Suchergebnisse

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play an active and noteworthy role in governance, both at the national and international level. Three questions arise: First, how do CSOs exercise their advocacy, what repertoires, strategies and resources do they use? Second, to what degree are they legitimized to do so? Third, are there systematic differences between member and non-member CSOs, respectively between policy fields? Based on a survey of 60 exemplary CSOs covering four distinct international-level policy making fora, we will inquire into these questions. The central finding is that membership CSOs neither differ substantially from non-member CSOs in their roles and strategies of dealing with International Organizations, nor do they differ in other aspects of legitimacy, such as transparency or inclusion of beneficiaries. There are no systematic patterns in CSOs properties or behavior which correspond to policy fields. ; Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen (ZGO) spielen im modernen Regieren eine wichtige Rolle, sowohl im Staat als auch auf internationaler Ebene. Drei Forschungsfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieses Papiers: Erstens, wie genau nehmen ZGO am Regierungsprozess teil und welche Einflussstrategien, Ressourcen und Handlungsrepertoire nutzen sie dabei? Zweitens, wie steht es um die Legitimation dieser Organisationen und ihrer Aktivitäten? Drittens, verhalten sich ZGO mit zahlreichen Mitgliedern systematisch anders als ZGO ohne Mitgliedschaft? Gestützt auf Daten von 60 transnationalen ZGO aus vier verschiedenen Politikfeldern gehen wir diesen Fragen nach. Zentrales Ergebnis ist, dass ZGO mit breiter Mitgliedschaft sich in ihren Rollenverständnis und ihren Einflussstrategien nicht grundlegend von anderen unterscheiden. Auch im Hinblick auf wichtige Aspekte ihrer Legitimität, wie etwa Transparenz oder Einbindung von Regelungsadressaten, gibt es keine auffälligen Unterschiede. Die Politikfelder, in denen ZGO aktiv sind, haben ebenfalls keinen messbaren Einfluss auf ihr Handlungsrepertoire und ihre politischen Strategien.

The problems of authority and legitimacy experienced by postcolonial states are often explained in terms of a 'colonial legacy'. This is examined, in the case of Ghana, by analysing changes in the kinds of legitimacy claimed by the state from the colonial period through decolonisation to independence. Concludes that, whilst the most enduring legacy of colonialism was the attempt to found legitimacy in particularistic, indigenous systems of law, the decolonisation process failed to transfer any one of the new, competing cliams to legitimacy which emerged. (Abstract amended)

On July 20, 1962, the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion concerning the expenditures of the United Nations for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and in the Congo. This Opinion is of the utmost importance, since it deals with a question affecting the very survival of the World Organization. The Court was asked to pronounce on the financial obligations of members in the fulfilment of the first purpose of the United Nations: the maintenance of international peace and security. The Opinion also involves the constitutional question of the division of powers between the General Assembly and the Security Council in the attainment of this basic purpose.

The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and fi rms, regardless of the ultimate origin - international, European or national - of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European 'government of governments' is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance - especially the rules of negative integration defi ned by politically non-accountable actors - may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply. ; Legitimität hat die Funktion, die freiwillige Befolgung unwillkommener Autoritätsakte zu sichern. Da das Europarecht fast vollständig von den Mitgliedstaaten und ihren Gerichten umgesetzt und durchgesetzt werden muss, kommt es nicht zu einer unmittelbaren Konfrontation der EU mit ihren Bürgern. Deshalb sollte auch die Legitimität des Regierens in Europa als Zweistufen-Konzept diskutiert werden. Auf der einen Ebene bestimmt die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten die Reaktion der Bürger auf unwillkommene Regeln oder Entscheidungen, ohne dass es dafür auf deren internationale, europäische oder nationale Herkunft ankäme. Dagegen entscheidet die Legitimität der EU als 'government of governments' darüber, ob die Mitgliedstaaten ihrerseits ihre europäischen Verpfl ichtungen freiwillig erfüllen. Anlass zu Besorgnis gibt allenfalls die Rückwirkung des europäischen Regierens - insbesondere der von politisch nicht verantwortlichen Instanzen defi nierten negativen Integration - auf die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten und letztlich auf deren Fähigkeit zur loyalen Umsetzung europäischer Regeln.

In The Captive Court, Ian Bushnell explores the judicial function of the Supreme Court of Canada from its establishment in the 1870s to the present day. He traces the evolution of the Court as a creative force in Canadian law and reveals its gradual recognition of the need to move from a literal, mechanical approach in interpretation to a more creative one. The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was of particular significance in forcing a re-evaluation of judicial function.

AbstractThis article interrogates the widely held, but rarely defended, view that states wield legitimate power over potential immigrants when and because they refrain from violating their human rights. I reconstruct a strong argument for this view, which turns on a claim about the limited power states claim over migrants. Drawing on recent empirical work, I show how this argument is inapplicable to the border regimes of a set of wealthy democracies. These regimes are characterized by a practice that is coordinated and extraterritorial in a way that undercuts the case for holding them to a minimal legitimacy standard. By participating in this practice, these states wield significant power over potential immigrants. I argue that this power exposes potential immigrants to novel risk, which in turn triggers a demand for the satisfaction of a higher standard of legitimation.