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DINÂMIA'CET-WP - Working papers com arbitragem científica ; This paper provides an empirical assessment of the effects of financialisation on private consumption using panel data for all 28 European Union countries from 1995 to 2015. According to the post Keynesian literature, financialisation exerts two contradictory effects on private consumption, notably a negative one linked to the fall of households' labour income and a positive one related to the increase of households' (financial and housing) wealth. A private consumption equation was estimated by including three variables linked to financialisation (labour income, financial wealth and housing wealth) and five additional control variables (lagged private consumption, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate). Our results confirm that financialisation has been detrimental to private consumption in the EU countries as a whole, and more specifically in the Euro area countries, as the beneficial wealth effect has not been sufficient to compensate for the prejudicial income effect. The fall of households' labour income has even been the highest constraint on private consumption in the Euro area countries ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper analyses the influence of country-level education mismatch on the individual-level relationship between education and the probability of being unemployed or staying in alternative labour statuses, for young people aged 15-34 in 2006, 2008 and 2010, living in 21 EU countries. We assume that young people may fall in five labour market statuses: 1) Employee; 2) Self-employed; 3) Unemployed; 4) In Education; 5) Inactive, and perform a multinomial logit model to study the effects of years of education on relative probability of being in labour statuses 2, 3, 4, or 5, compared to the base category (Employee). Afterwards, we interact the individual-level years of education with a country-level indicator of education mismatch in order to identify the heterogeneous effects of the aggregate mismatch among people with different educational attainments. Results show that more years of education: i) reduce the relative probability of being unemployed; ii) have a cumulative effect by extending the period of education; iii) slightly raise the relative probability to be self-employed. As regards country-level education mismatch, we found that only after 2008 it produces an additional effect on better educated young people by further reducing their relative unemployment risk when it is compared to that of low educated youngsters. This outcome tells us that improving access to university degrees remains the main road to tackle youth unemployment caused by education mismatch, even after the outburst of the current financial and economic crisis.

JEL Classification: C23, D10, E21, E44 ; This paper provides an empirical assessment of the effects of financialisation on private consumption using panel data for all 28 European Union countries from 1995 to 2015. According to the post Keynesian literature, financialisation exerts two contradictory effects on private consumption, notably a negative one linked to the fall of households' labour income and a positive one related to the increase of households' (financial and housing) wealth. A private consumption equation was estimated by including three variables linked to financialisation (labour income, financial wealth and housing wealth) and five additional control variables (lagged private consumption, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate). Our results confirm that financialisation has been detrimental to private consumption in the EU countries as a whole, and more specifically in the Euro area countries, as the beneficial wealth effect has not been sufficient to compensate for the prejudicial income effect. The fall of households' labour income has even been the highest constraint on private consumption in the Euro area countries.

The abilities of countries to take advantage of global technological progress is currently the main growth determinant. It is especially important in the case of developed economies and the countries that concentrate on closing a development gap. As a result, there is a scientific need to make an international comparisons of countries' technological potential, which can be useful in pointing the economies that can be considered as the leaders and the economies that make especially quick progress in the field. Thus, the main purpose of the research is the identification of the variables that influence countries' technological potential at macroeconomic level, which can be used in its measuring. The second aim of the article is the evaluation of progress obtained by "new" European Union member states. It is assumed that technological potential can be treated as a latent variable. Thus, it can be measured with application of Structural Equation Models (SEM). In the research, the hypothetic SEM model was proposed for the European Union countries in the years 2008-2012. The model was estimated with application of seven variables sugested by Eurostat as the potential measures of technological potential of the EU economies. The research confirmed significant influence of five of the given variables. Additionally, the research showed some progress in the field obtained by Central European countries that joined the EU after the year 2004.

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; FCT

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The abilities of countries to take advantage of global technological progress is currently the main growth determinant. It is especially important in the case of developed economies and the countries that concentrate on closing a development gap. As a result, there is a scientific need to make an international comparisons of countries' technological potential, which can be useful in pointing the economies that can be considered as the leaders and the economies that make especially quick progress in the field. Thus, the main purpose of the research is the identification of the variables that influence countries' technological potential at macroeconomic level, which can be used in its measuring. The second aim of the article is the evaluation of progress obtained by 'new' European Union member states. It is assumed that technological potential can be treated as a latent variable. Thus, it can be measured with application of Structural Equation Models (SEM). In the research, the hypothetic SEM model was proposed for the European Union countries in the years 2008-2012. The model was estimated with application of seven variables sugested by Eurostat as the potential measures of technological potential of the EU economies. The research confirmed significant influence of five of the given variables. Additionally, the research showed some progress in the field obtained by Central European countries that joined the EU after the year 2004.

Este artículo presenta los resultados de una investigación comparada realizada sobre la regulación de la cobertura de la información política en diez operadores públicos europeos. En concreto, el estudio investiga si existe regulación del pluralismo político, tanto para períodos electorales como ordinarios, aplicable a los informativos diarios. Aquí se proporcionan los resultados para cada país y las conclusiones comparadas. Los datos informan de diferentes grados de politizacion de la regulación, según el uso de criterios cualitativos o cuantitativos. La investigación también describe cuales són los sistemas de control del pluralismo político en los diez países estudiados.

Background: The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has set a "90-90-90" target to curb the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic by 2020, but methods used to assess whether countries have reached this target are not standardized, hindering comparisons. Methods: Through a collaboration formed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) with European HIV cohorts and surveillance agencies, we constructed a standardized, 4-stage continuum of HIV care for 11 European Union countries for 2013. Stages were defined as (1) number of people living with HIV in the country by end of 2013; (2) proportion of stage 1 ever diagnosed; (3) proportion of stage 2 that ever initiated ART; and (4) proportion of stage 3 who became virally suppressed (≤200 copies/mL). Case surveillance data were used primarily to derive stages 1 (using back-calculation models) and 2, and cohort data for stages 3 and 4. Results: In 2013, 674500 people in the 11 countries were estimated to be living with HIV, ranging from 5500 to 153400 in each country. Overall HIV prevalence was 0.22% (range, 0.09%-0.36%). Overall proportions of each previous stage were 84% diagnosed, 84% on ART, and 85% virally suppressed (60% of people living with HIV). Two countries achieved ≥90% for all stages, and more than half had reached ≥90% for at least 1 stage. Conclusions: European Union countries are nearing the 90-90-90 target. Reducing the proportion undiagnosed remains the greatest barrier to achieving this target, suggesting that further efforts are needed to improve HIV testing rates. Standardizing methods to derive comparable continuums of care remains a challenge. ; This work was supported by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (contract number ECD.5661). ; Sí

Background: tobacco control policies can reduce smoking prevalence. These measures may be less effective where smoking prevalence has significantly declined, as the remaining smokers have 'hardened'. Our aim was to empirically evaluate the 'hardening hypothesis' at the population level in the European Union (EU) and explore factors associated with hardcore smoking. Methods: we conducted two separate analyses in the EU using data on smoking from the Eurobarometer surveys (2009-2017, n=112 745). 1) A panel-data fixed-effects linear regression to investigate changes over time in the percentage of hardcore smokers in relation to standardised smoking prevalence at the country level. 2) A multilevel logistic regression analysis with hardcore (daily smokers, ≥15 cigarettes per day who have not attempted to quit in the last 12 months) or light (<5 cigarettes per day) smoking as the dependent variable and time as the main independent variable, controlling for individual and ecological variables. Results: we studied 29 010 current smokers (43.8% hardcore smokers and 14.7% light smokers). The prevalence of hardcore smoking among adult smokers increased by 0.55 (95% CI 0.14-0.96) percentage points per each additional percentage point in the overall smoking prevalence. The odds of being a hardcore smoker increased over time and were higher in middle-aged males and people with financial difficulties, while the odds of being a light smoker significantly declined among females. Conclusion: this study does not support the 'hardening hypothesis' in the EU between 2009 and 2017, but suggests a softening of the smoking population. Existing tobacco control policies are likely to be suitable to further decrease smoking prevalence in Europe.

AbstractAs zero population growth rates have existed for approximately 30 years in many European Union countries, one wonders whether this is optimal in these countries, considering differences in consumer preferences and wages. In this paper, we construct a framework to examine this issue, in particular incorporating both eldercare and immigration. Our theoretical and empirical analyses show that zero population growth rates are optimal, population growth rates and eldercare hours are determined separately, and eldercare hours may be optimal because of added support with public long‐term care spending of each country.