Rechtsstaatlichkeit und richterliche Unabhängigkeit in Osteuropa, im Südkaukasus und in Zentralasien
In: OSZE-Jahrbuch, Volume 17, p. 325-339
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In: OSZE-Jahrbuch, Volume 17, p. 325-339
World Affairs Online
In: Südost-Europa: journal of politics and society, Volume 51, Issue 1-3, p. 122-150
ISSN: 0722-480X
World Affairs Online
In: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft: ZPol = Journal of political science, Volume 11, Issue 1, p. 71-103
ISSN: 1430-6387
World Affairs Online
Marx has a threefold objective in "On the Jewish Question": to respond to Bruno Bauer's views on the same issue; to give us his own standing on the matter of the political emancipation of Jewish populations in Germany and the rest of Europe, while at the same time defining what political emancipation means for each citizen, no matter the religion, in a modern State; and lastly, to show us how political emancipation is not enough and how actual freedom (political plus social) is accessible to all once a new, final and imperative kind of emancipation is obtained: human emancipation. This paper will be divided into two parts: the first one will try to briefly review and explain Marx's text. Particular attention will be given to the differentiation between political and human emancipation and its implications. In this section, Marx's views on Judaism will be clarified by analyzing them on their proper socio-historical context. In the second one, an interesting and, hopefully, appropriate exercise will be put into consideration: taking into account Marx's concerns regarding the possibility of inclusion of a religious minority into the public spheres of a secular State, the Jewish question of 19th century's Europe will be altered into the Muslim question of 21st century's Europe. According to Yoav Peled the main difference between how Bauer and Marx confront the issue of Jewish emancipation is that the former one considers the problem as a theological one, while the latter does it as a sociological one (1). Bauer affirms that not only the Jews are longing for political emancipation, meaning being recognized by the State as equal citizens; but also the rest of the Gentile population is awaiting such recognition. The State cannot emancipate Jews if it still has not emancipated the rest. The Jewry cannot obtain full citizenship if there are no citizens. In order to attain political emancipation the State has to become a secular one, not to recognize any religion as its official one and to extend freedom of religion to all of its citizens. Religious freedom would require religion's removal from the public sphere and its "ostracism" into a private creed. This privatization of religion would eventually abolish it. Nevertheless, Bauer does not consider the Jews capable of becoming free because he does not consider Judaism able to become a private creed. Bauer characterizes Judaism as a religion of law not as, like Christianity, areligion of faith. Being a religion based on actions and not on beliefs would completely be opposed to freedom of religion, to its own removal from the public sphere. Judaism could not become free because there is a chance that its laws would contradict the laws of the State. Marx, instead, affirms that Jews (and Christians), in order to be really emancipated do not have to abandon Judaism in a theological way, but have to do it in a sociological manner. Political emancipation as stated by Bauer is not the final possible form of emancipation, but it is the last possible form of emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order. For example, according to Marx the citizens of the United States of America, which at the time was the best case of a modern secular State, still practiced, and needed to practice, their religious beliefs as private creeds. Then, Bauer was wrong; religion survived the test and did not disappear after political emancipation. As reported by Marx this happened because when religion is expulsed from the sphere of public law to that of private law, religion becomes the spirit of civil society and the essence of differentiation which leads to, and presupposes, inequality. Political emancipation divides the human being into two antagonistic spheres: the individual, who is egoistic by nature and based in inequality and corresponds to civil society; and the citizen, who is based in common solidarity and equality and complements with the State. This separation can only be overcome by human emancipation. Human emancipation is the final and real kind of reachable and desired emancipation by all human beings. Human emancipation would erase all deficiencies that are found in civil society: private property, insecurity and religion. Human emancipation would, then, end social inequality. Only then, humans would achieve real and total freedom. Only when the individual and the citizen would synthesize their antagonisms in the species-being would humanity be free from all its social and political constraints and a truly democratic State would appear. (2)Marx's views on Judaism have been defined as anti-Semitic by several critics; but it is not the case (3). First of all, Marx was a strong advocate for political emancipation to the Jewish communities in Europe, especially in Germany, and he believed, in opposition to Bauer, that the Jewry was fully capable of becoming citizens in a secular State by privatizing their creed. Although, it has to be said that Marx, like Bauer, considered Judaism to be a religion based on laws; he did not directly consider the case if Judaism could withstand the transformation to a private form. Orthodox Jews, for example, would not become suitable for citizenship in the modern secular State. Because Marx could not resolve this argument in a direct form he chose to solve it by taking Judaism in its socio-historical context instead than in a purely theological way. To Marx Jews have embodied the mercantile spirit in a natural economy dominated Europe (4). Jews did not choose to be merchants or entrepreneurs: feudal society limited them to those kinds of activities. They could not legally own land or be members of any corporate guild. Jews could only deal with money or goods exchange(5). Then, Jews could only be considered as bourgeois, as capitalists, as financiers. Even if, like Marx says, the Jewish mercantile particularity had already generalized through the Christian world and there was no economic basis for distinguishing between Jews and Gentiles, which allowed the Jews to practically self-emancipate by the "Judaization" of society; the general public was still perceiving Judaism as a synonymous of "merchants"(6). It is rather interesting to note that in 1850 half of all entrepreneurs in Berlin were Jews and that in 1861 58% of the Prussian Jewry was engaged in commerce and credit, while only 2% of Christians was similarly employed (7). When Marx calls for the abolition of Judaism, he is calling for the abolition of the economic activity that was a reflection of the Jews social-historical role in society; he is calling for the end of the mercantile/capitalist elements that produce social inequality. The abolition of Judaism means the abolition of all religions through the correction of the secular defect of civil society(8). Finally, Marx's views on the political emancipation of a religious minority and of social emancipation as the only way to end all inequalities and distinctions could be helpful in order to understand the current Muslim Question that is concerning much of Europe. The Muslim question is significantly different from 19th century's Jewish question. Jews were asking for the State's recognition of the same basic constitutional rights that Christians already, or were about to, benefited from. Additionally, liberal-secularists, like Bauer, were concerned about Judaism's capability to remove their religious practices from the public sphere and privatize them. According to them, it was essential for the survival of the modern secular State that its citizens should exclude their religious distinctiveness from all of their public interactions with the State or with other fellow citizens. Today, Muslims in Europe enjoy all of the individual and social rights that are recognized in each of the European Constitutions; meaning political emancipation is not an issue. It is Islam's interactions with the secular, and almost irreligious, European public spheres that has become on of the most fervent debates in the last few years. Such debate extremely overcomes the purpose of this article, but a few points should be taken into account regarding the Muslim question and the relevance of Marx's work on the matter. Marx, just like with the political emancipation of the Jews, would not have been able to directly confront the possibility of a real privatization of Islamic beliefs, because he would have faced the same issue that arose in the Jewish question: Islam, like Judaism, is a religious of laws. As it has been said, a religion of laws will almost certainly contradict the laws of a secular State and would not be able to refrain from interrelate with the public sphere. For example, teachers wearing a Muslim veil or turban in public schools; Muslim women wearing burqas in public facilities; the introduction of Sharia law in order to legalize social relationships within Muslim communities and in their relations with non-Muslim communities; etc., are challenges to the secular State. Several European countries are juggling between the right of freedom of religion and absolute secularism(9): France chooses to ban burqas in public spaces; the Netherlands to expel teachers from public schools that insisted in wearing veils or turbans in class; Italy to reform family law in order to stop "honor killings" among Muslim families; etc. But like with Judaism, Marx would overcome Islam's inability to privatize its creed by arguing that such incapability is a symptom of the antagonism between civil society (the individual egoistic man) and the State (the solidary citizen) and that will never be surpassed until human emancipation is obtained. Interestingly enough, while during the 19th century Jews were an equivalent to bourgeois and entrepreneurs, Muslims of the 21st century, on the other hand, are identified with other kinds of socio-economic characterization. Muslims are identified either as proletarians or as lumpenproletarians. Remarkably, the occupational standing of 84% of Muslims living in Germany is either blue or white collar; compared to just 40% of non-Muslims Germans (10); 20% of young non-Muslim French are unemployed compared to 50% of young French Muslims(11); 9% of non-Muslim Dutch are unemployed, while 30% of Dutch Muslims are jobless(12); 10% of non-Muslim Belgians live below the poverty line, while 60% of Muslim Belgians are poor(13); 15% of non-Muslim British households are in poverty, but that percentage ascends to 55% when Muslim British households are considered(14). In Europe 80% of Muslim men are employed in low-skill/low-wage jobs and in routine manual and service occupations, only 45% of non-Muslim men are employed in the same kind of jobs(15). Finally, when the Human Development Index is taken into account and it is divided among the Muslim and non-Muslim population in the European countries it is evidenced that the standard of living of Muslim communities is significantly lower than that of the rest (16). This brief and expedited socio-economic context of Muslims in Europe would be employed by Marx in order to circumvent Islam's inability to privatize its creed: Muslims, although they live in modern secular States and enjoy political emancipation, persist in carrying on with their religious practices in public spaces, and sometimes in opposition to public laws, because they are suffering social inequality; they are suffering from not attaining human emancipation. Of course, all human beings lack of human emancipation, not only Muslims in Europe, but it is Muslims' special socio-economic situation in Europe that creates a secular deficiency from political emancipation and prevents their religion's transformation into a private creed. Jews did not have political emancipation and were, in their majority, entrepreneurs, which gave them a better socio-economic standing and allowed them to privatize their religion once political emancipation was conquered. Most of European Muslims, in contrast, are proletarians and, in worst cases, lumpenproletarians (17)and even if they enjoy political emancipation they find themselves in a position characterized by an extreme social inequality, that does not allow many of them to privatize their creed (18). Only through human emancipation and social equality they would be able to negate their religious differentiation; because in a true democratic State, a communist State according to Marx, communism itself would act as a religious belief and manner of living. That is, perhaps, how Marx intended to accomplish the abolition of all religions: by the emergence of a new politically and socially equal "religion for all human beings", that of communism.(1) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation";History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992. (2) Marx borrows the concept of species-being from Feuerbach. It seems to be implied in the text, although it is more possible to be influenced by later Marx's texts, that revolution is the mean to obtain human emancipation; the mean that those who suffer from social inequality will use in order to end that suffering. Once human emancipation is reached then the democratic/communist State is at hand. Again, this is not actually said in On the Jewish Question. (3) See Flannery Edward, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, pp.154-157; and Lewis Bernard, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999, pp. 112.(4) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 475. (5) It was this image of the "financial Jew", embodied in the Rothschild dynasty, which begot the western anti-Semitic wave of the 19th and 20th century. See Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Benediction Books, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World, Penguin, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The House of Rothschild, Penguin, New York, 2000; Landes David,Dynasties: Fortunes and Misfortunes of the World's Great Family Businesses, Penguin, New York, 2007.(6) Actually, the word "Judentum" came to be a synonymous with commerce.(7) Sorkin David, The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840, Wayne State University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 108-9.(8) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 481.(9) For more about the interaction of Muslim minorities and political liberalism in a Rawlsian version see Benhenda, Mostapha, "For Muslim Minorities, it is Possible to Endorse Political Liberalism, but this is not Enough", Journal Of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 71-87. The article concludes that almost all Muslim minorities could and will endorse political liberalism, but many will not be able to do it because of a religious normative prohibition to reform their doctrine.(10) "Muslim Life in Germany", Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, German Government, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb6-muslimisches-leben,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/fb6-muslimisches-leben.pdf(11) "Muslims in Europe", Open Society Institute; http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20100302.pdf(12) Ibid.(13) Ibid.(14) Ibid.(15) Ibid.(16) For example, the HDI of Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany and Sweden are: 0,955; 0,951; 0,947; 0,961; 0.947 and 0,963 respectively; while the HDI of their respective Muslim communities are: 0,841; 0, 848; 0, 830; 0, 850; 0, 860; 0,912. Available at the European Social Survey http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ (17) Loïc Wacquant would call them "urban outcasts" or marginal. See Wacquant Loïc, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality, Polity, Cambridge, 2007; Wacquant Loïc, Prisons of Poverty, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009; Wacquant Loïc, Los Condenados de la ciudad. Gueto, peripherias, Estado, Siglo XII Editores, Buenos Aires, 2007.(18) Certainly they are more religious than Christian and Jewish Europeans because they are perceived as a marginalized minority and in fierce competition with non-Muslim proletarians. It is civil society that enforces religious differentiation on them.*Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.
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Two weeks ago was the 40th anniversary of President Nixon's dramatic resignation. He did so against his own will, in order to avoid the certainty of impeachment as a result of the Watergate case. This event, together with the traumatic defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam that preceded it, resulted in a dramatic loss of trust in the Executive, followed by strong legislative action to limit its powers. It also revealed the growing partisan polarization that has characterized the politics of the following four decades.Today we may be living the climax of this polarization, as Congress is unable to pass badly-needed legislation on immigration, energy and infrastructure funding, to name a few. Indeed, not even the presence of 40,000 unaccompanied Central American children at the border is sufficiently dramatic to bring about some kind of consensual action. At the same time, President Obama is being sued by the House leadership for abuse of power, and the media are irresponsibly talking about possible impeachment, the ultimate use of legislative power against a democratically elected President.The transformative President has fulfilled or at the very least addressed most of the platform under which he was elected in 2008 and re-elected in 2012. Obstruction in Congress, his own bad foreign policy decisions and constant complaints from the left wing of his own party have resulted in low approval ratings (around 40%) by a frustrated public that has, for the most part, tuned out of politics. This will no doubt have consequences for the coming mid-term elections, when the majority of voters will stay home, giving an advantage to the militant extremes on both sides of the ideological spectrum.Gridlock in government is nothing new. In fact, the fathers of the Constitution preferred Congress to "muddle through" rather than being too pro-active. Incremental, slow change was preferable to sweeping reforms. Yet this 113th Congress, now in its long August recess before its return to a full-fledged electoral campaign in September, is probably unique in its paralysis. There are not only deep divisions between the two Houses, each dominated by one party, but also within the House of Representatives itself, where the GOP has a majority of seats but is so internally divided that it has had to withdraw many of its own leadership-introduced bills for lack of votes from its own party.This Do-Nothing-Congress that left town on August 1st for a five-week recess is the least productive in History: Congressional productivity is down from 151 in the previous 112th Congress to 142; the originally "Do-Nothing Congress" of 1947-48 passed 906 laws.Nothing seems to be sufficiently urgent or dramatic enough to bring the GOP legislators to a consensus, not even the unprecedented border crisis, where 40,000 unaccompanied migrant children from Central America are amassed in military bases and other government agencies at the southern border, awaiting due process. The House leadership was ready to pass a bill to provide a small part of the funding the President had requested to help him address the surge of newly arrived immigrants, but it did not have the votes. The Tea Party, on the other hand, opposed the funding and wanted to introduce its own bill to speedily deport the children and to rescind the President's authority to decide whether to deport or not certain undocumented immigrants from earlier waves of immigration.Late in the afternoon of their last day in the Capitol when all bags were packed and representatives were ready to leave, Speaker John Boehner announced he was ready to withdraw his bill since he didn't have the votes, and let the recess begin. But Tea Party favorites Steven King and Michele Bachman demanded a vote on both measures. Finally, at the eleventh hour, Boehner compromised: both bills were introduced and passed by a narrow vote. They are at this point insignificant, and very unlikely to become laws since the Senate will not consider them. But the point was made: the Tea Party's main goals is not solving any problems, but instead keepconstraining presidential powers to the point of total ineffective government. They are succeeding to a large extent, even if Obama has been quite deft at using his executive authority of implementation to break free from the imposed legislative shackles.Dysfunction in government is the new normalcy in the nation's capital. These bills were only a modest attempt to deal with the crisis of the day, but the acrimonious debate brought into relief a bigger systemic failure: the inability of Congress, since 2007, to pass a comprehensive overhaul of Immigration law. Once the Senate passed it last summer, it was expected that the House may come up with its own proposal, which would have been a series of smaller bills to solve the problem piecemeal, thereby satisfying different constituencies with a mixture of more border security, more workers' permits and other special visas, and the granting of legal status to the 11 million undocumented.Unlike the year 2007, when G.W. Bush had expressed support for Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation but could not muster enough consensus, this time around (2013-2014) it was supposed to be different. For the first time the concept had widespread support from all the very powerful interest groups concerned: corporations, labor unions, the Christian Evangelical right and immigration advocates. But it was halted by the Tea Party in the House and no legislation was passed.It is this vacuum, among others, that the Executive has been trying to fill through administrative measures and executive decrees. The President used his prosecutorial discretion to solve some aspects of the enormously complex issue of dealing with 11 million undocumented immigrants, most of whom have lived and worked in the US for ten, twenty, or even thirty years. One example is the President's policy directive that provided temporary relief from deportation and study/work authorization to young people brought here illegally by their parents between certain dates, and under certain conditions (DACA). Lately, Obama has expressed some interest in extending DACA to the children's families, causing more Tea party outrage and increasing their attempts to stop him.To strike a balance and to give more legitimacy to his unilateral decision to solve that part of the problem, the President has applied to the letter the pre-existing immigration law to deport (other) immigrants through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency. He has deported more immigrants than any other president before him (360,000 in 2013 alone), earning him the sobriquet of "Deporter-in-chief" and the antipathy of immigrant advocate groups.During the latest crisis of children at the border, Speaker Boehner expressed his "frustration and his concern" with the situation, and quite cynically called on Obama to "take steps to secure the border and return the children to their home countries", adding that the President "didn't need Congressional action to do that". Given that the Speaker is suing the President (just a political gesture, since he has no legal standing to do so) for over-stepping his Constitutional powers, his hectoring makes even less sense. In any case, his frustration was misdirected: Obama had asked Congress to approve funding for this operation and a Republican bill was ready to be introduced, but the Speaker himself was struggling to get the Tea Party votes he needed to pass it. This sort of dysfunction is a weakness the Republican Party will need to address in order to succeed in future elections.The November mid-term election will be critical: according to the latest polls, Republicans have around an eighty per cent chance to win the six seats they would need for a majority in the Senate. With both Houses in Republican hands, the President will not only lose the minimum control he now has to shape the agenda but he will also find it very hard to keep in place the policies that he is already implementing.If we add to that the problematic challenges he is now faced with on several foreign policy fronts, none of which can be solved in the short term, a Republican win becomes almost certain, not only in 2014 but also perhaps in the 2016 presidential election. But in order to seal those wins, Republicans will need two fundamental elements they lack now: party unity and a positive agenda. Professor Maria Fornella-Oehninger, Old Dominion UniversityVirginia, U.S.A.
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The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.
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The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.
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RIASSUNTO TESI Il concetto della performance, della sua misurazione, gestione e controllo, accanto a quelli di efficienza, trasparenza, accountability e responsabilità, rappresentano gli elementi fondanti la dottrina del New Public Management e in quanto tali sono stato oggetto di studi accademici e analisi da parte dei professionisti del settore pubblico. La crisi economica dei primi anni '90, le sue implicazioni e le conseguenti tensioni politiche hanno aumentato l'interesse dei governi e parlamenti italiani, che si sono susseguiti, sulle problematiche dell'aumento incontrollato della spesa e del debito pubblico. La conseguenza immediata di questa nuova attenzione, anche per le nuove esigenze di bilancio derivanti dal processo di adesione all'Unione Europea, è stata un incremento della produzione legislativa. In questo contesto gli interventi legislativi, a partire in primo luogo dalla legge n. 142 del 1990, hanno avuto tutti il medesimo filo conduttore, ovvero l'obiettivo di realizzare in concreto il disegno costituzionale di articolazione del governo centrale nei suoi livelli territoriali, quali Comuni, Province e Regioni (queste ultime previste successivamente nel 1970, operative con il d.P.R. n 616/77). I governi e i parlamenti hanno incentrato la loro azione legislativa su interventi finalizzati a favorire il decentramento amministrativo e l'autonomia locale, dapprima solo statutaria e regolamentare, poi anche impositiva, finanziaria e gestionale. L'attenzione nei confronti della programmazione dell'attività amministrativa locale, e successivamente anche sulle prestazioni pubbliche, è aumentato contestualmente al crescere delle esigenze informative dei cittadini sulle modalità di utilizzo delle scarse risorse pubbliche (derivanti in grande parte dal gettito fiscale), al fine di poter garantire i servizi essenziali alla collettività. Gli organi di indirizzo politico – amministrativo orientano la gestione tramite il complesso di decisioni ed azioni organizzative che seguono le linee di indirizzo generali (D.Lgs 165/2001), la definizione di piani, programmi e direttive generali. L'oggetto della Legge n. 150 del 2009 (c.d. riforma Brunetta) è la performance della pubblica amministrazione, la performance organizzativa ed individuale dei dipendenti pubblici. Quest'ultima in particolare è un tema sensibile nel dibattito pubblico, spesso con un'accezione negativa nell'opinione pubblica. A seguito dei più recenti interventi in materia di armonizzazione contabile, si è ritenuto fosse necessario e interessante avviare una riflessione sul complessivo sistema di programmazione e controllo della performance negli enti locali allo scopo di sviluppare un modello della performance integrato. In questo senso, la presente tesi di dottorato si è concentrata sugli strumenti a disposizione degli enti locali italiani per la programmazione, la misurazione e la gestione della performance, partendo dai primi dettati legislativi in materia di programmazione e controllo, analizzando successivamente quanto introdotto dal D.Lgs 150/09 e più recentemente dal D.Lgs 118/2011, al fine di giungere allo sviluppo di uno strumento che rispondesse alle principali esigenze informative in materia di performance della PA locale. A questo scopo, inizialmente è stata effettuata un'analisi della letteratura, il più completa possibile, sul concetto della performance e della sua misurazione, sottolineando i benefici e gli effetti inaspettati delle misure di performance, i limiti e la differenze esistenti tra misurazione e gestione della performance. La trattazione successivamente si concentrerà sull'illustrazione dei concetti di indicatori e misure di performance, dal punto di vista delle caratteristiche e differente principali, oltre che dell'utilità, dei possibili usi ed utilizzatori dell'informazione di performance (ad esempio: decision-makers, politici e cittadini). L'analisi del background teorico sarà finalizzata alla descrizione del complessivo contesto del tema della performance tramite i) il contesto internazionale del settore pubblico e ii) le dinamiche della performance delle pubbliche amministrazione. Il contesto specifico di rifermento è quello degli enti locali italiani, 1) descritto nei suoi aspetti normativi e dottrinali in termini di programmazione, performance, pianificazione e gestione della performance nonché di armonizzazione contabile e di controllo, con particolare riferimento ai controlli interni, e 2) analizzato con riferimento a principi, criteri, obiettivi e strumenti pluriennali ed annuali che ogni ente è tenuto e può utilizzare per poter al meglio pianificare, programmazione e controllare le proprie prestazioni di breve, medio e lungo termine. Una volta delineato il background teorico si procederà alla descrizione di un'ipotesi di piano integrato della performance, sotto il punto di vista del processo di sviluppo e degli strumenti, con l'evidenziazione di punti di forza, possibili benefici, ma anche dei limiti e delle questioni non affrontate o che rimangono senza una risposta efficace. A titolo di approfondimento verrà presentato un caso di studio per evidenziare come un sistema integrato di performance possa essere considerato un sistema di governance amministrativa. La definizione del modello è stato guidata da due principi guida: i) semplificazione del contesto e ii) riduzione della complessità degli strumenti. Il tutto, in una prospettiva di possibile futura applicazione pratica all'interno degli enti locali italiani di piccole dimensioni. Tali enti sono caratterizzati da strutture organizzative con un minor grado di complessità, minori risorse economiche, finanziarie, strumentali ed umane, rispetto ad enti di maggiori dimensioni. Per queste ragioni, questi enti rappresentano un miglior contesto in cui adottare uno strumento di pianificazione e programmazione semplice e chiaro che possa aggiungersi agli altri adempimenti previsti per legge, senza appesantire troppo la gestione amministrativa. Se da un lato il modello proposto ha il vantaggio di riunire in un unico documento gli elementi di pianificazione e programmazione della performance strategica con collegamenti chiari e diretti ai documenti di programmazione pluriennali dell'intera attività amministrativa degli enti (DUP) e a quelli di gestione amministrativa e di bilancio (PEG), dall'altro potrebbe incorrere nel rischio di recepimento dello stesso come mero elemento formale, senza un'utilità sostanziale. Lo strumento ipotizzato permette, da un lato, di rispondere a quanto previsto dalla riforma del 2009 e con i dettati derivanti dal processo di armonizzazione contabile, ma, dall'altro, potrebbe contribuire a creare confusione, soprattutto all'interno di quegli enti locali con competenze limitate e risorse inadeguate all'utilizzo di strumenti innovativi per la gestione strategica e dell'intero ciclo di programmazione e controllo A questi punti possono e devono essere aggiunte riflessioni in merito alle modalità di trasmissione, gestione e comunicazione dell'informazione di performance oltre che di conciliazione e sintesi con i processi di decentramento amministrativo, di sviluppo ed affermazione dell'autonomia locale, nel nuovo quadro dei vincoli finanziaria, economici ed istituzionali nazionali e comunitari. THESIS SUMMARY Performance, performance measurement, management and control, alongside the concepts of efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsibility are considered the basis of New Public Management by both scholars and practioners of public sector. The economic crisis at the beginning of the 90's, its implications and political tensions have increased the concern of Italian governments and parliaments (over the years) on uncontrolled growth of public expenses and public debt. An increasing legislative provision on local government dynamics and principles was a consequence of this concerning, amplifying also by the new European Union's budget procedures and needs. The State organization in different levels of government as stated by the constitutional prevision was the focus of main legislative measures (starting form the law no. 142/1990) . In particular Italian local governments are articled in three different levels: Municipality, Provinces and Regions (last are stated in 1970 but became operating with the republican president decree no. 616/77). Moreover governments and parliaments focused their attention on the promotion of administrative decentralization and local statutory, regulative, fiscal, financial and management autonomy. The focus on local government planning activity and performance increased as well as the attention on citizens' informative needs about the use of scarce public resources in order to guarantee the public services. Decisions and actions of the political and administrative bodies followed the general guidelines (legislative decree 165/2001), plans and programs. The object of the Law no. 150 of 2009 (Brunetta Law) is public administration performance, organizational and individual performance of public employees. The public performance is often a sensitive issue in the public debate and generates negative point of views. The last regulation on accounting harmonization generates i) a rethinking process about the overall local governments performance programming and control systems ii) to develop an integrated system to satisfy informative needs on local public administration performance. The present PhD thesis's focused on Italian local governments tools and procedures to i) program, ii) measure and iii) manage the performance by the analysis of the legislative provisions until the last legislative decree 150/09 and the legislative decree 118/2011. First, a full literature review about performance meanings and performance measurement has been carried out. This work highlighted the benefits and the unexpected effects of the performance measures, their limitations and the existing differences between performance measurement and management. Then, concepts of indicators and performance measures are introduced, their principal features and differences, utility and possible uses and the users of performance information (e.g. decision makers, politicians, citizens). The presentation of the theoretical background will be aimed to describe the overall context of performance issue through, i) the international context of public sector and ii) the local public administration performance dynamics. The specific context of this dissertation will be the Italian local government focusing on 1) the description of legislation and doctrine for the programming, planning and management of performance, as well as the accounting harmonization and internal controls and 2) the analysis of local governments' principles, criteria, aims and tools for long and short term performance planning, programming and controls. The next section will be dedicated to describe an hypothesis of integrated performance plan, its development process and tools, its strengths and weaknesses, and the non-addressed and unresolved issues. Further a case study is presented in order to highlight how an integrated performance system can be considered as an administrative governance system. The overall analysis is guided by two principles: i) context simplification and ii) tools' complexity reduction. The future perspective of its practical application is represented by small local governments, characterized by lower complexity and economic, financial, instrumental and human resources than larger ones. For these reasons small governments are better context to apply a new simple tool in addition to the traditional legislative fulfillments without increasing the administrative complexity. Elements of performance planning and programming and their connections with the others multiannual programming, budgeting and management documents (Single Programming Document: DUP, Executive Management Plan: PEG) are included in one single document. However, this system can be seen as another mere formality, without substantial benefits. It meets the aims of the 2009 reform and the principles of the accounting harmonization but it can also create confusion, in particular for local governments with limited skills and inadequate resources to use innovative tools of strategic governance, programming and control. Finally, it will be presented a reflection about systems of performance information transmission, management and communication and the settlement between decentralization processes, development and statement of local autonomy, national and European economic-financial constraints.
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Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Iran's president, foreign minister, and several other high-level officials lost their lives on Sunday, when their helicopter crashed in a mountainous area in northwest Iran. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was an ultra-hardliner who had been handpicked in 2021 by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to be Iran's president. Before his election, Raisi had a long career in the judiciary and a notorious and well-documented track record for violating the human rights of the Iranian people.Raisi played an important role in the execution of nearly 4,000 political prisoners during the summer of 1988. As Tehran Prosecutor from 1989 to 1994, he arrested and prosecuted leading nationalist-religious figures, who had played important roles in the 1979 Revolution. During the Green Movement of 2009 to 2010, when Raisi was serving as the principal deputy of the judiciary chief, he declared that the demonstrators should be executed and played an important role in the crackdown in the aftermath of the movement.As the Prosecutor of the "Special Court for the Clergy" — an unconstitutional and extra-judicial court — from 2012, he persecuted dissident clerics opposed to Khamenei's rule. And after demonstrations broke out in Iran in September of 2022 in the aftermath of the death of Mahsa Amini, a young woman who had lost her life while in detention, Raisi took a hard line against demonstrators. The economic performance of the Raisi administration over the past three years has been dismal. He was not able to deliver on any of his promises, from reducing rampant inflation (estimated to hover around 50%) to building 4 million new houses for low-income people. In foreign policy, Raisi had promised that his administration would negotiate with the United States regarding a return to the nuclear agreement, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but his hardline approach was not successful, and the negotiations stalled. Thus, aside from his hardline supporters, who make up about 10 to 15% of the population, hardly anyone will shed any tears for him.Raisi's death will nevertheless contribute to the complex dynamics of Iran's internal politics, including the fierce power struggle among various conservative and moderate factions.The most important issue facing Iran, and particularly the conservatives, is who will succeed Khamenei as the next supreme leader. He is 85 years old and has been known for years to be ill, although the Western press has at times exaggerated the extent of his illness. In 2016, Khamenei appointed Raisi to the highly important post of Chairman of Astan Quds Razavi in Mashhad, placing him in control of the shrine of Imam Reza, Shia Islam's 8th Imam, and its vast assets, totaling tens of billions of dollars. Many interpreted that decision as a signal that Raeisi would be a candidate for succeeding Khamenei. The plausibility of the interpretation was strengthened when, immediately after Raisi's appointment, senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) visited Raisi in Mashhad, treating him as a sort of future national leader. That was the first sign that Raisi was rising among the hardliners. With the support of Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba — a shadowy figure whom many also consider as another potential successor to his father — Raisi ran in the presidential elections in 2017 but lost badly to former President Hasan Rouhani.Raisi's main base of support was in the Jebheh Paydari Enghelab-e Eslami (JPEE) [the Front of Stability of Islamic Revolution], who are followers of the reactionary and hardline cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (1935-2021). Although they have always professed their loyalty to Khamenei, over the past several years fissures have emerged between the JPEE and those who are close to the beit-e rahbari – the office of the supreme leader – and Mojtaba Khamenei, who plays a key role in it. These fissures became more transparent in the most recent elections for the Majles (Iran's parliament), held in March of this year, when the younger Khamenei's father-in-law, who is close to the supreme leader, criticized the JPEE, as did some of the mouthpieces of the IRGC.The recent Majles elections were held simultaneously with those for the Assembly of Experts, a constitutional body whose most important task is to elect the new supreme leader. By vetting the candidates, the hardliners prevented moderate clerics, such as Rouhani, from running in those elections. This set the stage for a succession showdown between various hardline factions, namely, supporters of Mojtaba Khamenei, Raisi, and perhaps a dark horse candidate like Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje'i, the hardline judiciary chief who recently criticized Raisi implicitly over economic corruption. Some in Iran believe that helping Raisi to become Iran's President was in fact a trap set for him by the younger Khamenei to showcase Raisi's incompetence. Indeed, the dismal performance of Iran's economy under Raisi — coupled with his administration's poor planning and rampant corruption — would have severely complicated his chances of becoming supreme leader.According to the Islamic Republic's constitution, national elections should be held to elect the next president within 50 days of Raisi's death. Only 30 to 40% of eligible voters participated in the recent Majles elections, a low turnout that has alarmed many, even among the regime's supporters, since the ruling elite had always interpreted the high turnout of voters in the past national elections as a sign of legitimacy of its political system. The question is, will Khamenei use the opportunity of Raisi's death to allow for more open elections with the hope of shoring up his regime's legitimacy?In addition, given Raisi's deep unpopularity among the masses, his funeral and the upcoming elections may provide an opportunity for the Iranian people to once again demonstrate their frustrations with the terrible state of the economy, as well as social and political repression.Given that the most important reason for Raisi's rise to the presidency was his loyalty to Khamenei, who will be the latter's candidate in the upcoming elections? There is no shortage of candidates among the hardliners, but none can advance without Khamenei's support, and it is not yet clear who will have his backing.Finally, how will Raisi's death affect the question of a successor to Khamenei? Will new candidates emerge? Will Raisi's death lead to the possibility of a more moderate successor to Khamenei? What will be the role of the IRGC in selecting the successor?Given Iran's complex political dynamics, these are not easy questions to address. But, particularly at a time when the war in Gaza is continuing and Iran's shadowy war with Israel has come into the open, there is no question that what happens in Iran will have repercussions for the entire Middle East.
The pandemic of COVID-19, the threat of technogenic and anthropogenic character, brought to the foreground non-market aspects of the general, corporate branch culture and strategy in medicine and health care. Therefore, in many countries, despite differences in state and private property ratios in health infrastructure, the state priority is ensuring cooperation within the national health care system which capable quickly and well-coordinated work in the extremely dangerous epidemics conditions and other emergency situations. The purpose of this article is discussing a problem of public and private models of medical care organization in Russian health care system.Materials and methods. Content analysis methods, economical and statistical analysis, information and analytical materials of the Russian and foreign news agencies, a summary across Russia of Rosstat form No. 62 of the state statistical observation «Data on resource providing and on delivery of health care to the population» (legal entities - the medical organizations which are carrying out activity in the sphere of compulsory health insurance), analytical materials and statistical data of World Health Organization (The European portal of information of health care of WHO: https://gateway.euro.who.int/en/hfa-explorer/), statistical data and metadata on the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/), the materials of monographic researches and periodicals including placed on the Internet were used in this article.Results: the system of compulsory health insurance is an ancestor of the program of the state guarantees of free medical care of in Russian citizens. The length of the text of this Program so far was increased in 130 times in comparison with initial edition of 1998. At the same time, there is still no clear delineation for the bases, volumes and conditions differentiation of free and paid medical care rendering. As a result, the major human right to free medical care remains not completely realized. The numbers of the non-state medical organizations to provide free of charge medical care to the population according to the policy of obligatory medical insurance (i.e. financed from the state sources) in the period of 2011 to 2019 – from 648 to 2423 organizations respectively were increased in Russia four times. This demonstrates the creation of the new, «integrated» model of health care in Russia in the mode of public and private partnership for deciding of social tasks. Although, free medical care for citizens in the private medical organizations is not mentioned in the Constitution of Russian Federation (Main Law). In emergency situations such integration allows private medical structures to involve capacities and also be coordinated with one of the tasks of the Ministry of health target program «Development of the Fundamental, Transmitting and Personalized Medicine».Conclusions. There is a formation of the integrated, public and private (hybrid) model of health care in modern Russia that needs developing of a new partnership and principles of management in the sphere of medical care organization. State policy in the health care financing sphere should be directed not only to the state guarantees of medical care specification, but also to a gap in social and economic inequality reduction. The social protection systems should be focused, first of all, on people who are most in great need of medical care. For the protecting population from catastrophic payments for medical care, it is necessary to bring the concept of the social standards - a number of the general rules, norms and standards which must guarantee the state ensuring constitutional rights of citizens to free medical care in the health care legislation. ; Пандемия COVID-19, угрозы техногенного и антропогенного характера, вывели на передний план нерыночные аспекты общей, корпоративной отраслевой культуры и стратегии в медицине и здравоохранении. Поэтому во многих странах, несмотря на различия в соотношениях государственной и частной собственности в инфраструктуре здравоохранения, государственным приоритетом является обеспечение их сотрудничества в рамках национальной системы здравоохранения, способной оперативно и слаженно работать в условиях крайне опасных эпидемий и угроз иных чрезвычайных ситуаций.Цель данной статьи – обсудить проблему формирования в системе здравоохранения России общественно-частной модели организации медицинской помощи.Материалы и методы. Использованы методы контент-анализа, экономико-статистического анализа, информационные и аналитические материалы российских и зарубежных информационных агентств, сводная по России форма государственного статистического наблюдения № 62 «Сведения о ресурсном обеспечении и об оказании медицинской помощи населению» (сдают юридические лица – медицинские организации, осуществляющие деятельность в сфере ОМС), статистические сборники Росстата, аналитические материалы и статистические данные ВОЗ (Европейский портал информации здравоохранения ВОЗ: https://gateway.euro.who.int/en/hfa-explorer/ ), статистические данные и метаданные по странам Организации экономического сотрудничества и развития(ОЭСР, https://stats.oecd.org/ ), материалы монографических исследований и периодической печати, в том числе в сети Интернет.Результаты. Родоначальником Программы государственных гарантий бесплатного оказания гражданам медицинской помощи в России является система ОМС. Объем текста этой Программы увеличился к настоящему времени в 130 раз в сравнении с первоначальной редакцией 1998 года. При этом все еще отсутствует четкое нормативное разграничения оснований, объемов и условий оказания бесплатной и платной медицинской помощи, в результате важнейшее право человека на бесплатную медицинскую помощь остается не полностью реализованным. Число негосударственных медицинских организаций, оказывающих населению медицинскую помощь бесплатно по полису обязательного медицинского страхования, т. е. финансируемых из государственных источников, увеличилось в России за период с 2011 по 2019 гг. в четыре раза – с 648 до 2423 организаций соответственно. Это свидетельствует о формировании в России новой, «объединенной» модели здравоохранения в режиме общественно-частного партнерства по решению социальных задач, хотя в Конституции Российской Федерации бесплатное оказание гражданам медицинской помощи в частных медицинских организациях не предусмотрено. Такая интеграция позволяет задействовать производственные мощности частных медицинских структур в чрезвычайных ситуациях, а также согласуется с одной из задач ведомственной целевой программы «Развитие фундаментальной, трансляционной и персонализированной медицины».Выводы. В современной России идет формирование объединенной, общественно-частной (гибридной) модели здравоохранения, что требует разработки новых, партнёрских отношений и принципов управления в сфере организации медицинской помощи. Государственная политика в сфере финансирования здравоохранения должна быть направлена не только на конкретизацию государственных гарантий медицинской помощи, но и на сокращение разрыва в социально-экономическом неравенстве, а системы социальной защиты должны быть ориентированы, прежде всего, на людей, которые наиболее сильно нуждаются в медицинской помощи. Для защиты населения от чрезмерных («катастрофических») платежей за медицинскую помощь, целесообразно ввести в законодательство о здравоохранении понятие социальных стандартов – ряда общих правил, норм и нормативов, посредством которых государством гарантируются обеспечение конституционных прав граждан на бесплатное получение медицинской помощи.
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ANOTĀCIJA Ideju par cilvēka tiesībām uz vidi parasti saista ar cerībām, ka šo tiesību īstenošana destruktīvo attieksmi pret vidi varētu aizstāt ar "zaļāku un tīrāku" sabiedrību. Latvijā tiesības uz labvēlīgu vidi ir vienas no cilvēka pamattiesībām. Darba mērķis ir izpētīt tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi būtību un analizēt šo tiesību aizsardzības praksi Latvijā, lai veidotu labāku izpratni par cilvēka tiesību uz vidi institūtu. Darbu veido divi pētniecības virzieni. Pirmais ir cilvēka tiesību uz vidi būtības konceptuālo un teorētisko aspektu analīze, bet otrais – tiesu prakses pētniecība. Darba saturiskā struktūra veidota, pirmkārt, lai tiesības uz vidi būtu iespējams apskatīt no trim perspektīvām - tiesības uz vidi kā patstāvīgas materiālās tiesības, tiesības uz vidi kā procesuālās vides tiesības, tiesības uz vidi kā pilsonisko tiesību atvasinājums; otrkārt, lai novērtētu minēto perspektīvu piemērotību un atbilstību tiesību uz vidi būtībai un tai vietai, kāda Latvijas tiesību sistēmā ir ierādīta cilvēka tiesībām uz labvēlīgu vidi. Darba pirmajā nodaļā ir apskatītas materiālās tiesības uz vidi, atklājot šo tiesību vietu cilvēktiesību sistēmā, atzīšanas pakāpi un juridiskā nostiprinājuma rangu starptautiskajās, pārnacionālajās un valstu, tostarp Latvijas nacionālajās tiesībās. Lai veidotu izpratni par tiesību uz vidi būtību, analizētas materiālo tiesību uz vidi galvenās satura interpretācijas, kā arī identificēti galvenie šķēršļi materiālo tiesību uz vidi atzīšanai. Eiropas Cilvēktiesību un pamatbrīvību aizsardzības konvencija nodrošina efektīvu cilvēktiesību aizsardzības mehānismu galvenokārt pilsoniskajām un politiskajām tiesībām. Tā kā cilvēka labklājību un dzīves kvalitāti lielā mērā noteic tieši politiskā iekārta, vides jautājumus nav iespējams strikti nodalīt no pilsoniskajām un politiskajām tiesībām. Darba otrajā nodaļā, balstoties uz Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesas judikatūru, veikta izpēte, lai noskaidrotu, cik lielā mērā cilvēks, aizsargājot savas starptautiski un nacionāli garantētās pilsoniskās tiesības, var panākt, ka valsts ievēro pieņemtos vides likumus. Darba trešajā nodaļā jautājums par cilvēka tiesībām uz vidi aplūkots caur sabiedrības procesuālo vides tiesību (tiesības zināt, tiesības piedalīties) prizmu. Vienlaikus sabiedrības procesuālās vides tiesības ir viens no ilgtspējīgas attīstības koncepcijas elementiem, kas sazobē ar citiem šīs koncepcijas elementiem (integrācijas principu, vides aizsardzības principiem) strukturē vides lēmumu pieņemšanu. Šajā nodaļā ir pētīts, kā ilgtspējīgas attīstības koncepcija un no tās izrietošie principi ir ietekmējuši izpratni par cilvēka tiesībām uz vidi. Darba ceturtajā nodaļā veikta izpēte par to, kā pašlaik Latvijā tiek nodrošināta tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi aizsardzība. Šajā nodaļā, balstoties uz Satversmes tiesas un administratīvo tiesu praksi, analizēti tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi procesuālie aspekti. Veikta detalizēta izpēte par sabiedrības līdzdalības tiesību institūta un personas tiesību vērsties tiesā institūta būtību, kā arī atklāts, kādā veidā šie tiesību institūti ir pielāgoti vides aizsardzības mērķu sasniegšanai. Šajā nodaļā ir identificētas tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi pazīmes, kas ļauj šīs tiesības nošķirt no citām pamattiesībām, sniegts vērtējums par šo tiesību saturu un subjektiem, par tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi līdzsvarošanu ar citām pamattiesībām, kā arī izteikti priekšlikumi par to, kādā veidā minētā līdzsvarošana būtu pilnveidojama, lai tiesību uz labvēlīgu vidi aizsardzību padarītu efektīvāku. ; ABSTRACT The concept of environmental rights usually is related with expectation that by guaranteeing these rights, a destructive attitude towards the environment could be replaced by a greener and cleaner society. In Latvia, the right to a benevolent environment is a fundamental human right. The aim of this thesis is to study the meaning of the right to a benevolent environment and to analyse the protection of this right in Latvia in order to broaden the understanding of an individual's environmental rights. The thesis contains two types of research, namely, the analysis of conceptual and theoretical aspects of an individual's environmental rights and the study of court decisions. The structure of the thesis is devised to consider environmental rights from three perspectives – environmental rights as autonomous substantive rights, environmental rights as procedural environmental rights, and environmental rights as derivative civil rights. The author also assesses the appropriateness and relevance of the above perspectives to the essence of environmental rights and the role of an individual's right to a benevolent environment as reflected in Latvia's legal system. The first chapter of the thesis considers substantive environmental rights by viewing the role of these rights in the system of human rights, the extent to which they are recognised and the level on which they are legally embodied in international, supranational and national legislation, including national legislation in Latvia. In order to explain the essence of environmental rights, the general interpretation of substantive environmental rights is analysed, and the main obstacles for recognising substantive environmental rights are identified. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides an effective mechanism for protecting human rights, particularly civil and political rights. As people's welfare and standard of living to a great extent depend on the political system, environmental issues cannot be separated from civil and political rights. On the basis of case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the second chapter of the thesis analyses the extent to which individuals, by defending their internationally and nationally recognised civil rights, can ensure that the state abides by laws pertaining to the environment. The third chapter views an individual's environmental rights from the perspective of public procedural environmental rights (right to know and right to participate). Concurrently, public procedural environmental rights are among the elements contained in the concept of sustainable development which, in interaction with other elements (principle of integration, principles of environmental protection), determine the structure of decision making in the sphere of environment. This chapter also analyses the impact of the concept of sustainable development and its principles on the understanding of an individual's environmental rights. The fourth chapter of the thesis analyses how the right to a benevolent environment is protected in Latvia. On the basis of cases heard by the Constitutional Court and administrative courts, this chapter analyses procedural aspects of the right to a benevolent environment. A detailed study is conducted of the right to public participation and an individual's right to refer to a court, and it is determined how these rights are adapted to environmental protection goals. This chapter identifies the characteristics of the right to a benevolent environment that differentiate this right from other fundamental rights; this chapter also evaluates the content and subjects of these rights, the balance between the right to a benevolent environment and other fundamental rights; it also presents recommendations on how this balance can be improved in order to ensure more effective protection of the right to a benevolent environment.
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ÖZETDünya siyasi tarihinin en önemli dönüm noktalarından biri olan 1980'li yıllarda, SSCB çözülmeye başlamış, 9 Kasım 1989 tarihinde adeta soğuk savaşın sembolü olan Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılmasıyla küresel dengeler Batı ve ABD lehine değişmiştir. Batı ve ABD, liberal demokratik sistemi artık dünyanın genel geçer tek egemen siyasal modeli olarak diğer ülkelere yayma ve egemen kılma stratejik hedefiyle "Yeni Dünya Düzeni" taktik projesini uygulamaya koymuşlardır.Osmanlı idaresi sonrasında Ortadoğu, uzun bir süre huzur bulamamış, bu yüzden ABD ve Batı için Yeni Dünya Düzeni projesinin en önemli uygulama alanı olmuştur. Diğer taraftan Irak, uzun yıllar istikrar yüzü görmemiş, kuzeyde Kürt grupların ayrılıkçı talepleriyle uğraşırken siyasi otoritesi ise sürekli bir darbeler zincirine muhatap olmuştur. En son Saddam rejiminin 2 Ağustos 1990 tarihinde Kuveyt'i işgaliyle başlayan fiili durum Mart 1991 tarihinde Irak'ın, askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik olarak çevrelenmesine sebep olmuştur. 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde, New York'ta Dünya Ticaret Merkezi'ne yapılan terörist saldırılar; başta ABD olmak üzere, ülkelerin güvenlik stratejilerini değiştirmiş, "savunma" temelli stratejilerden "tehdit algılandığı anda ortadan kaldırma" eksenli bir stratejiye kaymıştır. ABD, yeni Ulusal Güvenlik Doktrini gereği Irak'ın terörizmi desteklediği ve kitle imha silahları ürettiği ve bulundurduğu gerekçeleriyle 20 Mart 2003 tarihinde İngiltere ile birlikte Iraklı muhalif grupları da yanına alarak Irak'ı işgal etmiştir. Hemen yanı başında gerçekleşen bu savaş, Türkiye'yi stratejik konumu gereği çok yakından ilgilendirmiştir. ABD'nin Kuzey cephesinin açılması konusundaki talepleri 1 Mart tezkeresi ile reddedilmiş ancak, ABD ve müttefiklerine hava sahasını açarak savaş sırasında destek olmuştur. Türkiye, bu savaşta hep "Uluslararası Meşruiyet" arayarak, barışçıl bir politika izleme konusunda azami çaba sarf etmiş, ayrıca savaş sonrası Irak'ın yeniden yapılandırılması ve imarı konusunda da lojistik destek vermiştir.İşgal sonrası, 28 Nisan 2003 tarihinde başlayan Irak yönetiminin yeniden yapılandırılması çalışmaları neticesinde, Temmuz 2003 tarihinde Irak Geçici Yönetimi oluşturulmuş, 8 Mart 2004 tarihinde daha sonraki sürece yön verecek olan Irak Geçici İdari Yasası kabul edilmiştir. Yeni devletin rejimi demokratik cumhuriyet olarak tanımlanırken, Kerkük ve Bağdat'ın ayrı tutulduğu coğrafi esaslara göre 18 eyaletli federal bir yapı oluşturulmuştur. 30 Ocak 2005 yılında yapılan seçimlerinin ardından demokrasiye geçme çabası devam eden Irak'ta, 15 Ekim 2005 tarihinde Irak Yeni Anayasası referandumla kabul edilmiştir.Yeniden yapılandırılma sürecinde etnik temelde yapılan tartışmaların en önemlisi Kuzey Irak Bölgesel Kürt Yönetimi olmuştur. Özerkliklerine anayasal temelde meşruiyet sağlayan Kuzey Irak Kürt Yönetimi, Türkiye ve başta ABD olmak üzere diğer ülkelerin baskısı sonucunda demokratik sürece adapte olma ve Irak'ın bütünlüğünün korunması konusunda mesafe alarak bağımsızlık hedeflerini ötelemişlerdir. Ayrıca, Türkiye bu süreçte "Kırmızı Çizgileri"ni koruma konusunda ABD ve Irak Merkezi Hükümeti ile diyalog içinde olmuştur. Türkiye'nin, özellikle PKK, Kerkük ve Türkmenler ile ilgili yaptığı çalışmalar kısmen başarılı olmuş, son dönemde de Kuzey Irak Bölgesel Kürt Yönetimi ile iyi ilişkiler kurmaya başlamıştır. SUMMARYOne of the most important turning point in the History of World Politics was during 1980s: the USSR was begining to disintegrate; the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, which symbolised the (end of) cold war, shifted the global balance in favor of the United States and the Western Europe. From then on, the West and the U.S. put the New World Order (NWO) policy into effect, which is known to be a strategy aimed at spreading the liberal democratic system to other countries as the world's only and dominant political system.For a long time after the Ottoman ruling, the Middle East failed to achieve stability and became the main focus of the west. Moreover Iraq was struggling to stabilize her political system with the demands of Kurdish separatist groups and ongoing coups d'etat in the country. The Invasion of Kuwait on the 2nd of August 1990 by Saddam's Baathist regime led to the surrounding of Iraq's millitary, politics and sanctions on its economy by the west in March 1991. The 9/11 terrorist attack on America in 2001 at the World Trade Center Towers made the U.S. and other countries around the world to reconsider their security strategies from defensive to "elimating the threat at the instant of its detection". Under the new National Security Doctrine, the U.S. and Britain, with the coalition forces invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003 on the grounds of Saddam's government supporting terrorism, and holding in its possesions weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Having a war right across its borders caused a major concern for Turkey. The U.S. officially requested from Turkey to open the northern Iraqi front line and give passage to the U.S, personnel. However, on March the first, by the majority of Turkish Parliament, the bill was blocked. Nevertheless, Turkey gave indirect support to the coalition forces by opening her airspace to their military use. During the war, Turkish government had put maximum effort seeking peaceful policy on the grounds of "international legitimacy", and in the aftermath of the war, the Turkish government have been giving full logistic support during the reconstruction of Iraq.Folowing the invasion on the 28 of April 2003, restoring of the Iraqi goverment began and as the result, in July 2003 Iraqi Interim Administration was constituted. In order to direct the course of reconstruction of the country, in 8 March 2004 the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law was approved: the new state government was defined as a democratic republic, where Kirkuk and Baghdad kept separate from the 18 states with a federal structure based on geographical basis. The effort of transition to democracy continued following the January 2005 elections, and as a result on October 15, 2005 the new constitution was approved by a referandum.In the process of restructuring Iraq, the most disputed ethnic issue was Kurdish Northern Iraq Regional Administration. The Northern Iraqi Kurdish Administration obtained a legitimate autonomy under the constitutional basis, however the administration deferred its declaration of independence due to political pressure from Turkey, the U.S and other countries. The Northern Administration was encouraged to adapt to the new Iraqi deomcratic process and to preserve the country's unity. Furthermore, during this process Turkey have been in dialogue with the United States and Iraqi Central Government to advocate for maintaining the regions safety, and the issues which the Turkish government is sensitive. Turkey's effort especially on the matters like the PKK, Kirkuk and Turkmen has been partly successful, the Turkish government has recently began establishing good relations with Northern Iraq Kurdish Regional Administration.
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In: West European politics, Volume 36, Issue 1, p. 97-121
ISSN: 0140-2382
World Affairs Online
In: Politique étrangère: PE ; revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Volume 59, Issue 2, p. 517-536
ISSN: 0032-342X
World Affairs Online
El modelo de Estado Social de Derecho se adopta bajo el marco de la Constitución de 1991 y es asumido como una concepción jurídica que busca la garantía de los derechos, privilegiando aquellos relacionados con la protección a la vida y los bienes de los ciudadanos. Es por esto que surge la necesidad de garantizar el derecho a la seguridad, término que ha variado con el correr de los tiempos y el desarrollo de las sociedades humanas, especialmente, como consecuencia del conflicto armado. En este orden de ideas, el Estado, al tener como eje principal la protección de la vida propende por un orden público democrático que, elimine todo tipo de amenazas a la población y garantice la protección de los derechos y las libertades de los ciudadanos. Es así que el Estado colombiano frente a los retos que implica el cambio en las formas de violencia y de los actores que las llevan a cabo, y teniendo en cuenta la dicotomía existente entre conflicto armado interno y la urgencia de desarrollar una política pública de seguridad ciudadana con enfoques en seguridad en orden público, se ha dotado de herramientas para cumplir, total o parcialmente, con su función de buscar mecanismos de protección ante la violencia social en procura de garantizar el goce de los derechos de los ciudadanos. Ahora bien, para hacer efectivo el cumplimiento de los derechos de los ciudadanos se acogió y adaptó la concepción de seguridad ciudadana; que constituye una de las dimensiones de seguridad humana que, en términos de Charles-Phillipe David (2008), se define de la siguiente manera: 8 Análisis de la política de seguridad ciudadana y su aporte como herramienta para garantizar derechos a los ciudadanos mediante los planes de desarrollo 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez La seguridad humana se distingue esencialmente [de la seguridad estatal o clásica] por el hecho de que tiene por objeto la protección del individuo y no la protección del Estado, y por el hecho de que las amenazas provienen al mismo tiempo del exterior y del interior de los Estados (p. 62) Por otra parte, el concepto de seguridad ciudadana se orienta a preservar la tranquilidad individual y colectiva de la sociedad ante peligros que pudieran afectarla, garantizando el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos, es preciso señalar entonces que, la seguridad ciudadana no solo constituye la lucha contra el crimen, sino que además propende por la creación de un ambiente propicio y adecuado para la convivencia pacífica de las personas, es decir, procura la consolidación de procesos que mejoren las relaciones entre la comunidad y las instituciones encargadas oficialmente de brindar seguridad. De tal forma, dada la amplitud y complejidad de un tema como la seguridad ciudadana, se requiere para su regulación del diseño e implementación de políticas públicas, concepto que para fines de este documento, se adoptó del autor Roth (2017) quien las concibe como: (…) un conjunto de medios y acciones que son tratados, por lo menos parcialmente, por una institución u organización gubernamental con la finalidad de orientar el comportamiento de actores individuales o colectivos para modificar una situación percibida como insatisfactoria o problemática‖. ( p.27) El anterior concepto permite esclarecer el fenómeno de la política pública, tal y como lo señala el autor, haciendo referencia a toda acción que desarrolle el Estado para alcanzar los fines u objetivos ante situaciones consideradas como problemáticas o insatisfactorias, a fin de armonizar y/o afrontar falencias. Esto indica que el Estado, una vez vislumbrada la necesidad de proteger al individuo y el libre ejercicio de sus derechos y libertades, a partir de la garantía de la 9 Análisis de la política de seguridad ciudadana y su aporte como herramienta para garantizar derechos a los ciudadanos mediante los planes de desarrollo 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez seguridad de los ciudadanos, acoge las políticas públicas en materia de seguridad ciudadana como mecanismo para el cumplimiento de su fin. No obstante, la seguridad ciudadana, entendida bajo la perspectiva de Carranza (1995), involucra un concepto verdaderamente amplio y completo, que: Concibe la seguridad de los habitantes, no solamente como la tranquilidad de no ser víctima de hechos delictivos sino, también, de vivir en un Estado constitucional de derecho y de participar de los beneficios del desarrollo en materia de salud, educación, vivienda, y todos los ámbitos del carácter social (p. 21). En términos generales, el Estado ha enfrentado retos a través de la implementación de normatividad e imposición de la fuerza pública, e instituciones encargadas de la seguridad a través de la delegación de funciones, aspecto que se contempló desde la Constitución de 1991 en el artículo 314, que facultó a los alcaldes llevar a cabo el ejercicio de la seguridad, por ser considerados como la primera autoridad de policía. Posteriormente, con la Ley No 62, 1993 se determinó que, tanto alcaldes como gobernadores, junto con la Policía Nacional, deberían diseñar y desarrollar planes integrales de seguridad para las entidades territoriales, conocidos estos como Planes Integrales de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (PISCC), que resultan de un proceso interinstitucional para el fortalecimiento de la garantía de la seguridad ciudadana. En tiempos más recientes, con la Ley No 1801, 2016 que establece el Código Nacional de Policía, se reglamenta en su artículo 5, capítulo II la convivencia, entendida como ―la interacción pacífica, respetuosa y armónica entre las personas, con los bienes y con el ambiente, en el marco del ordenamiento jurídico‖. 10 Análisis de la política de seguridad ciudadana y su aporte como herramienta para garantizar derechos a los ciudadanos mediante los planes de desarrollo 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez Sin embargo, a pesar de que el Estado colombiano, es un Estado Social de Derecho, que goza de amplia normatividad e institucionalidad, aún se evidencia y de manera cotidiana en los medios de comunicación masiva, una alteración en el goce de los derechos de los ciudadanos en materia de seguridad ciudadana, contrarrestando o menoscabando lo estipulado tanto en la ley, como en las políticas públicas que han sido diseñadas para tal fin. Lo anteriormente expuesto lleva a formular la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo en su calidad de políticas públicas, los planes de desarrollo del período 2012-2018, han incidido y contribuido a garantizar el derecho a la seguridad ciudadana? El fundamento de la problemática radica en la necesidad que el Estado busque mecanismos para el cumplimiento de los fines que democráticamente le fueron impuestos, pues el fortalecimiento del orden social, no solo se consolida con la eliminación de factores que puedan desequilibrar a la comunidad, sino con los mecanismos que se impartan para tratarla. Sin embargo, como una posible respuesta a la pregunta planteada se observa que, si bien es cierto, las políticas públicas generan un impacto directo en el bienestar de la sociedad, con el transcurrir de los años y con los índices que se reflejan en los medios de comunicación no se evidencian avances significativos en materia de seguridad ciudadana, respecto a las políticas públicas implementadas para el manejo de la seguridad ciudadana, persistiendo falencias en el sistema. Por tanto, no se ven reflejados en la población, avances significativos en el tema de seguridad ciudadana, en relación al ámbito social, es decir, en el libre goce de los derechos y libertades, por ello, los planes de desarrollo como política pública que regulan el ámbito de la 11 Análisis de la política de seguridad ciudadana y su aporte como herramienta para garantizar derechos a los ciudadanos mediante los planes de desarrollo 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez seguridad se han limitado y no han incidido de manera tal, que den una respuesta positiva frente a la seguridad ciudadana. Ahora bien, para dar respuesta a la pregunta planteada, se tiene como objetivo general i. Estudiar las políticas públicas entre los periodos 2002 a 2018, en materia de seguridad ciudadana, e identificar las líneas de acción y su continuidad en el tiempo. Así mismo, se contemplan como objetivos específicos ii. Conceptualizar las políticas públicas e identificar sus fases y contextualizar la seguridad ciudadana, y también iii. Identificar las herramientas para llevar a cabo el cumplimiento de las políticas, respecto a la seguridad ciudadana. Una vez analizado lo anterior, se tendrá un diagnóstico para esclarecer qué aporte o influencia han tenido los planes de desarrollo, como políticas públicas, en la garantía de los derechos de los ciudadanos, en materia de seguridad ciudadana. De modo tal, que una vez esté recopilada la totalidad de la información y el contenido, respecto al tema objeto de análisis, se podrá dar respuesta a la pregunta formulada. De manera que, para la construcción de una respuesta sólida a la pregunta planteada en este documento, fue necesario concebirla haciendo uso del método cualitativo, dado que se aborda un fenómeno con sus principales problemáticas, y cuyo propósito es la descripción del objeto que se estudia distinguiendo sus características. Igualmente se acudió al método histórico lógico que permite ver el progreso, desarrollo y evolución de las instituciones y normas jurídicas precisando transformaciones de un fenómeno socio jurídico. Por último, la respuesta se halla con apoyo de la dimensión jurídica, teniendo en cuenta que corresponde a la línea del derecho que como conjunto de preceptos conforman un sistema estructurado, con coherencia, y cuya finalidad 12 Análisis de la política de seguridad ciudadana y su aporte como herramienta para garantizar derechos a los ciudadanos mediante los planes de desarrollo 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez radica en encausar y organizar las relaciones sociales con técnicas de control y mediación, regulando y coordinando la coexistencia de la continuidad de la sociedad. Para concluir, gracias al empleo de las metodologías anteriormente señaladas, se puede establecer cuál es el aporte de las políticas públicas, desde su formulación e implementación a una política en materia de seguridad ciudadana, y cómo se ha podido garantizar. ; The model of the Social State of Law is adopted under the framework of the 1991 Constitution and is assumed as a legal concept that seeks the guarantee of rights, privileging those related to the protection of life and property of citizens. That is why the need arises to guarantee the right to security, a term that has varied over time and the development of human societies, especially as a result of the armed conflict. In this order of ideas, the State, having as its main axis the protection of life, tends for a democratic public order that eliminates all kinds of threats to the population and guarantees the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens. In this way, the Colombian State faces the challenges implied by the change in the forms of violence and the actors that carry them out, and taking into account the existing dichotomy between internal armed conflict and the urgency of developing a public security policy citizen with security approaches in public order, has provided tools to fully or partially comply with its function of seeking mechanisms of protection against social violence in order to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights of citizens. However, in order to enforce the fulfillment of the rights of citizens, the conception of citizen security was accepted and adapted; which constitutes one of the dimensions of human security that, in terms of Charles-Phillipe David (2008), is defined as follows: 8 Analysis of citizen security policy and its contribution as a tool to guarantee rights to citizens through the development plans 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez Human security is distinguished essentially [from state or classical security] by the fact that it is aimed at the protection of the individual and not the protection of the State, and by the fact that the threats come simultaneously from outside and inside of the States (p. 62) On the other hand, the concept of citizen security is aimed at preserving the individual and collective tranquility of society against dangers that could affect it, guaranteeing the exercise of the rights and freedoms of citizens, it is necessary to point out that, citizen security not only It constitutes the fight against crime, but also promotes the creation of a favorable and adequate environment for the peaceful coexistence of people, that is, it seeks to consolidate processes that improve relations between the community and the institutions officially responsible for providing security. Thus, given the breadth and complexity of an issue such as citizen security, it is required for its regulation of the design and implementation of public policies, a concept that was adopted by the author Roth (2017) for the purposes of this document, who conceives them as : (.) a set of means and actions that are treated, at least partially, by a government institution or organization in order to guide the behavior of individual or collective actors to modify a situation perceived as unsatisfactory or problematic problem. (p.27) The previous concept allows to clarify the phenomenon of public policy, as indicated by the author, referring to any action that the State develops to achieve the ends or objectives in situations considered as problematic or unsatisfactory, in order to harmonize and / or face shortcomings. This indicates that the State, once envisioned the need to protect the individual and the free exercise of their rights and freedoms, from the guarantee of the 9 Analysis of citizen security policy and its contribution as a tool to guarantee rights to citizens through the development plans 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez citizen security, welcomes public policies on citizen security as a mechanism for the fulfillment of its purpose. However, citizen security, understood from the perspective of Carranza (1995), involves a truly broad and complete concept, which: conceives the safety of the inhabitants, not only as the peace of mind of not being a victim of criminal acts but, also, to live in a constitutional state of law and to participate in the benefits of development in health, education, housing, and all areas of social character (p. 21). In general terms, the State has faced challenges through the implementation of regulations and enforcement of the public force, and institutions responsible for security through the delegation of functions, an aspect that was contemplated since the 1991 Constitution in article 314 , which empowered the mayors to carry out the exercise of security, for being considered the first police authority. Subsequently, with Law No. 62, 1993, it was determined that both mayors and governors, together with the National Police, should design and develop comprehensive security plans for territorial entities, known as Integral Plans for Coexistence and Citizen Security (PISCC) , which result from an inter-institutional process to strengthen the guarantee of citizen security. In more recent times, with Law No. 1801, 2016 that establishes the National Police Code, coexistence is regulated in article 5, chapter II, understood as ―the peaceful, respectful and harmonious interaction between people, with property and with the environment, within the framework of the legal system‖. 10 Analysis of citizen security policy and its contribution as a tool to guarantee rights to citizens through the development plans 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez However, despite the fact that the Colombian State is a Social State of Law, which enjoys broad regulations and institutions, it is still evident and on a daily basis in the mass media, an alteration in the enjoyment of the rights of the citizens in matters of citizen security, counteracting or undermining what is stipulated both in the law and in the public policies that have been designed for this purpose. The foregoing leads us to ask the following question: How, in your quality as public policies, have the development plans for the 2012-2018 period influenced and contributed to guaranteeing the right to citizen security? The basis of the problem lies in the need for the State to seek mechanisms for the fulfillment of the ends that were democratically imposed, since the strengthening of the social order is not only consolidated with the elimination of factors that can unbalance the community, but with the mechanisms taught to treat it. However, as a possible answer to the question posed, it is observed that, although it is true, public policies generate a direct impact on the well-being of society, with the passing of the years and with the indexes that are reflected in the media of communication there are no significant advances in citizen security, regarding the public policies implemented for the management of citizen security, persisting flaws in the system. Therefore, significant advances in the issue of citizen security are not reflected in the population, in relation to the social field, that is, in the free enjoyment of rights and freedoms, therefore, development plans as a public policy that regulate the scope of the 11 Analysis of citizen security policy and its contribution as a tool to guarantee rights to citizens through the development plans 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez security have been limited and have not affected in such a way that they give a positive response to citizen security. However, in order to answer the question posed, it has as a general objective i. Study public policies between 2002 and 2018, in terms of citizen security, and identify the lines of action and their continuity over time. Likewise, they are contemplated as specific objectives ii. Conceptualize public policies and identify their phases and contextualize citizen security, and also iii. Identify the tools to carry out the compliance of the policies, regarding citizen security. Once analyzed the above, there will be a diagnosis to clarify what contribution or influence the development plans have had, such as public policies, in guaranteeing the rights of citizens, in terms of citizen security. Thus, once all the information and content have been compiled, regarding the subject under analysis, the question asked can be answered. So, for the construction of a solid answer to the question posed in this document, it was necessary to conceive it using the qualitative method, given that a phenomenon with its main problems is addressed, and whose purpose is the description of the object being studied distinguishing its characteristics. Likewise, the logical historical method that allows to see the progress, development and evolution of the institutions and legal norms was required, requiring transformations of a socio-legal phenomenon. Finally, the answer is supported by the legal dimension, taking into account that it corresponds to the line of law that, as a set of precepts, forms a structured system, with coherence, and whose purpose 12 Analysis of citizen security policy and its contribution as a tool to guarantee rights to citizens through the development plans 2002-2018. Bertha Lucía Moreno Martínez It lies in prosecuting and organizing social relations with control and mediation techniques, regulating and coordinating the coexistence of the continuity of society. To conclude, thanks to the use of the aforementioned methodologies, it is possible to establish what the contribution of public policies is, from its formulation and implementation to a citizen security policy, and how it has been guaranteed. ; CRAI-USTA Bogotá ; orcid:0000-0003-3147-7488 ; https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=gNTDKPYAAAAJ&hl=es ; http://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001562809 ; http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co
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