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Price Determination and Vertical Restraints: Antitrust & IP Interface
SSRN
Boundaries between Unilateral and Multilateral Conducts in Vertical Restraints
In: ECLR: European Competition Law Review, 29 10: 600-607
SSRN
System failure: Vertical restraints and EC competition law
In: Common market law review, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 973-990
ISSN: 0165-0750
On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Note
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 293
ISSN: 1756-2171
System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC competition law
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 973-989
ISSN: 0165-0750
Manufacturers' Promotional Allowances, Free Riders and Vertical Restraints
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 383-411
ISSN: 1930-7969
The effect of tariffs in markets with vertical restraints
In: Journal of international economics, Band 26, Heft 1-2, S. 99-117
ISSN: 0022-1996
On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Reply
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 298
ISSN: 1756-2171
The Free Rider Rationale and Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered
In: 56 Antitrust Law Journal 1987
SSRN
Vertical Restraints: The European Part of the Policy Failure
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 167-185
ISSN: 1930-7969
This article advances several reasons why EU competition policy on vertical restraints has been a failure. First, the distinction between price and nonprice restraints is inconsistent, since the economic effects of both practices are similar. Second, EU competition law creates a number of inefficiencies that cause a negative impact on social welfare; an example is the ban on absolute territorial protection that does not allow a full protection from free-riding. Third, it is doubtful that the inefficiencies of EU competition law can be justified by the market integration goal, since the rules may turn out to be ineffective in reaching this objective. Fourth, EU competition law on vertical restraints has created negative side effects: it has put an end to experimentation and innovation of competition rules at the member-state level and induced private interests groups to spend a lot of effort in lobbying national regulators. The example of resale price maintenance for books serves as an illustration of the latter problem. Several of the above pitfalls have been indicated by Richard Markovits in his treatise on U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law. These criticisms are supported in this paper and further expanded by a discussion of additional errors that have made the EU competition rules on vertical restraints a policy failure.
Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines provide guidance?
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 609-642
ISSN: 1930-7969
Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China's Antitrust Enforcement
In: Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, 51(2): 193-215.
SSRN
Reviewing vertical restraints in Europe: reform, key issues and national enforcement
In: Concurrences
Includes bibliographical references
Antitrust Policy and the Republican Congress: Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 15-41
ISSN: 1930-7969