Suchergebnisse

The development of a vaccine for COVID-19 presented hope for a way out of the global crisis caused by the virus. However, a potential barrier may be vaccine hesitancy, and identifying the factors that affect it is critical, especially concerning a new vaccine technology. The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that effects vaccine hesitancy by using a holistic view. The data were collected from 504 people in December 2020, 3 days before the vaccine operation started in Israel. The analysis included three categories of determinants: (1) contextual influences; (2) health records; and (3) perceived health attitudes. The results indicate that different sets of variables affect willingness to accept the vaccine among the whole spectrum of the vaccine-hesitant and the undecided subsample. In the full sample, gender, age, income, influenza vaccine, perceived trust, perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers affected vaccine acceptance. The perceived level of suffering from COVID-19 was associated with willingness to vaccinate, and when religious beliefs increased, the intention to vaccinate decreased. For the undecided subsample, the factors included gender, influenza vaccine, trust in the vaccine company, and perceived vaccine benefits and barriers. The results suggest that efforts of governments and health institutions should focus on women and highlight the vaccine as an opportunity to "go back to normal" without worries. Those results will help implement vaccine strategy in the following cases: if infant vaccination is pursued and if emergency vaccines or new vaccine technologies emerge for another pandemic as well.

AbstractWe study different contract mechanisms between a vaccine manufacturer (VM) and a vaccine procurement agency (VPA) to coordinate the two‐peak influenza vaccine supply chain. Motivated by the prevalent industry contracts, we study two hybrid contracts under budget constraints, which allow flexibility in deciding the contractual parameters between the VM and the VPA. We consider the case of both private (for‐profit) and public (not‐for‐profit) VPA and the impact of different objectives, such as profit and vaccine coverage, on contract choice. We show that for public VPAs or for private VPAs with low available budget, both hybrid contracts are equally preferred by VM and VPA. However, under high budget, the preferences of VPA and VM will differ. We then extend our models to consider the case of both private and public VPA coexisting in the market under both budget and vaccine availability constraints. Contrary to intuition, we find that the vaccine coverage provided by the public VPA is not always higher than the vaccine coverage provided by the private VPA, with the private VPA providing greater vaccine coverage under conditions of low budget and low vaccine availability. Our findings have important policy implications for governments of emerging economies with limited budget for mass vaccination programs.

BACKGROUND: In 2021, donor countries, the pharmaceutical industry, and the COVAX initiative promoted vaccine donation or "dose-sharing" as a main solution to the inequitable global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX positioned itself as a global vaccine-sharing hub that promised to share doses "equitably, effectively and transparently," according to rational criteria overseen by independent scientists. This article provides a critical analysis of the principles and practice of "dose-sharing," showing how it reveals the politics at play within COVAX. RESULTS: Donated doses were an important source of COVAX's vaccine supply in 2021, accounting for 60% of the doses the initiative delivered (543 million out of 910 million). However, donations could not compensate fully for COVAX's persistent procurement struggles: it delivered less than half of the two billion doses it originally projected for 2021, a fraction of the 9.25 billion doses that were administered globally in 2021. Donor countries and vaccine manufacturers systematically broke COVAX's principles for maximizing the impact of dose-sharing, delivering doses late, in smaller quantities than promised, and in ad hoc ways that made roll-out in recipient countries difficult. Some donors even earmarked doses for specific recipients, complicating and potentially undermining COVAX's equitable allocation mechanism. CONCLUSIONS: COVAX's pivot from global vaccine procurement mechanism to dose-sharing hub can be seen as a "win-win-win" solution for COVAX itself (who could claim success by having access to more doses), for donor countries (who could rebrand themselves as charitable donors rather than "vaccine hoarders"), and for the pharmaceutical industry (maintaining the status quo on intellectual property rights and protecting their commercial interests). Although dose-sharing helped COVAX's vaccine delivery, its impact was undermined by donors' and industry's pursuit of national security, diplomatic and commercial interests, which COVAX largely accommodated. ...

Background In 2021, donor countries, the pharmaceutical industry, and the COVAX initiative promoted vaccine donation or "dose-sharing" as a main solution to the inequitable global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX positioned itself as a global vaccine-sharing hub that promised to share doses "equitably, effectively and transparently," according to rational criteria overseen by independent scientists. This article provides a critical analysis of the principles and practice of "dose-sharing," showing how it reveals the politics at play within COVAX. Results Donated doses were an important source of COVAX's vaccine supply in 2021, accounting for 60% of the doses the initiative delivered (543 million out of 910 million). However, donations could not compensate fully for COVAX's persistent procurement struggles: it delivered less than half of the two billion doses it originally projected for 2021, a fraction of the 9.25 billion doses that were administered globally in 2021. Donor countries and vaccine manufacturers systematically broke COVAX's principles for maximizing the impact of dose-sharing, delivering doses late, in smaller quantities than promised, and in ad hoc ways that made roll-out in recipient countries difficult. Some donors even earmarked doses for specific recipients, complicating and potentially undermining COVAX's equitable allocation mechanism. Conclusions COVAX's pivot from global vaccine procurement mechanism to dose-sharing hub can be seen as a "win-win-win" solution for COVAX itself (who could claim success by having access to more doses), for donor countries (who could rebrand themselves as charitable donors rather than "vaccine hoarders"), and for the pharmaceutical industry (maintaining the status quo on intellectual property rights and protecting their commercial interests). Although dose-sharing helped COVAX's vaccine delivery, its impact was undermined by donors' and industry's pursuit of national security, diplomatic and commercial interests, which COVAX largely accommodated. The lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms within COVAX's overly complex governance structure as a global public-private partnership enabled these practices.

In this paper legal prerequisites for vaccine licensure in Croatia are discussed. The Croatian legislation concerning vaccine licensing, marketing authorisation and utilization is reviewed. The procedures for including a vaccine into the Mandatory Childhood Vaccination Programme are also discussed with focus on Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines. Non-obligatory vaccination recommendations are given when according to professional opinion; vaccination is beneficial for the vaccinee. There is little doubt that HPV vaccines should be recommended for preadolescent girls in Croatia. However, reaching a decision on its possible introduction into the Childhood Vaccination Programme will require careful consideration of the larger picture and a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of a mandatory vaccination against other competing public health priorities.