Ülkelerin diplomatik düzeyde güç sahibi olabilme çabalarına ilişkin tartışmalar Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında önemli bir yer tutmuştur. Güç, en temel anlamı ile bir devletin bir başka devlet üzerindeki etki durumu olarak elen alınmaktadır. Güçlü olan devletlerin bir diğeri üzerinde etkin olabilmesi, istediği neticeyi alabilmesi ve hatta uluslararası sistemi biçimlendirebilme durumu güç kazanmanın yol ve yöntemleri hakkında birtakım çalışmalar gerektirmiştir. Bu çalışmalar, hangi güç unsurları ile güç elde edebilmenin mümkün olduğuna dair tartışmaları ortaya çıkarmıştır. Askeri kapasite, ekonomik durum, enerji üretimi, diplomasi, çelik üretimi, coğrafya gibi konularda avantajların gücü ne derece etkilediğine dair çalışmalar yapılmış ve matematiksel denklemler aracılığı ile sayısal olarak ifade edilmiştir. Böylelikle birçok farklı güç denklemi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle güç kavramı detaylı bir biçimde incelenmiş, ardından bir siyasetçi olarak Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan'ın hayatı ve savunduğu hak anlayışına dolayısıyla da kuruluşuna öncülük ettiği Kalkınan 8 Ülke (D-8)'e üye ülkelerin uluslararası düzeyde güç kazanabilmeleri ve uzun vadede uluslararası sistemi biçimlendirebilme gücünü elde edebilmelerine ilişkin düşünceleri ele alınmıştır. Mevcut dünya düzenini "ezen – ezilen" düzeni olarak tarif eden Erbakan, ekonomik işbirliği aracılığıyla kalkınma, kendi ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilme, bağımlılığı azaltma ve neticede güç kazanımı ile bu düzenin değişmesi idealini ortaya koymuştur. Bu ideali İslam Birliği düşüncesi ve vizyonu ile İslam ülkelerinde bir fikri dönüşüme sebep olmuş ve sonuç olarak D-8 kurulmuştur. Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan'ın büyük manalar yüklemiş olduğu D-8'e üye ülkelerin genel durumu ortaya koyularak Wilhelm Fucks'un "güçlü olmanın yolunun çelik üretiminden geçtiği" düşüncesi ile öne sürdüğü güç denklemi referans alınmış ve referans alınan güç denklemi ışığında D-8 ile dünya ekonomisinde ilk sıralarda yer alan muhtemel dört rakibi ile verileri karşılaştırmalı olarak hesaplanmış, ardından analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında yapılan hesaplama ve analizler sonucunda denklemin değerleri olan çelik üretimi ve enerji tüketimindeki artışın güç denklemine yansımaları ve D-8'in güç denklemi sıralamasında öne geçmesi için çelik üretimine dair adımlar atması gerektiği görülmüştür. ; The endeavors of countries for gaining and holding diplomatic power have been widely discussed within the field of International Relations. The concept of power in its essence refers to the effect of one country over another country. The fact that a powerful country may become effective over another one, that it may acquire the desired results out of an event, and even that it may shape the international system have required studies on the methods and practices realized to gain power. These studies have brought out the discussions about which elements of power enables the countries to gain power in the international arena. Many studies have been carried out on how and to what extent the power is affected by military capacity, economic status, energy generation, diplomacy, steel production and geographical characteristics, and the results have been shown in quantitative data through mathematical equations. As a result of this, there are many different power equations utilized in the field. This study firstly analyzes the concept of power in detail, and then continues with the life story of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, a political figure, whose sense of rights guided the foundation of the Developing Eight (D-8). In this regard, the study focuses on the ideas of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan regarding the power gains of the D-8 member countries, and thus their potential capacity to shape the international system in the long run. Erbakan, describing the current world order as consisting of "oppressor-oppressed", suggests the objective to change this order through development by economical cooperation, self-sufficiency, less dependency on other countries, and thus gaining power. This ideal, along with the Islam Union ideas and vision, has caused an ideological change for the Islam countries, as a result of which D-8 has been founded. After presenting the overall statement of D-8 member countries, highly appraised by Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, this study bases its discussions on the power equation by Wilhelm Fucks proposed on the grounds that "being powerful equals to steel production." In the light of this reference equation, the data acquired from D-8 and its four potential rivals, which are lead countries in terms of world economy, are comparatively calculated, and then analyzed. The calculations and analysis carried out within the framework of this study have demonstrated how the increase in steel production and energy consumption is reflected on power equation, reaching to the conclusion that D-8 is required to take further steps in steel production in order to move up in the power equation rankings.
This article analyses Peter I's visit to Paris in a long-term historical perspective (la longue durée; from the late fourteenth to the early twentieth century) and in juxtaposition with those of other sovereign monarchs of Europe, including Russian emperors who visited the French capital after Peter I. Due to all the difficulties in determining the place of the Russian tsar in the hierarchy of Christian princes and despite many problems in bilateral relations, the French court was obliged to render Peter I honours equivalent to sovereigns of the "first rank" (such as a military escort, royal carriages, and royal residences, the palaces of the Louvre, Versailles, Trianon, and Marley). When communicating with the regent, Duke Philip of Orleans, the latter showed priority honours to his crowned counterpart, which was not usually done for secondary monarchs. At the same time, in order to prevent etiquette embarrassments and not to lower the honour of the French royal house, the visit of Peter the Great was styled as a semi-official one, with some elements of an incognito visit. The usage of royal titles, which was a sensitive issue for traditionalist Moscow diplomacy, was also curious. Avoiding problems with the translation of the title "Grand Duke" (grand-duc), equivalent in the Western tradition to the title of a minor sovereign, the French began to use the title "Majesty" (Majesté), comparable with the Latin title "Caesarea Majestas", applicable to German emperors. It is particularly noteworthy that Peter I became the founder of a certain etiquette tradition, which later, in the 19th century, was reproduced by other monarchs. He laid down a kind of protocol route through the landmarks of the French capital with a mandatory visit to the Mint, where they coined a commemorative medal in memory of the visit. Finally, the organisation of the Russian tsar's stay in Paris became a model for official high-level visits. Peter the Great's journey of 1717 should be placed in the long sequence of royal and princely visits to France from the Middle Ages to the 19th century. Comparisons with the ceremonial of previous royal sojourns help us understand the tsar's aims and the intentions of the French court toward its guest. The 1717 visit was neither completely "incognito" nor totally official but secured the advantages of both solutions for Peter. ; Анализируется визит Петра I в Париж в контексте долгой исторической перспективы других суверенных монархов Европы (с конца XIV до начала ХХ в.), включая русских императоров, посещавших французскую столицу после него. Автор делает ряд интересных заключений, доказывая, что при всех сложностях с определением места русского царя в иерархии христианских государей и проблемах двусторонних отношений французский двор вынужден был оказывать ему почести, равнозначные тем, которые оказывались суверенам первого ранга (сопровождение гвардейским эскортом, предоставление королевских экипажей и в качестве мест проживания королевских резиденций – Лувра, Версаля, Трианона и Марли). Не вызывает сомнения автора и то, что при общении с регентом, герцогом Филиппом Орлеанским, последний демонстрировал приоритетные почести своему венценосному vis-à-vis, чего обычно не делалось для второстепенных монархов. В то же время, чтобы снять этикетные неловкости и не уронить честь французского королевского дома, визит Петра I был протокольно обставлен как полуофициальный, с некоторыми элементами инкогнито. Любопытны и находки в области использования царской титулатуры, к чему была так чувствительна традиционная московская дипломатия. Избегая проблем с переводом титула «великий князь», равнозначного в западной традиции титулу «великий герцог» (то есть титулу второстепенного суверена), французы стали употреблять обращение «царское величество», созвучное латинскому обращению «Caesarea Majestas», приложимому к германским императорам. Особого внимания заслуживает вывод автора о том, что Петр стал основателем определенной этикетной традиции, которую позже, в XIX в., воспроизводили другие монархи. Он заложил своего рода протокольный маршрут по знаковым местам французской столицы с обязательным посещением Монетного двора, где чеканили памятную медаль в память о пребывании высокого гостя. Наконец, организация пребывания русского царя в Париже, по мнению автора, стала в целом провозвестником официальных визитов на высшем уровне современного типа. Путешествие Петра I в 1717 г. должно быть помещено в контекст длительных королевских и княжеских визитов во Францию от Средневековья до XIX в. Сравнения с церемонией предыдущих королевских времен помогают понять цели царя и намерения французского двора по отношению к гостю. Путешествие 1717 г. не было полным инкогнито и не было полностью официальным, но обеспечило Петру преимущества обоих вариантов.
When the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state's international relations was ending, they suggested Stanisław August to turn to Russia. Because of their initiative, the king introduced several members of the St. Petersburg court to the Guardians of the Laws. Yet, it did not reorient Polish foreign policy. Having strengthened his position, Stanisław August was delaying direct talks with the empress. He was convinced, that to avoid Russian intervention in the Commonwealth's internal affairs, one should not provoke Russians and appease any internal conflicts. That assumption turned to be wrong, though. Contrary to the views of the vast majority of Polish historians, who believed that Russian intervention in Poland was predetermined, the St. Petersburg court was divided, when it came to the policy on the Polish-Lithuanian state. Some advisers of Catherine II believed, that without a final agreement with German courts, one should not start a war with the Commonwealth, because it would be hard, long-lasting and costly. Yet, views of Polish malcontents and empress's favorite, Platon A. Zubov, were taken into account, and a military operation was launched, without looking at Vienna and Berlin's position. A passive diplomacy turned out to be a fatal mistake of the Polish king and his advisers. The concept of a limited warfare was equally wrong. The weak resistance of the Polish army strengthened the position of the empress's favorite. When Stanisław August's letter to Catherine II arrived at St. Petersburg, already in the course of war, at the Russian court a group of war opponents took a final attempt to stop hostilities, and start negotiations with the Commonwealth's ruler. However, successes of empress's troops, that rapidly moved towards Warsaw after the withdrawing Poles, favored supporters of an armed intervention. The king and his advisers ceased to believe in the possibility of victory too soon, and capitulated at the time, when there was still a chance to continue the war, a prolongation of which by several weeks might have prompted the empress to start peace negotiations. It was a great political mistake, which turned out to be the beginning of the end of the First Republic. ; Po uchwaleniu Konstytucji 3 maja ułożenie stosunków z Rosją było najważniejszą kwestią z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej. Widząc wygasanie pomyślnej dla państwa polsko-litewskiego koniunktury w stosunkach międzynarodowych, przywódcy Sejmu Wielkiego zasugerowali Stanisławowi Augustowi dokonanie zwrotu ku Rosji. To z ich inicjatywy król wprowadził do Straży Praw kilku stronników dworu petersburskiego. Nie pociągnęło to jednak za sobą reorientacji polskiej polityki zagranicznej. Umocniwszy swoją pozycję, Stanisław August zwlekał z nawiązaniem bezpośrednich rozmów z cesarzową. Był przekonany, że wystarczy nie prowokować Rosjan i łagodzić wszelkie konflikty wewnętrzne, żeby uniknąć rosyjskiej interwencji w wewnętrzne sprawy Rzeczypospolitej. Założenie to okazało się błędne. Wbrew twierdzeniu ogromnej większości historyków polskich, którzy uważali, że rosyjska interwencja w Polsce była z góry przesądzona, na dworze petersburskim do ostatniej chwili trwały spory i dyskusje dotyczące kształtu polityki wobec państwa polsko-litewskiego. Część doradców Katarzyny II była zdania, że bez ostatecznego porozumienia z dworami niemieckimi nie należy zaczynać wojny z Rzecząpospolitą, gdyż będzie ona ciężka, długotrwała i kosztowna. Namowy polskich malkontentów sprawiły jednak, że ostatecznie zwyciężyła, lansowana przez faworyta cesarzowej – Płatona A. Zubowa, koncepcja rozpoczęcia działań zbrojnych bez oglądania się na stanowisko Wiednia i Berlina. Bierność dyplomatyczna okazała się fatalnym błędem polskiego króla i jego doradców. Równie błędna była koncepcja prowadzenia wojny w ograniczonym tylko zakresie. Słaby opór polskich armii umacniał bowiem pozycję faworyta cesarzowej. Już w trakcie działań wojennych, po nadejściu do Petersburga listu Stanisława Augusta do Katarzyny II, grupa przeciwników wojny na dworze rosyjskim podjęła ostatnią próbę przerwania działań zbrojnych i rozpoczęcia rozmów z władcą Rzeczypospolitej. Sukcesy wojsk cesarzowej, które w ślad za wycofującymi się Polakami zmierzały szybko w kierunku Warszawy działały jednak na korzyść zwolenników zbrojnej interwencji. Król i jego doradcy zbyt szybko przestali wierzyć w możliwość odniesienia zwycięstwa i skapitulowali w chwili, kiedy wciąż istniały szanse na kontynuowanie wojny, której przedłużenie o kilka tygodni mogło skłonić cesarzową do wyrażenia zgody na rozpoczęcie negocjacji pokojowych. Był to fatalny błąd polityczny, który okazał się w konsekwencji początkiem końca pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej.
When the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state's international relations was ending, they suggested Stanisław August to turn to Russia. Because of their initiative, the king introduced several members of the St. Petersburg court to the Guardians of the Laws. Yet, it did not reorient Polish foreign policy. Having strengthened his position, Stanisław August was delaying direct talks with the empress. He was convinced, that to avoid Russian intervention in the Commonwealth's internal affairs, one should not provoke Russians and appease any internal conflicts. That assumption turned to be wrong, though. Contrary to the views of the vast majority of Polish historians, who believed that Russian intervention in Poland was predetermined, the St. Petersburg court was divided, when it came to the policy on the Polish-Lithuanian state. Some advisers of Catherine II believed, that without a final agreement with German courts, one should not start a war with the Commonwealth, because it would be hard, long-lasting and costly. Yet, views of Polish malcontents and empress's favorite, Platon A. Zubov, were taken into account, and a military operation was launched, without looking at Vienna and Berlin's position. A passive diplomacy turned out to be a fatal mistake of the Polish king and his advisers. The concept of a limited warfare was equally wrong. The weak resistance of the Polish army strengthened the position of the empress's favorite. When Stanisław August's letter to Catherine II arrived at St. Petersburg, already in the course of war, at the Russian court a group of war opponents took a final attempt to stop hostilities, and start negotiations with the Commonwealth's ruler. However, successes of empress's troops, that rapidly moved towards Warsaw after the withdrawing Poles, favored supporters of an armed intervention. The king and his advisers ceased to believe in the possibility of victory too soon, and capitulated at the time, when there was still a chance to continue the war, a prolongation of which by several weeks might have prompted the empress to start peace negotiations. It was a great political mistake, which turned out to be the beginning of the end of the First Republic. ; Po uchwaleniu Konstytucji 3 maja ułożenie stosunków z Rosją było najważniejszą kwestią z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej. Widząc wygasanie pomyślnej dla państwa polsko-litewskiego koniunktury w stosunkach międzynarodowych, przywódcy Sejmu Wielkiego zasugerowali Stanisławowi Augustowi dokonanie zwrotu ku Rosji. To z ich inicjatywy król wprowadził do Straży Praw kilku stronników dworu petersburskiego. Nie pociągnęło to jednak za sobą reorientacji polskiej polityki zagranicznej. Umocniwszy swoją pozycję, Stanisław August zwlekał z nawiązaniem bezpośrednich rozmów z cesarzową. Był przekonany, że wystarczy nie prowokować Rosjan i łagodzić wszelkie konflikty wewnętrzne, żeby uniknąć rosyjskiej interwencji w wewnętrzne sprawy Rzeczypospolitej. Założenie to okazało się błędne. Wbrew twierdzeniu ogromnej większości historyków polskich, którzy uważali, że rosyjska interwencja w Polsce była z góry przesądzona, na dworze petersburskim do ostatniej chwili trwały spory i dyskusje dotyczące kształtu polityki wobec państwa polsko-litewskiego. Część doradców Katarzyny II była zdania, że bez ostatecznego porozumienia z dworami niemieckimi nie należy zaczynać wojny z Rzecząpospolitą, gdyż będzie ona ciężka, długotrwała i kosztowna. Namowy polskich malkontentów sprawiły jednak, że ostatecznie zwyciężyła, lansowana przez faworyta cesarzowej – Płatona A. Zubowa, koncepcja rozpoczęcia działań zbrojnych bez oglądania się na stanowisko Wiednia i Berlina. Bierność dyplomatyczna okazała się fatalnym błędem polskiego króla i jego doradców. Równie błędna była koncepcja prowadzenia wojny w ograniczonym tylko zakresie. Słaby opór polskich armii umacniał bowiem pozycję faworyta cesarzowej. Już w trakcie działań wojennych, po nadejściu do Petersburga listu Stanisława Augusta do Katarzyny II, grupa przeciwników wojny na dworze rosyjskim podjęła ostatnią próbę przerwania działań zbrojnych i rozpoczęcia rozmów z władcą Rzeczypospolitej. Sukcesy wojsk cesarzowej, które w ślad za wycofującymi się Polakami zmierzały szybko w kierunku Warszawy działały jednak na korzyść zwolenników zbrojnej interwencji. Król i jego doradcy zbyt szybko przestali wierzyć w możliwość odniesienia zwycięstwa i skapitulowali w chwili, kiedy wciąż istniały szanse na kontynuowanie wojny, której przedłużenie o kilka tygodni mogło skłonić cesarzową do wyrażenia zgody na rozpoczęcie negocjacji pokojowych. Był to fatalny błąd polityczny, który okazał się w konsekwencji początkiem końca pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej.
A unique 17th-century historical source, the diaries of Patrick Gordon, a Scot in Russian service, contains a great deal of information about Russian history. A close reading of the detailed record of daily events in the author's life reveals details about Russian life, which are not found in other documents. From Gordon's diaries and correspondence, the article's author extracted information, which helps us understand the functioning of the postal service in Russia in the late 17th century. Several aspects of the problem are treated. Firstly, information about his correspondents is systematized, including personal, official, and more casual acquaintances. Analysis of the correspondence underscores Gordon's wide-reaching national, social and familial connections. Secondly, the article describes the routes that letters traveled to and from their addressees. There was a clear preference for sending letters via special couriers or acquaintances who happened to be traveling, even if a government system of communication was available. Thirdly, the article establishes transit times and explains the possible objective or subjective reasons why they might be faster or be delayed. This analysis also reveals something about the interactions between Patrick Gordon and his contemporaries, which is evidenced by the frequency of the correspondence and the direct responses. The author discusses concrete circumstances around the organization of the official postal network and its development in its early stages.The publication of the article is in two thematically delineated parts. The first examines data about Gordon's communications network, such as communication routes, official and personal agreements, as well as speed and frequency of exchanges. To a degree the content of the letters is examined here, though their more detailed treatment is to be found in the second part of the article devoted to the analysis of how he obtained political news and intelligence information. Both parts are organized roughly chronologically: it is important to see what changes occurred over nearly half a century covered in the diaries.The author's conclusions provide evidence about the broad connections of Russia and Europe as well as the active diplomacy, which made it imperative in the Petrine era to establish a state postal system. In the case of Patrick Gordon, who was an active participant in the political process, we can see how it was essential for him to take advantage of all means of communication in order to maintain his extensive correspondence about political, military, and personal affairs. ; Уникальный исторический источник XVII в. — дневники шотландского подданного на российской службе Патрика Гордона — таят в себе немало сведений по русской истории. Подробное описание каждодневных событий из биографии автора при внимательном чтении обнаруживает такие детали российской жизни, которые не представлены ни в каких других документах. Автор статьи поставил задачу вычленить из дневников и переписки Патрика Гордона информацию, способную раскрыть состояние почтовой службы в России конца XVII в. Проблема поставлена в нескольких аспектах. Во-первых, систематизируются адресаты Гордона, учитывая частные, официальные и дружеские контакты. Анализ переписки свидетельствует об очень широких национальных, социальных и родовых связях ее героя. Во-вторых, обрисовываются маршруты, которыми письма шли к адресатам и обратно, выявляется предпочтение отправки писем с нарочными или попутными средствами, хотя начинает работать и государственный канал доставки. В-третьих, фиксируется время доставки и устанавливаются возможные объективные и субъективные причины ее ускорения или замедления. Попутно обращается внимание на взаимоотношения Патрика Гордона и его современников, проявляющиеся в частоте переписки и оперативности ответов. Уточняются конкретные обстоятельства организации официальной почтовой связи и ее развития на начальном этапе.Публикация статьи тематически разделена на две части. В первой рассматриваются данные о сети коммуникаций, которой пользовался Гордон, — о путях сообщения, официальных и личных договоренностях, скорости, частоте сообщений. В некоторой степени здесь раскрывается содержание писем, более подробно разбираемое автором во второй части статьи, посвященной анализу того, как Гордон получал политические новости и сведения разведки. В обеих частях данные приводятся преимущественно в хронологическом порядке: важно увидеть, какие изменения произошли почти за полвека, которые охватывают дневники.Выводы автора свидетельствуют об обширных связях России и Европы, активной дипломатической деятельности, в связи с чем для петровского времени стало актуально создание государственной службы почтовой связи. Новые качества обнаруживаются в личности Патрика Гордона, активного участника политического процесса в России, пользующегося малейшей возможностью коммуникации с различными адресатами политического, военного и дружеского свойства.
A unique 17th-century historical source, the diaries of Patrick Gordon, a Scot in Russian service, contains a great deal of information about Russian history. A close reading of the detailed record of daily events in the author's life reveals details about Russian life, which are not found in other documents. From Gordon's diaries and correspondence, the article's author extracted information, which helps us understand the functioning of the postal service in Russia in the late 17th century. Several aspects of the problem are treated. Firstly, information about his correspondents is systematized, including personal, official, and more casual acquaintances. Analysis of the correspondence underscores Gordon's wide-reaching national, social and familial connections. Secondly, the article describes the routes that letters traveled to and from their addressees. There was a clear preference for sending letters via special couriers or acquaintances who happened to be traveling, even if a government system of communication was available. Thirdly, the article establishes transit times and explains the possible objective or subjective reasons why they might be faster or be delayed. This analysis also reveals something about the interactions between Patrick Gordon and his contemporaries, which is evidenced by the frequency of the correspondence and the direct responses. The author discusses concrete circumstances around the organization of the official postal network and its development in its early stages.The publication of the article is in two thematically delineated parts. The first examines data about Gordon's communications network, such as communication routes, official and personal agreements, as well as speed and frequency of exchanges. To a degree the content of the letters is examined here, though their more detailed treatment is to be found in the second part of the article devoted to the analysis of how he obtained political news and intelligence information. Both parts are organized roughly chronologically: it is important to see what changes occurred over nearly half a century covered in the diaries.The author's conclusions provide evidence about the broad connections of Russia and Europe as well as the active diplomacy, which made it imperative in the Petrine era to establish a state postal system. In the case of Patrick Gordon, who was an active participant in the political process, we can see how it was essential for him to take advantage of all means of communication in order to maintain his extensive correspondence about political, military, and personal affairs. ; Уникальный исторический источник XVII в. – дневники шотландского подданного на российской службе Патрика Гордона – таит в себе немало сведений по русской истории. Подробное описание каждодневных событий из биографии автора при внимательном чтении обнаруживает такие детали российской жизни, которые не представлены ни в каких других документах. Автор статьи поставил задачу вычленить из дневников и переписки Патрика Гордона информацию, способную раскрыть состояние почтовой службы в России конца XVII в. Проблема поставлена в нескольких аспектах. Во-первых, систематизируются адресаты Гордона с учетом частных, официальных и дружеских контактов. Анализ переписки свидетельствует об очень широких национальных, социальных и родовых связях ее героя. Во-вторых, обрисовываются маршруты, которыми письма шли к адресатам и обратно, выявляется предпочтение отправки писем с нарочными или попутными средствами, хотя начинает работать и государственный канал доставки. В-третьих, фиксируется время доставки и устанавливаются возможные объективные и субъективные причины ее ускорения или замедления. Попутно обращается внимание на взаимоотношения Патрика Гордона и его современников, проявляющиеся в частоте переписки и оперативности ответов. Уточняются конкретные обстоятельства организации официальной почтовой связи и ее развития на начальном этапе.Статья тематически разделена на две части. В первой рассматриваются данные о сети коммуникаций, которой пользовался Гордон, – о путях сообщения, официальных и личных договоренностях, скорости, частоте сообщений. В некоторой степени здесь раскрывается содержание писем, более подробно разбираемое автором во второй части статьи, посвященной анализу того, как Гордон получал политические новости и сведения разведки. В обеих частях данные приводятся преимущественно в хронологическом порядке: важно увидеть, какие изменения произошли почти за полвека, которые охватывают дневники.Выводы автора свидетельствуют об обширных связях России и Европы, активной дипломатической деятельности, в связи с чем для Петровского времени стало актуальным создание государственной службы почтовой связи. Новые качества обнаруживаются в личности Патрика Гордона, активного участника политического процесса в России, пользовавшегося малейшей возможностью коммуникации с различными адресатами политического, военного и дружеского свойства.
In: Policy studies journal: the journal of the Policy Studies Organization, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 452-465
ISSN: 1541-0072
Books reviewed in this articles:Altshuler, Alan, Martin Anderson, Daniel Jones, Daniel Roos, and James Womach, The Future of the Automobile: the Report of MIT's International Automobile ProgramBenner, Jeffrey, Structure of Decision: The Indian Foreign Policy BureaucracyBerry, Jeffrey M., Feeding Hungry People: Rulemaking in the Food Stamp ProgramBertsch, Kenneth A., and Linda S. Shaw, The Nuclear Weapons IndustryBhide, Amar, Of Politics and Economic Reality: The Art of Winning Elections with Sound Economic PoliciesBinkin, Martin, America's Volunteer Military: Progress and ProspectsBrown, Lawrence D., James W. Fossett, and Kenneth T. Palmer, The Changing Politics of Federal GrantsBrowning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, Protest is Not Enough; The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban PoliticsChristie, Renfrew, Electricity, Industry and Class in South AfricaDilworth, Mary E. with V. Y‐Tessa Perry, Teachers' Totter: A Report on Teacher Certification IssuesFlammang, Janet A. (ed.), Political Women: Current Roles in State and Local GovernmentFloyd, Robert H., Clive S. Gray, and R.P. Short, Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies; Some Macroeconomic AspectsGere, Edwin A. Jr., Modernizing Local Government in Massachusetts; The Quest for Professionalism and ReformGodson, Roy, Labor in Soviet Global StrategyHargrove, Erwin C., and Samuel A. Morely (eds.), The President and the Council of Economic Advisers: Interviews with CEA ChairmenHargrove, Erwin C., and Michael Nelson, Presidents, Politics, and PolicyHess, Stephen, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their OfficesHewitt, Ed A., Energy, Economics, and Foreign Policy in the Soviet UnionHills, Jill, Information Technology and Industrial PolicyHolzer, Marc, and Stuart S. Nagel (eds.), Productivity and Public PolicyIppolito, Dennis S., Hidden Spending; the Politics of Federal Credit ProgramsIrwin, Manley Rutherford, Telecommunications America; Markets Without BoundariesJain, R.K. (ed.), China and Thailand, 1949–1983Johansen, Elaine, Comparable Worth: The Myth and the MovementJohnson, Chalmers (ed.), The Industrial Policy DebateJohnson, Loch K., The Making of International Agreements; Congress Confronts the ExecutiveKlein, Ethel, Gender Politics: From Consciousness to Mass Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), x + 209 pp.; ISBN 0‐674‐34196‐1, $16.50 hardcover.Klinger, Donald E., and John Nalbandian, Public Personnel Management: Contexts and StrategiesKronish, Rich, and Kenneth S. Mericle (eds.), The Political Economy of the Latin American Motor Vehicle IndustryLandsman, Stephan, The Adversary System: A Description and DefenseLogue, Dennis E., and Richard J. Rogalski, Managing Corporate Pension Plans: The Impacts of InflationLustgarten, Steven, Productivity and Prices; The Consequences of Industrial ConcentrationMakin, John H., The Global Debt Crisis: America's Growing InvolvementMarien, Michael, with Lane Jennings (eds.), Future Survey Annual, 1983: A Guide to the Recent Literature of Trends, Forecasts, and Policy ProposalsMilbrath, Lester W., with Barbara V. Fisher, Environmentalists; Vanguard for a New SocietyMiller, Edward B., Antitrust Laws and Employee Relations: An Analysis of Their Impact on Management and Union PoliciesMurray, Charles, Losing Ground; American Social Policy, 1950–1980Navarro, Peter, The Policy Game: How Special Interests and Ideologues are Stealing AmericaNess, Gayl, and Hirofumi Ando, The Land is Shrinking; Population Planning in AsiaNoelle‐Neumann, Elisabeth, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social SkinOrganski, A.F.K., Jacek Kugler, J. Timothy Johnson, and Youssef Cohen, Births, Deaths, and Taxes; The Demographic and Political TransitionsPalen, J. John, and Bruce London (eds.), Gentrification, Displacement and Neighborhood RevitalizationPearlman, Michael, To Make Democracy Safe for America; Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive EraPearton, Maurice, Diplomacy, War and Technology Since 1830Perry, Ronald W., and Alvin H. Mushkatel, Disaster Management: Warning Response and Community RelocationPorter, Paul R., and David C. Sweet (eds.), Rebuildng America's Cities: Roads to RecoveryPreston, Michael B., The Politics of Bureaucratic Reform; The Case of the California State Employment ServiceSarkesian, Sam C. (ed.), Presidential Leadership and National Security: Style, Institutions, and PoliticsSchweitzer, Carl‐Christoph, Detlev Karsten, Robert Spencer, R. Taylor Cole, Donald Kommers, and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany; Basic DocumentsSmith, Bruce L.R. (ed.), The Higher Civil Service in Europe and Canada: Lessons for the United StatesSmith, Steven S., and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in CongressTanzi, Vito (ed.), Taxation, Inflation, and Interest RatesVig, Norman J. and Michael E. Kraft (eds.), Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New AgendaWeintraub, Sidney, Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?Wireman, Peggy, Urban Neighborhoods, Networks, and Families: New Forms for Old ValuesWoolley, James T., Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary PolicyYager, Joseph A. with Shelley M. Matsuba, The Energy Balance in Northeast Asia
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
Fifty years is a long enough time to dissipate the impact of war. In the United States, the Vietnam War is no longer much discussed. Scholars still plow the field, but the war that tore America apart, spurred a counterculture movement, killed 57,000 Americans (and vastly more Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians), led to a restructuring of the U.S. military and the all-volunteer force, and was an impetus to Desert Storm no longer shapes the discourse.My students were born in 2002 or 2003; they're voting age. Even those with living grandparents who served in Vietnam don't know much if anything about the conflict. Of course, there have been intervening failures that proved costly, although not on the same scale. But proximity bias — the hard-wired human tendency to accord greater importance to things that are closer than others in time or distance — ensured that the mayhem generated by the Iraq and Afghan Wars would eclipse the awfulness of Vietnam.The Yom Kippur War of 1973 has likewise receded in the Israeli imagination. But its specter is more complex. The 2,500 Israeli soldiers killed (a fraction of the 15,000 Arabs who perished) was three times the per capita human cost of the Vietnam War to the United States. I was in Israel during that time, and everyone knew someone who'd been killed. The war was also far shorter, about 10 days, so the casualty list had an outsized emotional impact. It was not the long slog of Vietnam, but rather an avalanche.Early in the war, Syrian armor destroyed the Israeli tank brigade deployed to the Golan Heights and reached Gesher B'not Yaakov (Jisr Banat Yaqub). Just beyond it was the Jezreel Valley. The prospect of a large Syrian armored formation penetrating the Israeli heartland was as ghastly for Israelis as it must have been thrilling for the Syrians. The United States has never experienced anything like this, including 9/11.In the space of this instant, violence burgeoned. The largest tank battle since World War II, when German and Soviet armored juggernauts collided at Kursk, unfolded on the Golan. Fierce battles developed in the Sinai and then on the left bank of Suez, where Israeli forces encircled an entire Egyptian army. A week into the war, the U.S. launched its largest-ever intra-war arms transfer. For days, U.S. C-5 cargo aircraft touched down at Israeli airfields every six minutes. The airlift, however, occurred after Israel had regained its balance and counterattacked, halting an hour outside of Damascus and holding Egyptian territory — in addition to the Sinai, where Israel stopped the main thrust of Egyptian armor toward the mountains passes and destroyed the advancing units.The war also included other dramatic moments. Apparently believing that the Soviets were preparing to intervene militarily on Syria's behalf, the Nixon administration raised the United States' nuclear readiness level, an extraordinary step. Saudi Arabia led an OPEC oil embargo against the United States that carried profound implications for its economic and political stability for the ensuing decade, bringing the so-called long summer of postwar economic growth to an end and guaranteeing an era of sluggish economic growth and high inflation.The long-term effects of the war on Israel were profound as well. The outcome, despite the phenomenal recovery of Israeli forces under the much maligned but in fact highly competent IDF chief of staff, was traumatically dislocating for an Israeli public accustomed to thinking that its victory in the 1967 war rendered the state immune to Arab military challenge.Within four years, the Labor Party that had dominated Israeli politics in one form or another since 1948 was dislodged. Trust in the old elites was shattered. The intelligence community failed to credit the Egyptian and Syrian commitment to waging war. Across the board there was a conviction that the conditions under which the Arabs would launch an offensive simply did not exist. And Military Intelligence disregarded Mossad's success in recruiting a senior member of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's entourage who underscored that a war was in the cards. Moreover, the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, who had presided over the disaster, had heeded stern guidance from Nixon and Kissinger not to preempt Arab war preparations when these were finally acknowledged 24 hours before the start of hostilities.Whether or not this was a wise call on Washington's part, it certainly increased the butcher's bill Israel was to pay and undermined the Labor government. Meir would come under attack later for having ignored Sadat's peace feelers following the 1969 War of Attrition along the Suez Canal. Sadat, however, tended to frame his overtures as demands for an upfront Israeli withdrawal from all of the Sinai Peninsula, which the Israeli government could not meet. There was plenty of blame to go around. In any case, combined with serious ethnic tensions generated by the political mobilization of Mizrahim — Jews who had immigrated from the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa — the cratering of Labor credibility enabled the ascendance of the Likud Party.Half a century later, what lingering significance does the war have? Israel and Saudi Arabia are negotiating normalization, which will entail a civilian Saudi nuclear capability that is inherently dual-purpose. The Abraham Accords have already normalized Israel's relations with Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco. Egypt and Jordan have longstanding peace treaties with Israel. Syria has been neutered by a long, destructive civil war. Lebanon has ceased to exist as a functioning state and has not engaged Israel in hostilities since 2006. Two eviscerating wars with the United States removed Iraq as a potential combatant of the old rejectionist front.A cataclysmic ground war between Israel and its neighbors has been inconceivable during this veritable Age of Aquarius. But if the Yom Kippur War is no longer relevant, the present irenic reality — excluding the West Bank and Gaza — is largely due to the instrumentalization of that conflict by the Nixon administration for the purpose of peacemaking. One really can't contemplate these developments without implicitly thinking about the 1973 war.Another potent outcome of the war was the diplomatic process that surrounded the ceasefire and the years that followed. Kissinger gets credit for this, not unfairly. He was not one to waste a crisis. He seized the opportunity the war presented to use Sadat's evident interest in joining the Western camp and Israel's reliance on American support to bind each closer to Washington while crowding out the Soviet Union. Although his diplomatic strategy yielded disengagement agreements on both fronts, the fact remains that Egypt and Israel had embarked on a quiet bilateral process even as the guns were still cooling.Sadat had waged the war to shatter the status quo by drawing Israeli blood and bringing the U.S. into the conflict. His goal was the negotiated return of Sinai to Egyptian control. The war, for him, had a clear and well-defined political purpose. Although the seven years that preceded the Camp David Accords were at times touch and go — down to the climactic talks themselves — the so-called peace process would be difficult to imagine without the bloody impetus of 1973. Kissinger's key insight, regrettably abandoned by his successors but seemingly grasped now by Beijing, is that it pays to maintain ties with both sides in a conflict.As the Arab-Israeli conflict has devolved to Israel and the Palestinians, this lesson of the 1973 war has faded for Israel as well. Israel's use of force now has no political objective. Its purpose is solely conflict management and deterrence. To borrow from Lord Carrington's verdict on NATO, it is to keep the Palestinians down, the U.S. out, and wealthy Persian Gulf states in.Yet, perversely, the possibility of change is in the air. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right coalition partners are less interested in managing the level of violence on the West Bank than in informally annexing it. Their commitment to Israeli settlement of the West Bank is greater than their interest in grand geopolitical deals that might boost the Tel Aviv stock exchange but defer redemption of biblical lands. One could construe the hard right's agenda as restoring a true political objective to Israel's fight with the Palestinians.The 1973 war also altered Israeli military doctrine. Planners have recognized that — beginning with that war — Israel has not won any major ones. (Neither has the United States.) The reasons for this are legion, but one stands out: the losers do not concede defeat. They take a licking but keep on ticking. Hence the most recent development in Israel's military doctrine, accorded the acronym Mabam, meaning "the battles between the wars."The idea is that major wars are no longer decisive and will therefore recur periodically. The best course is to delay these wars and weaken adversaries' ability to wage them by fighting draining low-level battles in the interim. This makes some sense, naturally, but militates against any attempt to leverage the fighting to achieve durable peace. This applies to the Palestinians as well. Their violence is expressive, perhaps reflecting their view that there is no conceivable political objective.There's a larger theme here, though. The international system was vastly different in 1973. The Cold War framework in which the United States and Soviet Union conducted their foreign policies and made it possible for Sadat to conduct a war with such a bold but cogent purpose is long gone. We will see whether the U.S.-China in the Middle East recreates it.The leftist post-colonial Arab states that fought Israel are scarcely even remembered. The Israeli state and society that fought the Yom Kippur War, like the America that waged war in Vietnam, no longer exists. The values that animated it no longer shape the nation's thoughts and actions.Fifty years after the war, this should come as no surprise. In the ongoing demonstrations against judicial reform in Israel, one can see veterans of 1973 claiming that their wartime sacrifice would be betrayed by the triumph of the hard right. They are correct, but they're old duffers and out of touch with young Israeli mainstream voters, who, if they dwell on the 1973 war at all, likely see the left as the guilty party. Thus, policy makers, mostly in the West, can noodle about the war's lessons for diplomacy and statecraft, but for Israel — and the Arabs — it's ancient history.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
When Joe Biden was running for U.S. president, he promised to reverse many of his predecessor's decisions on foreign policy, generally hewing towards more restraint and diplomacy, and less bluster, militarism, and unilateralism. That included restoring the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) from which Donald Trump withdrew in 2018 — despite evidence, shared even by his own officials, that the deal was delivering on its core objective to block Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon. On December 7, 2023, Biden's nominee for deputy secretary of state, the current National Security Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, effectively declared the JCPOA dead. "I don't think anyone sees that there's any chance in the current environment to go back to the JCPOA. It's not up for discussion," Campbell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearing. Pushed by Republicans who also expressed outrage over the "cash for hostages" deal (which conditionally grants Tehran access to its own $6 billion for strictly humanitarian use in exchange for a prisoner swap), Campbell also noted that the U.S. "must be sending a military message that provocations will be met, and met with stern responses. We must isolate them diplomatically, internationally."Although the prospects for a revived JCPOA have been dim since at least 2022 — for which Iran carries a fair share of blame — officials from the Biden administration until now have largely refrained from using such threatening language against Iran. Conclusively abandoning any effort to revive the JCPOA does not serve U.S. interests and is in fact counterproductive.Addressing students at Tehran University a few days after Campbell's Senate testimony, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian downplayed the relevance of the JCPOA by reportedly saying that the "more we move forward, the more JCPOA becomes pointless. We will not force ourselves to remain in the narrow tunnel of the JCPOA forever."So, the Biden administration finds itself in the rather awkward position of effectively agreeing with Tehran, but this was a self-inflicted problem: by refusing, for three years now, to engage with its critics and the broader public on the agreement's benefits to the U.S. and global security, it has allowed the notion that the JCPOA was some kind of reward for Iran, rather than a deal that strictly curbed Tehran's nuclear ambitions, to become conventional wisdom. As is evident in Abdollahian's remarks, Iranians today certainly do see the JCPOA as a "narrow tunnel" that limits their options. Indeed, Abdollahian's references to "mov[ing] forward" are about advances in Iran's nuclear program. In mid-November, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, voiced alarm that Iran had amassed enough uranium enriched up to 60 percent purity for three atomic bombs, even as Tehran continued to bar several IAEA inspectors from carrying out their tasks, a step the agency deplored as "extreme and unjustified." As a result of Iranian actions following the U.S. exit from the deal, the IAEA currently estimates that Tehran's stockpile of enriched uranium is 22 times greater than it would have been if the JCPOA had remained in effect. Clearly, Iran is now far closer to being able to produce an actual bomb in a very short time if it decided to do so.If ever there was a mechanism that would prove effective in preventing Iran from acquiring a bomb, it was the JCPOA. In light of Abdollahian's remarks (which clearly reflect a growing skepticism about the JCPOA in Iran), the Biden administration, by publicly disowning the deal, is in fact removing obstacles to further Iranian nuclear escalation.Unless Biden is prepared to accept the advice of the late international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz, who, in an influential 2012 Foreign Affairs article, argued that an Iranian bomb would stabilize the Middle East, it is not clear what his administration would do in place of a revived JCPOA to check additional Iranian nuclear advances. Campbell emphasized the "current environment" as an additional factor rendering a JCPOA revival infeasible. In fact, if he was referring to the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, then it is precisely such a conflict that makes some sort of a direct dialogue between Washington and Tehran — on nuclear, but also regional security issues — all the more urgent if a wider war is to be avoided. Substituting such a dialogue with military threats at a moment when the U.S. is providing Israel virtually unconditional support, including the lavish replenishment of its arms stocks, the deployment of marines and two aircraft carrier task forces to the region, and the veto of a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for a ceasefire, could do more to incentivize Iranians to seek a nuclear deterrent than anything else. Vows to isolate Iran "internationally and diplomatically" are also unwarranted as Iran, despite its rhetorical support for Hamas, has so far demonstrated considerable restraint. While hardline ideological hostility to Israel is wired into the Islamic Republic's identity, the actual position Tehran adopted towards the Israel-Palestine conflict is much more nuanced, more in line with the Arab and Islamic (and indeed broad international) mainstream consensus that insists on a viable two-state solution. Instead of building on these shifts, however modest and tentative, Washington seems to prefer to double down on confrontation.The sad irony is that this explosive situation could have been avoided had Joe Biden had the courage and wisdom to deliver on his own election campaign promise to restore the nuclear agreement with Iran. It would not have solved all the problems between Washington and Tehran, but a working agreement would have removed one major source of instability in the Middle East. By building on it, both countries may have even been brought to engaging on regional discussions which would have not only further normalized their relationship, but also contributed to the prevention of a wider war in the Middle East.
In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Degree Completion category. ; 1 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century Michael J. Bearden Norwich University SOCI401: Cultural and Anthropology Studies Dr. Timothy Maynard April 30, 2020 2 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. 3 Since its beginning in circa 610 CE, when the prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah was visited by the angel Gabriel in a cave near Mecca, Islam has shaken the foundations of the Middle East and remained in a state of near-perpetual conflict with the Western world. Islam is an Arabic term most closely relating to the English words submission or surrender. Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, spread this new religion by the sword throughout Asia, forcing the "submission" of thousands, and have hardly been at peace with their neighbors since. Centuries later, in the two decades following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, radical Islam's stance against the West has altered the diplomatic landscape between the world's great powers, fundamentally changed the United States' national strategic direction, and caused youth from all walks of life to sacrifice the best years of their lives in holy war to protect the supra-national community of Islam. From the invasion of Afghanistan to the subsequent invasions of Iraq and Syria to the ongoing peace talks with the Taliban, diplomatic and military efforts to eradicate jihadists from the Middle East have to-date been nearly ineffectual. Not only have these efforts failed to contain or defeat jihad, but at times have served to strengthen Islamic extremists' resolve in their call to arms against the West. Because jihad is such a fundamental part of the Islamic faith, it can never be "defeated" in the sense of traditional military eradication of an enemy force, but it can be confronted, contained, or refocused, as this paper will address. I argue that enabling local solutions and promoting education, alongside tailored surgical strike and security cooperation operations where necessary, are the keys to confronting, containing, and countering jihad. 4 Background Defining Jihad and Salafism Jihad is a transliterated form of the Arabic word meaning to struggle or to strive. In the traditional teachings of the Islamic faith, jihad is broken into two distinct categories: Greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad includes the personal struggle against selfish desires, emphasizing discipline and morality, as well as the struggle against Satan and the forces of evil. It includes jihad of the heart, jihad of the mind, and jihad of the tongue, involving praise for those who follow the will of Allah and correction for those who have gone astray (Gorka, 2016). The second category, lesser jihad, is viewed as the struggle against the enemies of Islam and the defense of its people. Lesser jihad is commonly referred to as Jihad of the Sword. Gorka (p. 60) reveals that, over time, this category of jihad has been used as justification for at least seven different subsets of holy war: 1. Using holy war to build an empire 2. Going after apostate regimes or individuals 3. Revolting against non-pious Muslim leaders 4. Fighting against the forces of imperialism in Muslim lands 5. Countering the West's pagan influence 6. Guerrilla warfare against a foreign invader 7. Using jihad as justification for terrorist attacks against civilian targets In a broad sense, lesser jihad can be viewed as offensive or defensive martial action. On the offensive side, jihadists use religion to justify building an empire, such as the Islamic State, attack apostate regimes, like those of the Taliban against Afghan government forces, and use terrorism against civilians, like the attacks on the World Trade Center. This offensive action 5 often takes jihadists beyond the borders of the ummah, or the people of Islam, striking fear into hearts of unbelievers around the globe. The defensive variety, especially in recent history, has most often correlated directly with the use of guerrilla warfare against foreign invaders, such as al-Qaeda's attacks on the international military coalitions that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This radical view of Islam is mostly practiced by those who follow the way of the Salafi, or the pious predecessors from the time of Muhammad, who experienced Islam in its purest form. It is believed that the first three generations who practiced the teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ones who all Muslims thereafter should try to emulate. Themes of Salafism focus on complete adherence to sharia law, the fight against apostate Muslim regimes, and the spread and protection of Islam and its followers. At its core, Salafism is a very traditionalist view of Islam and has been practiced by multiple 21st Century terrorist organizations. The terms jihad and Salafi have shared such a close relationship in the last few decades that they have become nearly synonymous, at times described as Salafi-Jihadism or Jihadi-Salafism (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019) What Cultural Influences Lead One to the Path of Jihad? Before the attacks on 9/11, the largest call to jihad answered by the international Muslim community was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Stopping the spread of communism and defending the ummah against the atrocities of Russian ground forces was seen as a noble and just cause for young Muslim men, and not just among Muslims (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019). Many nations, including the United States, funded, equipped, and trained the Afghan mujahedeen (those who conduct jihad) for the fight against the Soviet empire. Jihad in the 21st Century has been viewed in a much different light, as it is most closely associated with acts of extreme violence against Western nations. While the piles of rubble that used to be the 6 World Trade Center smoldered, and a gaping hole scarred the wall of the Pentagon, people of the world were forced to ask themselves, "How could a person do this? Why would someone take their own lives and thousands of others in the name of Allah?" Religious Justification for Jihad. Though jihad has become almost entirely associated with Islamic holy war, the term itself is still simply the Arabic word for striving. Struggling against one's selfish desires, striving to maintain traditional values, and defending a community against a common enemy are not just Islamic concepts, they are universal to most tightly-knit cultures. Similarly, Christians and Jews are taught self-discipline, adherence to moral codes, and defending their belief against enemies of their faith. So, why has the Islamic flavor of this common cultural theme become so violent, causing deep unrest around the world in our modern era? Verses from the Qur'an can begin to unpack why horrific public executions, suicide bombings, and advocating for generalized violence against non-Muslims may be justifiable in jihadist culture. The Qur'an (2015) lays out the following decree in chapter 9, verse 29: Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the tax with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection (p. 208). My personal study of Islam and conversations with Muslims in the field revealed that this bit of prose has been used as motivation and justification for jihad by groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham of our modern age. Some of the following themes are evident in the translation: 7 • Jews and Christians are recognized as People of the Book, but are required to accept the following—Allah as the one true god, sharia as the acceptable law, and Islam as the one true religion. • If Jews and Christians refuse to accept these statutes, they must pay a tax called the jizyah to show their subjugation. • If they refuse to do either of these, they are to be put to the sword (p. 208). Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State have tried to revive the jizyah tax in areas under their control. Likewise, hundreds of Christians, Jews, and even Muslims who refuse to adhere to strict sharia law have been publicly executed. This vehement enforcement of arcane Islamic law is seen as a return to the purest form of Islam, as pious as the first few generations who followed the Prophet Muhammad. Another common religious cultural theme that ties these jihadist organizations together is a message of religious oppression. They preach to young Muslims that the Islamic world is under siege by the West and that their god, their value systems, and their way of life are being threatened by the evils of capitalism and democracy (Venhaus, 2010). In joining organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, young men from across the globe find a sense of purpose and direction in their cause to protect the ummah. This theme is manifested in the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda and the father of home-grown terrorism in the United States. He calls on Muslims living among those in the West: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this, you have two choices: either hijra [migration 8 to an Islamic land] or jihad. You either leave or you fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers on the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as cited in Gorka, 2016). This way of thinking is also captured in chapter 9, verse 5 of the Qur'an (2015): Kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free (p. 204). When taken literally, as they are by followers of Salafi-jihad, scriptures such as these leave no choice. To these men who have committed themselves fully to the ways of the pious ones, they are compelled to become shahid, or martyrs in the protection of the ummah. The Qur'an promises paradise for those who do: Surely, Allah has purchased of the believers their persons and their property in return for the Garden they shall have; they fight in the cause of Allah, and they slay and are slain—a promise the He has made incumbent on Himself in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his promise than Allah? Rejoice, then, in your bargain which you have made with Him; and that it is which is the supreme triumph (p. 222). The concept of becoming a martyr in the struggle for Islam is romanticized by jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and even state governments in local programming. In Lebanon, Mothers of Martyrs are interviewed to share the stories of their sons' glorious end while fighting abroad against the infidels (Venhaus, 2010). The Qur'an itself calls this sacrifice the supreme triumph for a jihadist, striving for the glory of Allah. 9 Though enforcing the jizyah, publicly executing those who do not follow sharia law, and seeking opportunities to kill infidels through suicide attacks represent a very small, extremist cultural sect of Islam, each of these practices is still justifiable if one looks to the Qur'an. This could be viewed as no different than a rural Pentecostal church in the Deep South who maintains strict standards for how women must dress and act: it all comes down to interpretation and a community's willingness to subjugate themselves to these standards. Spiritual leaders of jihadist groups in the 21st Century have used the Qur'an as continued justification for a variety of cruel, inhumane, and brutal actions that served to shock the West. The holy book of Islam acts as the essential glue, binding together all facets of Arab and Islamic culture. Artistic Inspiration for Jihad. A far cry from the harsh proclamations of the Qur'an, Arabic poetry predates Islam by centuries and serves as a bedrock of Arabic culture across the Middle East. Early desert nomads composed poems mostly in mono-rhyme and in one of sixteen standard canonical measures, which made them easy to commit to memory (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Naturally, this beautiful form of cultural expression has found a home in the modern jihadist movement, where it has become an inspiration for new recruits to join the cause and crucial in the sustainment of those already fighting infidels abroad. Creswell and Haykel assert that although analysts have generally ignored this facet of jihadist culture, it is woven deeply into the fabric of modern Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden, most recognized as the former head of al-Qaeda, was also a highly-celebrated jihadist poet. Without question, his lyrical genius inspired young Arabs with stories of a return to the heroic and chivalrous past of Islam. One of his most famous works celebrates the martyrdom of the 9/11 hijackers. This is a theme among modern jihadist poetry, which preserves the tales of suicide bombers, the conquered apostate regimes of Iraq and Syria, and the glories of jihadist heroes (Creswell & Haykel). Likewise, in a 10 group of individuals who have each traveled far from home to defend Islam against the kuffar, these poems help to establish a sense of cultural identity, strengthening their wartime bond and solidifying their resolve. In seeing the videos of the Islamic State as they carved a path of destruction across large swathes of Iraq in early 2014, it may be difficult for one to believe that its members were motivated by the rhythmic lines of jihadist poetry. It is hard to accept that the same young fighter who is willing to behead an infidel for all the free world to see, could also be found passionately reciting lines celebrating the glorious return of an Islamic caliphate. During its rise, the Islamic State capitalized on the lyrical talent of a Damascus-born woman named Ahlam al-Nasr. In her first broadcast, called the Blaze of Truth, she sang each one of her 107 works a cappella, in accordance with the Islamic State's ban on musical instruments. The video was uploaded to Youtube, receiving thousands of views and further shares on multiple social media platforms (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). In the early days of the group's brutal campaign in Iraq, al-Nasr celebrated victory in Mosul as a new dawn for the country: "Ask Mosul, city of Islam, about the lions— how their fierce struggle brought liberation. The land of glory has shed its humiliation and defeat and put on the raiment of splendor" (as cited in Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Her choice of words helps one sense her deep passion for jihad, hidden within the lines. Mujahedeen are called lions and liberators. Mosul is called both a city of Islam and a land of 11 glory that, because of its liberation, has been released from the chains of shame and can now live in the splendor and pride of its former renown. Poetry has succored those serving in times of war for hundreds, even thousands of years. In the same manner, this key element of artistic cultural expression has helped bind together the modern jihadi movement, capturing the heroic deeds of martyrs who would otherwise remain nameless and unrecognized by the outside world. Serving in lands far away from home, young jihadists find inspiration, strength, and a renewed sense of identity in these haunting bits of rhyme. Social Pressure to Join Jihad. Abdullah Anas was an Algerian who served as one of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spent several years studying under Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian "Father of Resistance to the Soviets" (Gall, 2020). Working to help Algerians achieve nonviolent change in their government, Anas, now in his 60s, has spent a life living and working among jihadists. To Anas, jihad is a fundamental principle of Muslim culture through which mujahedeen receive rewards in heaven: "I will never denounce jihad. As a Muslim, I know this to be a noble deed—where man can be the most beastly" (Gall). In a study of three Swedish jihadists, with experiences ranging from 1980s Afghanistan to the modern fight in Syria, Nilsson (2019) suggests that one of the fundamental social justifications for joining jihad is the sense that Islam and Muslims are collectively under attack. This, again, is a theme that applies to more than just the modern jihadist movement: Americans lined up in droves outside recruiting stations following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and decades later after September 11, 2001. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Muslims from around the world began to see this not as just the West going after the 9/11 conspirators, but as a global attack on Islam. Each day, fresh news stories of coalition soldiers' crimes against 12 Muslim civilians and pictures of burning villages continued to motivate men to join the fight to protect the ummah from the foreign invaders. Nilsson contends that since most jihadists are very young, in their teens and early twenties, they are very susceptible to the influences of close friends and social groups. Safet, a young Muslim living in Sweden, was pressured by a friend to join the Islamic State in Syria, saying that he became convinced by his friend Ahmed that the group was fighting to protect Muslims (Nilsson). However, after realizing that the Islamic State was actually killing other Muslims in a practice called takfir, or excommunication, Safet became disillusioned and returned to Sweden (Nilsson). From the fight against the foreign invaders in the early 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in 2015, it seems jihadists have most often been motivated by the need to protect the international Muslim community. Aside from the social responsibility of defending their faith and people, the need for adventure also seems to permeate the ideations of young men seeking to join a jihadist group. One of Nilsson's (2019) most interesting theories is that jihad is not the radicalization of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism. Individuals who are already naturally predisposed to such adventurous or nihilistic behavior get caught up in the social dynamics of their time, ending up in a jihadist movement. Venhaus (2010) explains that in interviews with over 2,000 al-Qaeda prisoners from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay, he found that young Muslim men sought the cause of jihad for a number of normal social pressures felt by normal teens worldwide: "Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure" (Venhaus). The Effects of Social Media and Technology on Jihad. In the modern era, news is no longer bound by the time it takes for an article to be published, printed, and distributed across 13 great distance in a community. Social media platforms like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, and Instagram have made sharing news instantaneous. Additionally, the advent of the smartphone, which acts simultaneously as a hand-held computer, high definition camera, and telephone with nearly world-wide coverage has forever changed the media landscape. In the era of modern jihad, one can post a single video that moves the minds of thousands in a matter of seconds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, news stories of atrocity among the efforts of coalition troops over the next decade served to further the cause of local and foreign jihadists to protect the ummah from these invaders. Accidental bombing of civilians, mistreatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and a general ignorance toward Muslim culture were fueled by social media and smartphone technology. Venhaus (2010) claims that throughout this early phase of the war in Iraq, al-Qaeda very rarely had to actively recruit, their global brand was aggressively promoted through satellite television, internet chat rooms, and social media platforms; willing candidates sought them out. This use of media continued to be perfected by jihadist organizations like the Islamic State, who published a digital magazine called Dabiq, named for the ideological capital of the proposed caliphate, which rallied Muslims to jihad through stories of glory and heroism in the cause for Islam. The Islamic State also posted grisly execution videos, with stunning music and production value, including super high-definition shots of their brutality. Publications and videos such as these could be copied, saved, shared, and re-shared before any sort of government intervention could stop them. Creswell and Haykel (2015) reveal that jihadists were running a massive, secret network of social media websites and fake accounts that could be rapidly assembled and dissembled by hackers. The effects of social media and technology on modern jihadist culture are easy to understand, but challenging to measure in scope and reach. Just as easily as videos of Islamic 14 State propaganda or poetry can be shared, so too can stories of coalition force atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has put strategists in a unique position, where it is nearly impossible to control the narrative. Unfortunately, the story that breaks first is still the one that is liked and shared the most, even if the truth comes out after. Effects of Western Culture on Jihad. Rapid globalization, including the widespread diffusion of the internet and technology into the Middle East in the last two decades has continued to foment jihadist hatred for the West. Personal conversations with multiple Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that the decadence, lavish richness, and sinful lifestyles portrayed by Western movies and media served to fuel the fires of disdain among the pious Salafi-jihadists. Additionally, Muslim men living in Western nations following the attacks on the World Trade Center were ostracized and feared by society, often leading them to an eventual radicalization process. Being denied a peaceful coexistence because of continued Western misperception, caused many young Muslims to become angry and seek community and brotherhood among other Muslims experiencing the same problems. Venhaus (2010) notes that out of the over 2,000 captured jihadists interviewed, more than 30 per cent of them sought al-Qaeda because they were angry. Under the tutelage of local al-Qaeda mentors, the frustrations of these young men were then turned upon their neighbors through careful instruction and manipulation. They were taught to see the West as the enemy of Islam, with hundreds of the ummah being harmed by their military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq each day. They were instructed in the ways of the pious ones who came before them, inspiring them to turn from the sinfulness of their Western neighbors and take pride in their newfound self-discipline and righteousness in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, many of these young men would travel to their 15 ancestral homelands to join the struggle, or conduct terrorist attacks on their own Western communities. Analysis A Unique Challenge Given the litany of reasons one might join jihad, the incredibly complex cultural and social environment, and the fluidity of the modern jihadist movement, how can the United States begin to contain this problem? The reasons one individual might join a jihadist cause are as various and sundry as why one might choose to join any movement or profession over another. As Nilsson (2019) and Venhaus (2010) have detailed, there appears to be no singular marker: one could be an extremely religious or a passive Muslim, rich or poor, single or married with a family, have a completely stable social life or be isolated with no friends. Jihadists can be from any country, any walk of life, and usually do not widely broadcast their intentions prior to taking part in acts of violence for the cause of Islam. It is because of the near-impossibility of clearly identifying a pattern of distinguishable cultural markers that make it such a challenge for the United States government and its allies to address the threat of jihad. Targeting an individual before they become a jihadist or before they commit a terrorist act has been one of the most formidable challenges of our time for military and law enforcement professionals alike. Usually, the much simpler job is finding a jihadist who has allowed their communications discipline to slip before an act, or catching them in a pitched battle on foreign soil. In order to protect citizens of the West and East alike against jihadists' aims, the United States Government must be prepared to confront, contain, and counter the jihadist narrative "left of bang," before an attack occurs. 16 The Global War on Terrorism: Taking the Fight to the Jihadists. In the months that followed September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary officers and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to find, fix, and finish pockets of al-Qaeda militants being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A fierce campaign of relentless aerial bombardment and mounted assaults by the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance led to a swift and decisive defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. With Kabul and Kandahar in allied hands, and an interim government established under the leadership of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, the future of a free and prosperous Afghanistan seemed assured, but what came to be known as The Long War had only just begun. Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and 19 years later, the United States and its allies have been forced to the negotiating table with the Salafi-jihadist Taliban. Likewise, after Saddam Hussein's continued disregard for international law, threats against the United States, and open violence against his own people, the administration of President Bush decided again to pursue a military option. Much like Afghanistan, the coalition was led by CIA operatives and SOF operators, coordinating airstrikes on key positions in a tactical display of American firepower affectionately titled Shock and Awe. However, unlike Afghanistan, a massive conventional invasion followed the bombing campaign, bent on toppling the Baathist regime and finding Saddam's chemical weapons stockpiles. What followed was a series of policy failures, leading to a steady influx of jihadists partnering with local insurgents seeking to oust the foreign invaders and protect the ummah from the atrocities of the kuffar. In my professional opinion, Iraq is still recovering from the decade-long military occupation, cleaning up the destruction left by the Islamic State, and on the brink of civil war due to concerns about being an Iranian puppet state. 17 Ineffective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my first combat rotation as an Infantryman in the Triangle of Death in southern Iraq in 2005-2006, I experienced the initial rumblings of a civil war between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, each wrestling for power in a post-Saddam world. I was also witness to the inundation of foreign jihadists, joining the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at times headquartered in my area of operations. As I analyze our highly-kinetic and aggressive initial campaigns years later, I can see that the coalition's fight, first against Saddam, then against al-Qaeda, only bolstered jihadist motivation. In being a foreign invader, we inadvertently created a jihadist resistance movement, bent on the removal of their occupiers. Kilcullen (2010) explains this dilemma by explaining that focusing on the wrong metrics in a fight against insurgents can be deceptive: If you kill 20 insurgents, they may have 40 relatives who are now in a blood feud with your unit and are compelled to take revenge. Again in 2007-2008, I was deployed to Iraq as an Infantry squad leader to the sacred city of Khadimiyah in Northwest Baghadad. This was during the famous troop surge, meant to fix the ongoing problems with stability throughout the country. Being in the home of the beautiful Shrine of the Seventh Imam, it was a predominantly Shia area. Over the course of 15 months, my unit fought several engagements against Iranian-backed Shia militias and worked on project after project to strengthen local civil infrastructure, all while maintaining the utmost discretion against damaging homes or creating civilian casualties. Yet again, although we had conducted a nearly perfect counterinsurgency fight, it seemed that Kilcullen's insurgent math still applied: Fighting the jihadists only served to create more unrest within the population, no matter if we were restoring essential services and reducing damage to homes or not. 18 Operation Enduring Freedom. Nearly a decade after the fall of al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts, I was deployed to the mountains of Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Stationed along the Arghandab River, just north of Kandahar, we were in the heart of the Pashtun Taliban. Again, the same story remained true: We fought the Taliban jihadists almost daily, but could not seem to win over the true key terrain in a counterinsurgency fight: The hearts and minds of the people. The Taliban would harass our unit's base of operations with a few pop shots as we called them, which would unleash a massive response in firepower and resources. Thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition would be fired into the farm fields surrounding our Combat Out Post (COP), squads would be sent in pursuit of the attackers, and helicopters would spend hours scouring the terrain in an attempt to heap justice on the insurgents. This massive effort against so few served to erode the unit's motivation, exhaust our supplies, and alienate the civilian population whose homes and fields had been damaged in the process. Reflections on Personal Combat Experience. After years of combat experience and deeply studying Muslim culture, I can now see how the mistakes the coalitions made early-on in both operations only fueled the fires of insurgency, resistance to foreign occupiers, and generalized hatred for the West. Porch (2013) argues brilliantly that US counterinsurgency doctrine made the same mistake as its imperialistic predecessors of centuries before: Believing that military action was a proper vehicle for providing Middle Easterners with Western values, as well as a foundation for governance, social programs, and economic transformation in a region. This became evident in my own experience, realizing that no matter what sort of social, infrastructure, or economic programs ran alongside our military efforts, the people of both Afghanistan and Iraq felt the enormous social weight of being occupied by a foreign power, rendering these efforts nearly ineffectual. On the contrary, local and foreign jihadist movements 19 capitalized on each and every mistake of coalition forces, increasing their recruitment and resolve against the West. Though our military may have been winning every major battle against the jihadists, our policy makers and field commanders made the fundamental mistake of believing that these non-Western nations lived in some sort of time-warp, in which the adoption of Western democracy, rule of law, and capitalism would allow them to thrive as a nation (Porch). Effective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Surgical Strike and Precision Targeting. A unique feature of the Global War on Terrorism was the US military's continued perfection of covert strike operations with surgical precision deep into enemy safe havens. This was put on display in the rout of al-Qaeda by CIA and SOF in Afghanistan, in the kill/capture missions against the Baathists in the deck of cards in Iraq, and later in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Sheik Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Having the ability to appear out of nowhere in the middle of the night, kill or capture an intended target with zero damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties, and leave within minutes of arrival struck fear into the hearts and minds of jihadists across the globe. The success and efficacy of this type of operation was acknowledged in the 2015 National Military Strategy, which stated: "The best way to counter VEOs [violent extremist organizations] is by way of.military strengths such as ISR, precision strike [emphasis added], training, and logistical support" (p.11). Likewise, President Obama's massive expansion of the use of drones, which could watch individuals for days and execute a precise strike that only touched the intended target, has continued to sow fear and deny jihadists' freedom of maneuver on a global scale. The US military and its allies have only continued to master these types of operations throughout the 20 fights in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations. The jihadists know this, and realize that one wrong move at any time could mean disaster. Security Cooperation. An additional theme that has spelled the end for jihadists throughout the globe has been the training, advising, and equipping of security forces and partners within Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other nations. Enabling the host-nation military to handle jihadist movements on their own helps the United States military work itself out of a job. US Army Special Forces are uniquely suited to accomplish this mission: With specialized training, language capability, and cultural understanding, they are able to train foreign security forces through a variety of Principle Tasks. These tasks include Foreign Internal Defense, which focuses on a holistic approach to internal security and protection of citizens against lawlessness and insurgency, and Security Force Assistance, which can be focused internally or externally against threats to a nation's stability and security. The success of these mission sets was evident in 2014, during my own experience with the Afghan Commando Kandaks' continued fight against the Taliban and in closely following the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service's efforts against the Islamic State. Both of these forces, built from the ground-up by US Army Special Forces have continually fortified weak conventional military force operations against jihadist groups in their respective nations. Muslim Youth Efforts Against Jihad Globalization, though it has been proven to bolster the jihadists' narrative against the West, has also been beneficial to the movement against jihad itself. Because youth of the world have access to technology that allows them to see the atrocities and lies associated with global jihadist organizations, they are beginning to turn the tide. During the Islamic State's rise to power in Iraq and Syria, Muslim youth from across Europe travelled to join the jihadists in their 21 fight against the West. However, groups of Muslim youth also spoke up to counter this narrative. In 2015 the Muslim Youth League, an anti-Islamic State cultural movement, declared a holy war against all extremist organizations (Dearden, 2015). The group called on all Muslims to stand united against those who have hijacked Islam and misrepresented the faith. Through engagement work in schools and communities, as well as a robust online campaign, the Muslim Youth League is fighting back against jihadist propaganda that bids young Muslims join the Islamic State and other extremist groups (Dearden). Since the time of this publication, the Muslim Youth League has spread to several countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, each with their own social media presence, outreach programs, community events, and websites. Local Government Efforts Against Jihad In the years following the Islamic State's spread across Iraq and Syria, the United Kingdom has developed a robust strategy to help at-risk Muslims avoid the radicalization process. The program itself is called Contest, and includes four distinct categories: Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Police departments and social organizations have built relationships with doctors, faith leaders, teachers and others, who are required to report suspicious persons to the proper authorities. In response to these reporting requirements and recommendations, over 7,500 reports were filed between 2015-2016, with one in 10 being actionable intelligence for government and police forces (BBC). In 2015 alone, over 150 people, including 50 children, were kept from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria (BBC). The strategy has of course drawn criticism, for fear that it will further alienate Muslims from their local communities, but it presents as an excellent plan of action for identifying individuals who are at risk beyond just using traditional signals intelligence and 22 surveillance techniques. It does more than just target the individual, it also seeks to reform them through education, outreach, and community programs. Counterarguments You Can Kill an Idea. I have heard the opinion throughout my time in the military that jihad and the idea of Islamic supremacy can be completely eradicated. The example most often given is that Nazism, including the idea that the Aryan race was superior to all others, was effectively destroyed by a global military campaign. This argument is weak. The Nazis represented a very small portion of German culture, including among those serving in the military, so it was relatively easy to contain once there was an overwhelming military victory by the Allies. However, although the German Army of the 1940s was defeated militarily, the idea of white supremacy lives on in small social groups throughout the world to this day. The Ongoing Taliban Peace Talks. I have colleagues throughout the military who are convinced that the current negotiations with the Taliban are a key indicator of success in our two decades at war against the Salafi-jihadist group. The issue with this is that temporary cease fires have already been violated several times, leading one to believe that the strategic level leadership's messages are simply not reaching their subordinates or that local factions are not adhering to the agreement. Trusting that radical Muslim extremists will not allow Afghanistan to become a future safe haven for other jihadists, as it has in the past, is simply unrealistic. Believing some sort of quasi peace deal is going to miraculously pacify an organization that hates everything the West stands for is misguided. My own experiences throughout the Middle East have proven that the spirit of jihad and hatred will live on in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is Nearly Defeated. Multiple global media outlets continue to run stories about the dismantling of the Islamic State, as though the battle is won. Though Sheik Abu 23 Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed, and the proposed Islamic caliphate was never fully realized, it would be naïve to think that the Islamic State's jihad is over. The movement will metastasize and take on new forms in other parts of the globe: It is already happening. Jihadists are continually leaving the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, headed back to their former homes in mainland Europe. As these individuals reenter the diaspora, the concern is that they will radicalize other individuals and conduct terrorist attacks within the continent. Conclusion The reasons an individual seeks to join a jihadist movement are deeply rooted in personal social dynamics, the security situation of their country, and a multitude of other religious, cultural, and economic factors. I agree with Venhaus (2010) and Gorka (2016) who assert that there is no singular military operation or strategy that can bring about a decisive victory against something so intangible as why one might join the modern jihadist movement. Use of the US military as a vehicle for the establishment of Western democracy and nation-building efforts in tribal nations like Afghanistan and Iraq only served to invigorate the jihadists' call to arms. Jihad is not something that can be eradicated completely by military force. Jihad must be confronted, contained, and countered through a comprehensive approach that empowers state and non-state actors to develop local solutions and directs expeditious military applications only where completely necessary. Recommendations Promote and Protect the Muslim Youth Leagues In order to truly create a cultural paradigm shift in Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, groups like the Muslim Youth League (BBC, 2017) should be promoted by governments worldwide as a bastion of true and peaceful Islam. While they should no doubt be supported, 24 governments must also protect these organizations from becoming targets for violent acts of terrorism or influence operations by jihadists. Through a combination of deep cultural understanding and positive messaging, the Muslim Youth League has already shown its effectiveness in the United Kingdom and beyond. Because the youth of each nation understand the social pressures and cultural influences that may lead one to seek jihad, they can effectively develop tailored, local solutions to persuade at-risk individuals. The Muslim Youth Leagues are on the front lines of countering the jihadist worldview, taking a stand and declaring war on jihad and its misrepresentations of Islam. Enable Local Solutions for Local Problems This should be accomplished through unified government action that involves all the United States' instruments of national power including diplomacy, information sharing, military action where necessary, and economic stimulus as needed. The specific issue with efforts like these, is that they cannot be accomplished during what is perceived by locals as a military occupation. This was proven true in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Despite massive efforts to rebuild infrastructure, aid in agricultural processes, build schools, and organize community projects, the United States and its allies were still viewed as pushing Western values and democracy on nations through military occupation. As much as possible, we must limit our military presence in areas that are ripe for developing a jihadist movement, or in ones that are recovering. I have seen firsthand that government efforts against jihadist organizations or at-risk communities have often been fragmented, poorly staffed, and uncoordinated. Venhaus (2010) suggests the creation of an agency that is staffed, trained, funded, enabled, and equipped for strategic communications, calling it the United States Strategic Communications Agency. An 25 agency like this could ensure that a comprehensive national communications strategy is developed and achieved, with a focus on enabling local community efforts to counter the jihadist narrative. By promoting social outreach, religious education, and community programs, this agency could bolster the efforts of community leaders and stifle jihadist aims in their areas. Support Religious Education and Reintegration Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere have successfully rehabilitated former jihadists through religious education (Venhaus, 2010). Countering the apocalyptic world view of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State requires local religious leaders who understand their community's issues to band together and refute the extremist narrative. Through careful, patient, and individually-tailored instruction, Muslim religious leaders can invalidate each and every one of the extremists' claims. Individuals who turn to jihad are often seeking this type of direction, they just find it in the wrong places. Counter Threats with Tailored Military Force Packages Continued themes among the military failures in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism are indiscriminate use of force, lack of cultural understanding, and hyper-focus on tactical gains while failing at the strategic level. US government nation-building efforts on the backs of the military cost our country trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and years of frustration, bogged-down in an endless quagmire of misunderstanding. US Army Special Forces are selected, trained, equipped, and enabled to clandestinely handle complex problem sets in denied or politically-sensitive environments. Each Special Forces Group is regionally-aligned, with Operational Detachments developing deep cultural understanding through Area Studies and continuous relationship-building with regional state and 26 non-state actors. Special Forces operators understand the complex cultural and security situations in their areas of responsibility and have the language capability and strategic understanding to operate with complete independence of outside support. Frankly, if given the authority and autonomy to do their jobs, Special Forces can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow jihadist organizations unilaterally, or train, advise, and equip foreign security forces to accomplish this task on their own. This can all be done independent of a large, slow, and expensive conventional military occupation. Organizations like al-Qaeda must be kept in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. US Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to this task. Through structured, rapid application of military force, SOF can find, fix, and finish intended targets with surgical precision. This has proven true in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, among numerous other targets throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Continuing to deny safe havens through short, precise applications of combat power is crucial and does not rely on a conventional military occupation of the target area. Operations such as these, characterized by discriminate use of force and strategic impact, should be the main avenue for denying the relative safety, security, and freedom of maneuver of jihadist organizations. 27 References British Broadcasting Corporation (2017, June 4). Reality check: What is the prevent strategy? Reality Check. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Creswell, R., & Haykel, B. (2015, June 1). Battle lines: Want to understand the jihadis? Read their poetry. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel. Dearden, L. (2015, March 21). Young British Muslims declare own jihad against ISIS and other terrorists who 'hijack' Islam. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-british-muslims-declare-own-jihad-against-isis-and-other-terrorists-who-hijack-islam-10146534.html. Dempsey, M. (2015). The national military strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States military's contribution to national security. The Joint Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. Gall, C. (2020, January 31). From armed struggle to peaceful protest, a road still to travel: A veteran of the Afghan jihad working for nonviolent change in Algeria. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/world/middleeast/from-armed-struggle-to-peaceful-protest-a-road-still-to-travel.html. Gorka, S. L. (2016). Defeating jihad: The winnable war. Regnery Publishing. Kilcullen, D. J. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press. Nilsson, M. (2019, 18 June) Motivations for jihad and cognitive dissonance: A qualitative analysis of former Swedish jihadists. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1626091. 28 Porch, D. (2013). Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war. Cambridge University Press. Qur'an (M. Ali, Trans.; 7th ed.) (2015). Islam International Publications. (Original work published ca. 1537). Venhaus, J. (2010). Why youth join al-Qaeda. Special Report, 236(1), 1-12. https://www.usip. org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf.
The Horn of Africa (HOA) is one of the most underdeveloped regions on earth. It is also one of the most conflict-ridden, insecure regions in the world. While Africa as a whole has enjoyed a trend in recent years toward reduction and termination of many of its civil wars, the HOA is the exception to the rule. Indeed, the region's prolonged armed conflicts have spread, engulfing several neighboring states in warfare and partial state collapse. While aspects of the HOA case are obviously unique, and sensitivity to context and complexity must be privileged in both analysis of and policy toward the Horn, the region's crises are not so distinct that they preclude useful comparative analysis. This paper considers conflict dynamics across the entire Horn of Africa, but devotes special attention to the case of Somalia which, because of the depth, length, and significance of its crisis, is a source of particular international concern. Because Somalia's crisis has been so protracted and has gone through several very distinct phases, it provides an opportunity to compare conflict dynamics in a single country over time.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
It is now clear that the Ukrainian offensive of the summer and fall of 2023 has failed, with minimal gains and enormous losses. There has been no repeat of the sweeping Ukrainian victories of 2022. Ukrainian army chief General Valery Zaluzhny has admitted that the war has now entered a stalemate.Russia is now attacking in its turn; and although so far its forces also have made only very slow progress, time does not appear to be on Ukraine's side. Russia has some four times Ukraine's population and 14 times its GDP, which give it huge advantages in what has become a war of attrition. Serious imbalances in the U.S. and European military industries mean that Russia is also producing far more shells than Ukraine is receiving from the West.Ukraine's victories in the first months of the war were due to the courage and grit of Ukrainian soldiers, certain particularly effective Western weapons, and extremely bad Russian planning. They were also, however, attributable to the fact that Ukraine was able to mobilize more men than Russia, due to President Putin's hesitation over increasing conscription. That advantage has now been reversed. Moreover, as recent developments in the U.S. Congress and in Europe make clear, there can be no guarantee that Western aid will continue at levels sufficient to allow Ukraine to continue the fight successfully.There is therefore no realistic prospect that Ukraine can significantly improve its existing position on the battlefield. The West can provide more weapons, but it cannot generate additional Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine is facing greater and greater difficulties in recruiting troops; meanwhile, Russia is calling up reserves and continually strengthening its defensive lines in southern and eastern Ukraine. Voices in the West that promote the idea of complete Ukrainian victory are becoming increasingly desperate; an example is the suggestion by retired American generals that, with additional U.S. missiles, Ukraine can somehow force Russia to evacuate Crimea through bombardment alone — something that the entire history of this war contradicts. To achieve this, Ukraine would also need massive amphibious forces that it altogether lacks.A ceasefire and negotiations for a peace settlement are therefore becoming more and more necessary for Ukraine. Indeed, if the fighting stopped along the existing battle lines, more than 80 percent of Ukraine would be fully independent of (and bitterly hostile to) Russia and free to do its best to move towards membership of the European Union. Given the Kremlin's original aims when it launched the invasion last year, and of the history of Russia's domination of Ukraine over the past 300 years, this would be not a Ukrainian defeat, but, on the contrary, a tremendous Ukrainian victory. If, on the other hand, the war continues indefinitely, there is a real possibility that Ukrainian resistance may collapse, whether through the exhaustion of its manpower or because Russia's additional forces allow it to reopen the fronts in northern Ukraine that it pulled back from last year and that Ukraine lacks the troops to defend.Recognizing this, the Biden administration is reported to be privately advising the Ukrainian government to start talks with Russia. It is however exceptionally difficult for the Ukrainian government to initiate talks. President Zelensky and other leading officials would have to reverse their repeated statements that they will not negotiate with Putin and that the only acceptable terms for even a provisional agreement are complete Russian withdrawal from all the territory that Russia has occupied since 2014. Ultra-nationalist groups are passionately opposed to any compromise. The Russian government for its part is naturally uninterested in a temporary ceasefire at present, since it, too, can see that time is on its side.In these circumstances, it is not enough for Washington to urge talks on the Ukrainians from behind the scenes, while insisting in public that only Ukraine can negotiate peace. Nor is it wise to defer any diplomatic initiative until after the next U.S. presidential election almost a year from now in the hope that both the Ukrainian forces and U.S. aid will hold up that long, and also that an embarrassing about face in the middle of the election campaign can be avoided.Ukraine may not be able to hold out that long, and a major Russian success, involving the conquest of significantly more Ukrainian territory, would confront the Biden administration with an agonizing choice: accept a Ukrainian defeat that would be a grave humiliation for the U.S. and NATO, or threaten direct intervention and risk nuclear war with Russia. Moreover, as the disaster in Israel and Gaza so vividly demonstrates, it is never sensible to trust that an inherently volatile situation like the U.S.-Russian struggle over Ukraine will remain stable. At any time, an accidental clash between (for example) the Russian and U.S. air forces over the Black Sea could precipitate a terrifying increase in tension and a lurch towards nuclear war. Even if the worst outcomes were avoided, such a crisis would have a dire effect on the global and U.S. economies.The full engagement of the United States in the peace process from the outset will be necessary if negotiations are to have any chance of success. Only a U.S. administration can bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Ukrainian government, while also offering reasonably credible security guarantees for the future. And only a U.S. administration can threaten Moscow that, for some time to come, massive U.S. military and economic aid to Ukraine will continue, while at the same time offering the Kremlin compromises on wider issues of vital importance to Russia. If Moscow is to be brought to the negotiating table when the military situation is developing in its favor, it will need to be assured that Washington is prepared to discuss seriously a final settlement involving neutrality for Ukraine (of course, including international security guarantees), mutual force limitations in Europe, the lifting of sanctions, and some form of inclusive European security architecture to reduce the danger of more wars in the future.Initiating such engagement will be extremely difficult for the Biden administration, given its repeated promises of Ukrainian victory and declarations that only Ukraine can negotiate peace. The administration therefore will need outside help if it is to engage in peace talks with Russia.The administration should therefore reach out in private to India, Brazil, and other leading countries of the "Global South" and urge them to issue a strong collective call for a ceasefire and peace talks. In initiating talks, Washington could then present itself as bowing to the will of the global majority. This may also help counteract the disastrous impact on U.S. relations with the "Global South" of the war in Gaza. The U.S. will also need to build support among European allies for a peace effort, including strong public U.S. commitment to NATO.Full Chinese participation will also be essential if a peace process is to succeed. Chinese influence on Moscow will be critical if Russia is to be persuaded to abandon its maximalist ambitions in Ukraine and accept a compromise peace. Amid dangerously rising tensions between the United States and China, such an invitation from Washington would signal to Beijing Washington's willingness to accept China as a partner and legitimate stakeholder in the solution of global problems.None of this is going to be easy, and there will be a strong temptation in Washington to let things slide in the hope that something will happen to let U.S. diplomacy off the hook. To follow this path would, however, be a tragic error and a betrayal of the vital interests of both Ukraine and the United States. The present trajectory of the war is towards disaster. Only the United States can change that trajectory, but it will need a lot of help from its friends.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
China and the United States, like sports captains picking sides, have been engaged in a considered effort to enlist partners. In the recruitment rush, the Biden administration has given short shrift to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its much vaunted balancing, or "centrality" in the Asia Pacific. Washington, like Beijing, has favored certain ASEAN members over others, frustrated no doubt by the group's lack of cohesion and effectiveness. But in the new multipolar world, these hinge countries and their groupings can be as important as power poles. There has been a lot of coalition building lately. In August, the BRICS bloc — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — invited six new members to join at the start of 2024. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia reestablished ties after years of antagonism in a deal brokered by Beijing. In July, China signed an accord on law enforcement and security with the Solomon Islands and announced a strategic partnership with Georgia. This month, China upgraded its relationship with American bugaboo Venezuela to an "all-weather" partnership.The U.S. has been similarly busy — perhaps more so to make up for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridge-building over the past decade. In August, President Joe Biden and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts launched a trilateral grouping at Camp David. The U.S. and the Philippines in February revived an agreement giving increased American access to Filipino military facilities. In May, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea concluded a defense pact. At the G20 summit in New Delhi this month, the leaders of the U.S., the European Union, India, Saudi Arabia and other countries committed to developing an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor for cooperation on clean energy, power grids and telecommunications. After the G20, Biden traveled to Hanoi where the U.S. and Vietnam announced that they were elevating relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," deepening cooperation in cloud computing, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — all areas of contention between Washington and Beijing. In a 2021 lecture, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan described how the administration was assembling a "latticework of alliances and partnerships globally." This was "not just about refurbishing the old bilateral alliances," he explained, "but modernizing those elements of the latticework and adding new components." Sullivan cited as examples the upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), to leader level and the creation of AUKUS, the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra and collaborate on advanced technologies.Both Washington and Beijing say they are not forcing countries to pick sides, though the impression that they do just that is unavoidable. Beijing has applied economic pressure on states for actions that it perceives to hew too closely to American positions — Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan have had to deal with such coercion. In network building, the U.S. has offered more carrots than sticks, particularly when it comes to courting pivotal states that Washington deems to have distinct geostrategic importance and — more to the point — the capacity to contribute to countering or containing China. In the Indo-Pacific, India, the Philippines and Vietnam have been the chief recipients of American courtship. But what about ASEAN? Washington insists that it values ASEAN centrality, but the proof of its perspective is in its actions. Biden skipped ASEAN's annual leaders' jamboree with dialogue partners, leaving it to his vice president to go to Jakarta, but squeezed in a visit to Hanoi just days later. The president's participation in the G20 was a not-to-be-missed opportunity to butter up Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who only in June had been feted at the White House. India is the most-prized pivot country in the Indo-Pacific (that status so obvious in the term). Under Modi, it sees itself as a power pole in its own right. New Delhi has proven its multi-alignment credentials, with its participation in the Quad, the BRICS and the China/Russia-conceived Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and its refusal to turn against traditional ally Moscow since the Ukraine war broke out. Biden is oiling the Indian hinge so it swings more Washington's way — and may be succeeding, given India's border clashes with China and its participation in joint military activities in the Pacific, Quad initiatives and Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).ASEAN should be as critical a hinge player if not to win over, at least to keep "central" as the region's balancer — a crucial section of the lattice that would act as a security blanket for peace and stability. Some member states, worried that the China-U.S. rivalry undermines their agency, have warned the two great powers against forcing them to choose sides. ASEAN has not bought into the American Indo-Pacific construct, merely articulating an "outlook" on the concept. Southeast Asian nations will profit more not by putting on any one team's jersey, but instead playing the field as something of a referee or honest broker in good stead with both sides, however heated the competition.U.S. administrations have never taken the centrality of ASEAN seriously, largely because member states themselves have failed to show what it means to be the region's ballast. It is a systemic problem — ASEAN is no EU in either form or practice. Even though it has launched an "economic community" and has sought to address thorny problems, such as Myanmar and the South China Sea, as a group, it remains a politically divided, economically diverse collection of states, with a reputation for glacial progress and ineffectiveness. It was born this way, though it was successful in its founding mission to be a bulwark against communism's spread.But ASEAN has strengths beyond being the world's fifth largest economy. Its convening power is unmatched, reaching across economic and strategic spheres. Its ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus are as evolved and inclusive a strategic framework for the region as is possible. ASEAN-led platforms offer a neutral space for the great powers to interact on a wide range of issues. By lavishing attention on certain ASEAN members — the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (host of a U.S. military facility) — Washington is mimicking the Chinese divide-and-conquer approach (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are reckoned to be on Team Beijing). But even small gaps weaken a lattice. The ASEAN way may be slow and plodding — negotiations with Beijing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea have dragged on for years — but this tortoise cannot be written off.In a speech on September 13 outlining "the power and purpose of American diplomacy," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tellingly never mentioned ASEAN. Yet, the Biden administration may be smartening up. Seven of the ASEAN 10 are part of the IPEF, the American answer to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), from which the U.S. withdrew, and the ASEAN-China concocted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade accord. And guess who's coming to the White House for a bilateral with Biden in November? Indonesian President Joko Widodo, the very leader whom Biden "snubbed" in favor of one night in Vietnam. With its sizable population, strategic geographical position, participation in China's BRI, a maritime dispute of its own with Beijing, a growing strategic relationship with Washington, and a critical presidential election next year, Indonesia is the key hinge power in Southeast Asia. Like India, it has proven its agency and pragmatism, particularly in vital areas such as data security standards and infrastructure development. Giving Jakarta more attention would bolster ASEAN's position in the American Indo-Pacific latticework, especially with Laos, a country that tilts towards Beijing and is taking over from Indonesia as ASEAN chair next year.