Suchergebnisse

The seventh annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development took place in Mexico City, Mexico, from September 3 to 12, 1952, under the chairmanship of Horacio Lafer, Minister of Finance of Brazil. Two of the Boards seven plenary sessions were joint sessions with the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund. In presenting the seventh annual report of the Bank to the Board, the President (Black) indicated that private participation in Bank lending would become an increasingly important feature of its operations and that from then on European countries would have to rely more on their own savings and mobilize their own capital more effectively. Mr. Black said that "the Bank, should it be called on, would be glad to search for feasible ways to assist" the European Coal and Steel Community. At the opening session the Chairman (Lafer) stated that the International Monetary Fund "must take a more active role" in using its resources, helping its members find a practical solution to their ex-change problems, and providing greater facilities for meeting temporary un-balance in international payments. He said that "it would be preferable to establish a system which would not compel countries to resort to harmful regimes of severe restrictions", and that without "an international mechanism capable of supplying credits to an extent corresponding to the general credit Worthiness of each country, it will be impossible to attain the kind of multilateral trade we all hope to restore."

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

In the last decades the interaction between labour standards and international trade has assumed new importance. We use an incentive based-approach to assess the efficiency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instruments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we find that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the Southern firm, due to free riding effect. ; Ces dernières années, la relation entre normes du travail et commerce international s'est intensifiée. Nous utilisons une approche basée sur les incitations pour évaluer l'efficacité des instruments de politiques commerciales et des mécanismes privés pour la promotion des normes internationales du travail dans les firmes du Sud. Nous montrons que les instruments de politiques commerciales peuvent appliquer les normes minimales. Cependant, nous trouvons que les mecanismes privés peuvent dépasser les normes minimales si et seulement si, il existe un contrat exclusif entre l'entreprise multinationale et le sous-traitant, due à l'effet de passager clandestin.

Public international law, through its rules regulating the dealings between independent nations, purports to impose limits on the actions of all governments, including those of the United States. In this context American lawyers interested in foreign relations may reasonably wonder whether American courts would enforce rules of public international law purporting to bind the United States against the United States government, particularly the executive branch. A fair number of Supreme Court cases have dealt with the enforce ability of treaties in American courts.' Treaties, however, are only one source of international law. The other important source, customary international law, is neither expressly mentioned in the Constitution nor much discussed in Supreme Court cases. Customary international law also differs in important respects from treaties. Treaties are by necessity purely consensual arrangements between the parties. Rules of customary law, as the definition implies, are matters of general practice that can come into existence if a practice can fairly be labelled "general." Thus, a state that did not actively participate in the practice that culminated in the creation of a rule could find itself bound by the rule anyway, at least if that state did not actively dissent during the period of the rule's gestation. Recently, the question whether the federal courts have the authority to compel the President to adhere to rules of customary international law has drawn comment from writers interested in the subject. Some have taken the position that the courts in fact possess such authority, at least when Congress has not by statute established for the United States a rule different from that which international law would apply to the issue in question.' According to these writers, one withstanding to complain of a contemplated presidential action that would violate customary international law should be able to obtain from a federal court an injunction forbidding the action. For example, some have suggested that ...

Forty-eight nations were represented at the fourth annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was held in Washington from September 13 to 16, 1949. Maurice Petsche, Minister of Finance of France and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Bank, acted as chairman and as co-chairman at the joint sessions with the International Monetary Fund.