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In democratic countries, the so-called covert actions are the most controversial element of the intelligence services activities. Covert actions are secret operations aimed, inter alia, at influencing the political, economic or military situation of other countries (e.g., inspiring coups d'état, paramilitary actions, assassinations, training and financing of armed troops or the use of "black" propaganda). Covert actions are a powerful tool in the hands of the executive, but they should be effectively controlled by the legislative authority. The purpose of the article is to analyze the powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America to control covert actions. The author presents current legal and organizational solutions and also indicates how, under the influence of successive covert action scandals, legal provisions have changed in the direction of extending the powers of the Congress in the field of control. At the same time, the author presents problems with the interpretation of some legal solutions in the context of the supervision of the Congress after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the extension of covert actions to include actions of special forces and targeted killings of terrorists.

'Third countries' are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export licensing officials, and intelligence services. While 'third countries' frequently feature in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia – A. Q. Khan's nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea's efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators' selection of 'third country' hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.

Abstract'Third countries' are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export licensing officials, and intelligence services. While 'third countries' frequently feature in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia – A. Q. Khan's nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea's efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators' selection of 'third country' hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.

В настоящей статье проанализирован состав цифровой коллекции документов британской разведки «Секретные файлы: от мировых войн - к холодной войне» и информационный потенциал данного источника для анализа дипломатического курса Французского комитета национального освобождения и Временного правительства Французской республики под руководством генерала Ш. Де Голля. Помимо указанных источников, в работе использовались материалы прессы, опубликованные дипломатические документы, дневники и мемуары. Согласно выводам статьи, документы цифровой коллекции «Секретные файлы: от мировых войн - к холодной войне» позволяют подробнее раскрыть ряд малоизученных сюжетов, связанных с голлистской дипломатией. ; The article deals with the structure of the digital collection of the British intelligence service documents "Secret files: From World wars to Cold War" and the potential of this source that can be used in the analysis of the foreign policy pursued by the French Committee of National Liberation and the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Besides the mentioned above sources the research is based on the press, published diplomatic documents, diaries and memoirs. According to the conclusions of this article the documents of the collection "Secret files: From World wars to Cold War" enable the historians to examine in greater detail a lot of seldom studied problems linked to the Gaullist diplomacy.

In December 18, 2012, Gokturk-2 satellite has been launched to the space from the Jiuguan station in China. The satellite has the pushbroom camera, which could enable to take panchromatic imaging with 2.5 m resolution and multispectral imaging with 5 m resolution at the height of 685 km. Satisfying the requests of Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish government agencies and institutes for satellite images has been aimed by the data provided by Gokturk-2 satellite. High Resolution Satellite Images (HRSI) have been extensively used in such fields as mapping, intelligence service, exploration, monitoring of environment, agriculture and change tracking; mapping is one of the most widespread application areas of HRSI.In order to use satellite images like a map, geometric deformations should be removed; in other words, the deformations are required to be orthorectified. The model, Ground Control Points (GCP) and Digital Elevation Models are needed for an accurate orthorectification application.In this study, block adjustment was made by using 20*60 km sized stereo image of Gokturk-2 satellite, GCPs and Check Points (CP) in different numbers. Average errors in X, Y, Z dimensions were analyzed at the end of the adjustment. Furthermore, the accuracy of Digital Elevation Model was controlled by the heights of primary bench marks.

This paper analyses the disputed election of President Park Geun-hye and her administration's confrontation of left-nationalist politicians and other social movements during her first year in office. We argue that the Park administration's policies resonate with contemporary discussions of "post-democratisation,� a process whereby social rights are increasingly subordinated to market logics and state power insulated from popular challenges. Under the conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, this process has been animated by a mode of confrontation known in South Korea as "politics by public security.� This politics targets social conflict and political dissent as threats to national security and has involved both illegal interventions by state institutions —such as the 2012 electoral interference by state agencies including the National Intelligence Service—and a cultural politics that affirms but revises the narrative of Korean democratisation by obfuscating the nature of the democracy movement and by attempting to restore the honour of conservative forces associated with former dictatorships. In order to better understand this conjuncture, we explore its origin within a tacit alliance between both former public security prosecutors-cum-conservative politicians and a movement of conservative intellectuals known as the New Right.

From 1967 till today, the gendered subjectivities of Palestinian activists incarcerated in Israel have evolved according to their political and armed mobilizations and the conditions of their detention. Up till the First Intifada, prison was a site of training for political women who asserted their activism in the context of secular parties (Fatah, leftwing parties) and feminism. When, in the course of interrogations, the Israeli intelligence services turned to forms of physical and psychological abuse tied to their gender and sexuality, these women violently experienced the conflict at the level of their bodies. In response, they resignified these stigmata as so many markers of their engagement. Following the Oslo peace agreement, their actions became more diversified. Faced with the repression of the Second Intifada, they threw themselves into martyrdom operations. Violence, however, is denied in their accounts and bodies appear sexualized and feminine. Secular activists were then joined by others belonging to religious parties (Hamas, Islamic Jihad). As the experience of incarceration became commonplace, new ways of living beyond prison gradually emerged. Former inmates established feminine collective networks and their activism and periods of imprisonment came to be seen as sources of transformation for gender relations.

From 1967 till today, the gendered subjectivities of Palestinian activists incarcerated in Israel have evolved according to their political and armed mobilizations and the conditions of their detention. Up till the First Intifada, prison was a site of training for political women who asserted their activism in the context of secular parties (Fatah, leftwing parties) and feminism. When, in the course of interrogations, the Israeli intelligence services turned to forms of physical and psychological abuse tied to their gender and sexuality, these women violently experienced the conflict at the level of their bodies. In response, they resignified these stigmata as so many markers of their engagement. Following the Oslo peace agreement, their actions became more diversified. Faced with the repression of the Second Intifada, they threw themselves into martyrdom operations. Violence, however, is denied in their accounts and bodies appear sexualized and feminine. Secular activists were then joined by others belonging to religious parties (Hamas, Islamic Jihad). As the experience of incarceration became commonplace, new ways of living beyond prison gradually emerged. Former inmates established feminine collective networks and their activism and periods of imprisonment came to be seen as sources of transformation for gender relations.

Использование технологий социальных медиа стало одним из основных факторов антиправительственных выступлений в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке, давая возможность протестующим обмениваться информацией и получать прямой доступ к мировой аудитории. Этот новый уровень доступности информации также имел значимые последствия для конфликта в Ливии, причем оказывая влияние как на повстанцев, так и на операции НАТО. В ходе исследования делается вывод, что военных и спецслужбы в будущем будет все в большей степени интересовать, как использовать «новые» СМИ или избежать их внимания. Поэтому они вынуждены включать социальные медиа в процессы оперативного планирования. ; The use of new media technologies has become one of the major factors in anti-government riots in North Africa and the Middle East. These technologies gave protesters an opportunity to exchange information and push their case to foreign audience. This new level of availability of information had important consequences for the Libyan conflict influencing both the militants and the NATO forces. In our study we conclude that in the future both the military and the intelligence services will be more and more interested in either the use of new media or in escaping their attention. That is why they will be including new and social media in their operation planning processes.

Статья основана на архивных материалах органов безопасности Сибирского региона. На примере жизненного пути китайского студента Чжана Ючжана рассматривается тема влияния политических репрессий в Советской России на судьбы коммунистов Китая. Увлекшись идеями Маркса, Ленина и лидера китайской революции Мао Дзедуна, молодой коммунист Чжан Ючжан в 1928 г. приехал на учебу в Россию. Не особенно разбираясь в основах марксистско-ленинской теории, уже в 1930 г. Чжан Ючжан был причислен к подпольной «троцкистской» организации и осужден. Последующие несколько десятков лет ему пришлось провести в России под фамилией Сойкин, пережив аресты, суды, исправительно-трудовые лагеря ; The article is based on documentary materials from Siberian archives of Russian intelligence service. By example of a Chinese student's life, the problem of influence of political repression in Soviet Russia on the Chinese communists' fates is investigated. Being captivated by the ideas of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and the Chinese revolution leader Mao Zedong, he came to Russia in 1928 to study communism. Having a vague idea about the fundamentals of Marx-Lenin political theory by 1930 the student was considered to be a member of an underground "Trotskyist" organization and was convicted. He had to spend the following 30 years in Russia with a surname 'Soykin' suffering arrests, trials and prison.

The use of state terrorism by the 1982–86 PSOE administration undermined Spanish democracy and fostered support for ETA. Efforts to cover up this dirty war scandal, and to manipulate it for short-term political gain, compounded the damage. However, the investigation of the GAL
death squads by the judiciary and media indicates growing democratic maturity. The PP's very different counter-terrorism strategy has left an ambiguous legacy: legitimate police action has critically weakened ETA, but Aznar's hostility to Basque nationalism in general has left the region more
politically polarized than ever. His instrumentalization of the 9/11 attacks to gain international support against ETA led him to support the invasion of Iraq, but paradoxically caused him to underestimate the growing domestic danger of Islamic terrorism. The new PSOE administration has been
slow to reform the intelligence services and take other measures necessary to counter this threat. The government and the PP have played a blame game about the March 11 bombings, to the detriment of a clear democratic strategy against radical Islamism. Dirty war tactics have no place in the
'international war on terrorism'. When democracy breaks its best rules to fight terrorism, democracy loses and terrorism makes gains.

An enduring paradox lies at the heart of Brazilian politics. The Brazilian Army has long suffered from corruption at the highest levels so extreme as to create disquiet throughout the institution. Yet the Brazilian military, like other armed forces in Latin America, has justified its involvement in politics and society by accusing civilians of corruption. Despite repeated revelations of military corruption, soldiers and civilians as well have sometimes accepted the armed forces' use of this moral discourse. For example, an anonymous businessman wrote General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro on 30 November 1954: "The country is on the brink of financial and economic ruin. This state of things is the result of the abuses of past governments and of the deceased President Vargas and the generalized corruption. … The only solution for the reestablishment of confidence in the exterior would be the delivery of the government to a military dictatorship" (emphasis in the original).2 Thirty years later, at the close of authoritarian rule in Brazil, a daring journalist named Carlos Alberto de Carli exposed rampant corruption within the military's intelligence services. Yet Carli himself dedicated his book in part to "the armed forces—the moral reserves of our people" (cover page, Carli 1985).

How was Bletchley Park made as an organization? How was signals intelligence constructed as a field? What was Bletchley Park's culture and how was its work co-ordinated? Bletchley Park was not just the home of geniuses such as Alan Turing, it was also the workplace of thousands of other people, mostly women, and their organization was a key component in the cracking of Enigma. Challenging many popular perceptions, this book examines the hitherto unexamined complexities of how 10,000 people were brought together in complete secrecy during World War II to work on ciphers. Unlike most organizational studies, this book decodes, rather than encodes, the processes of organization and examines the structures, cultures and the work itself of Bletchley Park using archive and oral history sources. Organization theorists, intelligence historians and general readers alike will find in this book a challenge to their preconceptions of both Bletchley Park and organizational analysis