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"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

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Dragged down in important part by disapproval over the U.S. position on the Gaza war, the popular image of the United States abroad has declined over the past year, according to a new poll of public opinion in 34 countries released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.The survey, the latest in an annual series that dates back more than two decades, also found that international confidence in U.S. democracy has fallen. A median of four in ten of the more than 40,000 respondents said U.S. democracy used to be a good model for other countries to follow but no longer is. That view was most pronounced in the ten European countries covered by the poll.This year's survey also found that respondents in 24 of the countries have more confidence in President Joe Biden to "do the right thing" in world affairs than they have in his rival, former President Donald Trump, while Trump was favored over Biden in two countries (Hungary and Tunisia). It found that there was no significant difference in confidence in the two men in the remaining eight countries.At the same time, however, confidence in Biden's stewardship of international issues fell over the past year in 14 of the 21 countries that were polled by Pew both this year and in 2023, by double digits in eight of the countries, notably South Africa, Australia, the UK, Poland, Sweden, Spain, Israel, and Japan.The survey was conducted from early January this year through the latter part of May. In addition to Hungary, the UK, Poland, Sweden, and Spain, European countries included France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. In the Americas, the poll covered Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.In the Asia-Pacific region, ten countries were polled. In addition to Australia and Japan, they included Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Besides South Africa, sub-Saharan African countries included Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria.Overall, views of the United States remained more positive than negative across all of the countries with a median of 54% of respondents offering a favorable opinion, with the most positive ratings found in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In ten of the 21 countries that were also surveyed last year, however, favorable views fell by six percentage points or more, with the biggest declines found in Australia, Israel, South Africa, and Germany. As for confidence in Biden "to do the right thing" in world affairs, confidence was highest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa where opinions were evenly split. In the Middle East, on the other hand, nearly 90% of respondents in both Turkey and Tunisia said they had "no confidence" in the U.S. president whose ratings were also mostly negative in Latin America (with the exception of Colombia), southern Europe, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, France and Hungary.Of five specific issues on which respondents were asked to rate Biden's performance, by far the most negative appraisals were related to his handling of the Gaza war. A median of 31% across the 34 countries said they approve of his conduct in that conflict, while a median of 57% said they disapproved. The most negative assessments were recorded in predominantly Muslim Turkey (8% approval), Tunisia (5%), and Malaysia (15%). Twenty-five percent or less of respondents in Hungary, Italy, Peru, Mexico, and Chile also said they approved of Biden's policy on Gaza.With respect to the war in Ukraine, a median of 39% of respondents voiced approval of Biden's policies. The most positive views of his performance in that war were recorded in Canada and Europe, particularly in Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and the UK. In Asia, views were most favorable in Japan and South Korea, although they still fell short of 50%. As with Ukraine, a median of 39% of respondents said they approved of Biden's approach to China with his strongest support of around 50% coming from respondents in Poland, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Kenya, and Nigeria.Asked to rate their confidence in four current national leaders "to do the right thing" in world affairs, French President Emmanuel Macron scored highest at 44% of all respondents, followed closely by Biden at 43% . Chinese President Xi Jinping received a median confidence score of 24%, and Russian President Vladimir Putin placed lowest at 21%. The lowest confidence scores for Putin came from European respondents (with the exception of Greece), Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Brazil, and Chile. European respondents also gave Xi poor marks, as did respondents in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Turkey, Brazil, and Chile.

The United States is bombing Yemen, and according to the news coverage the reason is a string of recent attacks by Houthi militants on commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden. A New York Times headline from last week is typical: "After Red Sea Barrage by Houthis, U.S. and Allies Weigh Retaliation."This is technically true. Since November, the Houthis, who receive weapons and aid from Iran, have launched dozens of missiles at vessels in international shipping lanes, leading some ships to avoid the Red Sea entirely and sail all the way around Africa. But contra the headlines, the Houthis didn't suddenly become aggressive last year nor did American meddling in Yemen begin yesterday.The U.S. has been trying to dislodge the Houthis for almost a decade now. It's failed, and there's little reason to think the current effort will succeed either.American involvement in Yemen began in 2015 after the Houthis invaded and captured the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. In response, Yemen's neighbor Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab nations and began bombing Houthi targets, with the U.S. providing arms, logistical support, and other assistance like midair refueling for Saudi jets. It was seen as reluctant realpolitik on Washington's part: The Saudis felt cold-shouldered by the West's nuclear deal with their hated rival Iran, so the Obama administration reassured them by backing their war.From the beginning, Yemen's conflict was a strange fit for American involvement. At stake were largely local issues: The Houthis were Zaydi Muslims, an idiosyncratic sect of Shiite Islam, who had historically complained of discrimination. They were allied with a former president of Yemen who was trying to depose a then-current president of Yemen. There was also a sectarian overlay: The Houthis were Shias backed by Iran while the Saudis and its allies were Sunnis.You'd think Washington would have learned from the failure of the Iraq war to stay out of Islamic sectarian battles. If the United States had any interests in Yemen at all, it was in keeping a Sunni group and an enemy of the Houthis, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), at bay. Instead as the Saudis further destabilized Yemen, into the chaos stepped AQAP. They fanned out across the eastern part of the country, establishing a foothold as never before, with many analysts suggesting they were the most dangerous al-Qaeda franchise on Earth.Here was another lesson from Iraq: Instability is a terrorist's best friend. The Houthis in a sense were an echo of Iraq too. As Bruce Riedel has written, "The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 deeply radicalized the Houthi movement, like it did many other Arabs. …It was a turning point largely unrecognized outside Yemen, another unanticipated consequence of George Bush's Iraq adventures." Now, the American intervention in Yemen was yielding horrific civilian casualties and humanitarian strife, driving locals into the arms of both al-Qaeda and the Houthis, the very groups we were trying to stop.This is the Yemen into which America is hurling fresh ordnance today, one emaciated by war and bloodshed. It's the poorest country in the Middle East. The U.N. says it's home to the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The Houthis have survived the Saudi coalition and are increasingly confident they can outlast any challenger. The American-recognized Yemeni government is still banished from Sanaa and holed up in the country's south.Meanwhile the United States is once again finding that dislodging the Houthis is more complicated than it seems. Dropping bombs is easy; influencing events on the ground less so. So it was that, as the New York Times reports, while recent U.S. airstrikes in Yemen "damaged or destroyed about 90 percent of the targets struck, [Houthi forces] retained about three-quarters of its ability to fire missiles and drones at ships transiting the Red Sea." The Houthis have since vowed to retaliate against the U.S. while Sanaa recently hosted a large anti-American rally.It's a pattern that's played out time and again: The U.S. intervenes somewhere; this empowers our putative enemies who take advantage of the chaos and win hearts and minds; those enemies launch an attack; the U.S. uses the attack as a pretext for another military action; rinse and repeat sans any historical memory. Remember this the next time you hear that our hand was forced by the Houthis.

 There's been a lot of discussion of the evasive answers given by the presidents of Harvard, Penn, and MIT to a question on whether a call for genocide against the Jewish people would violate their institution's code of conduct.  But one point that has rarely been mentioned is that there's no evidence that anyone at those universities, or any other university, has called for genocide against the Jewish people.  The premise of the question was that certain slogans , like "from the river to the sea," are equivalent to calls for genocide.   What do people who say "from the river to the sea" mean?  I think that the great majority would say they want a secular state encompassing what is now Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank in which Jews, Muslims, and people of other religions all are equal.  It's easy to see why this vision would be appealing, especially for Americans.  Of course, you could object that it's naive and unrealistic, but student politics (and let's face it, faculty politics too) often involves taking stands on principle with little regard to practicality.  There is a poll that bears on this issue--it has a question on whether Israel should "remain a Jewish state," "become a mixed state in which Palestinians have a major share of power," or "should no longer exist as an independent country."  Unfortunately, it's from 2002, but it's the only one I could find that asks about general vision for the future.  Overall, 42% said Israel should remain a Jewish state, 39% that it should become a mixed state, 6% that it should no longer exist, and 14% didn't know.  Some factors that were related to opinions (from now on, the base for the percentages excludes don't knows):1.  Religion--there were only 19 Jews in the sample, and all 19 said Israel should remain a Jewish state.  Among Protestants, 56% said it should remain a Jewish state, 37% that it should become a mixed state; Catholics favored a mixed state by 60%-34%.  People with no religion were in between.  2.  Race--blacks were more likely to say Israel should not exist (18%-6%).  Support for a mixed state was highest among Hispanics (53%).3.  Education--more educated people were more likely to say Israel should become a mixed state and less likely to say it should not exist, but the differences were not very big (50%-39%-11% among people without a high school degree, 47%-49%-5% among college graduates).  4.   Age--younger people were more likely to say that Israel should become a mixed state--support for that option fell from 54% among people aged 18-29 to 31% among people aged 65 and above.  5.  Party--Republicans were somewhat more likely to say Israel should remain a Jewish state, and Democrats more likely to favor the other two options.  But the highest support for a "mixed state" was among independents (57%, against 39% among both Democrats and Republicans).  Independents tend to have less political knowledge and interest, so I think this shows that the mixed position has an intuitive appeal.  These results raise a question of why political elites pretend the "mixed" position doesn't exist rather than trying to explain why it wouldn't work.  Of course, part of the answer is just the search for political advantage--discrediting an opinion is often more appealing than engaging with it.  Another is that it's a fringe position among political elites, so they don't realize that it's fairly popular among the public.  And finally, there's the "anti-elitist" mood that I've remarked on before:  people who (rightly) say that we should try to understand working-class Trump voters rather than just condemning them as racist will go straight to condemning college students, especially Ivy Leaguers, as anti-Semitic.  [Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

We had a great time in Spain, as my general observations of each place we visited indicated, but I thought I could provide some general lessons across the entire trip.  Most of our tactics and strategies worked out quite well.  The Valencia hotel was just a couple of milesfrom the beach and was just beautiful.We treated southern Spain like a tapas restaurant--we tried out a lot of places rather than have one big helping except for Barcelona and maybe Madrid.  And it was great.  We could have spent more time in a few of the places, but each of the cities and towns we visited were so different, each had much to offer.  Would we take the train next time to avoid the awkward few spots of driving? I am not so sure--we tend to pack heavy and dragging bags onto and off of trains every day may have defeated us. We relied mostly on Expedia for arranging hotel rooms.  I focused on air-conditioned rooms mostly in or near the old quarters that got a rating at Ex of 9 or better.  This worked out really well--none of the hotels were disappointing, all were clean, well located, and staffed with very helpful people. There were no quarrels or confusions about the the arrangements, although we had to contact a few places ahead of time, as Ex told us, to confirm parking spots.  We even chatted online with Ex help to have them contact one place since I could never figure out how to make calls.The one mistake may have been to stay too close to the city center in Toledo and Granada as that led to, um, narrow driving lanes and more stress than I needed.  We relied mostly on our guide book to give us ideas of places to eat, but then mostly used google map's ratings, sticking to 4's or better and mostly finding 4.5's.  And, yes, there seemed to be a real different between a 4.3 and a 4.7.  Crowdsourcing works even if I am a collective action shirker by not rating places myself. Google maps was also good for finding out which guidebook-recommended restaurants were permanently closed and for getting the hours right for each place.We tended to order too much food as the tapas experience means so many tasty options.  But, on the other hand, it allowed to sample more widely, so I am not sure how much I would dial it down.I would distrust the walking directions a bit more next time in terms of distances--things were often much further than I had thought, punishing Mrs. Spew as she tried to keep up.  Likewise, four museums in a day was probably one too much.  We did do just one army museum and one navy museum, as my wife was less interested in that stuff and more interested in gardens. Both of the military museums were interesting for as much as they omitted as they showed us.  The Army museum in Toledo was undergoing some renovations, so we did not get much history of the 1900s.  The Navy Museum underplayed 1588.  And both did not cover the civil war much at all.  I really should have looked more aggressively for Spanish Civil War museums as I was most curious and most ignorant despite reading a certain dissertation a while back.  We definitely hit our fill of cathedrals.  We were glad to hit the less central one in Toledo that had amazing views from the tower, and those originally built by Muslims were quite special.  We probably could have hit more markets for lunches.Torrejas were an important discovery.Getting rooms near city centers may have made parking hard, but made siestas easy.  And they were key.  Maybe go sometime that is not late June?Given that it was late June/July, we should have committed to a day at a beach somewhere--that was dumb.Oh, and I should tried asking for Sangria Blanco earlier. Overall, we had a great time, we ate well, learned a lot, saw some spectacular art and architecture and landscapes, met some really nice people, and had a heap of fun. 

As a provocative response to the debate on Leitkultur around a proclaimed "core" identity which is being frequently reheated within German socio-political realms, Max Czollek— author of political and poetic works—curated the artistic intervention TdJML, Tage der Jüdisch-Muslimischen Leitkultur (Days of the Jewish-Muslim Leading Culture). Accordingly, this research explores the relation between narrative and counter-narrative based on its case study TdJML reflecting on an internship at the performing arts institution Kampnagel as a host venue thereof. Hence, the main assumption is that TdJML provides an explicit counter-narrative to the idea of Leitkultur which results in a twofold objective: firstly, providing a deep understanding of Leitkultur, which is defined as narrative, before closely examining TdJML as an oppositional force to Leitkultur in a second step. To investigate the above-stated hypothesis, the study initially discusses concepts and ideas which construct the narrative Leitkultur, such as belonging or the exclusionary "We". By incorporating linguistic, journalistic, political and culture science perspectives the discourse on Leitkultur is screened to provide argumentative grounds for the case study and its deconstructive effort. Consequently, both the resistant and the artistic position of TdJML are traced by exploring its constitutive conceptual framework within radical diversity and by highlighting TdJML's artistic means which hyperbolize, ironize, subvert, and therein counter the ideas of a Leitkultur narrative. Against the backdrop of a substantial increase in exclusionary, xenophobic tendencies currently noticeable throughout Europe, this research does not mirror a German phenomenon only. But it also connects socio-political, cultural concepts with new perspectives negotiating strategic practices of radical diversity, such as allyship and de-integration. On the basis of detecting TdJML's various dimensions of resistance, it will be particularly interesting to understand how such emancipative practices are reflected within its aesthetic expression. This brings to light the potential in artistic interventions to both contemplate and illustrate pathways towards the concrete utopia of a society based on radical diversity, whereby its members can remain different and thus establish a certain resistant selfconception. ; Como resposta provocadora ao debate sobre Leitkultur em torno de uma identidade proclamada "núcleo" que está a ser frequentemente reacendida nos domínios sócio-políticos alemães, Max Czollek—autor de obras políticas e poéticas—curou a intervenção artística TdJML, Tage der Jüdisch-Muslimischen Leitkultur (Dias da Cultura Líder Judaica- Muçulmana). Deste modo, esta investigação explora a relação entre narrativa e contranarrativa com base no estudo de caso TdJML, refletindo sobre um estágio na instituição de artes performativas Kampnagel como local de acolhimento. Assim, o principal pressuposto é a conceção de que a TdJML fornece uma contra-narrativa explícita à ideia de Leitkultur, o que resulta num duplo objectivo: primeiro, proporcionar uma compreensão profunda de Leitkultur, que é definida como narrativa, antes de examinar de perto a TdJML como uma força oposta a Leitkultur num segundo passo. Para investigar a hipótese acima exposta, o estudo discute inicialmente conceitos e ideias que constroem a narrativa Leitkultur tais como a pertença ou o "Nós" de exclusão. Ao incorporar perspetivas linguísticas, jornalísticas, políticas e de ciência cultural, o discurso sobre Leitkultur é analisado para fornecer fundamentos argumentativos ao estudo de caso e o seu esforço desconstrutivo. Consequentemente, tanto a posição resistente como a artística da TdJML são traçadas explorando a sua estrutura conceptual constitutiva dentro da diversidade radical e destacando os meios artísticos da TdJML que hiperbolizam, ironizam, subvertem e contrariam as ideias de uma narrativa de Leitkultur. Tendo como pano de fundo o aumento substancial de tendências xenófobas e de exclusão atualmente percetíveis em toda a Europa, esta investigação não espelha apenas um fenómeno alemão. Este trabalho liga também conceitos sociopolíticos e culturais a novas perspetivas de negociação de práticas estratégicas de diversidade radical, tais como a aliança e a deintegração. Com base na deteção das várias dimensões de resistência da TdJML, será particularmente interessante compreender como tais práticas emancipatórias se refletem na sua expressão estética. Isto traz à luz o potencial das intervenções artísticas tanto para contemplar como para ilustrar caminhos para a utopia concreta de uma sociedade baseada na diversidade radical, através da qual os seus membros podem permanecer diferentes e assim estabelecer uma certa auto-conceção resistente.

An epidemic of any infectious disease is an invisible ruthless enemy that cannot be defeated by military, political, economic or ideological means. Humanity always reacts to such threats quite nervously and subconsciously tries to mythologize them, at least a little, in order to somehow psychologically protect itself from the real fear of imminent death. Since there is no rational defense against such a threat, people for the most part react in an irrational manner.The 19th century, almost the same as the previous centuries, «started» in epidemiological terms almost from the very beginning of its calendar. Only in contrast to the previous 18th century, the main and dominant danger was posed by another infectious pathology — cholera.In the history of medicine, over the 19th century, as many as six outbreaks of cholera epidemics were recorded since 1817. The first of them began in East Bengal and lasted 8 years (1817—1824), gradually, covering almost all India and big regions of the Middle East. It was worsened by the traditional travels of both Hindu and Muslim pilgrims to «holy places» who spread Vibrio cholerae on foot and through active communication with local residents.One of the significant reasons why cholera epidemic continued with minimal interruptions for almost the entire nineteenth century was an insufficient level of scientific knowledge in microbiology and the resulting ignorance of the causative agent of cholera — vibrio and its properties.Another factor was a complete lack of understanding by society of the need to observe at least the simplest sanitary standards in everyday life. And there was also misunderstanding among the leadership which tried to limit the next outbreak of cholera mainly by administrative measures without adequate explanations of their essence and necessity to the population. ; Эпидемия любой инфекционной болезни — это невидимый безжалостный враг, которого невозможно победить военным, политическим, экономическим или идеологическим путем. На такого рода угрозы человечество всегда реагирует достаточно нервно и подсознательно пытается их немного мифологизировать, чтобы хоть как-то психологически защитить себя от реального страха неминуемой смерти. Поскольку от такой угрозы нет рациональной защиты, большинство людей реагируют преимущественно иррационально.Девятнадцатый век, почти так же, как и предыдущие, в эпидемиологическом плане «стартовал» почти с самого календарного начала. Только в отличие от ХVIII в. основную и доминирующую опасность представляла уже другая инфекционная патология — холера.В истории медицины на протяжении позапрошлого века зафиксировано шесть вспышек эпидемий холеры начиная с 1817 г. Первая из них началась на востоке Бенгалии и длилась 8 лет (1817—1824 гг.), постепенно охватив почти всю Индию и значительные районы Ближнего Востока. Способствовали этому традиционные путешествия к «святым местам» как индуистских, так и мусульманских паломников, которые во время пешего хода и активного общения с местными жителями разносили холерный вибрион.Одной из существенных причин того, что эпидемия холеры продолжалась с минимальными перерывами на протяжении почти всего ХIХ в., был недостаточный уровень научных знаний по микробиологии и обусловленное этим незнание возбудителя холеры — вибриона и его свойств.Еще одним фактором стало полное непонимание обществом необходимости обязательно ежедневно соблюдать в быту хотя бы простейшие санитарные нормы. Такое же непонимание было и среди руководства, которое пыталось ограничить очередную вспышку холеры преимущественно административными мерами без адекватных объяснений их необходимости и смысла населению. ; Епідемія будь-якої інфекційної хвороби — це невидимий безжальний ворог, якого неможливо перемогти військо­вим, політичним, економічним або ідеологічним шляхом. На такого роду загрози людство часто реагує досить нервово та підсвідомо намагається їх трохи міфологізувати, щоб хоч якось психологічно захистити себе від реального страху неминучої смерті. Оскільки від такої загрози не було раціонального захисту, більшість людей реагували переважно ірраціонально.Дев'ятнадцяте століття, майже так само, як і попередні, в епідеміологічному плані «стартувало» із самого календарного початку. Тільки на відміну від ХVIII ст. основну небезпеку становила вже інша інфекційна хвороба — холера.В історії медицини впродовж позаминулого сторіччя було зафіксовано шість спалахів епідемій холери починаючи з 1817 р. Перша з них розпочалась на сході Бенгалії і тривала 8 років (1817—1824 рр.), поступово охопивши майже всю Індію та значні райони Близького Сходу. Сприяли цьому традиційні подорожі до «святих місць» як індуїстських, так і мусульманських прочан, що під час пішої ходи та активного спілкування з місцевими мешканцями розносили холерний вібріон.Однією з суттєвих причин того, що епідемія холери продовжувалась з мінімальними перервами майже все ХIХст., був низький рівень наукових знань з мікробіології і те, що на той час ще не був виявлений збудник холери — вібріон.Ще одним чинником стало тотальне нерозуміння суспільством нагальної потреби обов'язково щодня дотримуватись в побуті хоча б найпростіших санітарних норм. Таке нерозуміння було і серед керівництва, що намагалося обмежити черговий спалах холери переважно адміністративними заходами без адекватних пояснень їхньої необхідності та суті населенню.

Over the long centuries and nowadays the historical concept and political status of Jerusalem remain the most acute problem of relations between the peoples and states of the Middle East, Arabs and Jews, Israel and the Arab Palestinian state. The poignancy of the problem, the arguments of the opposing sides, are mainly rooted in conflicting interpretations of the history of Jerusalem and its holy places. The article presents a view of the history of Jerusalem as a process that began before the formation of the historical consciousness of the Arabs and Jews but used to continuously influence its shaping during the struggle for the city between powerful political forces standing behind the claims of various congregations. The article examines the written evidence of the shrines of Jerusalem that existed before the construction of the First Temple; selected archaeological data are used for additional verification of written sources. Recent proposals for a solution to the political status of Jerusalem are placed in the context of ideas about its cultural and historical significance. Particular attention is paid to the importance of Jerusalem in the history of the formation of religious doctrine and ritualism in Islam; a distinctive opinion is substantiated by the author concerning the reasons of the initial orientation of the Muslim prayer ritual towards Jerusalem; the existence of perceptions of the shrines of Jerusalem as sacred objects, recognized in the religious and ritual traditions of the Semitic peoples – the ancestors of Jews and Arabs – is established. On the ground of research findings the inseparability of history, culture, spatial limits and political status of the city of Jerusalem as an organic whole and a system is argued, the breach of the balance of which is claimed to inevitably destroy the integrity of the characteristics of Jerusalem in the history of the region, various peoples and all of humanity. The search for a solution to the Jerusalem problem is seen as interaction and the development of a model that recognizes and balances three factors of influence: 1) ideas about the importance of Jerusalem in the national historical narrative of Arabs and Jews; 2) the concept that asserted the consideration of the beginning of the cultural history of Jerusalem as a common Middle Eastern religious centre; and 3) the range of various political solutions proposed for the settlement of the problems of disputed territories in international relations with the assumption of the feasibility of fundamentally new models of solution. ; Трактовка исторического прошлого и политический статус Иерусалима на протяжении столетий и в наши дни остаются острейшей проблемой отношений между народами и государствами Ближнего Востока, арабами и евреями, Израилем и Палестинским государством. Острота проблемы, аргументы противоборствующих сторон главным образом коренятся в конфликтующих трактовках истории Иерусалима и его святынь. Статья представляет взгляд на историю Иерусалима как на процесс, начавшийся еще до начала складывания исторического сознания евреев и арабов. В ходе борьбы за обладание городом между различными политическими силами, стоявшими за религиозным спором об идентичности Иерусалима, и формировалось это сознание. Статья исследует письменные свидетельства о святынях Иерусалима, существовавших до строительства Первого храма, для дополнительной верификации привлекаются некоторые археологические данные. Последние предложения о решении политического статуса Иерусалима помещаются в контекст представлений о его культурно-историческом значении. Особое внимание уделяется значению Иерусалима в истории формирования религиозной доктрины и ритуальности в исламе; обосновывается авторское мнение о причинах изначальной ориентации мусульманского молитвенного ритуала на Иерусалим; устанавливается существование представлений о святынях Иерусалима как сакральных объектах, признававшихся и присутствовавших в религиозно-ритуальных традициях семитских народов – предков евреев и арабов. На основе полученных результатов аргументируется неразрывность истории, культуры, пространственных пределов и политического статуса города как органического целого и системы, нарушение баланса которой неминуемо разрушает целостность характеристики Иерусалима в истории региона, отдельных народов и всего человечества. Поиск решения проблемы Иерусалима рассматривается как взаимодействие и разработка модели, признающей и устанавливающей баланс трех факторов влияния: 1) представлений о значении Иерусалима в национальном историческом нарративе арабов и евреев; 2) аргументированной и предложенной к рассмотрению концепции начала культурной истории Иерусалима как общего ближневосточного религиозного центра и 3) спектра различных политических решений, предлагавшихся для урегулирования проблем спорных территорий в международных отношениях с допущением принципиально новых моделей решения.

An epidemic of any infectious disease is an invisible ruthless enemy that cannot be defeated by military, political, economic or ideological means. Humanity always reacts to such threats quite nervously and subconsciously tries to mythologize them, at least a little, in order to somehow psychologically protect itself from the real fear of imminent death. Since there is no rational defense against such a threat, people for the most part react in an irrational manner.The 19th century, almost the same as the previous centuries, «started» in epidemiological terms almost from the very beginning of its calendar. Only in contrast to the previous 18th century, the main and dominant danger was posed by another infectious pathology — cholera.In the history of medicine, over the 19th century, as many as six outbreaks of cholera epidemics were recorded since 1817. The first of them began in East Bengal and lasted 8 years (1817—1824), gradually, covering almost all India and big regions of the Middle East. It was worsened by the traditional travels of both Hindu and Muslim pilgrims to «holy places» who spread Vibrio cholerae on foot and through active communication with local residents.One of the significant reasons why cholera epidemic continued with minimal interruptions for almost the entire nineteenth century was an insufficient level of scientific knowledge in microbiology and the resulting ignorance of the causative agent of cholera — vibrio and its properties.Another factor was a complete lack of understanding by society of the need to observe at least the simplest sanitary standards in everyday life. And there was also misunderstanding among the leadership which tried to limit the next outbreak of cholera mainly by administrative measures without adequate explanations of their essence and necessity to the population. ; Эпидемия любой инфекционной болезни — это невидимый безжалостный враг, которого невозможно победить военным, политическим, экономическим или идеологическим путем. На такого рода угрозы человечество всегда реагирует достаточно нервно и подсознательно пытается их немного мифологизировать, чтобы хоть как-то психологически защитить себя от реального страха неминуемой смерти. Поскольку от такой угрозы нет рациональной защиты, большинство людей реагируют преимущественно иррационально.Девятнадцатый век, почти так же, как и предыдущие, в эпидемиологическом плане «стартовал» почти с самого календарного начала. Только в отличие от ХVIII в. основную и доминирующую опасность представляла уже другая инфекционная патология — холера.В истории медицины на протяжении позапрошлого века зафиксировано шесть вспышек эпидемий холеры начиная с 1817 г. Первая из них началась на востоке Бенгалии и длилась 8 лет (1817—1824 гг.), постепенно охватив почти всю Индию и значительные районы Ближнего Востока. Способствовали этому традиционные путешествия к «святым местам» как индуистских, так и мусульманских паломников, которые во время пешего хода и активного общения с местными жителями разносили холерный вибрион.Одной из существенных причин того, что эпидемия холеры продолжалась с минимальными перерывами на протяжении почти всего ХIХ в., был недостаточный уровень научных знаний по микробиологии и обусловленное этим незнание возбудителя холеры — вибриона и его свойств.Еще одним фактором стало полное непонимание обществом необходимости обязательно ежедневно соблюдать в быту хотя бы простейшие санитарные нормы. Такое же непонимание было и среди руководства, которое пыталось ограничить очередную вспышку холеры преимущественно административными мерами без адекватных объяснений их необходимости и смысла населению. ; Епідемія будь-якої інфекційної хвороби — це невидимий безжальний ворог, якого неможливо перемогти військо­вим, політичним, економічним або ідеологічним шляхом. На такого роду загрози людство часто реагує досить нервово та підсвідомо намагається їх трохи міфологізувати, щоб хоч якось психологічно захистити себе від реального страху неминучої смерті. Оскільки від такої загрози не було раціонального захисту, більшість людей реагували переважно ірраціонально.Дев'ятнадцяте століття, майже так само, як і попередні, в епідеміологічному плані «стартувало» із самого календарного початку. Тільки на відміну від ХVIII ст. основну небезпеку становила вже інша інфекційна хвороба — холера.В історії медицини впродовж позаминулого сторіччя було зафіксовано шість спалахів епідемій холери починаючи з 1817 р. Перша з них розпочалась на сході Бенгалії і тривала 8 років (1817—1824 рр.), поступово охопивши майже всю Індію та значні райони Близького Сходу. Сприяли цьому традиційні подорожі до «святих місць» як індуїстських, так і мусульманських прочан, що під час пішої ходи та активного спілкування з місцевими мешканцями розносили холерний вібріон.Однією з суттєвих причин того, що епідемія холери продовжувалась з мінімальними перервами майже все ХIХст., був низький рівень наукових знань з мікробіології і те, що на той час ще не був виявлений збудник холери — вібріон.Ще одним чинником стало тотальне нерозуміння суспільством нагальної потреби обов'язково щодня дотримуватись в побуті хоча б найпростіших санітарних норм. Таке нерозуміння було і серед керівництва, що намагалося обмежити черговий спалах холери переважно адміністративними заходами без адекватних пояснень їхньої необхідності та суті населенню.

Writing a travel is not a harmless gesture, bereft of any political implications — especially in the Indian Ocean world. The history of Indianoceanic travels is one of commercial routes between Asia, Middle East, and East Africa; a history of silk trade, coal trade, sugar and spice trade, slave trade, labor trade. When Europeans arrived, it became a history of colonization, of conquest, cultural domination, of capitalism and imperialism. Travel (to and from Europe, between the trading posts) became the one lens to see the Indian Ocean through. But can travel writing tell the Indian Ocean as a home for its inhabitants, and not only as a paradise or anti-paradise? Can it tell the all the travel stories the Indian Ocean world is made of? Indeed, writing is a claim of power; it requires a legitimized, authorized voice in what Foucault calls the order of discourse. In Conrad's Lord Jim same as in Le Clézio's La Quarantaine, it is not the Muslim pilgrims travelling to Mecca nor the indentured labourers coming from India who tell the story: it's the White European men. Thus, writing travel is claiming power and domination over space and history. Based on works by Foucault, Pratt, Debaene and Marimoutou among others, my hypothesis is that the history, memory, and intertextuality of travel writing in the Indian Ocean have built a discourse of travel: a discursive system designed to tell the space of travel as Empire, the journey as a conquest and the traveler as a colonizer. My research aims to both enlighten how this discourse structures the works of Conrad, Coetzee and Le Clézio, and what it does not / cannot say: the dark side of this discourse. Because travel writing also is a quest for otherness and estrangement, which is the exact opposite of imperialism, two conflictual forces are working against each other in travel writing. This struggle is omnipresent in Lord Jim, Life and Times of Michael K, La Quarantaine et Voyage à Rodrigues and takes multiple forms to question the very possibility of telling travel stories. ; Écrire le voyage n'a rien d'un geste anodin, dépourvu de toute implication politique, particulièrement dans l'espace indianocéanique. L'histoire des voyages dans l'océan Indien est faite de routes commerciales entre l'Asie, le Moyen Orient et l'Afrique de l'Est ; c'est une histoire du commerce de la soie, du charbon, du sucre et des épices, mais aussi des esclaves et des travailleurs. À l'arrivée des Européens, cette histoire devient coloniale : une histoire de conquête, de domination culturelle, de capitalisme et d'impérialisme. Le voyage (depuis et vers l'Europe, entre les comptoirs) devient le paradigme dans lequel est inventé l'espace indianocéanique. Mais l'écriture du voyage peut-elle dire l'océan Indien comme un pays pour ses habitants, et pas seulement un paradis ou un anti-paradis ? Peut-elle dire toutes les histoires de voyage dont l'océan Indien est fait ? Car écrire est un acte de pouvoir qui requiert une voix légitimée et autorisée au sein de ce que Foucault appelle l'ordre du discours. Dans Lord Jim de Conrad comme dans La Quarantaine de Le Clézio, ce ne sont ni les pèlerins musulmans se rendant à la Mecque ni les travailleuses engagées voyageant d'Inde vers l'île Maurice qui racontent l'histoire — ce sont les hommes blancs. Écrire le voyage, c'est donc prendre le pouvoir dans la représentation de l'espace et l'écriture de l'histoire. Formulée à partir des travaux de Foucault, Pratt, Debaene et Marimoutou entre autres, mon hypothèse est que l'histoire, la mémoire et l'intertextualité de l'écriture du voyage dans l'espace indianocéanique construisent un discours du voyage : un système discursif qui ordonne l'écriture de l'espace du voyage comme celui de l'Empire, du voyage comme une conquête et du voyageur comme un colonisateur. L'objectif de ma recherche est de mettre en lumière, dans les textes étudiés, à la fois cette structure discursive et ses points aveugles — l'envers du discours. Car écrire le voyage, c'est aussi chercher à dire l'altérité et le dépaysement, à l'opposé de l'impérialisme : il y a ainsi deux forces conflictuelles qui s'affrontent au cœur de l'écriture du voyage. Cette lutte est omniprésente dans Lord Jim, Life and Times of Michael K, La Quarantaine et Voyage à Rodrigues et adopte des esthétiques multiples pour questionner la possibilité même de raconter des histoires de voyage dans l'océan Indien.

Sectarianism has become the magic word with which many scholars and politicians describe the current Middle East politics. Much of the existing literature presumes that most of the state and non-state actors of the region are divided over Shia and Sunni blocs led by Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabi (KSA) respectively. However, so far scholars have left out the Kurds within their studies on sectarianism. Scholars have not explicitly pointed out why they are disinterested in sectarianism among the Kurds; it might be due to the perception that the Kurds are mostly Sunnis who have an ethnic and not a religious cause. The main aim of this research is to look at sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and find out whether or not of this perception is true. To do so, this research rejects the general application of the English term "sectarianism" in the first place as a theme to explain the politics of the Middle East. Instead, in the first chapter it is argued that there are three tiers of relations among regional actors: 1) state-state realpolitik, which is based on geopolitical realities among Turkey, Iran and the KSA, 2) political sectarianism (taifiyya) among sectarian groups such as the MB, Wahabis and Shia, often conducted through political agents like state and non-state actors, and 3) the civil and non-violent sect-sect theological sectarianism (madhabiyya) among those three sects. In the second chapter this new understanding of sectarianism is then applied on the domestic politics of the KRI. It is argued that while there is theological sectarianism in the KRI, there is no political sectarianism. The third chapter explores the foreign relations of the KRI. It argues that the KRI as an unrecognized state, acts rationally to survive. It evades sectarianism and deemphasizes its demands of international recognition. Alternatively, the KRI pursues 'Regional Acceptance Policy' within which the Kurdish leadership persuades the regional powers, especially Turkey and Iran, that the de facto state will not declare independence, in return, they ask regional powers' acceptance of the KRI as a legitimate actor with its unique status. ; Doctor of Philosophy ; Throughout the 20th century ethno-nationalism was the strongest sentiment in the Middle East. Within the past decade or so, however, Islam's two main sectarian identities, Shia and Sunni, have become extraordinarily strong, if not stronger than ethno-national identities. The common understanding of the region's politics is that Iran, as a Shia majority country, has allied with the other Shia non-Persian countries and actors, such as Iraq and Hezbollah. The Sunni countries, on the other hand, have gathered around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) against Iran or Shias in general. There is also, however, a common perception that Kurds are the only people in the Middle East who have not become sectarian. This research is to see whether this perception towards the Kurds is true, and if it is, why? The first chapter argues that the English term "sectarianism" fails to explain the current politics of the Middle East. Instead, it is argued, there are two different forms of sectarianism in Islam; one is about theological disagreements, which in Arabic is called "madhabiya", the other is about the political competition among the various Muslim groups which in Arabic is called "taifiya". Regardless of the religious factor, states of the Middle East act rationally based on geopolitical realities. Political sectarianism comes emerges especially when those sectarian groups mobilize under political parties and armed militia groups. Sects and states sometimes cooperate for mutual interests and hence it appears that the entire conflicts of the region are driven by sectarian motivations. The second and third chapters then explore sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) within this new understanding. The KRI acts like the state actors based on its interests and not its Sunni sectarian identity. Contrary to the common perception towards the unrecognized state which assumes that the KRI's ultimate goal should be international recognition (IR), it is here argued that the KRI prioritizes 'regional acceptance' (RA) over IR. Within the KRI there is theological sectarianism among Salafists, Sufis, and political Islamists. However, there is no political sectarianism because the Kurdish government has neutralized and unarmed the sectarian groups.

Im Allgemeinen ist die Kennzeichnung "palästinensische Flüchtlinge" – mit einer Bezugnahme auf das Rückkehrrecht – denjenigen PalästinenserInnen vorbehalten, die im Kontext der Kriege von 1948 und 1967 geflohen sind oder aus ihren Häusern vertrieben wurden, aber auch deren Kindern, Adoptivkindern und Enkelkindern. Etwa ein Drittel dieser äußerst heterogenen Gruppierung lebt immer noch in den so genannten "palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern", die in den 1950er Jahren durch das Hilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen für Palästina-Flüchtlinge im Nahen Osten (UNRWA) gegründet wurden. Die Debatte über die BewohnerInnen der palästinensischen Flüchtlingslager ist nach wie vor in die Debatte über "die palästinensischen Flüchtlinge" eingebettet und wird somit weitgehend determiniert. Sowohl in den Medien als auch im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs ist diese Debatte oft durch vage, homogenisierende, harmonisierende, aber auch essenzielle und politisch aufgeladene Beschreibungen charakterisiert. Dabei basieren die umstrittenen Definitionen meist auf verwirrenden Konzepten, die sich typischerweise auf die administrativen Kategorien der UNRWA stützen und nicht in einen konkreten soziohistorischen Kontext eingebettet sind. Diese Doktorarbeit verfolgt das Ziel, - auf der Grundlage empirischer Daten – das homogenisierende Bild über die "palästinensischen Flüchtlinge", sowohl im sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs als auch in den Diskursen, die in den verschiedenen Gruppierungen von PalästinenserInnen und in den jeweiligen Familien in den Flüchtlingslagern im Westjordanland gepflegt werden, zu analysieren. Dabei wird empirisch fundiert aufgezeigt, in welchen Diskursen und kollektiven Gedächtnissen eine Homogenisierung vorgenommen wird. Des Weiteren werden die Konsequenzen dieser Homogenisierung dargelegt. Der theoretische und methodologische Ansatz orientiert sich an den Arbeiten von Bogner und Rosenthal, die die sozialkonstruktivistische Biographieforschung und die Figurationssoziologie von Norbert Elias verbinden. Die für die Datenerhebung und -auswertung angewandte Forschungsmethode basiert auf den von Rosenthal vorgestellten methodenpluralen Verfahren, in denen teilnehmende Beobachtungen, biographisch-narrative Interviews (mit dem Ziel von Fallrekonstruktionen), Experteninterviews, Familieninterviews und Gruppendiskussionen kombiniert werden. Im Zentrum der Arbeit stehen zwei familiengeschichtliche Fallstudien. Es handelt sich dabei um zwei muslimische Familien, die in zwei verschiedenen Flüchtlingslagern wohnen und signifikante Unterschiede im Hinblick auf ihre konkreten Erfahrungen im Kontext der Flucht von 1947/49, aber auch in den langfristigen historischen und transgenerationalen Konsequenzen zeigen. Diese Familien stellen zwei verschiedene Typen dar: Der erste Typus zeichnet sich vor allem durch das seit mehreren Generationen verfolgte sozio-ökonomische Etablierungsprojekt aus. Der zweite Typus hingegen repräsentiert eine Familie, die sich an parteipolitischen Organisationen oder an einem "Prestige-Projekt" im Sinne Max Webers orientiert. In transgenerationeller Hinsicht hat die ältere Generation, die sowohl im Dorf vor 1948 als auch danach im Flüchtlingslager eigene Erfahrungen macht, ein ambivalentes Verhältnis zu den vorherrschenden kollektiven Diskursen. Bemerkenswert ist die Wirkmächtigkeit kollektiver Diskurse, insbesondere des islamisch-orientierten Diskurses, der das Alltagsleben der Communities in den palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern weitgehend bestimmt. Eine Konsequenz der Unterwerfung unter die wirkmächtigen kollektiven Diskurse in den palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern ist, dass es den Interviewten oft nicht gelingt, ungehindert über ihre eigenen Erfahrungen zu erzählen. Dies erschwert es ihnen, die belastenden und teilweise traumatisierenden Erfahrungen in ihren Familien zu verarbeiten oder zu bewältigen. ; The label "Palestinian refugees" with reference to the right of return is generally reserved for those Palestinians who have fled or were displaced from their homes in the context of the wars of 1948 and 1967, but also for their children, adopted children and grandchildren. Approximately a third of this extremely heterogeneous grouping is still living in the so-called "Palestinian refugee camps" established in the 1950s by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The debate on the residents of the Palestinian refugee camps remains embedded in and shaped by the debate on "the Palestinian refugees" in general. This debate – in the media as well as in scientific discourse – is often characterized by vague, homogenizing, harmonizing, essentializing and politically charged descriptions. Mostly, the controversial definitions are based on confusing concepts which are typically grounded in UNRWA's administrative categories and are not embedded in a concrete socio-historical framework. This doctoral thesis uses empirical data to explore the homogenizing image of "the Palestinian refugees" in social science discourses, as well as in the public and private discourses that are maintained within different groupings of Palestinians and within the families concerned in the refugee camps of the West Bank. Furthermore, it examines in which discourses and collective memories homogenization takes place, and the consequences of this. The theoretical and methodological approach is inspired by the work of Bogner and Rosenthal, who integrate social constructivist biographical research following the tradition of Berger and Luckmann with Michel Foucault's discourse research and Norbert Elias's figurational sociology. The research method used for data collection and evaluation is based on Rosenthal's methods and consists of ethnographic participant observation, biographical-narrative interviews and biographical case reconstructions. The empirical findings of family-history case studies of two Muslim families living in two different camps show significant differences in their concrete experiences in the flight context of 1947/49, but also in the long-term historical and transgenerational consequences. These families represent two different types. The first type is characterized primarily by the socio-economic establishment project being followed since generations. The second type, in contrast, represents a family that is oriented on party political organizations or on a "prestige project" in Max Weber's sense. In transgenerational aspects, the older generation – with experiences in the village before 1948 and later in the refugee camp – has an ambivalent attitude to the dominant collective discourses. Remarkable is the strong influence of collective discourses, especially the Islamic-oriented discourse, which widely determines the everyday life of the communities in the Palestinian refugee camps. One consequence of submission to the predominant discourses in the Palestinian refugee camps is that the interviewees are often unable to freely narrate their own experiences, which makes it difficult for them to process (or cope with) the stressful and sometimes traumatizing experiences within their families.