Suchergebnisse

Fiscal Decentralization is a popular economic development strategy among transition and developing countries. This article reviews the advantages of fiscal decentralization in a theoretical context, but critiques the relevance of the standard theory of federalism as it applies to emerging economies. It is argued that the macroeconomic benefits of fiscal centralization, the absence of good instruments of local government finance, and the centralist politics that characterize most low income countries have been strong enough to hold back increased emphasis on local government finance.

En este trabajo se consideran las implicaciones fiscales de un fondo de estabilización que garantice un consumo estable a lo largo del tiempo, en particular para el caso de los ingresos petroleros derivados de la exportación en México. Se presenta un modelo de política fiscal óptima en el contexto de un país que obtiene ingresos fiscales de un recurso no renovable como el petróleo. ; This paper deals with the fiscal implications of a stabilization fund that allows for a stable consumption over time, in particular in the case of an oil producing and exporting country like Mexico. We present a model of optimal fiscal policy in the context of a country with important revenues generated by an exhaustible resource such as oil.

The paper explores the interaction between the proposed monetary union for ECOWAS and structural reforms of fiscal policy. The effects depend to a large extent on the degree of similarity of member countries. In a monetary union of similar countries, member states run a more distortive fiscal policy, while their structural reform efforts will fall. This is also the case for countries that unilaterally peg to an anchor currency or introduce a foreign currency. In an monetary union with dissimilar countries the reverse can happen for those member states that are confronted with high distortion countries. This result implies that current WAEMU members will run a less distortive fiscal policy after the inclusion of other members of ECOWAS.

This paper examines the relationship between the fiscal policy and the public debt in Colombia within the framework of the financialization of the economy. It includes a theoretical-analytical study that is complemented with an econometric regression. The importance of this analysis is that public debt represents a problem for the development of peripheral countries and the proposed solutions fail to transform this reality. It is concluded that, for the Colombian case, the fiscal policy is pro-cyclical and the economic policy is subject to the operation of the financial capital so the fiscal policy does not achieve the country's economic problems. ; Este artículo evalúa la relación entre la política fiscal y la deuda pública en el marco de la financiarización de la economía. Se hace un estudio teórico-analítico, que se complementa con una regresión econométrica. La importancia de este análisis radica en que la deuda pública representa un problema para el desarrollo de los países periféricos y las soluciones propuestas no logran transformar esta realidad. Se concluye que, para el caso colombiano, la política fiscal es procíclica y que la política económica está supeditada al funcionamiento del capital financiero, por lo que la política fiscal no resuelve los problemas económicos del país. ; Avalia-se a relação entre a política fiscal e a dívida pública no quadro da financeirização da economia. É realizado um estudo teórico-analítico, o qual é complementado com uma regressão econométrica. A importância desta análise reside no fato de que a dívida pública representa um problema para o desenvolvimento dos países periféricos e as soluções propostas não conseguem transformar essa realidade. Conclui-se que, para o caso da Colômbia, a política fiscal é pró-cíclica e a política econômica depende da operação do capital financeiro, portanto a política fiscal não resolve os problemas econômicos do país.

- Foreword - Executive summary - A bird's eye view of fiscal decentralisation - Fiscal constitutions - Reforming the tax on immovable property - Taxes or grants: What revenue source for sub-central governments? - Monitoring sub-central government debt: Trends, challenges and practices - Spending power of sub-central governments.

This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. Results reveal evidence that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal policy at home and abroad. Also, there is evidence that domestic capital tax rates react: (i) positively to changes in capital tax rates in neighboring countries, and (ii) negatively to changes in public investment spending in neighboring countries. In contrast, strategic interdependence over public investment spending decisions is not established. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. The focus of this study is on aspects of public debt and austerity policy in the UK. It attempts to provide an evaluation of fiscal policy under neoliberalism and to consider the relationship between this policy and the macroeconomic performance of the UK economy. There also seems to be ambiguities among the policy makers about austerity. Therefore, it seems important to examine the issue of government imposed austerity policies and fiscal deficits. There is need to borrow to cover the deficits as there is no inflationary pressure in the UK. Most democratic solutions against any inflationary pressures are to reduce money in circulation through higher taxes. Further I argue that a number of counter measures could possibly be taken such as placing a requirement on financial institutions such as pension funds to place some minimum proportion of their asset portfolio into government stock. Keywords. Public Debts, Fiscal policy, Austerity, Neoliberalism.JEL. E63, H62.

In this paper we reconsider the trade‐off between rules and discretion in fiscal policy in the presence of politically motivated fiscal deficits. We present a model of political bias in the budget process appropriately developed to allow for tax‐smoothing‐motivated deficits as well as for the consideration of deficit biases in open economies. We find that endowing politically‐biased governments with the ability to respond to economic shocks with deficit finance will not exacerbate the existing biases. In an open economy, the ability to borrow abroad will significantly increase the deficit. However, restrictions to public foreign borrowing will not reduce the political bias as long as the private sector has access to international capital markets at the same terms as the government.

In this paper, we analyze politicians' expectations about future compliance with a fiscal rule, and in particular the dependence of the expectations on their role in parliament (opposition vs. incumbent government coalition). In addition, we explore how opposition and incumbent politicians adjust their expectations differently when new information on the fiscal environment becomes available. Answering these questions helps in understanding whether long-term policy goals like sustainable debt levels can be reached despite changes of executive power between parties. We study these questions in the context of the German debt brake, which became a constitutional provision in 2009 but is binding for the sub-national states from 2020 onwards only. We analyze compliance expectations of parliamentarians of all 16 German state parliaments based on a unique survey, conducted in 2011/2012 and 2014/16. We find a strong incumbency effect, making politicians from the governing coalition more optimistic than those from the opposition. A negative fiscal shock has little effects on the former, but a strongly negative one on the latter.