Suchergebnisse

The war has escalated into a nightmare for the people of Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands of their soldiers have been killed or wounded, infrastructure and environment have been devastated. Ukraine's chances of achieving any of its hoped for goals are receding and more land is being lost every day.Furthermore, many of the dynamics that led to the start and the continuation of the war are making it especially difficult to get out of it. Having nourished the people of Ukraine during the war with promises of maximalist achievements, it will be very hard for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate an end to the war with less than maximalist success.Having led Ukraine through the war, Zelensky may be unable to lead them out. To encourage both Ukrainians and Ukraine's allies, Zelensky promised not only that Ukraine would win back territory up to its prewar borders, but that it would recapture all of its territory to 2014 borders, including the Donbas and Crimea. To negotiate an end to the war without reclaiming that territory but having lost even more would be difficult for Zelensky.Worse, it would be difficult for Zelensky to even attempt to negotiate an end to the war having decreed that Ukraine would not negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin. And even if Zelensky were to regroup and rescind the ban on negotiating and preserve the best case scenario for Ukraine, he would be dissuaded by the same ultra-right nationalists who persuaded him off his campaign peace platform prior to the war.Zelensky defeated Petro Poroshenko in a landslide victory in 2019 largely because of a promise to implement the Minsk Agreement and start to move toward peace with Russia. But he was pushed off that platform by a backlash in Ukraine and lack of support in the political West. Ultranationalist leaders defied Zelensky and warned that a ceasefire and fulfillment of his campaign promises would lead to protests and riots. More seriously, they threatened his life. Dmytro Yarosh, the founder of the fRight Sector paramilitary organization threatened that, if Zelensky fulfilled his campaign promise, "he will lose his life. He will hang on some tree on Khreshchatyk boulevard if he betrays Ukraine and those people who died in the Revolution and the War. And it is very important that he understand this." During a presentation announcing Zelensky's creation of a National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity on March 12, 2020, Zelensky advisor Sergei Sivokho was thrown to the ground by a large gang from the Azov battalion.Were Zelensky to return to his prewar platform after the death and devastation of the war, he could face the same resistance from the same groups now magnified by that devastation.Zelensky could be replaced by a peacetime president with less baggage. But elections are prohibited by Ukrainian law during martial law, which is still in effect. Zelensky has ruled out holding them. Battlefield conditions would make it difficult, and many Ukrainians have already fled the country. Furthermore, a survey conducted in February 2024 found that 49% of Ukrainians definitely oppose elections right now and 18% rather oppose it, though the poll suffers from the methodological problem that it likely excludes those in the Eastern regions and those who have left Ukraine.Bottom line: Zelensky isn't going anywhere right now, but would struggle to negotiate an end to the war without help. Such assistance could come, however, from the U.S. and its partners in the West. Though Zelensky may not have the political strength to realistically reverse his maximalist promises nor to survive ultranationalist retribution, he would have a better chance of selling it if he could say that the Western powers who promised to support the pursuit of those goals for as long as it takes were pressuring him to negotiate an end of the war. Responsibility could be shifted to the United States.But would the U.S. shoulder that responsibility? U.S. President Joe Biden, from the beginning, has framed the war in Ukraine as "the great battle for freedom: a battle between democracy and autocracy." The U.S. has insisted on supporting the war against Russia in defense of "core principles," including that each country has "a sovereign right to determine for itself with whom it will choose to associate in terms of its alliances, its partnerships."It may be perceived as a blow to Biden's credibility, to U.S. hegemony, and to NATO to concede the inability to push Russia out of Ukraine and to defend NATO's right to expand and Ukraine's right to join.Negotiations to end the war would be a desirable path out of Ukraine. Diplomatic talks are possible as proven by the nearly successful negotiations in Istanbul in the early weeks of the war. The existence of the signed draft treaty that those talks produced has been confirmed by independent sources who have seen it, including The Wall Street Journal, Die Welt and Samuel Charap of RAND and Sergey Radchenko of John Hopkins University.Those talks "almost finalized an agreement that would have ended the war," according to Charap and Radchenko's analysis of the text of the treaty. "Kyiv and Moscow largely agreed on conditions for an end to the war," Die Welt reports. "Only a few points remained open." Oleksiy Arestovych, who was a member of the Ukrainian negotiating team in Istanbul, says the talks in Istanbul were successful and could have worked. He says that the Istanbul agreement was 90% prepared. "We opened the champagne bottle," he said.But it is the very success of the diplomatic talks that makes future negotiations difficult. It will be very difficult for Ukraine — and the United States — after over two years of war, death, destruction, disruption of lives, and loss of land to agree to terms that are essentially the same as the terms they had won before the war.But there is another way that surmounts many of these obstacles by transcending them. The diplomatic negotiations could be broader than just negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.While several aspects of any diplomatic solution must address Russian-Ukrainian issues, like territory, caps on the Ukrainian armed forces and protection of ethnic minorities in both countries, significant parts could, instead, be addressed in a wider global solution. Putin has recently suggested that future talks encompass, not just a Ukraine-Russia security arrangement, but a comprehensive European security structure. "We are open to a dialogue on Ukraine," Putin said in May, "but such negotiations must take into account the interests of all countries involved in the conflict, including Russia's. They must also involve a substantive discussion on global stability and security guarantees for Russia's opponents and, naturally, for Russia itself."Instead, the expansion of a U.S. led military alliance hostile to Russia appears to be moving to engulf Europe right up to Russia's doorstep. The insistence on defending that exclusive security structure contributed to the war in Ukraine. Addressing it could provide a more workable and lasting way out of it. Instead of building a bigger NATO that expands to Russia's borders and excludes and competes with it in conflict, the diplomatic energy could go into building a new inclusive European security structure that includes Russia in cooperation.This new structure could eliminate the need for Ukraine to join NATO and for Ukraine and the U.S. to concede the right to join NATO. It could eliminate the need for the U.S. to commit to bilateral security guarantees that it is reluctant to sign with Ukraine because they could draw the U.S. into a war with Russia should Russia again attack Ukraine. It could, at last, bring the hope of peace to Europe and of better relations across the Atlantic. Such global talks could relieve Zelensky of personal responsibility. They could bring sufficient force to defend against ultranationalist objections. They could truthfully be presented as a victory by the U.S. and not a surrender of "core principles." And they could avoid competition and comparison with the earlier talks in Istanbul by transcending them.How we get there is the hard part. But perhaps there is a way offered out of the war in Ukraine that delivers to each of Ukraine, Russia, the U.S. and Europe what it wants. Perhaps the way out is to transcend negotiations on the Russia-Ukraine war with talks that include that but expand to include an inclusive global security architecture.

An iconic New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman, has just been squired around the Middle East by the commander of Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for operations in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and North Africa. Now, don't get me wrong, the military and American journalists have cultivated symbiotic relations since the Civil War. It's in the nature of things. The press needs access, and the military needs public and congressional support. Quality time shared by the top U.S.military officer for this volatile region and the top foreign affairs columnist for the nation's top broadsheet makes sense.Among their whistlestops were U.S. installations in Syria. About 900 American troops are there, distributed in penny packets among seven bases. Some of these protect oil fields that supply U.S.-backed Kurdish authorities; others are in the far northeast, where they assist Kurdish units, help secure and supply the cluster of camps that house ISIS prisoners and their families and continue to hunt ISIS fighters; and still others in the southeast, at a road junction where the Iraqi, Syrian and Jordanian borders meet. This base was set up to interdict Iranian-backed forces attempting to entrench themselves in Syria and transport supplies to Lebanon.In Friedman's recap of this visit, he explained that the importance of these U.S. deployments lay in the need to fight the terrorists over there so we would not have to fight them over here. Let's say, for the moment, that there are several other rationales for maintaining troops in Syria. Iran, for example, does seek to use Syria as a land corridor to Lebanon and the Israeli-Syrian border, from which it can carry the fight to its enemy. Iran is 1,200 kilometers from Israel, so if it wants to reach out and touch someone without using ballistic missiles, it needs to be on Israel's borders. Rendering this a bit more difficult than it might otherwise be makes a regional blow-up marginally less likely. Maintaining a garrison at the oil fields is meant to secure them from capture by either ISIS or the Assad regime, against which the U.S. maintains heavy sanctions. Reserving the oil for use by Kurds, both for sale and consumption, reflects a longstanding policy that favors Kurdish autonomy in Syria. This policy preference, which owes in part to a romanticized image of Kurds as daring fighters fending off terrorist hordes to spare the U.S. an onerous burden, also dictates the use of U.S. forces in northeast Syria as a tripwire deterrent against Turkish attempts to suppress Syrian Kurds. For many members of Congress, they seem to be something like T.E. Lawrence's Bedouin insurgents in World War I, or U.S.-backed Montagnard guerillas in the Vietnam War. For them, abandoning the Kurds to the tender mercies of Turkey, or compelling them to seek protection from the Assad government, would be immoral and shred America's reputation as a reliable ally. (See under: Munich.) Trump, marching to the beat of a different drum, pointed out that the Kurds "didn't help us in the second world war, they didn't help us with Normandy as an example… ." The U.S. role in helping local forces and NGOs manage the ISIS detention centers and refugee camps as well as the slow process of the repatriation of Iraqi detainees, is meant to contribute to Iraqi stability, in which the U.S. has a stake. The fact that these bases are magnets for attack by Iran-backed militias is arguably a factor that outweighs any of these other considerations.One can have this or that view on the validity of these rationales or the salience of these objectives for core U.S. strategic interests. If the Turks and their radical Arab militias rip into the Kurds to get at the PKK, as they have done twice already, U.S. strategic interest is unlikely to suffer very much. If ISIS fighters escape the camps in Syria, Iraqi forces with U.S. help could probably limit the threat to Iraqi stability. The U.S. installation at al-Tanf in the southeast can be bypassed by Iran-backed militias via an Assad-controlled base at al bu-Kamal, a bit northeast of al-Tanf, so the U.S. base there might have outlived its usefulness. Of course, on any given day there are about 30,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, as there have been for decades, so 900 isn't a particularly impressive number. It's a good example of limited interests served by a commensurately limited commitment. Whether to stay or go comes down to a narrow judgment call.But of all the factors to consider there is one that does not merit concern: the idea of fighting them over there so we don't have to fight them over here. It's a vacuous meme trotted out to defend the controversial commitment and use of forward deployed forces and creation of distant security perimeters. If you were a Briton in September 1939 facing the German juggernaut, Friedman's old chestnut would have been pretty compelling. But since World War II, its specific gravity has dissipated. During the Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson defended the U.S. commitment by asserting that the countries of southeast Asia were like a row of dominos; if south Vietnam were to fall, it would tip over all its neighbors until all of Asia was communist. The problem, he explained, was that "Everything that happens in this world affects us because pretty soon it gets on our doorstep." Anyone who was politically sentient at the time was bombarded by Friedman's repurposed, shopworn epigram. Yet, the dominos never fell following the U.S. pullout and the collapse of South Vietnam; in the fullness of time, we never had to fight them over here and the only stuff on our doorstep are Amazon boxes. President George W. Bush, in a major speech at the 89th Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in 2007, declared "Our strategy is this: we will fight them over there so we do not have to face them in the United States of America." But the insurgency in Iraq was created by the 2003 U.S. invasion, which decapitated the regime and destroyed the capacity of the state to manage the country's affairs, while unleashing Shi'a power and Iranian influence. This ignited a brutal Sunni insurgency carried out, in part, by tens of thousands of soldiers the U.S. threw out of their barracks and left to fend for themselves in an anarchic and violent environment. The ideology and strategy of both Shi'a and Sunni insurgents had nothing to do with al-Qaida, let alone engaging SWAT teams in Dallas, or stealing our lawn furniture, as one of my former counterterrorism colleagues put it. Their concerns were local. Al-Qaida sought to attack the great power, the "far enemy," that underpinned the "near enemy," namely the conservative monarchy ruling Arabia. Al-Qaida in Iraq, ISIS, the Mahdi Army and Iran-backed militias fought a battle for power on their turf and against an occupying army, not an expeditionary war against the U.S. homeland. The mayhem, moreover, had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that there was never another al-Qaida attack was not because the U.S. invaded Iraq; it was because of al-Qaida's inability to follow up on its spectacular success. And that was a function of the loss of its support network in the U.S., the decimation of its top tier, and the swift tightening of security at U.S. borders. Now we are told once again that U.S. troops have to be somewhere else to prevent fighters operating in that space from coming to the United States and waging war here. The designated enemy in this case is the Islamic State, an organization that has inspired or arranged successful attacks in Europe but not in the U.S. It would be foolish to assume that no one in the organization dreams of murdering Americans in their beds. But they lack the capacity to do so and, more importantly, have urgent local goals that soak up resources, planning and organizational capacity, and face serious local constraints. There is a legitimate debate about the presence of U.S. forces in Syria. But it should be premised on the value of the real things at stake and the cost of protecting those stakes. It should not be distorted by old canards intended to inflate threats to the American homeland.

Dan Cassara (CEGA Project Manager, Financial Inclusion) and Ariana Zapanta (IPA Research Manager, Financial Inclusion) introduce a new synthesis on the relationship between the digitization of credit and development. Explore the full report or a condensed summary.The first digital credit loan was made in Kenya in 2012 [1]. By 2019, these loans had spread across the globe, with billions of dollars of credit disbursed to consumers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [2]. Though the proliferation of quick and easy loans made demand for these products clear, their impact on consumers was uncertain.While proponents hailed digital credit as a transformative development with the potential to drive financial inclusion and reduce poverty, reports of fraud, exploitation, and over-indebtedness led to concerns that many digital credit users suffered financial harm. Until now, a shortage of rigorous evidence has made it difficult to answer questions about the true impacts of the first wave of digital loans. Even as a sufficient body of evidence has formed to evaluate early digital credit products, rapid evolution in the market and the digitization of new credit products over the past decade has further complicated the challenge of fully understanding the impacts of digital credit today. Insights from early evaluations should be applied to critically assess newer forms of digital credit and focus future support on more productive and impactful products.A New SynthesisSupported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Mobile Instant Credit: Impacts, Challenges, and Lessons for Consumer Protection is a collaborative report from the Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA) and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) that contributes to a shared vocabulary, reference base, and conceptual framework to advance discussion on the relationship between the digitization of credit and development. The report draws on evidence mainly from CEGA's Digital Credit Observatory (DCO) and IPA's Consumer Protection Research Initiative (CPRI). Both initiatives have supported extensive research on digital credit and approaches to better protect consumers and support their financial health.This new report should temper both the fears of critics and optimism of proponents. The current evidence on digital credit suggests the average consumer has not benefited economically, but did see modest improvements in subjective well-being. Causal studies did not find that recipients were harmed by digital loans, but descriptive evidence showed a rise in problems such as debt stress, price shrouding, overcharging, and predatory collection practices. When considered alongside the proliferation of digital credit, these challenges necessitate new consumer protections.A small-business owner can be seen serving patrons in her restaurant in Nkhoma, Malawi. | Credit: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation/Barbara KinneyKey EvidenceThe report focuses on studies investigating the welfare impacts of digital credit, the forms of misconduct associated with digital credit, and the effectiveness of consumer protection tools. It emphasizes the narrower topic of Mobile Instant Credit (MIC) — small digital loans that are primarily marketed and used for consumption — and airtime loans, which together comprised the first wave of credit digitization. As digital credit continues to evolve with new products like Buy-Now Pay-Later, overdraft facilities, and Pay-As-You-Go schemes, this report synthesizes research on MIC to generate insights that can inform digital credit-related policy more broadly.The report's main findings include:The current evidence on MIC and airtime loans reveals modest improvements in subjective well-being for the average consumer. Most loans are small — the average loan was less than US$3 in half of the studies on the welfare effects of digital loans — which may limit how large the impacts can be. Although the majority of evidence indicates MIC has not affected financial outcomes, including resilience, consumption, and financial health, studies that examined subjective well-being found a positive impact. One research team speculated — with the caveat that more evidence is needed — that the ability to access resources in times of need can relax constraints that damage mental health, consistent with prior studies [3, 4].The absence of negative impacts contrasts with robust descriptive evidence on the diverse consumer harms associated with rapidly digitizing credit, including rising debt stress, price shrouding and overcharging, predatory collections, and fraud. The rapid digitization of finance in many regions of the world has revealed new and growing consumer protection risks. While digital credit does not appear, on average, to harm consumers' financial health, ability to save, or overall spending, descriptive evidence from digital finance and mobile money, which underlies MIC and digital credit, reveals misconduct and other risks.Upgrading consumer protection regimes is imperative given the increasing digitization of finance and credit. Fortunately, there are promising approaches to improve market monitoring and empower consumers. Despite existing challenges, a handful of causal studies and pilot interventions confirm the effectiveness and feasibility of interventions to address consumer protection concerns. New data sources and collection methods, along with advanced data analytics, suggest that a next-generation approach to market monitoring would enable regulators to move towards preventative interventions. Further, several interventions directly targeting consumer and provider behavior have empowered consumers in early evaluations, and may be effective if scaled up.Policy InsightsDigital credit is growing and evolving rapidly, with providers increasingly using digital lending to offer more than just small consumer loans and targeting a wider array of sectors, from agricultural finance to e-commerce. The digital credit model has the potential to enable growth as reduced costs, faster underwriting, and better information on prospective borrowers may lead to more suitable and sustainable products, particularly in more productive parts of the economy. Evidence on Mobile Instant Credit and airtime loans is particularly informative for emergent forms of consumer-oriented digital credit, such as Buy-Now Pay-Later and overdraft products. However, the effectiveness of many forms of digital credit, particularly those focused on productive activities, remains unexplored, and regulatory frameworks are still being developed in many countries, leaving consumers at risk. More research is needed to understand who benefits from digital credit, and why.There are also clear dangers to maintaining the status quo in unregulated or underregulated markets. Although causal studies have not found clear negative impacts of MIC and airtime loans, decision-makers should consider a broader set of evidence. Robust descriptive studies highlight diverse consumer protection challenges associated with digitizing credit, and there is evidence that the most vulnerable people are more susceptible to fraud and exploitation as they enter the formal financial system via digital credit. Though risks have grown, initial research on new market monitoring techniques and interventions to directly support consumers have shown promise, and could pave the road to more proactive regulatory approaches.Despite what remains unknown, there are reasons for optimism. Digitization has catalyzed rapid growth in financial inclusion, and addressing known policy issues now can be instructive for informing management and regulation of digital credit products more broadly, including the potential movement of digital credit into more productive parts of the economy. Mobile Instant Credit: Impacts, Challenges, and Lessons for Consumer Protection gathers existing evidence on the relationship between the digitization of credit and development, while clarifying the need for further research. Whether the next evolution of digital credit improves upon the first to provide less risky and more transformative solutions will depend on the evolution of commercial product design and public policy to monitor markets and protect consumers.References:[1] Totolo, E. (2018) Kenya's Digital Credit Revolution 5 Years On. FSD Kenya, Blog. https://www.fsdkenya.org/blogs-publications/blog/kenyas-digital-credit-revolution-5-years-on/[2] Cornelli, G., J. Frost, L. Gambacorta, P.R. Rau, R. Wardrop, T. Ziegler, (2023) Fintech and big tech credit: drivers of the growth of digital lending. Journal of Finance and Banking, 148, 106742. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106742[3] Haushofer, J., E. Fehr, (2014) On the Psychology of Poverty. Science 344, no. 6186: 862–867. https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1232491[4] Banerjee, A., M. Faye, A. Krueger, P. Niehaus, T. Suri, (2020) Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the pandemic. UC San Diego Technical Report.The Promise and Harms of Digital Credit: What Does the Evidence Say? was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, much ink has been spilled on the future of his private military company (PMC), Wagner Group, and its affiliated companies. Most attention remains on Ukraine, where the PMC has not been formally active since Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20. Meanwhile, Wagner continues to conduct military operations in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).On November 14, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), backed by Wagner, took the separatist stronghold of Kidal. Despite entering a town nearly abandoned, the capture was undeniably a symbolic victory for Mali's Interim President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and his military regime. There is a significant risk that FAMA's March on Kidal will further exacerbate humanitarian crises in the region, all at a time when the international community is stepping back from the Sahel. This is a mistake. The Sahel has become the epicenter of the West's, including the United States', two great threat narratives: jihadist terrorism and the expansion of Russian influence. Their accompanying containment narratives almost ensure counterproductive, knee-jerk reactions to future events on the ground.To avoid these pitfalls, the international community must focus today on creative solutions that account for Russia's presence in Africa.BackgroundThe past five years have seen a popular backlash against peacekeeping and humanitarian-military operations in central Africa and the Sahel. While politicized, the criticism has not been without merit. Peacekeeping missions have undoubtedly improved the lives of many. They have also often empowered the most violent and produced more, not less, armed groups. Yet it was Wagner Group's interventions in Sudan and CAR that turbocharged the criticism.
The structure of Wagner's 2017 intervention in Sudan initially followed standard practices for Africa's private security sector: training and security provision in exchange for mineral concessions. (A notable exception was the political consulting and media operations Prigozhin's team also offered.) In Sudan, the structure stayed consistent. In CAR, events on the ground shaped the nature of Wagner's intervention. In 2018, Prigozhin's men became diplomats.Wagner's diplomacy in CARIn February 2019, the CAR government and 14 major armed groups signed the Khartoum Agreement — a peace deal hailed by the United Nations. A considerable contribution to this process belonged to Prigozhin's working group, although experts from various Russian government entities also participated.
For Prigozhin, the prospect of peace would translate into increased access to mining concessions. It would also deliver a win to Moscow and increase the chances for Kremlin subsidies to fund his Africa gambit. For armed group leaders, the Agreement was a chance to obtain lucrative ministerial positions, while President Faustin-Archange Touadéra could shore up his vulnerable position vis-à-vis the armed groups.
The significance of the Agreement was immense, but unfortunately most walked away with the wrong conclusions. The international community felt it could finally distance itself from CAR's seemingly endless problems. The CAR government and Prigozhin, victims of their own success, felt they could abandon notions of an inclusive government. All seemed unable to account for the return of the largest potential spoiler of the peace, former president François Bozizé, and his decision to run in the 2020 presidential elections.
Despite rising tension between Touadéra and Bozizé, the CAR government, Wagner, and the international community pushed elections at all costs, even as a new coalition of armed groups — nominally led by Bozizé and including six of the fourteen Khartoum Agreement signatories — advanced on Bangui, the capital.
As a result of the rebellion, Wagner's mandate changed from that of a training mission to a military operation. The resulting counteroffensive brought nearly all major towns under government control.
The partial victory — armed groups are down but not out — led to overconfidence within Wagner's ranks: Military solutions were possible. The PMC came to view the Khartoum Agreement through a cynical lens as insiders reframed it as a clever way to weaken and divide the armed opposition, rather than the genuine effort at conflict resolution it was at the time.Wagner began to fashion itself as Russia's "security solution," Moscow's most successful export to Africa. Back then, Prigozhin had the ear of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Taking advantage of Moscow's light footprint on the continent, Wagner's boss could define what Moscow's interests in Africa were.Wagner's military solution in the SahelBy 2020, all actors recognized the value of the "Wagner threat" to Africa; not least African governments which leveraged narratives of "cooperating with" or "countering" Wagner to extract concessions or support from both Russia and the West.
Cold War containment narratives became a self-fulfilling prophecy in 2021 when, after a second coup, tensions between Colonel Goïta and France resulted in French military withdrawal from Mali and Wagner's arrival. Goïta's grievances with Paris were first political: He wanted France to recognize his government. Second, anti-French rhetoric helped build political legitimacy for the military regime.
The rhetoric tapped into genuine grievances with France's Operation Barkhane, especially among Mali's military class. At the top of the list was France's quiet cooperation with Tuareg separatists to oust the jihadists in northern Mali. Bamako saw that cooperation as a violation of sovereignty. Intervenors and those intervened upon could not agree on who the terrorists were.
Wagner's arrival in Mali further revealed the conflict's separate realities. Western analysts focused on human rights abuses and the territorial expansion of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) to prove Wagner's intervention a failure.
Goïta's circle was far less focused than western analysts on controlling territory outside the capital. The potential for another coup in Bamako was more important, and the government relied on internet influencers and political entrepreneurs to shore up its popularity. In turn, it became a prisoner of its own jingoistic claims to return Kidal to the fold.The resulting Wagner-backed operation has enjoyed more success than predicted. The Malian army has demonstrated increased combat capability and coordination between branches of the armed forces. Wagner's operations in Mali also reflect a new level of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Russian officers are involved in planning military operations and acting as advisors. Wagner mercenaries participate in ground operations, but, unlike in CAR, they are always embedded within FAMA.A return to diplomacyFAMA does not have the ability or capacity to fight both separatists and jihadists. Indeed, FAMA and Wagner are on the path to an unwinnable counterinsurgency in the north. Interaction between Tuareg separatists and JNIM suggest the jihadi group is not quite neutral in the conflict, and its role could grow.Despite the current success of Wagner's military solution, it is evident that only peace talks, a process of reconciliation, and the equitable distribution of power and resources between Bamako and the provinces can end the conflict.The victory in Kidal puts the government in Bamako in a stronger position to negotiate with separatists. But given the prospect of an unwinnable war in the north, the continued threat of jihadist groups, and a host of economic woes, the window for "cashing in" on victory will be short.Of course, the Malian government has demonstrated little interest in serious negotiation to date. Few outside powers have leverage over its decision-making. Russia, and the Wagner Group in Mali, have more influence than most. For Russian diplomats, efforts to bring peace to Mali would reinforce Moscow's growing prominence in the Sahel. Wagner Group, too, has consistently engaged in diplomacy when it sees greater potential for profit in peace than open warfare.The international community has leveraged the presence of Wagner Group in Mali as a pretext to step away from the conflict. Yet the crisis in Mali, and the Sahel more generally, cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to create at least conditions for a negotiating process.The West's exceptional concentration on the war in Ukraine and its support for Israeli operations in Gaza have damaged its credibility in the Global South. Competing with or trying to contain Russia (or China, for that matter) in Africa only does further damage to that credibility. Limited, compartmentalized work with all partners in the Sahel will show that the U.S. can view issues in the Global South outside these prisms.Russia is here to stay in Africa. Mali, and the Sahel more generally, should be an opportunity to engage in geopolitical deconfliction rather than competition.

Even if one were to take at face value Israel's declarations that its assault on the Gaza Strip and its two million residents is all about "destroying Hamas," the Israeli operation is too misguided for the United States or any other power to support or condone it. Hamas cannot be destroyed with bombs and a ground invasion, and even if it could, the operation is worsening, not enhancing, the future security of Israeli citizens.But the Israeli declarations should not be taken at face value in any event. Other motivations are also likely behind the Israeli assault. Almost two months into the Israeli offensive, the evidence is increasingly suggesting that Israel is engaged in nothing less than ethnic cleansing of Palestinians who live in the Strip.One is the sheer scale and indiscriminate nature of Israel's military attacks. The leveling of entire neighborhoods and the inflicting of civilian casualties far outnumbering any military ones, with little evidence of any positive result beyond the capture and display of some empty tunnels, can hardly be described as an operation sharply focused on destroying Hamas.Consider the following numbers. Israeli officials claim that their operation in Gaza has so far killed 5,000 Hamas fighters. The officials admit that this is a squishy estimate, and the outside world has no way of knowing whether it is even close to being true. But assume for the moment that it is. By the Israeli military's own estimates, Hamas' military wing numbered about 30,000 fighters at the start of this war, implying there are still 25,000 yet to be eliminated. The latest estimates of the fast-rising count of total Palestinian casualties from the war so far are 16,000 dead, including more than 5,000 children.Do the math. At the current pace and with Israel's current methods, finishing the supposed job of destroying the Hamas military wing would entail almost 100,000 dead Palestinians, including more than 30,000 dead children. And that does not include the damage from Israel going after the rest of Hamas besides its military wing, including the senior leadership whom Israel has vowed to kill, as well as the Hamas-run civil administration of the Gaza Strip, which Israel has vowed to eliminate. Nor does it consider that the rate of civilian casualties from Israeli military operations currently escalating in the southern part of the Strip — now crammed with those who had fled the north — is likely to be at least as high as from the previous operations in the north.These numbers are not only orders of magnitude greater than anything that could be justified as a response to the brutality Hamas committed in Israel in October. They strongly suggest that in addition to eliminating Hamas, killing civilians and pushing as many Palestinians as possible out of Gaza is an Israeli objective.The Israeli military's claim to have used warnings to try to reduce civilian casualties has become little more than a cruel joke. Residents are ordered to flee their homes but then are bombed anyway, either en route or at the location to which they were told to flee. Then they are ordered to move again — if there is any place at all they can go — and get bombed yet again. QR codes on leaflets promising information about safe zones are useless with communications knocked out and most Palestinians having no access to the internet. Israel is not even bothering to use its previous "knock on the roof" practice of using a small munition to warn occupants of a building that it was about to be destroyed — as if it ever were acceptable to bomb someone's home as long as they are advised a few minutes earlier that it is going to be bombed.Further evidence of Israel's objectives in Gaza comes from simultaneous events in the West Bank. For the last two months, Israeli settlers there, acting largely with the acquiescence of Israeli authorities, have been using violence and intimidation to drive longtime Palestinian residents out of their villages.Then there is the rhetoric of Israeli political leaders, which some observers have described as genocidal. Examples over the past two months abound. About Gaza, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said, "we will eliminate everything." Meanwhile, deputy Knesset speaker Nissim Vaturi said of Palestinians in Gaza, "expel them all," while Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter said, "we are now rolling out the Gaza nakba," (the original nakba, or catastrophe, being the forced displacement of 750,000 Palestinians when Israel was created in 1948). Heritage Minister Amachai Eliyahu suggested that Israel should consider dropping a nuclear weapon on Gaza.Added to all this is evidence of planning within the Israeli government. A report in October revealed a proposal from the intelligence ministry to transfer the entire population of the Gaza Strip to Egypt's Sinai peninsula, to be housed first in tents and then in permanently constructed cities. This proposal did not explain how Israel would overcome Egypt's strong opposition to any such population transfer, but other reports confirmed that Israeli leaders and diplomats were quietly proposing to other governments the transfer of several hundred thousand Gazans to Egypt. The Israelis contended this would be a temporary movement for the duration of the current war, but their interlocutors rejected the idea given the likelihood that such a displacement, like earlier displacements of Palestinians, would become permanent.More recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reported to have tasked his U.S.-born Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, with developing a plan to "dilute" the population of the Gaza Strip to a minimum. That story was broken by the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom, which has supported and is considered to have good access to Netanyahu.As a possible reflection of such planning, other Israeli press reports that a proposal has already been quietly floated with members of the U.S. Congress to have two million Gazans move through Egypt for ultimate settlement both there and in Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen. The United States would be expected to use aid to those countries as leverage to pressure them into accepting the arrangement.Since the Hamas attack on October 7 demonstrated that the conflict with the Palestinians could not be removed from the regional equation, the Israeli government has rejected as forcefully as ever the only avenue for ending such troubles, which is to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations that permit Palestinian self-determination, whether through a two-state solution or equal rights in one state. Instead, it is increasingly looking like Israel is trying to remove the Palestinians themselves from the equation through death and displacement. Israel's apparent strategy is no more likely to bring peace to Israelis or anyone else than its earlier gambits, as long as there are dissatisfied exiles. For just one example, think of how Israel went after the exiled Palestine Liberation Organization beginning in the 1980s and how it led to multiple wars, the rise of Lebanese Hezbollah, and the loss of almost any hope for stability in Lebanon.The Biden administration has shown some signs of recognizing what is going on. Vice President Harris, speaking at the climate meeting in Dubai, stated that "under no circumstances will the United States permit the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank." And the United States has begun imposing visa bans on Israeli settlers guilty of violence in the West Bank.But those signs fall short of fully dissociating Washington from abhorrent policies and practices — a dissociation necessary to spare the United States from any more of the international opprobrium it already has incurred through its association with Israeli conduct.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

For the first time — and it is rather remarkable that this is the first time — the United Nations COP28 climate summit beginning this week in Dubai will include a "Global Stocktake" of progress made in achieving the goals set out and commitments made by global agreements since the 2015 Paris climate accords. If this stocktaking is honest, it will also be extremely depressing.In order to prevent the rise in global temperatures since pre-industrial times from exceeding the reasonably safe limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit), COP26 in Glasgow established a goal of reducing fossil fuel emissions by 45 percent by 2030. Those goals are now unachievable. Based on present trajectories, emissions will actually rise nine percent above 2010 levels by that date. Since carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for thousands of years, this means that a rise above 1.5 degrees Celsius is now inevitable and cannot subsequently be reversed, at least with any technology now available to us.The inevitable result will be an intensification of the heat waves, droughts, forest fires and floods that have plagued large parts of the world — including the United States — over the past year. Without a radical change of course, however, much worse lies ahead. If emissions continue to rise until 2030, it is almost impossible to imagine how "net zero" (whereby carbon extracted from the atmosphere equals that put into it) can be achieved by 2050. Even with the commitments made by states under the Paris agreement — hailed as a radical breakthrough in climate change action — it has been estimated that by the end of this century global temperatures will rise by 2.5 degrees Celsius. This would bring us into quite unknown territory. The negative impacts of natural disasters and on agricultural yields in key parts of the world will rise exponentially. Perhaps new crops genetically modified to withstand heat will ward off mass famines, or perhaps not. Apart from anything else, hundreds of millions of agricultural workers in Asia and elsewhere cannot be genetically modified to withstand sustained exposure to temperatures that are lethal to human beings.This will happen even if this rise in temperatures occurs, as it has until now, in a linear and gradual fashion (gradual by the standards of humanity, not of the Earth). There is however a real, albeit unquantifiable, risk that such an increase will lead to "tipping points" and "feedback loops," whereby a rise of two degrees will lead to three degrees and three degrees to four degrees over a short period of time. If so, civilization as we know it will be destroyed. No organized society on Earth could withstand both the physical disruption involved and the immense movements of desperate people that would result.This danger of feedback loops exists primarily in the Arctic, where the melting of sea ice reduces the reflectivity of sunlight back into space, and the melting of the Arctic permafrost risks releasing enormous quantities of methane from frozen rotted plants. Although methane is far less long-lived than carbon dioxide, it is almost 40 times more powerful in terms of its greenhouse effect. And the Arctic is warming at almost three times the rate of the planetary average.This is why the approach of the U.S. security establishment to the warming of the Arctic is so bitterly indicative. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of papers, briefings and articles have concentrated on the supposed threat that the melting of the Arctic sea ice will allow Russia and China to sail more ships through the region. To this, the only sensible answer must be: So what? Russia and China cannot invade Alaska or Canada through the Arctic, and the danger posed by nuclear missiles or bombers overflying the region has existed for more than sixty years and is completely unaffected by climate change. Meanwhile, these writers appear completely indifferent to the likelihood that climate change in the Arctic will drown American cities, wreck much of U.S. agriculture, and inflict grievous harm on the lives and health of hundreds of millions of U.S. citizens. We are suffering from a severe case of "residual elites;" foreign policy and security establishments that grew up to deal with one kind of challenge — in the U.S. case, World War II and the Cold War — but whose structures, ideologies and economic interests render them incapable of meeting a wholly different set of challenges. A parallel might be made with the "Confucian" elites of 19th-century China. They represented by far the oldest and most successful governing tradition in history; but it was one that was wholly unprepared to meet the completely new challenge of Western imperial capitalism.It must be said of course that this criticism applies just as much or more to the security elites of other major powers, including the Indians and Chinese, who are also focused on geopolitical ambitions and risks at the expense of action against climate change. Indeed, they can be considered even more foolish. While, for a long time to come, developed societies in the West will be able to withstand or adapt to the direct physical effects of climate change, parts of Asia are far more immediately threatened. This is especially true of South Asia, where even fairly limited increases in temperatures are projected to have potentially disastrous impacts on agricultural production. Yet too much of the Indian approach to COP28 seems to consist of diplomatic grandstanding intended to boost India's status and prestige by acting as the leader of the "Global South" in demanding reparations and vastly increased aid from Western countries to compensate for their emissions since the Industrial Revolution. This may be just. But it misses the point that the duty of Indian officials today is to do everything possible to minimize damage to India, above all by reducing India's own steeply rising emissions from coal.The other issue exemplified by South Asia is the prospect that rapid climate change will radically increase migration. It is natural that Western commentators and analysts should concentrate on illegal migration to Europe and America and both the human suffering and the political dangers involved. Yet one of the two most ferociously defended anti-immigrant borders in the world is India's with Bangladesh, a line on which more than 1100 Bangladeshis have been shot dead by Indian security forces over the past decade. Indian worries about Bangladeshi migration have been amplified by the fact that Bangladesh is one of the countries both most over-populated and most endangered by climate change and consequent sea level rise. Moreover, mass Bengali migration into the surrounding hill country has sparked numerous bloody instances of ethnic strife in eastern India over the past decades, and contributed to Burmese hostility to the Bengali-speaking Rohingya minority in Myanmar.After a long series of record-breaking years, 2023 is now set to be the hottest since records began. Across the U.S., local heat records have been shattered. Massive forest fires have devastated areas of northern Canada where such events would have been unthinkable in the past. U.S. neighbors in Central America, already under severe social, economic, criminal and ecological stress, are facing a future when the additional effects of climate change will render their governments completely unable to cope. These are threats to American society and ordinary Americans that dwarf anything China and Russia can do (short of nuclear war). While the Biden administration has declared rhetorically that climate change is an "existential threat," the country's security establishment has still failed to reorder its priorities accordingly. If U.S. elites truly believe that America is the "indispensable nation," they should feel compelled to do so. For if we continue with one international "agreement" after another that fails to meet its own stated goals, then historians of the future will consider that U.S. global leadership failed at its most important test.Sophia Ampgkarian contributed to the research for this article.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

Since the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea last week, the Houthis reportedly fired ballistic missiles that landed within ten nautical miles of the USS Mason on Sunday. The missile launch followed the U.S. Navy destroyer's intervention in the attempted hijacking of another ship, a tanker named the Central Park, in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis denied responsibility for this hijacking which appears to have been carried out by Somali pirates.The Houthis, who control most of northwest Yemen, also continue to launch cruise missiles and armed drones toward Israel.There are few good options when it comes to dealing with the Houthis. They are a formidable near-state organization that has evolved and been repeatedly tested during nearly two decades of war. From 2014, when they seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, the Houthis systematically vetted and incorporated many of Yemen's best engineers, technicians, and officers from the Yemeni military and intelligence services into its own organization. This incorporation, combined with assistance from Iran, has transformed the Houthis from a hardened guerrilla force into a militarily sophisticated group that is now, at least at a low level, an important regional actor.Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which launched an intervention in Yemen in 2015, are learning just how dogged and determined the Houthis are as an enemy. After repeated border incursions by the Houthis as well as missile and drone strikes on its territory, Saudi Arabia pivoted from war to negotiations. Rather than continue to pursue a policy modeled on a kinetic American approach, the Saudis returned to the careful and measured foreign policy that had served them well for decades. Since late 2022, the Saudis have been engaged in unilateral talks with the Houthis, part of a well-designed effort to de-escalate tensions and stabilize areas along the more than 800-mile-long Saudi-Yemeni border. These talks, which have been aided by China and Iran, were nearing a conclusion before the Houthis effectively declared war on Israel. Now, provocative actions by the Houthis are in danger of derailing those talks.The U.S. has indicated that the Biden Administration is considering re-designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Trump administration previously designated the Houthis as an FTO in January 2021, which the Biden administration subsequently revoked. While the designation is more justifiable now than when it was first imposed, it will have little or no impact on the Houthis or their leadership. Senior Houthi members do not leave Yemen and do not have foreign assets that would be subject to seizure. In fact, the designation will be celebrated in Sana'a as proof that the Houthis are "winning." However, the FTO designation will negatively impact the NGOs providing humanitarian assistance that must deal with the Houthis.Military strikes, which are undoubtedly at an advanced planning stage, are an equally poor option for dealing with the Houthis. The militant group has not only survived years of strikes carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE during their intervention in Yemen, but they thrived militarily and politically. The Saudi and Emirati-led airstrikes stoked public anger and acted as a glue that kept the broader Houthi organization together. During that time, the group refined its ability to hide weapons and facilities within northwest Yemen's maze of mountains and narrow valleys and within densely-populated urban areas. At the same time, they continued to launch cross-border attacks with men, drones, and missiles deep into Saudi territory.Much like the imposition of an FTO designation, attacks by the U.S .or Israel on targets in Yemen will be viewed as a victory by many within the Houthis' leadership. This is especially the case with the hardliners who are ascendant. Strikes are also likely to bolster support for the Houthis among Yemenis. Military strikes, which will likely be limited in nature, will do little to degrade the Houthis' ability to carry out strikes in the Red Sea or elsewhere.More worryingly, such U.S. or Israeli strikes, even if they are limited, are likely to set off an escalatory loop that could have regional and even global implications. The Houthis have the ability to impede shipping in the Red Sea, at least for short periods. They can also target vital energy-producing infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Such attacks, even if only modestly successful, can materially move global energy prices. It must also be noted that the Houthis still control the replacement tanker for the FSO Safer, which is anchored near the port of Hodeidah on the Red Sea. The UN successfully transferred over a million barrels of degraded crude from the rusting tanker to a new tanker, MOST Yemen, in August of this year. The Houthi leadership has an innate understanding of asymmetric warfare and, if cornered, they might well damage or blow up the tanker to cause havoc in the Red Sea.While the Houthis' missiles and drones have all been intercepted, the Houthis are viewed by many in Yemen and in the larger Muslim world, as "fighting back" against perceived Israeli aggression. The attacks, including the recent hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, which is partly owned by Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar, have also demonstrated the group's military reach. Most importantly for the Houthis, the attacks on Israel-linked targets have, just as they were intended to, bolstered support for them among many Yemenis.Before the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis' were facing headwinds with respect to internal support. Unemployment, a profound lack of economic opportunity, rising food and energy prices, and the Houthis' brutal suppression of dissent were beginning to erode support for the group, especially among some key tribes. This is not to argue that the Houthis were in danger of losing control of northwest Yemen. They were not. But the fissures were growing. Now, even old enemies of the Houthis are signaling support for their attacks on Israel. Prominent members of Islah, Yemen's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is aligned with Yemen's internationally recognized government, recently met with Houthi officials in Sana'a. This is noteworthy given that Islah has been engaged in deadly fighting with the Houthis since 2015. Attacks on the Houthis, even if justified, will only reinforce this trend and further bolster support for the group. But this support will be short-lived. Due to the Houthis' hijacking of the Galaxy Leader and their ongoing threats, insurance rates for ships transiting the Red Sea, and especially for any ships docking at the Houthi controlled port of Hodeidah, have soared. There are indications that some ships that were due to dock in Hodeidah have altered course as a result of Houthi actions. If there are further provocations, it is possible that the port, through which most of Yemen's food flows, will be closed to international shipping. This will put immense pressure on the Yemeni people who are already suffering from ever-increasing levels of food insecurity. There are no good options for dealing with the Houthis. But the simple fact is that they aren't going anywhere anytime soon, and they will not be defeated by military means alone.Saudi Arabia, which has recast itself as a valuable mediator in a number of conflicts, including Yemen, is best placed to try to moderate Houthi behavior through continued hard nosed negotiations. Saudi officials understand that there are moderates within the Houthi leadership who have more interest in business and development than in war. Even Houthi hardliners now have fortunes and legacies that they want to protect and pass on. There are also technocrats within the Houthi organization who understand that Houthi control of northwest Yemen cannot easily weather continued economic decline. Saudi officials are betting that an approach that fosters moderates through development and reconstruction efforts will be more successful over the medium and long-term than a return to war. The Houthis thrive on war, but peace is far more of a challenge for them. However, the Houthis' escalating provocations are all but guaranteeing a kinetic response from the U.S. and its allies. Such a response is justified, but it will be giving the Houthis, or at least the hardliners among them, exactly what they want, war. Dear RS readers! It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

Paul Matzko









This global public opinion poll asking respondents whether they have a favorable view of the USA has been bouncing around the interwebs. The topline finding — the US is pretty popular! — surprised many American cultural critics who remember the bad old days of the Iraq War when global criticism of US imperialism surged.
I find the handful of countries where the opinion of the US remains more negative just as interesting. Hungary's worst‐​in‐​Europe result is amusing given how the far Right in the US fetishizes Viktor Orban's reactionary politics. American Hungary stans suffer from sublimated self‐​hatred, wishing they could be as xenophobic and culturally chauvinist as team "Make Hungary Magyar Again."
But the other outlier country on this list with a marked dislike of the US might be more of a surprise to Americans: Australia. We're almost underwater Down Under. This is in sharp contrast with how highly Americans think of Australia; if you combine all positive responses from this survey, Americans consider Australia their warmest ally. Which means the gulf between how Americans and Australians view each other would be one of the widest in the world!
As it so happens, I spent eight summers as a teenager living in Australia. That certainly doesn't make me a country expert — and it's been two decades since I was last there — but it does mean that Australian antipathy towards the US doesn't take me by surprise.
That dislike was very much on the surface when I was a 10 or 11 year old trying to make Aussie friends. The most popular country singer in Australia at the time was the man, the legend, John Williamson. I've written about Australian country music elsewhere, but I can still sing many of Williamson's top hits from memory, including his rip‐​roaring nationalist anthem "A Flag of Our Own" (1991). Williamson was a republican, which meant that he believed Australia should leave the British Commonwealth, reject the monarchy, and take the British stripes off the Australian flag. Here's the song's chorus:
'Cause this is Australia and that's where we're from We're not Yankee side‐​kicks or second class P.O.M.s And tell the Frogs what they can do with their bomb Oh we must have a flag of our own

Let me decipher that for you. P.O.M.s stands for "Prisoners of Her Majesty," or Brits, which is often amended with an adjective such as "whingeing POMs" to describe those who yearn for ye olde country and constantly complain about Australia's supposedly backward ways. This was a particularly popular complaint in Australia in the aftermath of Australia's 1975 constitutional crisis. The Australian Governor‐​General — a crown appointee in a mostly symbolic role — had invoked a long neglected royal power and replaced the elected left‐​wing prime minister with a conservative. (For comparison, imagine the hoopla if King Charles III were to kick British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak out of office and install a Labour prime minister!)
"Frogs," of course, are the French, who were on the radar of Aussie nationalists in the 90s for conducting nuclear testing in their Polynesian colonies — which Australia considered its own backyard — and doing so without regard for the effects of nuclear fallout on surrounding islands and Australia itself.
That leaves us with Yankees, commonly shorted to "Yanks," which quickly becomes, via Australia's penchant for rhyming puns, "Septic Tanks," or then shortened further to "seppos." (Aussies are world leaders in slang. It's like if Cockney wasn't just the lingo of one neighborhood in London but had been exported en masse via prison ships, transported to the other side of the globe, and then had taken over an entire continent. Oh wait…)
Maybe you're wondering why America made that opprobrious list alongside the POMs and Frogs. We weren't testing any nukes in the Pacific (at least, we hadn't for a while) and we weren't meddling in their domestic politics (though blaming the CIA for the 1975 constitutional crisis remains popular among Aussie conspiracists).
But when this song was released in 1991, the Australian military had just participated in the US‐​led Gulf War. Although suffering no combat casualties, Australian nationalists saw this as yet another example of Australia blindly serving the interests of foreign superpowers, from dying at the command of callous British generals in the trenches at Gallipoli — the subject of a 1981 blockbuster starring a young Mel Gibson — to the failed fight alongside the Yanks in the jungles of Vietnam.
Bear in mind that Australia's anti‐​Vietnam War protests in 1970 were the *largest* protests in their history; by contrast, the much feted anti‐​Vietnam war protests in the US don't even crack our top 27! Australia's involvement in the Iraq War did little to assuage critics who believed Australia should stop playing second fiddle to the US, especially after leaked documents showed that the Aussie government's primary purpose for sending troops was to cozy up to the US. All the talk about eradicating weapons of mass destruction and promoting democracy was merely "mandatory rhetoric."
However, when I was a teenager in Australia in the late‐​90s, especially while visiting rural communities in Northern Queensland, the complaint I heard the most often revolved around US trade policy, specifically US tariffs on the import of Australian lamb meat. I remember riding around the bush in a ute (flatbed pickup truck) with a local farmer who was spitting mad about US tariffs and who said that the Monica Lewinsky scandal was Bill Clinton getting his just desserts for harming Aussie sheep farmers. What a thought! Australian headlines from the time were simply scathing in their critique of Clinton's hypocrisy in signing a free trade deal with Canada and Mexico while slapping new tariffs on Australia.
Yet other than the mad cow panic, meat import policies — let alone veal tariffs, lol — have never been a major political issue in recent US national politics. But they sure mattered a great deal to Australia, which is the second largest sheep exporting country in the world (Australia and New Zealand combine for an incredible 93% of the global market). In any case, US trade policy in the 1990s fit with Australian nationalists' broader critique of the US as a bully who simply expected Australia to meekly comply with its broader geopolitical agenda regardless of whether it was in Australia's own national interest.
So Australians' mixed opinions regarding the US are grounded in real, pragmatic considerations. It's yet another situation in which our imperial entanglements and trade protectionism have provoked blowback.
It's possible that in the future those feelings might revert towards the more US‐​positive, Australasian mean given Chinese economic and military expansionism in the region. Up until now, Australia has been insulated from the downside risks of Chinese expansion — funnily enough, the intervening Indonesians have been a more significant target for Australian jingoism — while benefitting greatly as a supplier of raw materials for the post‐​Mao Chinese economic miracle. Until the pandemic, Australia hadn't experienced a recession in nearly thirty years (!).
On a more speculative note, if Noah Smith and other India boosters are correct, Australia's role as a potential trading partner with India could matter as much for that country's success as its trade with China has for the past three decades. Last year, Australia signed a new free trade deal with India and expects its exports to triple by 2035. And given the ongoing decoupling of global investment from the Chinese market, Australia could benefit from a major boost of foreign investment given its proximity and ties with India, Vietnam, and other high growth South and Southeast Asian markets (nicknamed "Altasia"). There's little in the way of Australia enjoying another thirty years of torrid economic growth.
The US should forge a new, peer relationship with Australia, signaling that it takes Australia seriously as a vital regional ally rather than treating it as a junior partner in our foreign misadventures. We have a golden opportunity to do so right now. As Doug Bandow has noted, China has foolishly kicked off a trade war with Australia, and while Trump considered following suit with new tariffs on Australian exports, he was finally persuaded not to. We should take advantage of China's mistake by expanding our 2005 free trade agreement with Australia and lower rates on agricultural products that are feeling the pinch from Chinese tariffs.
This is a crosspost from the author's Substack. Click through and subscribe for more content on the intersection of history and policy.

When under pressure, people revert to their true
natures. And insofar as political leadership goes, in the final session of the
2020-24 term of the Louisiana what we saw from the Legislature leadership was
ugly, hopefully the last gasp of a mentality that has left Louisiana in tatters.

In the House of Representatives, Republicans
Speaker Clay
Schexnayder and Pro Tem Tanner Magee
have come under much fire for their handling of the session. It all crystallized
in the last week of the session, when they muscled through a resolution
allowing state government to spend, as opposed to banking, about 10 percent
more of transitory revenue generation, and in the final half-hour of the
session, when most of the spending bills were presented for members' approval
with hardly any of them knowing any details about what they were asked on which
to vote.

This failure of leadership occurred at two levels,
beginning with their unwise squandering of dollars ahead of a bleaker revenue picture.
The Revenue
Estimating Conference foresees fiscal year taxes, licenses, and fees
falling from $15.277 billion in fiscal year 2024 to $15.103 billion in FY 2025,
$14.666 billion in FY 2026, then a bump upwards to $14.936 billion in FY 2027 –
a drop of over a billion bucks from FY 2023 just wrapping up. Given that new
commitments (at least in intention) of around $320 million annually were doled
out for education alone starting in 2024, maintaining this total level of
spending will be difficult.

This leads to consideration whether this
budget isn't some kind of poison pill left to the next governor and
Legislature. Frontrunner GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry has made no secret of
wanting to rein in government, and neither is hidden the distaste that Schexnayder
and Republican Sen. Pres. Page
Cortez have for Landry and those legislators sympathetic to Landry's
right-sizing goal, who certainly would gain considerable power in the Legislature
with Landry in office.

Of course, one goal with the bloated budget was to
allow its backers to puff their chests out with pride in to leave in the history
books or as a resume-builder for future elections the fact that they "gave"
stuff to the people (as if one can be made a gift of your own resources; it's
not legislators' money, it's the people's) – a legacy of Louisiana's liberal
populism where politicians seeks to hoard as much money as they can then distribute
it as a way that makes themselves seem indispensable to the wellbeing of the
polity. But another motive also was using it as a tool of payback against those
with a different vision.

It's all right to have competing visions, where
the Schexnayders and Magees of the world take the grasshopper version of
blowing it all now in the face of a certain looming winter, and the fiscal
conservatives who voted against the enabling resolution to do this adhere to
the ant version of saving to deal with that future. Realize as well a good portion
of the excess spending authority went to non-priority items, mainly
transportation infrastructure, while $237 million went towards more critical things
such as stabilizing property insurance markets and coastal protection – which could
have been afforded without busting the cap. There absolutely was no need to
spend so much at this time.

For their trouble, most of the fiscal
conservatives had Schexnayder yank
their capital projects from the supplemental bill after the successful vote
to violate the cap. This turned into a tag team effort when liberal big spender
Democrat Gov. John
Bel Edwards subsequently used
his line item vetoes on those in the regular capital outlay bill.

The grasshopper view is a flawed vision and in and
of itself may disqualify those who follow it from being entrusted with elective
office. It's why Louisiana has lurched from fiscal crisis to fiscal crisis
historically while remaining relatively overtaxed, which manifested in the Edwards
era – who backed Schexnayder for Speaker and with whom has cooperated in
keeping bloated government – as declining
population and stagnant job and wage growth contrary to most other states.

But truly reprehensibly about these people is their
avoidance of taking responsibility for this and trying to blame others for their
failures. This excuse-making stems not just from bad policy-making, but from
bad leadership as an extension of trying to explain away policy mistakes.
Remarks by both Schexnayder and Magee after the session attempted to address widespread
complaints about budget priorities and the zero transparency involved in its
promulgation that hardly
was distinguishable from budgeting in the heyday of the Soviet Union.

In a radio interview, Magee (like
Cortez before him) adopted the spousal abuser role by blaming the victims
in causing the budgetary chaos, saying "You have a group of lawmakers who are
more interested in making headlines about obstructing government than they are
about doing the people's work." Note the breath-taking arrogance of this remark:
equating a desire to spend less as "obstructing … the people's work" and attempting
to cancel legitimation of opposition to his big-spending agenda, as well as the
avoidance of responsibility for his cabal's cutting $100 million out of health
care in the operating budget and $136 million out of Jimmie Davis Bridge
funding in the capital outlay budget.

In media remarks, Schexnayder attempted even more
vigorously to distance himself from accusations of failure to budget responsibly
and transparently. Also assuming the spousal abuser role by calling those who
voted against raising the cap "a small group of blockers, instead of helpers" –
similar to Magee voicing a sentiment that trying to keep government spending
under control was illegitimate – he mischaracterized outside assessments of the
budget in trying to defend his actions as the chief budget architect (and who
sat on the conference committees that approved removing dissenters' projects,
as did Magee, and the bridge money). "Someone sent me PAR
[Public Affairs Research Council] and CABL[Council
for a Better Louisiana]'s evaluations of the budget. The budget is a good
budget; a good, conservative budget that moves our state forward. That has
excellent projects in it."

PAR did say the operating, capital, and supplemental
bills had "many state priorities and positive developments," but also noted that
those "were overshadowed by the messy way lawmakers handled the spending of
taxpayer dollars" and "lawmakers wasted tens of millions on favored projects
for their districts that don't represent state priorities. They continued
unnecessary giveaways through tax break programs with uncertainty about their
long-term impact on the state treasury. And they stripped hundreds of millions
of dollars from the state health department with no idea what the impact might
be on services to the poor, elderly and people with developmental disabilities."

CABL noted that "lawmakers did enact spending
bills that make many wise investments in the future of Louisiana" where for the
"most part it spends non-recurring revenue on one-time expenses, mostly
infrastructure projects." But it also declared "there needs to be more time and
transparency when making decisions over such huge sums of money" and "It also
remains to be seen what the fiscal impact of this session's spending will mean
in a couple of years when some current taxes are removed from the State General
Fund."

Regarding these and other critiques of how the
process was handled, Schexnayder followed the playbook by saying this could
have been avoided if only the fiscal conservatives hadn't dissented. But that's
a failure of leadership in that only at the last minute relatively speaking did
Schexnayder convince enough of them to back a breach – by promising to retain
the majority of dollars to pay down unfunded pensions and use much of the authorized
excess on one-time expenses – and then he had an entire day after to clear up everything.
Maybe if he hadn't spent so much time trying to find ways to punish dissenters
he might not have produced such shoddy results.

And his laughable assertion that dissenters
deliberately disengaged themselves from the process so they didn't know about
contents is absurd on its face since he went out of his way to punish them, a
style of leadership that doesn't invite participation of your opponents. Nor does
it address similar complaints from others who voted to bust the cap.

These attitudes and behaviors by Schexnayder and Magee,
as representations of legislative leadership and policy-making, reveal
everything that is wrong with Louisiana and why it has fallen so far behind
other states by squandering its resources. Making mistakes and blaming others, neither
wisely nor warily, only continues a long history state politicians of doing the same. As for the
future as they and others who think like them seek elective office, voters
should know Schexnayder and Magee are the problem and having nothing to do with
the solution.

Croatia has been facing a population decline, mainly due to a low birth rate and the emigration of young and qualified workers. Considering the historical and dynamic aspects of emigration (Draženović, Kunovac and Pripužić, 2018), leading to depopulation, it is necessary to investigate all contributing factors in Croatia and explore potential models and measures to mitigate these unfavourable processes. Apart from Germany, Croatian citizens have emigrated mostly to Ireland and Austria since the country acceded to the EU (Pokos, 2017). Research confirms that the number of Croatian citizens who immigrated to Germany, Ireland and Austria in 2016 was, on average, 62% higher than the official data reported by the Republic of Croatia (Jerić, 2019). The increasingly intensive emigration of the young and able-bodied population additionally contributes to a rapidly ageing population, exerting strong pressure on the sustainability of the pension system (Družić, Beg and Raguž Krištić, 2016) and underscores the importance of investigating the reasons for emigration and the factors essential for return. Migration is also an important area of interest for the European Union due to its exceptional impact on all aspects of society. Increased opportunities for mobility, advances in technology that provide access to information sources, and societal changes strongly suggest the need for policymakers to examine the micro, meso, and macro drivers that influence migration or potentially influence a person's decision not to migrate or remigrate. Governments require migration analysis to create informed migration policies, including citizen participation in the policy development process. The perspectives of migrants and their behaviour should be taken into account when creating policies to better understand the key success factors needed for the desired outcomes of migrants (European Commission, 2020). According to Fargues (2017), migration is a complex process that is constantly changing as a result of various local, international, and global situations, highlighting the need for con¬tinual investigation and repeated surveying of the population. Within the current demographic climate, the World Youth Alliance Croatia (SSMH) launched the project "Network 2050 – Demography, From Challenges to Answers", co-financed by the European Social Fund. The project is based on intersectoral cooperation, identified as necessary for improving collaborative efforts to address the effects of negative demographic trends on the social and economic development of Croatia and develop measures for demographic revitalisation. This paper will present the data and analysis of the empirical results of the research conducted by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies. The study focuses on emigrants' opinions and perspectives regarding the factors that influenced their decision to migrate. This includes their own perceptions of the situation in Croatia, as well as abroad in their host country, which played a role in their decision-making process and continues to potentially impact them. Additionally, the paper explores the emigrants' perception of their current life circumstances. The target group comprised Croats currently living as expatriates in European countries. A total of 497 respondents, Croats currently living abroad, most of whom left Croatia between 2016 and 2021, took part in the survey. Three main research questions guided the investigation: 1) What are the key drivers of migration at the micro, meso, and macro levels that influence the decision to emigrate or stay, according to the perception of emigrants from Croatia?; 2) What factors influence the decision of Croats to stay abroad?; and, 3) What are the key factors that influence the decision to return to Croatia? For the purposes of this paper, the general results related to research questions 1 and 2 will be presented. The instrument used for data collection was an online questionnaire that respondents filled out independently. The questionnaire consisted of 62 questions, mostly closed-ended, with only a few open-ended questions to accommodate additional information if participants chose to elaborate on their perceptions. Including this option also allowed for the possibility of results that were not expected by the research team. The questions were divided into five thematic chapters: sociodemographic data, migration status, socioeconomic status, returnee motivational status, and identity and value system. The questionnaire was administered with special attention to the time of completion, clarity, and appropriateness of the questions. The data collection process included advertising the research project and posting calls for participation on various social media networks across platforms managed by members of various Croatian dias¬pora groups. Additionally, advertising was conducted through social groups and institutions, as well as using the snowball method. Data was collected during the period from July to October 2021. At the beginning, the purpose of the questionnaire was explained, and respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary with the possibility to withdraw at any time. Consistency in the questionnaire administration was achieved by exclusively offering it online. A total of 500 responses were received, of which 497 were valid, while three questionnaires were partially filled. Only key socio-demographic information was collected and, together with the respondents' personal perceptions, it was examined in relation to the key drivers of emigration. Their perception is the key feedback that can help state authorities and policymakers in designing measures aimed at retaining the population and attract¬ing potential returnees. Their perception was viewed as potentially showing indica¬tors of migration drivers, push and pull factors, as well as demonstrating public perception around key issues and policies, and the type of information (including its accuracy) used to inform migration. Respecting the perception of the general public when creating policies is in line with the concepts promoted by the EU Parliament (2020), which encourages the participation of citizens in decision-making. According to the obtained sociodemographic data, 208 respondents (41.9%) were female, and 289 respondents (58.1%) were male. The most represented age category (39%) was 30–39 years old. Additionally, 24% of respondents were between 40 and 49 years old, 22% were between 18 and 29 years old 9.5 % were between 50 and 59 years old, 3.2% were 60–69 years old and 2% were between 70 and 81 years old. This indicates that the majority of respondents who leave are younger than 40, i.e. in the reproductive age group. The results obtained support the relevance of the research by Družić, Beg and Raguž Krištić (2016), who warn about the loss of the young population in Croatia, which results in population ageing. The majority (78.3%) were born in Croatia, and the next significant group (13.1%) was born in Bosnia and Herzego¬vina. The largest group of respondents, at the time of the questionnaire, lived in Germany, followed by the numerically significant groups in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden. The trend shown by the majority of respondents coming from Germany is in line with the large wave of migration to Germany since 2013 when Croatia entered the EU, and since July 2015 when the labour market in Germany was opened to Croatia. Jurić (2022) and Pokos (2017) describe Germany as still the most desirable country for Croatian emigration. The results showed that macro-level factors related to working conditions and employment rates influence micro-level factors, such as socioeconomic status. Work opportunities and the working environment were perceived as somewhat important because respondents believe that these aspects affect their personal quality of life. An interesting result is that the number of respondents who stated that they were married or in a partnership doubled after moving. It is worth mentioning that Jang, Cast¬erline and Snyder (2014) warn that the longer the time spent abroad, the stronger the ties made, potentially leading to the establishment of family life connected to the host country. This could negatively affect the potential decision to return. The influence of this factor at the micro level requires further research to show the possible impact of marriages abroad on the mobility of new families and their possible return to Croatia, especially if Croatia's goal is to encourage the return of its emigrants. The results of this study, as well as the recommendations of researchers such as Kis, Ozdemir and Ward (2015) on the importance of improving working conditions and wages as a means of improving living conditions, are useful for formulating strategies for population retention. Additionally, certain political restrictions can negatively affect the achievement of the country's migration goals (Boswell, 2002), which, in the case of Croatia, involves return migration and population retention.

DOI:10.1590/2179-8966/2022/65135 ApresentaçãoMarço 2022 Nossas saudações a todas e todos! Seguimos firmes na esperança de que 2022 seja um ano de mudanças e melhoras na situação do mundo e, particularmente, do Brasil! Aqui, apresentamos o primeiro número do volume 13, do ano de 2022, da Revista Direito e Práxis! Como de costume, trazemos novos manuscritos em todas as nossas seções: artigos inéditos, dossiê, resenhas e traduções! O tema da Covid 19, como não poderia deixar de ser, segue presente, com trabalhos que analisam a pandemia nas suas diferentes conexões: recessão democrática, plataformas digitais e medidas emergenciais. Questões e dilemas político-jurídicos aparecem em artigos que analisam processos de lutas por direitos e, em última instância, da própria democracia. Num contexto mais amplo temos uma revisão crítica do constitucionalismo de 1988, já em contextos mais específicos os artigos trazem estudos consistentes, também de natureza crítica, sobre a questão racial, da violência contra a mulher, do direito à desconexão no mundo do trabalho, do reconhecimento de pessoas trans, da luta parlamentar por direitos dos ciganos. A questão da justiça de transição aparece em abordagens no âmbito dos cenários brasileiro e equatoriano. Questões e políticas de genêro também estão presentes tanto numa abordagem a partir do pluralismo jurídico e do pensamento descolonial quanto numa abordagem institucional do Poder Judiciário. Por fim, a questão da alteridade em sua dimensão política e usos pragmáticos. Sem dúvida, a leitora e o leitor poderão se confrontar com trabalhos provocativos e estimulantes em diferentes perspectivas. No primeiro Dossiê do ano de 2022, organizado cuidadosamente pelas editoras convidadas Carina Calabria e Flavianne Nóbrega, ambas da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, trazemos uma discussão tão importante quanto urgente a respeito da questão indígena, seja por meio de estudos que relatam e denunciam o desrespeito e a violação de direitos, seja por meio de estudos que buscam os mecanismos para a garantia de direitos desses povos originários. São feitas importantes conexões não apenas com o direito, mas também com a antropologia, a sociologia e a política. Questões do bem-viver e de um outro referencial antropológoco nos ajudam a pensar fora dos parâmetros da modernidade colonial e eurocêntrica. Nessa mesma perspectiva segue a tradução do artigo "Escrevendo Além das Distinções" e a resenha do livro Xukuru: memórias e história dos índios da Serra de Ororubá. Como sempre, agradecemos profundamente a todas e todos que contribuíram para mais essa edição da Revista: autoras e autores, tradutoras e tradutores, editoras convidadas. É desse trabalho colaborativo que é feito nossa Revista! Relembramos que as políticas editoriais para as diferentes seções da Revista podem ser acessadas em nossa página e que as submissões são permanentes e sempre bem-vindas! Agradecemos, como sempre, às autoras e aos autores, avaliadoras e avaliadores e colaboradoras e colaboradores pela confiança depositada em nossa publicação. Boa Leitura! Equipe Direito e Práxis***EditorialMarch 2022 Our greetings to all of you! Despite the new conflict in the Ukraine, we stand firm in the hope that 2022 will be a year of changes and improvements in the world situation, and particularly in Brazil! Here we would like to announce the first issue of 2022 of the Journal Law and Praxis (v. 13)! As usual, we bring new manuscripts in all our sections: unpublished articles, dossier, reviews, and translations!The theme of Covid 19, as it could not be otherwise, is still present, with papers that analyze the pandemic in its different connections: democratic recession, digital platforms, and emergency measures. Political-legal issues and dilemmas appear in articles that analyze processes of struggles for rights and, ultimately, democracy itself. In a broader context we have a critical review of constitutionalism of 1988, already in more specific contexts the articles bring consistent studies, also of critical nature, on the issue of race, violence against women, the "right to disconnection" in the world of work, the recognition of transgender people, the parliamentary struggle for rights of the Roma. The issue of transitional justice appears in approaches within the Brazilian and Ecuadorian scenarios. Gender issues and policies are also present both in an approach from legal pluralism and decolonial thinking and in an institutional approach to the Judiciary. Finally, the issue of otherness in its political dimension and pragmatic uses. Undoubtedly, the reader will be confronted with provocative and stimulating works from different perspectives.In the first Dossier of the year 2022, carefully organized by the guest editors Carina Calabria and Flavianne Nóbrega, both from the Federal University of Pernambuco, we bring a discussion as important as it is urgent regarding the indigenous issue, whether through studies that report and denounce the disrespect and violation of rights, or through studies that seek mechanisms to guarantee the rights of these original peoples. Important connections are made not only with law, but also with anthropology, sociology, and politics. Questions of good life and of a different anthropological referential help us to think outside the parameters of colonial and Eurocentric modernity. In this same perspective follow the translation of the article "Writing Beyond Distinctions" and the review of the book Xukuru: Memories and History of the Indians of the Serra de Ororubá.As always, we warmly thank everyone who contributed to this issue of the Journal: authors, translators, and guest editors. It is from this collaborative work that our journal is made! We remind you that the editorial policies for the different sections of the journal can be accessed on our website and that submissions are permanent and always welcome! We thank, as always, the authors, reviewers and reviewers, and collaborators for the trust placed in our publication. Enjoy your reading! Direito e Práxis Team***PresentaciónMarzo 2022 ¡Saludos a todos y todas! ¡Seguimos firmes en la esperanza de que 2022 sea un año de cambios y mejoras en la situación del mundo y, en particular, de Brasil! ¡Aquí presentamos el primer número del volumen 13, del año 2022, de la Revista Direito e Práxis! Como siempre, traemos nuevos manuscritos en todas nuestras secciones: artículos inéditos, dossier, reseñas y traducciones.El tema de Covid 19, como no podía ser de otra manera, sigue presente, con trabajos que analizan la pandemia en sus diferentes conexiones: recesión democrática, plataformas digitales y medidas de emergencia. Las cuestiones y dilemas político-jurídicos aparecen en artículos que analizan los procesos de lucha por los derechos y, en definitiva, la propia democracia. En un contexto más amplio tenemos una revisión crítica del constitucionalismo de 1988, ya en contextos más específicos los artículos aportan estudios consistentes, también de carácter crítico, sobre la cuestión de la raza, la violencia contra las mujeres, el derecho a la desconexión en el mundo del trabajo, el reconocimiento de las personas trans, la lucha parlamentaria por los derechos de los gitanos. La cuestión de la justicia transicional aparece en los planteamientos de los escenarios brasileño y ecuatoriano. Las cuestiones y políticas de género también están presentes tanto en un enfoque basado en el pluralismo jurídico y el pensamiento decolonial como en un enfoque institucional del poder judicial. Por último, la cuestión de la alteridad en su dimensión política y sus usos pragmáticos. Sin duda, el lector se encontrará con obras provocadoras y estimulantes desde diferentes perspectivas. En el primer Dossier del año 2022, cuidadosamente organizado por las editoras invitadas Carina Calabria y Flavianne Nóbrega, ambas de la Universidad Federal de Pernambuco, traemos una discusión tan importante como urgente sobre la cuestión indígena, ya sea a través de estudios que informan y denuncian la falta de respeto y la violación de derechos, o a través de estudios que buscan mecanismos para garantizar los derechos de estos pueblos originarios. Se establecen importantes conexiones no sólo con el derecho, sino también con la antropología, la sociología y la política. Las cuestiones del buen vivir y de otro referencial antropológico nos ayudan a pensar fuera de los parámetros de la modernidad colonial y eurocéntrica. En esta misma perspectiva sigue la traducción del artículo "Escribir más allá de las distinciones" y la reseña del libro Xukuru: memorias e historia de los indios de la Serra de Ororubá.Como siempre, agradecemos profundamente a todos los que han contribuido a este número de la revista: autores, traductores y editores invitados. ¡De este trabajo de colaboración está hecha nuestra Revista! Le recordamos que las políticas editoriales de las distintas secciones de la revista pueden consultarse en nuestra página web y que los envíos son permanentes y siempre bienvenidos. Agradecemos, como siempre, a los autores y autoras, revisores y revisoras, y a los colaboradores y a las colaboradoras la confianza depositada en nuestra publicación. ¡Buena lectura! Equipo Direito e Práxis

Funding Information: This work was conducted in part using the resources of the Advanced Computing Center for Research and Education at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. KS, BL, CH were supported by the National Institutes of Health under award numbers R01EB017230, and T32EB001628, and in part by ViSE/VICTR VR3029 and the National Center for Research Resources, Grant UL1 RR024975-01. This work was also possible thanks to the support of the Institutional Research Chair in NeuroInformatics of Université de Sherbrooke, NSERC and Compute Canada (MD, FR). MP received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 754462. The Wisconsin group acknowledges the support from a core grant to the Waisman Center from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (IDDRC U54 HD090256). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, NIH NIBIB 1R01EB029272-01, and a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. LF acknowledges the support of the Cluster of Excellence Matters of Activity. Image Space Material funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany´s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2025. SW is supported by a Medical Research Council PhD Studentship UK [MR/N013913/1]. The Nottingham group's processing was performed using the University of Nottingham's Augusta HPC service and the Precision Imaging Beacon Cluster. JPA, MA and SMS acknowledges the support of FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia within CINTESIS, R&D Unit (reference UID/IC/4255/2013). MM was funded by the Wellcome Trust through a Sir Henry Wellcome Postdoctoral Fellowship [213722/Z/18/Z]. EJC-R is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, Ambizione grant PZ00P2 185814/1). CMWT is supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Fellowship (215944/Z/19/Z) and a Veni grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (17331). FC acknowledges the support of the National Health and Medical Research Council ofAustralia (APP1091593 and APP1117724) and the Australian Research Council (DP170101815). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. D.B. was partially supported by NIH NIMH T32-MH103213 to William Hetrick (Indiana University). CL is partly supported by NIH grants P41 EB027061 and P30 NS076408 "Institutional Center Cores for Advanced Neuroimaging. JYMY received positional funding from the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation (RCH 1000). JYMY, JC, and CEK acknowledge the support of the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation, Murdoch Children's Research Institute, The University of Melbourne Department of Paediatrics, and the Victorian Government's Operational Infrastructure Support Program. C-HY is grateful to the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (MOST 109-2222-E-182-001-MY3) for the support. LC acknowledges support from CONACYT and UNAM. ARM acknowledges support from CONACYT. LJO, YR, and FZ were supported by NIH P41EB015902 and R01MH119222. AJG was supported by P41EB015898. NM was supported by R01MH119222, K24MH116366, and R01MH111917. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 785907 & 945539 (HBP SGA2 & SGA3), and from the ANR IFOPASUBA- 19-CE45-0022-01. PG, CR, NL and AV were partially supported by ANID-Basal FB0008 and ANID-FONDECYT 1190701 grants. We would like to acknowledge John C Gore, Hiromasa Takemura, Anastasia Yendiki, and Riccardo Galbusera for their helplful suggestions regarding the analysis, figures, and discussions. Funding Information: This work was conducted in part using the resources of the Advanced Computing Center for Research and Education at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. KS, BL, CH were supported by the National Institutes of Health under award numbers R01EB017230, and T32EB001628, and in part by ViSE/VICTR VR3029 and the National Center for Research Resources, Grant UL1 RR024975-01. This work was also possible thanks to the support of the Institutional Research Chair in NeuroInformatics of Universit? de Sherbrooke, NSERC and Compute Canada (MD, FR). MP received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sk?odowska-Curie grant agreement No 754462. The Wisconsin group acknowledges the support from a core grant to the Waisman Center from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (IDDRC U54 HD090256). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, NIH NIBIB 1R01EB029272-01, and a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. LF acknowledges the support of the Cluster of Excellence Matters of Activity. Image Space Material funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany?s Excellence Strategy ? EXC 2025. SW is supported by a Medical Research Council PhD Studentship UK [MR/N013913/1]. The Nottingham group's processing was performed using the University of Nottingham's Augusta HPC service and the Precision Imaging Beacon Cluster. JPA, MA and SMS acknowledges the support of FCT - Funda??o para a Ci?ncia e a Tecnologia within CINTESIS, R&D Unit (reference UID/IC/4255/2013). MM was funded by the Wellcome Trust through a Sir Henry Wellcome Postdoctoral Fellowship [213722/Z/18/Z]. EJC-R is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, Ambizione grant PZ00P2 185814/1). CMWT is supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Fellowship (215944/Z/19/Z) and a Veni grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (17331). FC acknowledges the support of the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (APP1091593 and APP1117724) and the Australian Research Council (DP170101815). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. D.B. was partially supported by NIH NIMH T32-MH103213 to William Hetrick (Indiana University). CL is partly supported by NIH grants P41 EB027061 and P30 NS076408 ?Institutional Center Cores for Advanced Neuroimaging. JYMY received positional funding from the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation (RCH 1000). JYMY, JC, and CEK acknowledge the support of the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation, Murdoch Children's Research Institute, The University of Melbourne Department of Paediatrics, and the Victorian Government's Operational Infrastructure Support Program. C-HY is grateful to the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (MOST 109-2222-E-182-001-MY3) for the support. LC acknowledges support from CONACYT and UNAM. ARM acknowledges support from CONACYT. LJO, YR, and FZ were supported by NIH P41EB015902 and R01MH119222. AJG was supported by P41EB015898. NM was supported by R01MH119222, K24MH116366, and R01MH111917. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 785907 & 945539 (HBP SGA2 & SGA3), and from the ANR IFOPASUBA- 19-CE45-0022-01. PG, CR, NL and AV were partially supported by ANID-Basal FB0008 and ANID-FONDECYT 1190701 grants. We would like to acknowledge John C Gore, Hiromasa Takemura, Anastasia Yendiki, and Riccardo Galbusera for their helplful suggestions regarding the analysis, figures, and discussions. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 ; White matter bundle segmentation using diffusion MRI fiber tractography has become the method of choice to identify white matter fiber pathways in vivo in human brains. However, like other analyses of complex data, there is considerable variability in segmentation protocols and techniques. This can result in different reconstructions of the same intended white matter pathways, which directly affects tractography results, quantification, and interpretation. In this study, we aim to evaluate and quantify the variability that arises from different protocols for bundle segmentation. Through an open call to users of fiber tractography, including anatomists, clinicians, and algorithm developers, 42 independent teams were given processed sets of human whole-brain streamlines and asked to segment 14 white matter fascicles on six subjects. In total, we received 57 different bundle segmentation protocols, which enabled detailed volume-based and streamline-based analyses of agreement and disagreement among protocols foreach fiber pathway. Results show that even when given the exact same sets of underlying streamlines, the variability across protocols for bundle segmentation is greater than all other sources of variability in the virtual dissection process, including variability within protocols and variability across subjects. In order to foster the use of tractography bundle dissection in routine clinical settings, and as a fundamental analytical tool, future endeavors must aim to resolve and reduce this heterogeneity. Although external validation is needed to verify the anatomical accuracy of bundle dissections, reducing heterogeneity is a step towards reproducible research and may be achieved through the use of standard nomenclature and definitions of white matter bundles and well-chosen constraints and decisions in the dissection process. ; Peer reviewed

Funding Information: The World Health Organization World Mental Health (WMH) Survey Initiative is supported by the United States National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; R01 MH070884), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Pfizer Foundation, the United States Public Health Service (R13-MH066849, R01-MH069864 and R01 DA016558), the Fogarty International Center (FIRCA R03-TW006481), the Pan American Health Organization, Eli Lilly and Company, Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical Inc., GlaxoSmithKline, and Bristol-Myers Squibb. We thank the staff of the WMH Data Collection and Data Analysis Coordination Centres for assistance with instrumentation, fieldwork and consultation on data analysis. None of the funders had any role in the design, analysis, interpretation of results or preparation of this paper. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the views of the World Health Organization, other sponsoring organisations, agencies or governments. The 2007 Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing is funded by the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing. The Argentina survey – Estudio Argentino de Epidemiología en Salud Mental (EASM) – was supported by a grant from the Argentinian Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud de la Nación) – (Grant Number 2002–17270/13−5). The São Paulo Megacity Mental Health Survey is supported by the State of São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) Thematic Project Grant 03/00204-3. The Bulgarian Epidemiological Study of common mental disorders, EPIBUL, is supported by the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Public Health Protection. The Colombian National Study of Mental Health (NSMH) is supported by the Ministry of Social Protection. The Mental Health Study Medellín – Colombia was carried out and supported jointly by the Center for Excellence on Research in Mental Health (CES University) and the Secretary of Health of Medellín. The ESEMeD project is funded by the European Commission (Contracts QLG5-1999-01042; SANCO 2004123, and EAHC 20081308), the Piedmont Region (Italy), Fondo de Investigación Sanitaria, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain (FIS 00/0028), Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, Spain (SAF 2000-158-CE), Generalitat de Catalunya (2017 SGR 452; 2014 SGR 748), Instituto de Salud Carlos III (CIBER CB06/02/0046, RETICS RD06/0011 REM-TAP), and other local agencies and by an unrestricted educational grant from GlaxoSmithKline. Implementation of the Iraq Mental Health Survey (IMHS) and data entry were carried out by the staff of the Iraqi MOH and MOP with direct support from the Iraqi IMHS team with funding from both the Japanese and European Funds through United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF). The Israel National Health Survey is funded by the Ministry of Health with support from the Israel National Institute for Health Policy and Health Services Research and the National Insurance Institute of Israel. The World Mental Health Japan (WMHJ) Survey is supported by the Grant for Research on Psychiatric and Neurological Diseases and Mental Health (H13-SHOGAI-023, H14-TOKUBETSU-026, H16-KOKORO-013, H25-SEISHIN-IPPAN-006) from the Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Lebanese Evaluation of the Burden of Ailments and Needs of the Nation (L.E.B.A.N.O.N.) is supported by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, the WHO (Lebanon), National Institute of Health/Fogarty International Center (R03 TW006481-01), anonymous private donations to IDRAAC, Lebanon, and unrestricted grants from, Algorithm, AstraZeneca, Benta, Bella Pharma, Eli Lilly, Glaxo Smith Kline, Lundbeck, Novartis, OmniPharma, Pfizer, Phenicia, Servier, UPO. The Mexican National Comorbidity Survey (MNCS) is supported by The National Institute of Psychiatry Ramon de la Fuente (INPRFMDIES 4280) and by the National Council on Science and Technology (CONACyT-G30544- H), with supplemental support from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Te Rau Hinengaro: The New Zealand Mental Health Survey (NZMHS) is supported by the New Zealand Ministry of Health, Alcohol Advisory Council and the Health Research Council. The Nigerian Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing (NSMHW) is supported by the WHO (Geneva), the WHO (Nigeria) and the Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria. The Northern Ireland Study of Mental Health was funded by the Health & Social Care Research & Development Division of the Public Health Agency. The Peruvian World Mental Health Study was funded by the National Institute of Health of the Ministry of Health of Peru. The Polish project Epidemiology of Mental Health and Access to Care –EZOP Project (PL 0256) was carried out by the Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology in Warsaw in consortium with the Department of Psychiatry – Medical University in Wroclaw and National Institute of Public Health-National Institute of Hygiene in Warsaw and in partnership with Psykiatrist Institut Vinderen–Universitet, Oslo. The project was funded by the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism. EZOP project was co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Health. The Portuguese Mental Health Study was carried out by the Department of Mental Health, Faculty of Medical Sciences, NOVA University of Lisbon, with the collaboration of the Portuguese Catholic University, and was funded by Champalimaud Foundation, Gulbenkian Foundation, Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and Ministry of Health. The Romania WMH study projects 'Policies in Mental Health Area' and 'National Study regarding Mental Health and Services Use' were carried out by the National School of Public Health & Health Services Management (former National Institute for Research & Development in Health), with technical support of Metro Media Transilvania, the National Institute of Statistics-National Centre for Training in Statistics, SC Cheyenne Services SRL, Statistics Netherlands and were funded by the Ministry of Public Health (former Ministry of Health) with supplemental support of Eli Lilly Romania SRL. The South Africa Stress and Health Study (SASH) is supported by the US National Institute of Mental Health (R01-MH059575) and the National Institute of Drug Abuse with supplemental funding from the South African Department of Health and the University of Michigan. The Shenzhen Mental Health Survey is supported by the Shenzhen Bureau of Health and the Shenzhen Bureau of Science, Technology, and Information. The Psychiatric Enquiry to General Population in Southeast Spain – Murcia (PEGASUS-Murcia) Project has been financed by the Regional Health Authorities of Murcia (Servicio Murciano de Salud and Consejería de Sanidad y Política Social) and Fundación para la Formación e Investigación Sanitarias (FFIS) of Murcia. The Ukraine Comorbid Mental Disorders during Periods of Social Disruption (CMDPSD) study is funded by the US National Institute of Mental Health (RO1-MH61905). The US National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) is supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; U01-MH60220) with supplemental support from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF; Grant 044708), and the John W. Alden Trust. Dr Dan J. Stein is supported by the Medical Research Council of South Africa (MRC). A complete list of all within-country and cross-national WMH publications can be found at http://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/wmh/ . Publisher Copyright: Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. ; Abstract Aims Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterised by a recurrent course and high comorbidity rates. A lifespan perspective may therefore provide important information regarding health outcomes. The aim of the present study is to examine mental disorders that preceded 12-month MDD diagnosis and the impact of these disorders on depression outcomes. Methods Data came from 29 cross-sectional community epidemiological surveys of adults in 27 countries (n = 80 190). The Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) was used to assess 12-month MDD and lifetime DSM-IV disorders with onset prior to the respondent's age at interview. Disorders were grouped into depressive distress disorders, non-depressive distress disorders, fear disorders and externalising disorders. Depression outcomes included 12-month suicidality, days out of role and impairment in role functioning. Results Among respondents with 12-month MDD, 94.9% (s.e. = 0.4) had at least one prior disorder (including previous MDD), and 64.6% (s.e. = 0.9) had at least one prior, non-MDD disorder. Previous non-depressive distress, fear and externalising disorders, but not depressive distress disorders, predicted higher impairment (OR = 1.4-1.6) and suicidality (OR = 1.5-2.5), after adjustment for sociodemographic variables. Further adjustment for MDD characteristics weakened, but did not eliminate, these associations. Associations were largely driven by current comorbidities, but both remitted and current externalising disorders predicted suicidality among respondents with 12-month MDD. Conclusions These results illustrate the importance of careful psychiatric history taking regarding current anxiety disorders and lifetime externalising disorders in individuals with MDD. ; publishersversion ; published

We thank the anonymous referee for their corrections and help in improving the paper. We warmly thank the entire technical staff of the Observatorio Astronomico Nacional at San Pedro Martir in Mexico for their unfailing support to SAINT-EX operations, namely: E. Cadena, T. Calvario, E. Colorado, B. Garcia, G. Guisa, A. Franco, L. Figueroa, B. Hernandez, J. Herrera, E. Lopez, E. Lugo, B. Martinez, J. M. Nunez, J. L. Ochoa, M. Pereyra, F. Quiroz, T. Verdugo, I. Zavala. B.V.R. thanks the Heising-Simons Foundation for support. Y.G.M.C acknowledges support from UNAM-PAPIIT IG-101321. B.-O. D. acknowledges support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (PP00P2-163967 and PP00P2-190080). R.B. acknowledges the support from the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant P2BEP2_195285. M.N.G. acknowledges support from MIT's Kavli Institute as a Juan Carlos Torres Fellow. A.H.M.J.T acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement nffi 803193/BEBOP), from the MERAC foundation, and from the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC; grant nffi ST/S00193X/1). T.D. acknowledges support from MIT's Kavli Institute as a Kavli postdoctoral fellow Part of this work received support from the National Centre for Competence in Research PlanetS, supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). The research leading to these results has received funding from the ARC grant for Concerted Research Actions, financed by the Wallonia-Brussels Federation. TRAPPIST is funded by the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (Fond National de la Recherche Scientifique, FNRS) under the grant FRFC 2.5.594.09.F, with the participation of the Swiss National Science Fundation (SNF). M.G. and E.J. are F.R.S.-FNRS Senior Research Associate. This publication benefits from the support of the French Community of Belgium in the context of the FRIA Doctoral Grant awarded to MT. We acknowledge the use of public TESS data from pipelines at the TESS Science Office and at the TESS Science Processing Operations Center. We acknowledge the use of public TESS Alert data from pipelines at the TESS Science Office and at the TESS Science Processing Operations Center. Resources supporting this work were provided by the NASA High-End Computing (HEC) Program through the NASA Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) Division at Ames Research Center for the production of the SPOC data products. Funding for the TESS mission is provided by NASA's Science Mission Directorate. This research has made use of the Exoplanet Follow-up Observation Program website, which is operated by the California Institute of Technology, under contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Exoplanet Exploration Program. This paper includes data collected by the TESS mission that are publicly available from the Mikulski Archive for Space Telescopes (MAST). We thank the TESS GI program G03274 PI, Ryan Cloutier, for proposing the target of this work for 2-min-cadence observations in Sector 30. This work is based upon observations carried out at the Observatorio Astronomico Nacional on the Sierra de San Pedro Martir (OAN-SPM), Baja California, Mexico. This work makes use of observations from the LCOGT network. Part of the LCOGT telescope time was granted by NOIRLab through the Mid-Scale Innovations Program (MSIP). MSIP is funded by NSF. This work includes data collected at the Vatican Advanced Technology Telescope (VATT) on Mt. Graham. This paper includes data taken on the EDEN telescope network. We acknowledge support from the Earths in Other Solar Systems Project (EOS) and Alien Earths (grant numbers NNX15AD94G and 80NSSC21K0593), sponsored by NASA. Some of the observations in the paper made use of the High-Resolution Imaging instrument Zorro (Gemini program GS-2020B-LP-105). Zorro was funded by the NASA Exoplanet Exploration Program and built at the NASA Ames Research Center by Steve B. Howell, Nic Scott, Elliott P. Horch, and Emmett Quigley. Zorro was mounted on the Gemini South telescope of the international Gemini Observatory, a program of NSF's OIR Lab, which is managed by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA) under a cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation. on behalf of the Gemini partnership: the National Science Foundation (United States), National Research Council (Canada), Agencia Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo (Chile), Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovacion (Argentina), Ministerio da Ciencia, Tecnologia, Inovacoes e Comunicacoes (Brazil), and Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (Republic of Korea). This research has made use of the NASA Exoplanet Archive, which is operated by the California Institute of Technology, under contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Exoplanet Exploration Program. This work made use of the following Python packages: astropy (Astropy Collaboration 2013, 2018), lightkurve (Lightkurve Collaboration 2018), matplotlib (Hunter 2007), pandas (Wes McKinney 2010), seaborn (Waskom & The Seaborn Development team 2021), scipy (Virtanen et al. 2020) and numpy (Harris et al. 2020). ; Context. Large sub-Neptunes are uncommon around the coolest stars in the Galaxy and are rarer still around those that are metal-poor. However, owing to the large planet-to-star radius ratio, these planets are highly suitable for atmospheric study via transmission spectroscopy in the infrared, such as with JWST. Aims. Here we report the discovery and validation of a sub-Neptune orbiting the thick-disk, mid-M dwarf star TOI-2406. The star's low metallicity and the relatively large size and short period of the planet make TOI-2406 b an unusual outcome of planet formation, and its characterisation provides an important observational constraint for formation models. Methods. We first infer properties of the host star by analysing the star's near-infrared spectrum, spectral energy distribution, and Gaia parallax. We use multi-band photometry to confirm that the transit event is on-target and achromatic, and we statistically validate the TESS signal as a transiting exoplanet. We then determine physical properties of the planet through global transit modelling of the TESS and ground-based time-series data. Results. We determine the host to be a metal-poor M4 V star, located at a distance of 56 pc, with properties T-eff = 3100 +/- 75 K, M-* = 0.162 +/- 0.008M(circle dot), R-* = 0.202 +/- 0.011R(circle dot), and [Fe/H] = -0.38 +/- 0.07, and a member of the thick disk. The planet is a relatively large sub-Neptune for the M-dwarf planet population, with R-p = 2.94 +/- 0.17R(circle plus) and P= 3.077 d, producing transits of 2% depth. We note the orbit has a non-zero eccentricity to 3 sigma, prompting questions about the dynamical history of the system. Conclusions. This system is an interesting outcome of planet formation and presents a benchmark for large-planet formation around metal-poor, low-mass stars. The system warrants further study, in particular radial velocity follow-up to determine the planet mass and constrain possible bound companions. Furthermore, TOI-2406 b is a good target for future atmospheric study through transmission spectroscopy. Although the planet's mass remains to be constrained, we estimate the S/N using amass-radius relationship, ranking the system fifth in the population of large sub-Neptunes, with TOI-2406 b having a much lower equilibrium temperature than other spectroscopically accessible members of this population. ; Heising-Simons Foundation ; Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos de Investigacion e Innovacion Tecnologica (PAPIIT) ; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico IG-101321 ; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) ; European Commission PP00P2-163967 PP00P2-190080 P2BEP2_195285 ; MIT's Kavli Institute as a Juan Carlos Torres Fellow ; European Research Council (ERC) nffi 803193/BEBOP ; MERAC foundation ; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) ; Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC) ; Science and Technology Development Fund (STDF) nffi ST/S00193X/1 ; MIT's Kavli Institute as a Kavli postdoctoral fellow ; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) ; Australian Research Council ; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS FRFC 2.5.594.09.F ; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) ; French Community of Belgium in the context of the FRIA Doctoral Grant ; NASA High-End Computing (HEC) Program through the NASA Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) Division at Ames Research Center ; NASA's Science Mission Directorate ; National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Exoplanet Exploration Program ; TESS GI program G03274 ; National Science Foundation (NSF) ; Earths in Other Solar Systems Project (EOS) ; Alien Earths - NASA NNX15AD94G 80NSSC21K0593 ; High-Resolution Imaging instrument Zorro (Gemini program) GS-2020B-LP-105 ; NASA Exoplanet Exploration Program ; National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) ; National Science Foundation (NSF)

Apresentação Junho 2020 Nesses dias tão cheios de imprevisão, incerteza e também de agravamento das atuais crises e sanitária e política mundial e brasileira, trazemos a única notícia que podemos garantir com certeza e um pouco de alegria. Apresentamos o mais novo número da Revista Direito e Práxis (vol. 11, n. 2, 2020, 30ª edição – jun-set), como sempre, trazendo doze artigos inéditos de pesquisadoras e pesquisadores brasileiros e internacionais. Os trabalhos tratam de temas nos campos do direito e biopolítica, feminismo, marxismo, teoria do direito e constitucionalismo crítico, além de retratar debates no campo dos estudos criminológicos críticos.O dossiê desse número foi organizado pela professora Adriana Dias Vieira da Universidade Federal Fluminense, e pelo professor Roberto Efrem Filho, da Universidade Federal da Paraíba. O dossiê reflete sobre a complexa relação entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e as políticas de gênero e sexualidade. A Revista já publicou, em outras edições, dossiês temáticos analisando o papel do STF na judicialização de conflitos urbanos e ambientais, também um dossiê marcando os 10 anos da reforma do judiciário, além de inúmeros artigos e outros dossiês focados na questão da mobilização de direitos e litígio estratégico. No que diz respeito às relações de gênero, o tema também foi trabalhado no dossiê sobre "Direito e Gênero" em 2016. O dossiê organizado nesse número retrata pioneiramente na Revista, em um conjunto de artigos selecionados rigorosamente, essa complexa interação entre a atuação do STF e suas formas de "fazer gênero", como os editores convidados apresentam em sua introdução abaixo. Nesse sentido, dá continuidade e aprofunda temas relevantes, não só para a nossa publicação, como também para nossa sociedade.Na seção de traduções, trazemos dois trabalhos inéditos, traduzidos do inglês para o português. O primeiro é um artigo do pesquisador Peter Hudis, do Oakton Community College em Illinois (EUA), intitulado "O Racismo e a Lógica do Capital: Uma Reconstrução Fanoniana". O trabalho foi traduzido pela doutoranda do PPGD/UERJ, Rhaysa Ruas. O segundo artigo é um trabalho de Carol Smart, Universidade de Warwick no Reino Unido, intitulado "A mulher no discurso jurídico". O artigo foi traduzido pelas professoras da Universidade de Brasília, Alessandra Ramos de Oliveira Harden e Fernanda de Deus Garcia, membros do Departamento de Línguas Estrangeiras e Tradução dessa universidade.Além disso, contamos com duas resenhas. A primeira trata do livro de Luciana Zaffalon Cardoso "A política da justiça: blindar as elites, criminalizar os pobres" (2018) e a segunda do trabalho dos autores Christian Laval e Pierre Dardot "Ensaio sobre a revolução no século XXI" (2017).Relembramos que as políticas editoriais para as diferentes seções da Revista podem ser acessadas em nossa página e que as submissões são permanentes e sempre bem-vindas! Agradecemos, como sempre, às autoras e aos autores, avaliadoras e avaliadores e colaboradoras e colaboradores pela confiança depositada em nossa publicação.Boa Leitura! Equipe Direito e Práxis***PresentaciónJunio 2020 En días tan llenos de imprevisibilidad, incertidumbre y también de agravación de las crisis actuales sanitarias y de las políticas mundiales y brasileñas, traemos las únicas noticias que podemos garantizar con certeza y un poco de alegría. Presentamos lo más reciente número de la Revista Direito e Práxis (vol. 11, n. 2, 2020, 30ª edição – jun-set), como siempre, trayendo doce artículos inéditos de investigadores y investigadoras brasileños e internacionales. Los trabajos abordan temas en los campos del derecho y de la biopolítica, feminismo, Marxismo, teoría del derecho y constitucionalismo crítico, así como retratan los debates en el campo de los estudios criminológicos críticos.El dossier para ese número fue organizado por la profesora Adriana Dias Vieira de la Universidade Federal Fluminense, y por el profesor Roberto Efrem Filho, de la Universidade Federal da Paraíba. El dossier reflexiona sobre la compleja relación entre la Corte Suprema Federal y las políticas de género y sexualidad. La Revista ya ha publicado, en otras ediciones, expedientes temáticos que analizan el papel de la Corte Suprema en la judicialización de conflictos urbanos y ambientales, también ha publicado un dossier que marca los 10 años de la reforma judicial, además de numerosos artículos y otros expedientes centrados en el tema de la movilización de derechos y litigios estratégicos. En lo que diga respecto a las relaciones de género, el tema también se discutió en el dossier sobre "Derecho y Género" en 2016. El dossier organizado en este número retrata, en acto pionero en la revista, en un conjunto de artículos seleccionados rigurosamente, esta compleja interacción entre el trabajo de la Corte Suprema y sus formas de "hacer género", como lo presentan los editores invitados en su introducción abajo. En este sentido, ha dado continuidad y profundiza temas relevantes, no solo para nuestra publicación, sino también para nuestra sociedad.La sección de traducción incluye trabajos inéditos, traducidos del inglés al portugués. El primero es un artículo del investigador Peter Hudis, del Oakton Community College en Illinois (USA), titulado "Racismo e a Lógica do Capital: Uma Reconsideração Fanoniana". El trabajo fue traducido por la estudiante de doctorado de PPGD/UERJ, Rhaysa Ruas. El segundo artículo es un trabajo de Carol Smart, de la Universidad de Warwick en el Reino Unido, titulado "A mulher do discurso jurídico". El artículo fue traducido por las profesoras de la Universidade de Brasilia, Alessandra Ramos de Oliveira Harden y Fernanda de Deus García, miembros del Departamento de Lenguas Extranjeras y Traducción de la Universidad.Además, tenemos dos reseñas. La primera trata del libro de Luciana Zaffalon Cardoso "A política da justiça: blindar as elites, criminalizar os pobres." (2018) y la segunda del trabajo de los autores Christian Laval y Pierre Dardot "Comum: ensaio sobre a revolução no século XXI" (2017).¡Señalamos que se puede acceder a nuestra política editorial para las diferentes secciones de la Revista en nuestro sitio electrónico y que las sumisiones son permanentes y siempre bien venidas! Agradecemos, como siempre, a los autores, revisores y colaboradores por la confianza depositada en nuestra publicación.¡Buena lectura! Equipo Direito e Práxis***EditorialJune 2020In face of such uncertain and unpredictable times, with the worsening of political and sanitary crises in Brazil and around the globe, we are glad at least to be able to present now the newest issue of Direito e Práxis Journal (Vol. 11 – N. 2, 30ª edition, 2020, Jun-Sep) containing, as always, twelve brand new articles from renowned Brazilian and international researchers. This issue addresses topics from various fields passing by law and biopolitics, feminism, Marxism, legal theory, constitutionalism, as well as a couple of reviews of debates on critical criminology.The dossier in this issue was set up by professors Adriana Dias Vieira and Roberto Efrem Filho from the Universidade Federal Fluminense and Universidade Federal da Paraiba, respectively. The dossier's themes ponder over the complex relationship between the Supreme Federal Court and policy issues on sexuality and gender. Previously, other publications on our Journal have focused on the role of the Supreme Court addressing environmental and urban land disputes, the celebration of the 10th year of judiciary reform in Brazil, and several articles dealing with legal mobilization and strategic litigation. In the context of gender and sexuality, the theme has already been elaborated in the "Law and Gender" dossier in 2016. This time, the selected new articles have been arranged and compiled, in order to discuss complex interactions between the role of the Supreme Court and the multiples forms of "doing gender", as the guest editors presented in their introduction below.This edition presents two translated articles, from English to Portuguese. First, an article by Peter Hudis, researcher from Oakton Community College (Illinois - USA), titled "Racism and the Logic of Capital: A Fanonian Reconsideration" ("O Racismo e a Lógica do Capital: Uma Reconstrução Fanoniana"). The translation was done by the PhD student Rhaysa Ruas, from PPGD/UERJ (Rio de Janeiro/Brazil). The second article is titled "The Woman of Legal Discourse" ("A Mulher no Discurso Jurídico") and was translated by the professors Alessandra Ramos de Oliveira Harden and Fernanda de Deus Garcia, members of the Department of Foreign Languages and Translation from the University of Brasília.Finally, this issue also counts with two reviews. The first summarizes the book "A Política da Justiça: Blindar as Elites, Criminalizar os Pobres" (2018), by Luciana Zaffalon Cardoso, and the second reviews the work of the authors Christian Laval and Pierre Dardot "The Common: An Essay on the 21st-Century Revolution" ("Comum: Ensaio sobre a revolução no Século XXI")We also remind our readers that the editorial policy guidelines for the Journal' sections are available in our homepage, and that all submissions are welcome. We thank, as always, all of the authors, reviewers and collaborators for the trust they place in our publication. Enjoy the reading! Team Direito e Praxis