Reviews James Hinton's Politics and visions which deals with the concept of 'imperialist pacifism'. Hinton argues that CND and the peace movement generally failed to grasp that Britain's position as a middle-ranking power gave it only a limited leverage position. Argues that Hinton misses how peace movement activites were vital in the lead-up to the INF treaty, and their educative role in enlightening both sides in the Cold War. (SJK)
British politics has become a strange place. Politicians making pronouncements on issues, but policies they implement achieving outcomes and conditions somewhat different has, under the Johnson government, been taken to an altogether different level.
Argues that the "modernist" concept of politics is coming to an end. Politics, defined as "the art of decision-making concerning the common good," determines the distinction between public & private. Political objectives are said to hinge on ever changing, but concrete, situations. Issues explored include the historical relationship between politics & democracy; today's focus on "depolitization"; & the need to reassert the "primacy of politics." It is contended that politics in the era of modernity has been increasingly threatened by hegemonic tendencies of economy, law, morality, & technology, which have spawned a generalized commodification. In addition, the notion of equality shifted from the political to the juridical; politics became linked to the natural equality of rights rather than the institution of democracy; & all social relations were positioned within the private sphere while politics was delegated to the domain of the state. It is concluded that politics is reappearing in the age of postmodernity from the bottom up through local autonomy, participatory democracy, & community life. J. Lindroth
This is a 1000-word encyclopedia entry arguing that lesbian politics in Australia had two strands, one that might be called 'liberal pluralist', and the other lesbian feminist (although both were argued within feminism). The first asked for mainstream recognition and acceptance of lesbianism as a valid alternative lifestyle, the second claimed to pose a challenge and a threat to that mainstream, particularly to the norm of heterosexuality for women.
What is the proper relation of religious moralities—and of moralities generally— to politics, especially to the politics of a society as religiously and morally pluralistic as our own. May a person rely on her religious-moral beliefs in making political choices? In deliberating about political choices with persons who do not share — who may even reject — her religious-moral beliefs? In defending her political choices to such persons? In this article, which is mainly critical rather than constructive, I indicate some basic respects in which the principal contemporary liberal responses to the question of the proper relation of morality to politics are deeply problematic.1Elsewhere in the work of which this article is a part, my effort is mainly constructive: I elaborate and defend a postliberal conception of the proper relation of moral beliefs, especially religious-moral beliefs, to the politics of a pluralistic society like our own; in particular, I elaborate and defend a conception of the proper relation of religious communities to the religiously and morally pluralistic political community of which they are a part.2
In this Essay I would like to share some reflections on the politics of same-sex marriage politics. In a very short period of time, this issue has moved to the center of the gay and lesbian rights movement as well as larger mainstream political and legal debates. Some have even argued that this issue affected, if not determined, the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. This, I believe, is rather an overstatement, but I must concede that the issue has gained traction in ways that most of us would not have predicted five years ago. The states of Vermont and Connecticut have enacted Civil Union laws for same-sex couples, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts now allows both same and different sex couples to marry, and, in the last year, trial courts have found unconstitutional the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage in New York and California. Spain has now joined some of its fellow EU members in the Rhine Delta by allowing same-sex couples to marry, and the Constitutional Court of South Africa found that the South African Constitution requires that same-sex couples be permitted to marry on terms equal to those made available to different sex couples. At the same time, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the same-sex marriage law in California, courts in Arizona and Indiana rejected constitutional challenges to their marriage laws, an intermediate appellate court in New York reversed a trial court finding that same-sex couples should be permitted to marry, and referenda barring same-sex marriage swept the country in 2004 and 2005 and will, no doubt, continue to do so in 2006. Forty-two states have enacted "little DOMAs," limiting the institution of marriage to one man and one woman. This issue, like so many others in American politics at the present moment, is highly polarized – rarely garnering moderate positions. I would like to reflect on this dynamic political, moral, and legal moment – which, I fear, may have shifted again by the time you finish reading this Essay – by offering some thoughts about how and why this particular issue has emerged as the highest of priorities in the gay community, and what might be the costs of such a strategic choice. Just two years ago, in sweeping language, the U.S. Supreme Court found laws that criminalized same-sex sex unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. This decision has been widely referred to in the lesbian and gay legal community as "our Brown," referring to the landmark 1954 desegregation decision Brown v. Board of Education. By this, of course, it is meant that Lawrence would usher in a civil rights revolution for gay men and lesbians in a fashion equivalent to the civil rights movement inaugurated by Brown.
This article serves as an introduction to the special section on Sensorial Politics, which includes articles by Nicholas Caverly, Elsa Davidson, Susan Falls and Ali Kenner. The introduction outlines the arguments of the articles before proceeding to a discussion of the common themes they illuminate as a whole. In particular, they address four key issues: the relationship between the sensorial and the political; the role of sensorial disruption and its political effects; the issue of labor; and the issue of knowledge. We conclude that while these pieces advance our understanding of the relationships between the sensorium and politics, they also open up avenues for ongoing research and theorization, particularly in our contemporary situation, in which the Covid-19 pandemic has recast sensorial politics in new ways.
