Suchergebnisse

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the strength of ceasefires in intra-state conflict. The framework is based on the perspectives of ceasefire practitioners. The practitioners view the essence of ceasefire design as the reduction and management of risk, which ranges in severity from violations to complete breakdown of the ceasefire agreement. The framework identifies three determinants of ceasefire risk: the design's objective quality, being the extent to which the ceasefire arrangements reduce and manage risk; the design's subjective quality, being the parties' satisfaction with these arrangements; and the will of the parties to end the conflict through negotiations. Each dimension is negatively associated with risk, such that strong objective quality, strong subjective quality, and strong political will reduce the level of risk. We explore the effects of these dimensions and the relationship between them. We discuss two exceptions to the standard thesis that objectively strong design leads to subjectively strong design and ceasefire durability: "spurious agreements," which are signed by the parties under duress with no intention of honoring them, and preliminary ceasefires, which the parties generally prefer to be objectively weak. We illustrate the conceptual framework through case studies of ceasefires in Sudan and South Sudan.

Costs associated with recognizing an internal armed challenger as a legitimate bargaining partner deter governments from initiating peace talks. Yet peaceful termination of conflict requires formal negotiations between the belligerents. This article presents evidence that democratic reforms provide a window of opportunity for peace talks. Democratic reforms represent an opportunity to break away from the past policies of the state and render the conflict as an artifact of the preceding authoritarian institutions. The article contributes to the research field by enhancing our ability to predict negotiations. It also highlights that democratic reforms can be undertaken during an ongoing civil conflict.

The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This article posits that the design of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence affects civil war termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider central bank independence as a good signal in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, central bank independence is associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) central bank independence is associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes. Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e. they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation.