity or progressivity, the manner in which they are exacted, their actual and perceived costs, and the visibility and desirability of resulting benefits, are examined with closed- and open-ended survey data. Taxes with more attractive design features are generally more positively perceived by the public. Open-ended responses help explain the fairness perceptions and popularity of several taxes, including a widespread belief that estate taxes constitute "double taxation" and the considerable embrace of the notion that "everyone pays" state sales tax (as opposed to the federal income tax, where some rich and poor people "get away" without paying). These results help explain why some taxes invite more ire than others.

China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China's fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China's emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents.