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The goal of paper is to put into focus and explain essential features of the political development in Lithuania during second post-communist decade by means of its comparison with the analoguos processes in other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and in those Central European countries with political systems which resemble most closely Lithuanian case (Poland and Hungary). In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for the understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice party has to be classified together with the brothers Kaczynski's Law and Justice party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and Gábor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše's New Era in Latvia. They were all right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of "new politics". While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in the former bureaucratic authoritarian countries Estonia and Latvia, in Hungary and Poland the outcome was the breakup of the implicit ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact which was the foundation of the political stability in these former countries of national communism. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Victor Orban used the two thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated due to the collaboration of all, by this time, "established" and Left-of-centre populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy, just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the EU and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. As far as the success in impeaching R.Paksas prevented the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers of impeachment events, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favour of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the Left-of-Centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to put into focus and explain distinctive features of the political developments in Lithuania during second post-communist decade, comparing them with other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and those Central European countries with political systems which resembled most closely Lithuania (Poland and Hungary) by the end of the first post-communist decade. In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice Party has to be classified together with the Kaczynski twins Law and Justice Party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and Gábor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše's New Era in Latvia. They all were right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of new politics. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in Estonia and Latvia, its outcome in Hungary and Poland was the breakup of the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact which was the foundation of the political stability during first post-communist decade. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Orban used the two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated thanks to the collaboration of all, by this time, established and left-of-center populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the European Union and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. Preventing the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the impeachment as stress test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favor of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the left-of-centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.

JUSTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s "marketplace of ideas" analogy continues to deeply influence First Amendment doctrine. It provides a rational substratum upon which the political or self-realization characterizations of free speech are built. However, typically overlooked is the Social Darwinistic root of the Justice's thought. He championed the spread of ideas and the political sway of majority opinions. That analytical insight is key to many of the Supreme Court's free speech precedents. On the one hand, the concept is invaluable for defending free discussions about philosophy, political science, the arts, humanities, pedagogy, and social sciences. In these areas, the marketplace of thoughtful expression will give rise to searching wisdom, understanding, culture, taste, achievement, scientific truth, political action, and creativity. On the other hand, market political leverage can drown out minority voices. According to a Holmesian relativist understanding, populist versions of truth can and should dominate law and its formation. To his mind, the judiciary lacks any power to check "proletarian dictatorship" from forming in the country. Left unqualified, his political perspective on truth allows for abuses of representative governance. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, democratic institutions are being exploited by populist autocrats like Hungary's Viktor Orban or Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Populism in the United States, on the right and on the left of the political spectrum, is alarmingly flirting with xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism. That political reality should give us some pause about expecting libertarianism to yield a just truth. Justice Holmes's Social Darwinistic approach to the marketplace of ideas is fraught with callous notions of preference for powerful speakers. It stands in opposition to a more equalitarian understanding of markets, which recognizes the policy balance governments sometimes undertake to advance important interests that protect open dialogue, while empowering indigent and powerless individuals to join the conversation. Truth and falsity are manipulable concepts, not generally something courts want to resolve. Falsehood is inevitable in conversation. At a minimum, mistakes are rampant in discourse, therefore as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan championed a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. People living in a deliberative democracy must be given space to joke, speak figuratively, and hyperbolically criticize government without risk of censorship or punishment. Government lacks the authority to require parties to adopt its version of truth. This essay first provides a brief doctrinal trajectory of how the Court developed its marketplace of ideas doctrine. It then critiques the construct's amenability to authoritarian doctrines. At its core, this essay argues against the libertarian view of free speech and for the adoption of a limited balancing test that, along with precedents, requires judges to weigh speech, public policy, a means/ends analysis, and the availability of less intrusive ways of achieving the narrowly tailored government aims.

Two interviews with national security adviser Jake Sullivan this week revealed the Biden administration's continued hesitance to pressure Ukraine to open peace talks with Russia, while maintaining that it expects the war will eventually end at the negotiating table and acknowledging that Washington's ability to support Kyiv's war effort is being hamstrung by Congress's inability to approve a new tranche of aid.
During an interview with Julia Ioffe of Puck News, Sullivan quickly dismissed last week's NBC News report that asserted "U.S. and European officials have begun quietly talking to the Ukrainian government about what possible peace negotiations with Russia might entail to end the war," citing one current and one former senior U.S. official.
When asked about the assessment — including from a top Ukrainian commander —that the war has reached a stalemate, Sullivan elaborated:
"There's been a robust debate in Ukraine based on the general's interview. I don't want to get into the middle of all that. I'll just give you our perspective, which is that we believe the battlefield remains dynamic, and we are going to continue to support Ukraine with the tools and resources and capabilities that it needs to continue to try to make progress on the battlefield. We do believe that, ultimately, when Ukraine determines it—because we feel passionately about the article of faith, 'Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine'—there will be a diplomatic phase to this. And our job is to put Ukraine in the best possible position on the battlefield so it's in the best possible position at the negotiating table."
But separate remarks from Sullivan earlier in the week suggest that Washington is struggling to fulfill what the national security adviser considers its responsibility in this war.
"Each week that passes, our ability to fully fund what we feel is necessary to give Ukraine the tools and capacities it needs to both defend its territory and continue to make advances, that gets harder and harder," Sullivan said during a press briefing on Monday. "So, for us, the window is closing."
President Joe Biden has requested that Congress approve a $104 billion emergency defense supplemental which purports to tackle a number of policy priorities, including $60 billion in aid for Ukraine. But the proposal so far remains in limbo in the Republican led-House, with new leadership instead opting to pass a short-term government funding measure that did not include any money for Ukraine.
Supporters of Ukraine aid still hope that another package will make its way through Congress eventually, but that will not happen until lawmakers return from their Thanksgiving recess, at the earliest.
The lack of funding "is already having an effect on our ability to give Ukraine everything that it needs," according to Sullivan, "and that effect will only compound over time."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba dismissed those calling for talks with Moscow, pointing to 30 years of "negotiations with Russia that it never respected," including the Black Sea Grain Initiative from which Russia unilaterally withdrew earlier this year. "There are no conclusions to be drawn here, except that no one can seriously use the words 'Russia' and 'negotiations' in the same phrase," Kuleba wrote on the social media platform X. "Russia's tactic has remained consistent in its many wars over the last three decades: kill, grab, lie, and deny."
— Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said that the European Union should not move forward on Ukraine membership talks. "Ukraine is in no way ready to negotiate on its ambitions to join the European Union," Orban said on Monday. "The clear Hungarian position is that the negotiations must not begin." EU leaders are preparing to vote next month on whether Kyiv should be invited, and all 27 member nations must agree in order to admit a new country. Slovakia, whose new government recently rejected an aid package for Kyiv, is also expected to be a potential obstacle to Ukraine's admittance.
— President Joe Biden met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Wednesday in San Francisco, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. While the discussion mostly focused on other aspects of the bilateral relationship, reports say that Biden reaffirmed U.S. support for Kyiv and "also pressed Xi to continue to withhold military support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine," according to the Associated Press. A CNN report from before the meeting said that "US officials believe there might be a limited role Beijing can play in the Ukraine war, notwithstanding China's deep economic alliance with Russia."
U.S. State Department news:
During a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller expressed concern over Congress's inability to move forward with the White House's supplemental request.
"So we are at a critical point with respect to aid to Ukraine. The Pentagon has said publicly that they have exhausted somewhere around 95 percent of their funds to provide security assistance to Ukraine – security assistance that's very important," Miller said.

Mit dem Titel "Profiteurin des Krieges" hat Annika Joeres vor wenigen Tagen in der ZEIT eine Analyse vorgelegt mit folgendem Teaser: "Die Partei von Marine Le Pen startete einst als antisemitische Truppe. Nun stellt sie sich in Frankreich als größte Verteidigerin Israels dar – mit überraschendem Erfolg" (https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2023-11/marine-le-pen-israel-antisemitismus-frankreich. Joeres beleuchtet darin folgende Gesichtspunkte:Trennung von Jean-Marie Le Pen und frühere Verbindungen der RN zu antisemitischen GruppenMarine Le Pen und RN als Verteidiger von Israel und der jüdischen GemeinschaftMarine Le Pens Haltung zu Antisemitismus und das Bemühen der RN, das öffentliche Auftreten zu verbessernWandel innerhalb der RN aufgrund des Hamas-Terrorangriffsbevorstehende und vergangene WahlkämpfeIslam und muslimische Flüchtlinge als FeindbildWidersprüche in GrundsatzfragenKonzentration auf die Bekämpfung von Islamismus als neue politische AgendaRN unterstützt jüdische Bürger und Bürgerinnen nur gegenüber islamistischen TatenStillschweigen bei rechtsextremen Übergriffensteigende Popularität der RN trotz rassistischer und antisemitischer GeschichteIn diesem Artikel wird die Wandlung von Marine Le Pen und ihrer rechtsextremen Partei Rassemblement National (RN) analysiert. Hauptthemen sind ihre Haltung gegenüber Israel, den aktuellen Konflikten und dem Judentum.Früher war die RN eng mit antisemitischem Gedankengut verflechtet. Beispielweise verharmloste Jean-Marie Le Pen den Holocaust und die Verankerungen mit antisemitischen Vereinen und Burschenschaften. Marine Le Pen schloss ihn 2015 aus der Partei aus, möglicherweise aus Angst, dass seine Aussagen zum Holocaust der Partei schaden könnten. Der Parteiname wurde von "Front National" in "Rassemblement National" umgewandelt, um dadurch das öffentliche Auftreten der Partei zu verbessern.Laut einer aktuellen Umfrage der Pariser Ifop-Institus sollen Marine Le Pen und die RN im Hinblick auf die Präsidentschaftswahl im ersten Wahlgang mehr als 30 Prozent der Stimmen erhalten. Das wäre das erste Mal in der Geschichte der RN, dass ihre Parteichefin bei einer Präsidentschaftswahl im ersten Wahlgang so erfolgreich wäre. Sie würde die derzeit aussichtsreichsten Mitbewerbenden deutlich übertreffen. Diese Umfrageergebnisse zeigen, dass Le Pen und ihre Partei derzeit erhebliche politische Unterstützung in Frankreich genießen.Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass es noch vier Jahre bis zur Präsidentschaftswahl in Frankreich sind, aber Le Pen und ihre Partei bereits politisch von dem Terrorangriff der Hamas auf Israel profitiert haben. Sie bezeichnete diesen Angriff als "Pogrom" und sprach sich für eine harte Reaktion Israels gegen die Hamas aus. Dieser Ansatz scheint bei der französischen Wählerschaft Anklang zu finden.Joeres betont, dass Le Pen Israel als Verbündeten ansieht und die Hamas als Feind betrachtet. Des Weiteren soll Le Pen immer noch politische Verbündete haben, die in der Vergangenheit für antisemitische Äußerungen kritisiert wurden. Hier wird der ungarische Präsident Viktor Orbán genannt.Seit ihrer Parteiübernahme 2011 versucht Le Pen, sie zu "entteufeln". Das Ziel ist es, die RN für die französische Wählerschaft wählbar zu machen. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass Le Pen jetzt verstärkt gegen islamistische Organisationen agiert und sie oft fälschlicherweise mit allen muslimischen Personen und Flüchtlingen aus muslimisch geprägten Ländern gleichsetzt. Die Partei wird von Olivier Véran kritisiert, sich nur dann für jüdische Bürger und Bürgerinnen einzusetzen, wenn sie von islamistischen Überfällen bedroht werden, während sie bei rechtsextremen schweigt, obwohl diese die Mehrheit der rassistischen und antisemitischen Übergriffe in Frankreich ausmachen. Der Islam wird oft als Feindbild dargestellt.Es gibt auch Widersprüche in Le Pens Haltung zur finanziellen Unterstützung für Palästina nach dem Hamas-Terrorangriff. Einige Stimmen der RN sagen, dass die Hilfe aufrechterhalten werden sollte, während andere dafür plädieren, sie sofort zu stoppen. Es gibt auch widersprüchliche Aussagen zur Beziehung zu Ländern wie Katar und Ägypten.Schließlich wird darauf hingewiesen, dass Le Pen offensichtlich versucht, sich von einigen früheren Strategien zu distanzieren, wie der Nähe zu Russland. Es wird erwartet, dass die Partei bei den kommenden Europawahlen eine beträchtliche finanzielle Unterstützung erhalten wird.Insgesamt zeigt der Artikel die Komplexität von Le Pens politischer Entwicklung und die Herausforderungen in Bezug auf Israel und den Nahostkonflikt. Es wird auch darauf hingewiesen, dass es weiterhin Widersprüche und Kontroversen innerhalb der Partei gibt. Darüber hinaus spricht Joeres an, wie sich Marine Le Pen und die RN in der politischen Landschaft Frankreichs positionieren, indem sie Israel und die Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Agenda stellen, um politische Unterstützung zu gewinnen. Dieser Schwenk in der politischen Ausrichtung hat dazu geführt, dass die Partei bei der Wählerschaft erfolgreicher ist, was in den Umfrageergebnissen zur Präsidentschaftswahl deutlich wird.Der ausgewählte Titel der Autorin kann als äußerst provokant angesehen werden. Es kann durchaus diskutiert werden, ob Le Pen als Profiteurin des Krieges gesehen werden kann. Einerseits ist es umstritten, ob Marine Le Pen und die RN tatsächlich als Profiteure des Krieges betrachtet werden können, da es viele Nuancen und Widersprüche in ihrer politischen Ausrichtung gibt und ihre Motive und Absichten möglicherweise von verschiedenen Interessen getrieben werden. Andererseits kann Marine Le Pen als Profiteurin des Krieges gesehen werden, da sie und die RN politisch von einem spezifischen Ereignis, dem Hamas-Terrorangriff auf Israel, profitiert haben.Dieser Angriff führte zu einem Wandel in Le Pens politischer Agenda und ermöglichte es ihr, sich als Verteidigerin Israels und der jüdischen Gemeinschaft in Frankreich zu präsentieren. Diese neue Positionierung zog Unterstützung der Wählerschaft an, wie in Umfragen gezeigt wurde. Indem sie den Hamas-Terrorangriff als "Pogrom" bezeichnete und sich für eine harte Reaktion Israels gegen die Hamas aussprach, konnte Le Pen politisch von den Spannungen im Nahen Osten profitieren. Dies führte zu einem Anstieg ihrer Popularität und stärkte ihre Position in der politischen Landschaft Frankreichs. Insofern kann sie als Profiteurin des Krieges betrachtet werden, da sie die politischen Auswirkungen des Konflikts zwischen Israel und der Hamas zu ihrem Vorteil nutzt.

In diesem Beitrag stellt Amelie Brühl folgenden Aufsatz vor: Kovács, Kriszta / Scheppele, Kim Lane (2021): Rechtsstaat unter Druck. Ungarn, Polen und die Rolle der EU; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 37/2021, S. 32-39, online unter https://www.bpb.de/apuz/herrschaft-des-rechts-2021/340009/rechtsstaat-unter-druck-ungarn-polen-und-die-rolle-der-eu. Der Artikel von Kriszta Kovács und Kim Lane Scheppele beschäftigt sich mit der Justiz in Ungarn und Polen. Es wird erklärt, wie es in den beiden Ländern dazu kommen konnte, dass die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ins Schwanken geriet. Im Anschluss daran befasst sich der Text mit den Maßnahmen, die die EU in diesem Kontext ergriffen hat, und den Hintergründen für das Handeln der EU.Die beiden Autorinnen beginnen mit einer Zusammenfassung der Ereignisse in Ungarn. Dort gewann die Fidesz-Partei 2010 die Parlamentswahlen und erhielt zwei Drittel der Parlamentssitze. Eine Zweidrittelmehrheit im Parlament war für die Partei von Viktor Orbán ausreichend, um grundlegende Änderungen an der Verfassung Ungarns vorzunehmen. Unter anderem wurde das Verfassungsgericht geschwächt, indem neue Richterinnen und Richter sowie neue Präsidenten des Verfassungsgerichts alleinig von der Regierungspartei bestimmt werden konnten (vgl. S. 33).Als Richter durch ein Herabsetzen des Rentenalters dazu verpflichtet wurden, aufgrund ihres Alters in den Ruhestand zu wechseln, mischte sich die Europäische Kommission in den Vorgang ein. Sie brachte den Fall vor den Gerichtshof der EU, der entschied, dass das Gesetz gegen den ,,Schutz vor Altersdiskriminierung'' (S. 33) verstoße. Das Urteil hatte für Ungarn nur eine Entschädigungsleistung zur Folge, die Richter durften nicht zurück in ihre ehemalige Position kommen.Ein weiterer Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz in Ungarn stellte das ,,Nationale Justizteam'' dar, das unter anderem die Macht darüber innehat, Richter und Richterinnen zu entlassen. Das Justizteam wird von einer Zweidrittelmehrheit des Parlaments gewählt, wieder reichten also die Stimmen der Fidesz-Partei aus (vgl. S. 34).Aufgrund einer Änderung des Namens für den Obersten Gerichtshof, woraufhin sich die Richter neu um ihr Amt bewerben mussten, konnte der damalige Präsident des Gerichtshofs abgesetzt werden. Diesmal wurde vom Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte entschieden, dass dieser Vorgang nicht rechtmäßig war. Ungarn kam aber wieder mit einer Entschädigungszahlung davon (vgl. S. 34).Im Anschluss an die Zusammenfassung der Geschehnisse in Ungarn geht der Artikel auf die Justiz in Polen ein. Auch dort wurde die Unabhängigkeit des Verfassungsgerichts stark angegriffen. Die Regierungspartei konnte hier durch eine Reihe von Vorgängen, die im Artikel näher beschrieben werden, dafür sorgen, dass im Verfassungsgericht eine Mehrheit der Richter der Regierungspartei PiS nahestehen (vgl. S. 36).Durch ein Gesetz durfte der Justizminister Gerichtspräsidenten entlassen und andere Personen in diese Positionen einsetzen. Außerdem wurde auch in Polen das ,,Rentenalter für alle Richterinnen und Richter unterhalb des Obersten Gerichtshofs'' (S. 36) gesenkt. Im Laufe der Zeit konnte die polnische Regierung den Nationalen Justizrat, das Verfassungsgericht und den Obersten Gerichtshof kontrollieren und in die Hände der eigenen Partei geben. Mit dem sogenannten ,,Maulkorbgesetz'' können Richter für das Übergeben von Fällen an den EuGH sogar bestraft werden (vgl. S. 36).Auf die Zusammenfassung der Vorgänge in den beiden Staaten folgt das Beleuchten der Eingriffe der EU in das Vorgehen der Regierungen. Außerdem gehen Scheppele und Kovács im letzten Teil des Artikels auf die Frage ein, weshalb sich die EU nicht stärker für die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz in Ungarn und Polen eingesetzt hat.Als Unternehmungen der Kommission führt der Artikel auf, dass diese 2014 den ,,Rahmen zur Stärkung des Rechtsstaatsprinzips'' (S. 34) verabschiedete, der von der nächsten Kommission jedoch nicht weitergeführt wurde. Es kam daher nicht zu einer Verwarnung Ungarns. Das Europäische Parlament leitete gegen Ungarn das Verfahren nach Artikel 7 EUV ein, welches eine Verwarnung an Ungarn nach sich ziehen würde. Die nötige Mehrheit für diesen Schritt konnte im Rat jedoch nicht erreicht werden. (vgl. S. 34f.)In Polen wurde die Kommission recht schnell aktiv und nutzte den ,,Rechtsstaatlichkeitsrahmen'', um ,,Warnungen und Empfehlungen" (S. 37) an Polen aussprechen zu können. Ein entscheidendes Urteil hat dann der EuGH gefällt. In diesem Urteil ging es darum, dass die Mitgliedsstaaten die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz schützen müssen. Daraufhin wurde von der Kommission ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Polen eingeleitet. Ein Nichteinhalten des Urteils kann hohe Geldstrafen nach sich ziehen, dies muss jedoch von der Kommission herbeigeführt werden (vgl. S. 39).Als einen der wichtigsten Gründe dafür, dass die EU nicht besonders stark in die Geschehnisse eingreifen konnte, nennen die Autorinnen die Abhängigkeit der EU von den Mitgliedsstaaten. Einerseits wollten sich die Mitgliedsstaaten nicht gegenseitig verurteilen, aus Angst selbst verurteilt zu werden. Die Verfahren nach Artikel 7 EUV, die eine Verwarnung an den jeweiligen Mitgliedsstaat nach sich ziehen, benötigten außerdem den einstimmigen Beschluss des Rates. Eine solche einstimmige Entscheidung habe jedoch nicht erreicht werden können (vgl. S. 39).Außerdem erklären die Autorinnen, dass die EU nur beschränkte Zuständigkeitsbereiche innehat, sodass es ihr in einigen Bereichen unmöglich ist, in die nationale Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten einzugreifen. 2020 wurde eine Verordnung verabschiedet, die es zulässt, EU-Mittel zu verringern, falls diese im Land der Empfänger ,,falsch'' (S. 39) ausgegeben würden. Diese Verordnung lässt die beiden Autorinnen auf eine Besserung der Situation hoffen. Kovács und Scheppele schließen mit der Erkenntnis, dass die ,,nationalen Regierungen immer einen Vorteil gegenüber den EU-Institutionen'' (S. 39) hätten, wenn sie sich nicht an die vorgegebenen Regeln hielten. Indem die EU zu wenig für die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz in Polen und Ungarn unternommen habe, habe sie ,,versäumt […]'' (S. 39), für europäische und demokratische Werte einzustehen und diese durchzusetzen.

In nearly three years in office, President Donald J. Trump's war against immigrants and the foreign-born seems only to have intensified. Through a series of Executive Branch actions and policies rather than legislation, the Trump Administration has targeted immigrants and visitors from Muslim-majority countries, imposed quotas on and drastically reduced the independence of Immigration Court Judges, cut the number of refugees admitted by more than 80%, cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and stationed Immigration Customs and Enforcement ("ICE") agents at state courtrooms to arrest unauthorized immigrants, intimidating them from participating as witnesses and litigants. Although initially saying that only unauthorized immigrants convicted of serious crimes would be prioritized for deportation, the Trump Administration has implicitly given ICE officers carte blanche to arrest unauthorized immigrants anytime, anywhere, creating a climate of fear in immigrant communities. Particularly disturbing is the targeting of asylum-seekers, employing the criminal justice system and the illegal entry statute in the "zero tolerance policy." Under this policy, children, including toddlers, are seized and languish for months and years separate from their families, many of whom are seeking asylum. Directly contrary to federal statute and international law, another policy makes anyone who enters the country without inspection ineligible for asylum. Kirstjen Nielsen, Trump's second Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), ordered asylum applicants to await the lengthy processing of their claims in cartel-ruled border areas of Mexico, with no realistic safe shelter and deprived of all meaningful opportunity to exercise their statutorily-guaranteed right to access to counsel—a necessity, given today's convoluted asylum law. Trump's first Attorney General, Jefferson Sessions, largely disqualified as grounds for asylum even the most brutal and terroristic persecution of women and violence perpetrated by inescapable quasi-state gang actors. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officers mislead asylum-seekers at the southern border, telling them they don't have the right to apply for asylum or saying yes, they may apply, but admitting only a minute fraction of those who present themselves for processing at ports of entry. President Trump's Administration refuses to grant parole or reasonable bond even to those asylum-seekers who establish a credible fear of persecution, frequently resulting in long-term detention, and forcing on detained asylum-seekers the Hobson's choice of lengthy incarceration in terrible conditions in the United States or the risks of persecution and death in their countries of origin. International law prohibits using the criminal justice system or prolonged administrative detention to deter and discourage bona fide asylum-seekers from asserting and proving their claims. We suggest two remedies: Federal courts should enforce article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (1) by prohibiting criminal charges of unlawful entry against bona fide asylum-seekers until they complete the asylum application process and are denied asylum; and (2) by requiring parole or reasonable bond for asylum-seekers who pass fair credible fear interviews. The article argues that bona fide asylum-seekers should be kept in detention only for a short period, if at all, to determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, made binding on the United States through our accession to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, generally prohibits "impos[ing] penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees . . . where their life or freedom was threatened." "Penalties" clearly must include not only criminal prosecution and prison, but also prolonged immigration detention and the seizure of children from parents without good cause, for "deterrence" purposes. We argue also that customary international law and human rights treaties support the recommended remedies and stand squarely against the Trump Administration's policies. Federal courts may utilize customary international law directly or through the Charming Betsy canon. Not only do the Trump Administration's harsh immigration policies and practices violate international law and American values, but also foretell a government tending toward exclusion, racism, nationalism, parochialism, authoritarianism, and disregard of the rule of law. The parallels between the Trump Administration and Hungary's autocratic, essentially one-party, state, are chilling. See Patrick Kingsley, He Used to Call Victor Orban an Ally. Now He Calls Him a Symbol of Fascism, N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-ivanyi.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Federal courts, however, have both the authority and the responsibility to enforce the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol as well as international human rights norms to protect asylum-seekers from criminal prosecution and from prolonged detention. The Framers of the United States Constitution and its key amendments envisioned that federal courts would apply treaties as the rule of decision to protect foreigners and would serve as a check upon an Executive that tramples on individual rights, particularly the rights of a vulnerable minority. Given the outlandish behavior of this Administration, federal courts must live up to that vision.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban agreed to a funding plan for Ukraine on Thursday, allowing the European Union to clear the final hurdle on its $54 billion aid package that will run through 2027. Orban, who had pushed for an annual review of the fund so that he would have the opportunity to veto additional aid each year, had been the sole holdout on the package since it was introduced last December.. It is unclear what, if any, material concessions Orban received before agreeing to the new package. The Financial Times earlier this week reported that Brussels had itself drawn up a plan to "sabotage" Budapest's economy if it vetoed the aid package. "All 27 leaders agreed on an additional €50 billion support package for Ukraine within the EU budget. This locks in steadfast, long-term, predictable funding for #Ukraine," Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, wrote on the social media platform X. "EU is taking leadership & responsibility in support for Ukraine; we know what is at stake." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed, saying it was "very important" that the funding plan had been agreed to unanimously. "Continued EU financial support for Ukraine will strengthen long-term economic and financial stability, which is no less important than military assistance and sanctions pressure on Russia," Zelensky wrote on X. This development comes at a precarious time for Ukraine, as the stalling of aid from Europe and the United States had left it on the verge of an economic crisis. While the support from Brussels is welcome news, new aid from Washington remains tied up in Congress. "The only way to preserve macroeconomic stability is support from the United States," Ukraine's finance minister, Serhiy Marchenko told the New York Times this week. The fate of President Joe Biden's national security supplemental request, which contains $60 billion for Kyiv remains unclear. Negotiations regarding the border security policy that is included in the bill have been ongoing for weeks. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said on Thursday that the text of the bill is expected to be finalized by Sunday, and that the legislation will be brought to a vote no later than next Wednesday. Whether or not it makes its way through the Senate, the bill faces even longer odds in the Republican-led House.NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg traveled to Washington this week to try to convince notable skeptics of continuing aid to Ukraine. He met with Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) and gave a speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation. Stoltenberg struck a positive tone about his visit, saying that he was optimistic that Washington would pass another tranche of aid."I expect that the United States will find a way to support Ukraine, because this is in U.S. national security interests to ensure that President Putin doesn't win and that Ukraine prevails," Stoltenberg told NBC News' Andrea Mitchell on Wednesday. He also released a joint statement with Johnson saying that they had "addressed the importance of sending a clear, decisive message to President Putin that he will not win his war of aggression in Ukraine."But, as RS's Connor Echols explained this week, the secretary general's efforts are up against serious roadblocks. "[Stoltenberg's arguments are] unlikely to satisfy concerns from budget hawks and restrainers, who fear the possibility of open-ended conflict with sky-high cost," Echols wrote. "But, as Ukraine's military capacity continues to degrade, only time will tell if Stoltenberg's last-ditch effort proved persuasive."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— The U.S. and Germany are pushing back at an attempt from other NATO members — namely Poland and the Baltic countries — to formally invite Ukraine to join the alliance during an upcoming summit this July, according to Foreign Policy. "[P]roponents of this view believe that bringing Ukraine into NATO sooner rather than later will be cheaper in the long run than the current Western strategy of funneling arms and munitions to Ukraine in perpetuity while keeping NATO membership on the back burner," according to the report. "Letting Ukraine into NATO too soon, however, particularly as large swaths of its territory are still occupied by Russian forces, could trigger a full-scale NATO-Russia conflict, given the 31-member alliance's bedrock collective defense clause that calls for all NATO countries to defend any one country that has been attacked. — Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis said that there may be a window for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine at the end of 2024, as both sides continue to suffer from war fatigue. "I think toward the end of this year, probably after the U.S. elections, we've got a moment for potential negotiation," Stravridis said, according to The Hill. He also laid out the broad parameters of what such a deal could look like, saying that the conflict will end "like the Korean War, meaning that Russia will probably still have control of some portion of Ukraine, Crimea, the land bridge to Russia. "On the other hand, I see Ukraine coming into NATO," he continued "I think the outline of that deal will probably become more clear as this year goes on."— Russia and Ukraine completed another round of prisoner exchanges on Wednesday. The exact figures were disputed, with the Russian defense ministry saying that each side had released 195 prisoners, while Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said that it had received 207 prisoners . This was the first prisoner exchange since a plane carrying a reported 65 Ukrainian POWs crashed while heading to a similar swap last week. Moscow accused Kyiv of shooting down the plane, calling it "a terrorist act." Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility. —The Washington Post is confirming earlier reports that Zelensky is planning to fire top military commander Valery Zaluzhny at some point in the near future. "Zaluzhny's popularity — both within the military and among ordinary citizens — makes his removal a political gamble for Zelensky. It also poses strategic risks at a time when Russia has intensified its attacks and Western security assistance for Kyiv has slowed," according to the Post report. "The general has built strong rapport with his Western counterparts and has often been able to advocate directly for certain materiel and seek counsel on battlefield strategy." However, friction between the two men has continued to grow following last summer's failed counteroffensive and ongoing disagreements over how many more soldiers Kyiv will need to mobilize this year.U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller denied reports that Washington was working behind the scenes to delay Ukraine's path to joining NATO."Those reports are incorrect," Miller said. "You've heard the President himself as well as the Secretary say it a number of times, that Ukraine will be a member of NATO."

In diesem Beitrag stellt Amineh Malek Merkoomyans folgenden Aufsatz vor Tardis, Mathieu (2016): Zwischen Abschottung und Ambitionen: Arbeiten Deutschland und Frankreich in der europäischen Flüchtlingskrise zusammen?; DGAP-Analyse, 7, Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., online unter: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55923-0."Die Ankunft von einer Million Migranten an den Küsten des Kontinents hat Europa in nur einem Jahr tiefgreifend verändert. Während sich Deutschland für eine Aufnahme der Geflüchteten stark machte, steht Ungarn unter Regierungschef Viktor Orban exemplarisch für das Prinzip der Abschottung. Wo positioniert sich Frankreich zwischen diesen beiden Extremen?" (S. 3)Mit diesen Worten beginnt der Autor seinen Aufsatz, der in folgende Abschnitte unterteilt ist:Unerfülltes Versprechen eines "Europas des Asyls"Deutschland und Frankreich in der Asylpolitik: Kooperation als FassadeAsylrecht in Frankreich: Lösungsversuch einer DauerkriseFazit: Das Ende des Mythos von Frankreich als Asylland?Der erste Teil des Textes widmet sich dem Versagen der europäischen Asylpolitik. In diesem Zusammenhang analysiert der Autor das Ungleichgewicht in der deutsch-französischen Zusammenarbeit im Politikfeld Asyl. Abschließend werden die Probleme, die die französischen Behörden mit der Aufnahme von Geflüchteten haben, näher beleuchtet. (S. 3)Unerfülltes Versprechen eines "Europas des Asyls"Einleitend verdeutlicht Tardis, dass die Flüchtlingskrise seinen Ursprung vor 2015 hatte und den unterschiedlichen nationalen Asylsystemen und der Schwierigkeit, eine gemeinsame Lösung für die Problematik zu finden, geschuldet sei. Auch die Konzentration von Asylanträgen auf wenige EU-Staaten ist nichts Neues. Im Jahr 2014 wurden 82,5% der Anträge auf internationalen Schutz in den fünf entscheidenden Aufnahmeländern (Deutschland, Schweden, Italien, Frankreich und Ungarn) gestellt (vgl. S. 3).Grundsätzlich sind die nordischen und westeuropäischen Länder aufgrund bestehender Aufnahmetraditionen und besserer Integrationsaussichten für viele Flüchtlinge attraktiver als der Rest Europas. Im Gegensatz dazu ist das Asylsystem in Süd- und Osteuropa weniger gut entwickelt.Auch die Zahl der 2014 anerkannten Anträge auf internationalen Schutz ist sehr unterschiedlich. Schweden hat 74 % der Antragsteller und Deutschland 42 % der Antragsteller anerkannt, in Frankreich ist diese Zahl auf 22 %, in Griechenland auf 14 % und in Ungarn auf 9 % gesunken (vgl. S. 3).Der Autor geht hier darauf ein, dass die Europäische Union sich schon lange nicht mehr ernsthaft mit diesen Problemen beschäftigt hatte, da die Zahl der Asylbewerber relativ gering war. 2015 waren insgesamt 65,3 Millionen Menschen auf der Flucht. Auf der Flucht aus dem Land beantragten 3,2 Millionen Menschen Asyl (vgl. S. 4).In diesem Zusammenhang kritisiert er, dass die europäischen Länder die Folgen der steigenden Zahl der Ankünfte falsch eingeschätzt hatten. Einerseits haben sie es versäumt, die wichtigsten Aufnahmeländer der Welt zu identifizieren (vgl. S. 4). 2005 haben sie regionale Schutzpläne in der Ukraine, Moldawien, Weißrussland und Tansania auf den Weg gebracht, um "die Einrichtung von Asylsystemen in Herkunfts- und Transitgebieten zu fördern." (S. 4)Deutschland und Frankreich in der Asylpolitik: Kooperation als FassadeAuf die Frage, wo Frankreich sich zwischen den beiden Extremen Deutschland und Ungarn positioniert, gibt Tardis eine klare Antwort:"Die französische Zurückhaltung gegenüber einer grundlegenden Reform der europäischen Asylpolitik bringt das deutsch-französische Tandem an seine Grenzen. Deutschland hingegen scheint in dieser Frage eine Führungsrolle in Europa anzustreben." (S. 6)Dies war jedoch nicht immer der Fall, denn in den letzten zehn Jahren hat Frankreich tendenziell Einwanderungs- und Asylfragen auf europäischer Ebene gefördert (vgl. S. 6). Während der Präsidentschaft von Nicolas Sarkozy war beispielsweise Einwanderung eines der Schlüsselthemen, doch nach den Wahlen 2012 verlor dieses Thema in der französischen Politik an Bedeutung (vgl. S. 6). Nach der Aufnahme von 20.000 syrischen Flüchtlingen im Rahmen des sogenannten humanitären Aufnahmeplans im Jahr 2013 wurde die Situation erneut zu einem neuen Thema. Deutschland forderte seine europäischen Partner auf, dies ebenfalls zu tun."Doch auch das deutsche Engagement spiegelt stets interne politische und gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen. Auf beiden Seiten des Rheins bestimmen somit vor allem nationale Interessen die europäische Politik und entscheiden über die Bedeutung, die ihr beigemessen wird." (S. 6)Asylrecht in Frankreich: Lösungsversuch einer DauerkriseDie Zurückhaltung Frankreichs ist nach dem Verfasser vor allem darauf zurückzuführen, dass das Land in den Streitigkeiten um Flucht und Asyl keine politische Übereinstimmung erreicht hat (vgl. S. 7). Die Meinungen sind sehr unterschiedlich, und die Diskussion wird von Sicherheitsüberlegungen bestimmt. Der Handlungsspielraum der Regierung ist begrenzt – die Opposition lehnt eine offenere Flüchtlingspolitik fast einstimmig ab, "insbesondere Front National, der das Thema Einwanderung ins Zentrum seiner populistischen Programmatik stellt." (S. 6).Das größte Manko des französischen Asylsystems sind jedoch die Aufnahmebedingungen. Aufgrund der langen Dauer des Asylverfahrens wurden in Jahr 2012 von freien 21.410 Plätzen nur 13.483 Neuankömmlinge in Einrichtungen aufgenommen (vgl. S. 7). Dennoch betont Tardis, dass die Regierung seit 2012 versucht, Lösungen in diesem Politikbereich zu finden. Die aktuelle Flüchtlingskrise in Europa kam laut dem Autor nur zu einer Zeit, in der die französische Regierung versucht, das französische Asylrecht zu reformieren (vgl. S. 6).Fazit: Das Ende des Mythos von Frankreich als Asylland?Abschließend geht der vorliegende Beitrag darauf ein, dass Frankreich und Deutschland ein hohes Maß an Überzeugungskraft brauchen, um gemeinsame Asylverfahren und ähnliche Asylrechte einzuleiten und die Anwendbarkeit der Freizügigkeit für Flüchtlinge zu verbessern (vgl. S. 9)."Die auch derzeit zu Tausenden über das Mittelmeer nach Europa fliehenden Personen stellen uns vor die Frage, wie wir mit dem im Jahr 1957 begonnenen Projekt Europa umgehen wollen. Und sie erinnern uns an dessen Fundament: Friede, Freiheit und die Achtung vor dem Einzelnen. Damit bieten sie uns nicht zuletzt den Schlüssel für eine Wiederbelebung des europäischen Projekts." (S. 9)

Ukraine would consider inviting Russian officials to a peace summit to discuss Kyiv's proposal for a negotiated end to the war, according to Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian president's chief of staff."There can be a situation in which we together invite representatives of the Russian Federation, where they will be presented with the plan in case whoever is representing the aggressor country at that time will want to genuinely end this war and return to a just peace," Yermak said over the weekend, noting that one more round of talks without Russia will first be held in Switzerland.The comment represents a subtle shift in Ukrainian messaging about talks. Kyiv has long argued that it would never negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin, yet there is no reason to believe Putin will leave power any time soon. That realization — along with Ukraine's increasingly perilous position on the battlefield — may have helped force Kyiv to reconsider its hard line on talking with the widely reviled Russian leader.Zelensky hinted at a potential mediator for talks following a visit this week to Saudi Arabia. The leader "noted in particular Saudi Arabia's strivings to help in restoring a just peace in Ukraine," according to a statement from Ukrainian officials. "Saudi Arabia's leadership can help find a just solution."Russia, for its part, has signaled that it is open to peace talks of some sort, though both Kyiv and Moscow insist that any negotiations would have to be conducted on their terms. The gaps between the negotiating positions of the two countries remain substantial, with each laying claim to roughly 18% of the territory that made up pre-2014 Ukraine.Ukraine's shift is a sign of just how dire the situation is becoming for its armed forces, which recently made a hasty retreat from Avdiivka, a small but strategically important town near Donetsk. After months of wrangling, the U.S. Congress has still not approved new military aid for Ukraine, and Kyiv now says its troops are having to ration ammunition as their stockpiles dwindle.Zelensky said Sunday that he expects Russia to mount a new offensive as soon as late May. It's unclear whether Ukrainian troops are prepared to stop such a move.Even the Black Sea corridor — a narrow strip of the waterway through which Ukraine exports much of its grain — could be under threat. "I think the route will be closed...because to defend it, it's also about some ammunition, some air defense, and some other systems" that are now in short supply, said Zelensky.As storm clouds gather, it's time to push for peace talks before Russia regains the upper hand, argue Anatol Lieven and George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft."Complete victory for Ukraine is now an obvious impossibility," Lieven and Beebe wrote this week. "Any end to the fighting will therefore end in some form of compromise, and the longer we wait, the worse the terms of that compromise will be for Ukraine, and the greater the dangers will be for our countries and the world."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Hungary finally signed off on Sweden's bid to join NATO after the Swedish prime minister met with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Budapest, according to Deutsche Welle. What did Orban get for all the foot dragging? Apparently just four Swedish fighter jets of the same model that it has been purchasing for years. The prime minister blamed his party for the slow-rolling, saying in a radio interview prior to the parliamentary vote that he had persuaded his partisans to drop their opposition to Sweden's accession.— French President Emmanuel Macron sent allies scrambling Tuesday when he floated the idea of sending NATO troops to Ukraine, according to the BBC. Leaders from Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and other NATO states quickly swatted down the idea that the alliance (or any individual members thereof) would consider joining the war directly. Russia said direct conflict with NATO would be an "inevitability" if the bloc sent troops into Ukraine.— On Wednesday, Zelensky attended a summit in Albania aimed at bolstering Balkan support for Ukraine's fight against Russia, according to AP News. The Ukrainian leader said all states in the region are "worthy" of becoming members of NATO and the European Union, which "have provided Europe with the longest and most reliable era of security and economic development."— Western officials were in talks with the Kremlin for a prisoner swap involving Russian dissident Alexei Navalny prior to his death in a Russian prison camp in February, though no formal offer had yet been made, according to Politico. This account contrasts with the one given by Navalny's allies, who claimed that Putin had killed the opposition leader in order to sabotage discussions that were nearing a deal. Navalny's sudden death has led to speculation about whether Russian officials may have assassinated him, though no proof has yet surfaced to back up this claim. There is, however, little doubt that the broader deterioration of the dissident's health was related to the harsh conditions he was held under.
U.S. State Department news:In a Tuesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the situation on the frontlines in Ukraine is "extremely serious." "We have seen Ukrainian frontline troops who don't have the ammo they need to repel Russian aggression. They're still fighting bravely. They're still fighting courageously," Miller said. "They still have armor and weapons and ammunition they can use, but they're having to ration it now because the United States Congress has failed to act."

Europe's top diplomats made history this week when they made a surprise trip to Kyiv for a meeting aimed at projecting a unified front in support of Ukraine's war with Russia and bid to join the European Union.
"It is the first time that we met in a candidate country," said Josep Borrell, the bloc's top foreign policy official. "And unfortunately, it was also the first time that the foreign ministers of the European Union met in a country at war."
"The EU remains united in its support to Ukraine," Borrell continued. "I don't see any member state folding on their engagement."
Shortly after the summit, which included 23 of the EU's 27 foreign ministers, Ukraine got another piece of good news when reports emerged that Kyiv could start official accession talks by the end of this year.
But, far away from the spotlight, a number of obstacles remain before Ukraine joins the powerful bloc. The first challenge is to meet the EU's standards for democracy and good governance. As of August, Ukraine had only met two out of seven legal benchmarks, and it remains unclear how Kyiv will make progress on the remaining five amid a brutal, all-out war with Russia.
If Ukraine manages to surpass that hurdle, it will face the arduous task of convincing each and every member of the consensus-driven bloc that Kyiv should become a member.
Slovakia will have little appetite for making concessions to Ukraine given the results of the country's recent elections, in which a leftist party opposed to arming Kyiv returned to power. Robert Fico, Slovakia's likely new prime minister, said last month that it is "illusory to deal with" the question of Ukraine joining the EU amid a "sharp military conflict."
There is, however, one factor working in Ukraine's favor: Fico had a history of pragmatism during previous stints as prime minister, leaving open the possibility that he could change his tack on Kyiv for the right price.
Reports also indicate that Hungary, led by firebrand Prime Minister Viktor Orban, will not back Ukraine's bid for free. In fact, EU officials are now considering unlocking as much as $13 billion in handouts that the bloc has withheld from Budapest due to concerns that Orban has reduced the independence of the country's courts. In return, EU officials hope Hungary will approve aid to Ukraine and back the effort to open accession talks.The final obstacle will be convincing the EU's smaller states to accept a fundamental shift in the economic balance of the bloc. Ukraine would get nearly $200 billion from the bloc over seven years, forcing some member states to go from net receivers of EU largesse to net payers, according to an EU report leaked to the Financial Times. Kyiv would also become the largest recipient of agricultural subsidies, dropping payments for all other states by about 20 percent.
Despite the long odds, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky remains determined to help his country achieve EU membership. "Our key integration goal is to hammer out a decision to start membership negotiations this year," Zelensky said. "Today, I heard once again at the meetings and negotiations that this is absolutely possible."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— The end of Rep. Kevin McCarthy's (R-Calif.) term as speaker of the House could mean the end of U.S. aid to Ukraine, according to Blaise Malley of RS. As Malley notes, all of McCarthy's likely successors have been critical of American aid, and options for bypassing the speaker and forcing a vote on more Ukraine funding would require some Republicans to either break with leadership or do some clever horse trading to convince Kyiv's skeptics. The news comes as public support for aid continues to fall, according to a new Reuters/ Ipsos poll, which found that only 41% of Americans want to continue arming Ukraine, while 35% were opposed and the rest were unsure.
— NATO's top military official warned that "the bottom of the barrel is now visible" when it comes to Western stocks for arming Ukraine, according to CNN. "We give away weapons systems to Ukraine, which is great, and ammunition, but not from full warehouses," said Adm. Rob Bauer.
— Zelensky met with European leaders in Granada, Spain, on Thursday in an effort to bolster support for Ukraine, according to Reuters. "Our joint goal is to ensure the security and stability of our common European home," he said on X, formerly known as Twitter. "We are working together with partners on enhancing the European security architecture, particularly regional security. Ukraine has substantial proposals in this regard."
— Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador said Monday that U.S. aid for Ukraine is "irrational," marking a shift in the controversial leader's rhetoric about the war, according to Reuters. "I was just looking at how now they're not authorizing aid for the war in Ukraine," AMLO said. "But how much have they destined for the Ukraine war? $30 to $50 billion for the war, which is the most irrational thing you can have. And damaging." AMLO has previously called for peace talks to end the conflict.
U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel called on Congress to pass new aid for Ukraine. "We cannot under any circumstances allow America's support for Ukraine to be interrupted," Patel said. "A lapse in support for even a short period of time could make all the difference in the battlefield."

As a result of the parliamentary elections held in the Czech Republic on October 20-21, 2017, the two left-wing parties of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) achieved the worst results in the history of their parliamentary rivalry from the time of the Velvet Divorce [Výsledky voleb a referend: 2018]. This fact is part of the regularity of recent years also in Poland, Hungary and partly in Slovakia - weaker results in the parliamentary elections of left parties. This article is an attempt to show the political strength of the most important left-wing parties in these countries. It will be a kind of background that will help show the scale of the crisis. Otherwise, we should consider parties isolated from those that had a significant influence on state policy through the governance. The index of participation and government responsibility suggested by Giuseppe Ieraci will be helpful in this case. The second part of this article is an attempt to identify the causes of the crisis. It is known that the determinants of this state of affairs are many, the more necessary it seems to systematize them and attempt to indicate similarities in this respect in the Visegrad Group countries. This will allow us to determine if there are common features of the leftist crisis in the V4, which in turn may become the basis of discussions about left-wing issues in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to reflections on the contemporary challenges of left-wing parties. Although the national political scenes as well as the processes taking place in their areas, in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary are clearly different from the mechanisms and decisions in Western Europe, it is impossible to analyze the subject taken by the authors in isolation from the crisis of the West European Left Wing as well as the growing debate and critical voices towards liberal democracy, which, according to some European leaders, such as Viktor Orban, is a failure in the field of solving the most important problems of the modern state [Nowak 2018: 45]. ; W wyniku wyborów parlamentarnych, które odbyły się w R epublice Czeskiej w dniach 20–21 października 2017 r., dwie partie lewicowe – Czeska Partia Socjaldemokratyczna (ČSSD) oraz Komunistyczna Partia Czech i M oraw (KSČM) – uzyskały najgorsze wyniki w historii swojej rywalizacji parlamentarnej od czasu "aksamitnego rozwodu" [Výsledky voleb a referend: 2018]. Fakt ten wpisuje się w prawidłowość występującą w ostatnich latach również w Polsce, na Węgrzech i częściowo na Słowacji – słabszych wyników w wyborach parlamentarnych ugrupowań lewicowych. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę wykazania politycznej siły najważniejszych ugrupowań lewicowych w tych państwach. Stanowić to będzie swoiste tło, które pomoże określić skalę wspomnianego kryzysu. Inaczej bowiem powinniśmy rozpatrywać partie izolowane od tych, które miały istotny wpływ na politykę państwa przez sprawowanie rządów. Pomocne będą w tym przypadku indeksy partycypacji i odpowiedzialności rządowej, zaproponowane przez Giuseppe Ieraciego. Druga część niniejszego artykułu to próba określenia przyczyn wspomnianego kryzysu. Wiadome jest, że determinantów takiego stanu rzeczy jest wiele, tym bardziej konieczne wydaje się ich usystematyzowanie oraz próba wskazania podobieństw w tym zakresie w państwach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Pozwoli to określić, czy istnieją wspólne cechy kryzysu lewicy w V4, co z kolei może się stać zalążkiem dyskusji o problemach lewicy w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, prowadząc do rozważań na temat współczesnych wyzwań partii lewicowych. Wprawdzie krajowe sceny polityczne, a także zachodzące w ich obrębach procesy w Czechach, Polsce oraz na Słowacji i Węgrzech różnią się wyraźnie od mechanizmów i rozstrzygnięć w państwach Europy Zachodniej, mimo to nie można analizować podjętego przez autorów tematu w oderwaniu od kryzysu lewicy zachodnioeuropejskiej, a także coraz silniejszej dyskusji oraz krytycznych głosów wobec demokracji liberalnej, która zdaniem niektórych przywódców europejskich państw, np. Viktora Orbana, przynosi klęskę na polu rozwiązywania najważniejszych problemów współczesnego państwa [Nowak 2018: 45].