Suchergebnisse

"Am 23. Januar 2012 werden in Brüssel die EU-Außenminister über eine neue Sanktionsrunde gegen den Iran entscheiden. Anlass ist der seit 2003 bestehende Streit über die nuklearen Aktivitäten der Islamischen Republik. Der im November 2011 veröffentlichte jüngste Bericht der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde (IAEA) über die nuklearen Aktivitäten der Islamischen Republik Iran ist deutlicher ausgefallen als je zuvor. Nach den aktuellen Erkenntnissen der IAEA ist es nicht auszuschließen, dass Iran neben dem zivilen Atomprogramm auch die Forschung und Entwicklung eines militärischen Atomprogramms vorantreibt. Viele Indizien sprechen dafür, dass Teheran sich zumindest die Option auf eine Nuklearwaffe sichern möchte. Die Position der deutschen Bundesregierung lautet, eine Atommacht Iran sei inakzeptabel. Was jedoch passiert, wenn weder Sanktionen greifen noch Militärschläge eine iranische Nuklearwaffenoption verhindern oder entscheidend verzögern können? Dann müssen Europa und die USA eine Position gegenüber einer virtuellen oder einer De-facto-Atommacht Iran finden." (Autorenreferat)

It is no coincidence that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos, is unanimously considered one of the most competent diplomats in Europe. This incomparable expert in the Israel-Palestine conflict (he was the EU's Middle East representative for seven years) is also one of the architects of the Ibero-American Community, whose aim is to bring Spain & Latin America closer together. Moratinos is also a close observer of North Africa (and enthusiastically supports French President Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal for a Mediterranean Union), & a key player in the Alliance of Civilizations, a UN project aiming for a rapprochement between the West & the Muslim world. This faithful supporter of Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero spells out his vision of the challenges in the years to come for his country & for Europe. Those with an interest in Europe would do well to pay heed. Adapted from the source document.

The difficulties Africa is going through are illustrated in the gap between its growing dependence on international authorities and the continual weakening of the means at its disposal to make it self heard in these bodies. For twenty years, Africa was caught up in the North-South dialogue. In the 1980s, the breaking-off of the dialogue and the breaking-up of the Third World deprived it of means for collective action. The distinction between North Africa and Black Africa has grown more pronounced as first the globalization of markets and then the changes in East-West relations caused the latter to fall victim to a process of double marginalization. International organizations consider Subsaharan Africa to be a "welfare case" and reserve special treatment for it, without loosening the external constraints bearing down on its economy. In these conditions, a consensus seems to be developing which holds that multilateral diplomacy is not what's most important for Africa and that the real question is to know how to involve the entire population in the development process. There is thus a return to the overall issue of grass root organizations and essential needs as outlined in the 1970s.