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The dictatorships of the twentieth century used different kinds of propaganda machines to justify their illegal rule. During the Nazi dictatorship and under Stalinism, for example, huge propaganda organs were created that both produced propaganda and became engaged in censorship. Combined with further political mechanisms (violent repression, surveillance, obligatory organisations, etc.), these means were used in order to mobilise the masses in favour of the regime and to silence any form of political dissent. During the New State (1937-45) a similar propaganda apparatus was built in Brazil that tried to amplify the notion of a union between the supposed leader figure, Getulio Vargas, and the people (more specifically the urban working class). This propaganda organ - the so-called Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) - tried to annihilate the difference between the public and the private sphere. Focusing on the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985) and offering a preliminary analysis, this article investigates to what extent Brazilian citizens were subjugated to the influence of official propaganda in their everyday lives, and to what extent the regime invaded their private lives. Drawing on the state of art, the article asks: Who was influenced and by which means? What knowledge do we have about the effect of the campaigns? The article shows that in contrast to the Nazi and Vargas dictatorships, the military regime operated only a small propaganda organ that rejected a politicisation and mobilisation of Brazilian citizens and refused to invade their everyday lives in an aggressive manner. To the contrary, the regime supported the private initiative and free-market ideology as one of capitalism's building blocks; hired civilian filmmakers to produce their propaganda; and opted for depoliticising and supposedly apolitical campaigns.

The USSR is often regarded as the world's first propaganda state. Particularly under Stalin, politically charged rhetoric and imagery dominated the press, schools, and cultural forums from literature and cinema to the fine arts. Yet party propagandists were repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to promote a coherent sense of "Soviet" identity during the interwar years. This book investigates this failure to mobilize society along communist lines by probing the secrets of the party's ideological establishment and indoctrinational system. An exposé of systemic failure within Stalin's ideological establishment, Propaganda State in Crisis ultimately rewrites the history of Soviet indoctrination and mass mobilization between 1927 and 1941. ; https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf/1061/thumbnail.jpg

Уявлення про ґрунтовані на WWW постмодерні медіа як анігілятор пропаганди виявилися утопічними. Здобутки соціального інжинірингу, соціотехніки, зокрема у сфері комерційної реклами, дає змогу вести мову про суттєве підсилення маніпуляційних технік та ймовірний розквіт пропаганди в ХХІ столітті. ; Assumptions about the internet, the ultimate postmodern communications medium, as a reliable counterbalance to propaganda have proved illusory. Major developments in social and political engineering, especially within commercial advertising, have clearly led to more sophisticated manipulation technologies. As a result, the 21st century may witness increasingly potent propaganda.

Objective: to analyze the use given to the image of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla for the regime's propaganda during the time of his dictatorship: June 13th 1953 to May 10th 1957. Methodology: qualitative from a documentary strategy (archives, press and official publications). Images from Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, that were produced or published in the studied period were selected, same that were then described, analyzed and interpreted. Results: from the beginning of the dictatorship, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla used his image as propaganda for the political régime to create popular consensus through references to peace and progress, which lead to a populist iconography that purposefully used images of Simón Bolívar and Jesus Christ. The strategy was applied by the Office for the State's Information and Propaganda (Oficina de Información y Propaganda del Estado (ODIPE) in Colombia and, in a way, internationally supported by the Hamilton Wright Organization. Conclusions: even if the publication of his image was done by force, its use as political propaganda in the dictatorship worked out for the moment, as it was designed to impact on several sectors of society who were mostly illiterate. © Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales. ; Objetivo: analizar el uso que tuvo la imagen de Gustavo Rojas Pinilla como propaganda de su régimen durante el periodo que duró su dictadura: 13 de junio de 1953 a 10 de mayo de 1957. Método: cualitativo desde la estrategia documental (archivo, prensa y publicaciones oficiales). Se seleccionaron imágenes de Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, que hubiesen sido producidas o divulgadas en el periodo estudiado, las cuales fueron descritas, analizadas e interpretadas. Resultados: desde el inicio de la dictadura, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla utilizó su imagen como propaganda del régimen para crear un consenso popular por medio de alusiones de paz y progreso, constituyendo una iconografía populista que empleó intencionalmente referencias a Simón Bolívar y Cristo. La estrategia fue encaminada desde la Oficina de Información y Propaganda del Estado (ODIPE) en Colombia, y apoyada de cierta manera por la Hamilton Wright Organization en el ámbito internacional. Conclusiones: si bien la circulación de su imagen se dio de manera impuesta, su uso como propaganda política en la dictadura funcionó acertadamente en ese momento, pues fue diseñada para impactar a varios sectores de la sociedad que en su mayoría eran analfabetas. © Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales.

La tesi narra lo sforzo compiuto da note agenzie di intelligence (Special Operations Executive e Political Warfare Executive) per portare alla rieducazione politica e al reclutamento dei prigionieri di guerra italiani internati in Egitto e India, in fasi diverse, al fine di costituire una Free Italian force che avrebbe potuto avere un ruolo militare o, più semplicemente, un forte valore propagandistico. Nel lavoro sono descritte le direttive generali che esplicarono tale politica, gli uomini che le elaborarono e i profili biografici di persone che furono coinvolte, a vario titolo, nei processi di propaganda progettati dai britannici. La tesi è stata resa possibile attraverso consultazioni di materiali bibliografici e serie archivistiche in biblioteche e archivi in Italia e all'estero. Costituiscono un elemento non irrilevante della tesi anche le opere memorialistiche dei reduci. Il lavoro è strutturato in quattro parti. Dopo un capitolo bibliografico a carattere introduttivo, si illustrano i tentativi di propaganda e reclutamento verso i pows italiani, iniziati in Egitto dal settembre-ottobre 1940 fino alla seconda metà del 1941. Nel terzo capitolo si narra quindi delle politiche di propaganda portate avanti in India, dove nel novembre del 1941 arrivò il personale d'intelligence dalla Gran Bretagna che doveva studiare e portare avanti a marce spedite il progetto dell'unità antifascista. Il quarto capitolo verte su quanto accaduto nei campi indiani dopo l'8 settembre e sui risultati, non previsti, della propaganda.

In spite of the enormous literature on propaganda recently surveyed by a committee of the Social Science Research Council, there has not as yet emerged a generally accepted definition of propaganda. Consequently, any discussion in this field requires at the outset some statement or general indication of what one is dealing with, in order to reduce misunderstanding. As political scientists, we are taking a strictly pragmatic view of propaganda, as completely removed as possible from the area of psychological controversies. We have, for the purposes of our studies, considered only such propaganda as is manifested in the organized activities involved in efforts to get people to take a particular step, such as to vote for Roosevelt, or to abstain from objecting to a particular step, such as the United States' entry into the World War. These efforts, when promotional, may be denominated "a propaganda campaign." Such a campaign proceeds by the organized dissemination of propaganda appeals. But these same appeals can, and do, operate without any organized promotion; and still they tend to influence those whom they reach. Many different kinds of individuals carry these appeals—teachers, writers, gossips, etc. From the viewpoint of propaganda analysis, they may be called "propagandizers." In the course of a typical campaign, there appear propagandizers who indulge in various activities which are significant in spite of their unorganized nature. Different is the propagandist who participates in a propaganda campaign.