Suchergebnisse

An American government delegation recently traveled to Niger to, according to the State Department, "continue ongoing discussions since August with leaders of the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland (CNSP) regarding Niger's return to a democratic path and the future of our security and development partnership."The CNSP is the junta that took power in Niger in July 2023, in a coup that extended a trend of military takeovers in the Sahel. For the U.S., the Nigerien coup was the most consequential of these putsches, given longstanding and intensive security cooperation, including the presence of a major U.S. drone base in the northern city of Agadez.The visit went poorly. Initially scheduled for March 12-13, the delegation extended its stay by one day in hopes of meeting military head of state General Abdourahamane Tiani, but was denied. Then, on March 16, the CNSP announced that it was rejecting the military cooperation agreements between Niger and the U.S. The junta has suggested that in the absence of what it considers a viable and legal status of forces agreement (referring to a 2013 document that the junta now rejects), American civilian and military personnel are no longer welcome in Niger. The Pentagon and the wider U.S. government are working through the implications of that statement while attempting to convince the Nigerien authorities to let U.S. personnel stay.Diplomatically, the U.S. side appears to have stumbled in several ways. The CNSP's spokesman criticized the U.S. for its "unilateral" announcement of the delegation's arrival date and composition and said that the Nigerien authorities received the delegation out of simple courtesy and hospitality. It's also possible that the Americans inadvertently insulted their hosts by sending what the U.S. regarded as a "high-level" team but what the Nigeriens may have seen as insufficiently senior. The delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley and included other senior officials such as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander.This episode has been a flashback to my yearlong fellowship in the State Department in 2013-2014. During that time, one thing that shocked and dismayed me is that the assistant secretary of state — as a position — was implicitly considered within the State Department as a position equivalent in rank to an African head of state.Within State (and I assume within Defense and within AFRICOM), senior officials are treated with extraordinary deference and sometimes fear by their own subordinates. But there is no reason why an African leader should see things that way. To be lectured at by an American official whose rank is far junior to one's own is an experience that many African officials tolerate, but it cannot be pleasant. For the Sahel's newly minted juntas, who emphasize a particular brand of sovereignty and who have not been shy about antagonizing Paris, it is not a stretch to rebuke Americans over perceived (and, I would argue, actual) arrogance.The delegation met Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine along with senior members of Niger's junta, such as Generals Salifou Mody and Mohamed Toumba. But I suspect one reason the delegation could not see Tiani is because they misread how seriously the Nigeriens want to be taken.Substantively, the conversation also seems to have gone badly. According to some reports, the American officials seem to have been criticizing Niger's turn towards Russia and to a lesser extent Iran. The junta also appears to have tired of criticism over the generals' handling of the "transition" back to civilian rule — criticism that is well deserved, since no serious transition appears to be underway, but that is nevertheless unwelcome.The episode underscores both the misguidedness of America's pre-coup policies towards Niger and the incoherence of current policymaking. In terms of pre-coup policies, Niger was a darling of American counterterrorism in Africa. Looking the other way over civilian overreach (particularly under President Mahamadou Issoufou from 2011-2021) and military abuses was long justified in the name of the "partnership."But one thing for American policymakers to reflect on is why the supposed closeness of the two militaries — including longstanding relationships at the senior level — has not translated into any substantial American influence over the junta. If huge investments in training and infrastructure can evaporate with a change in political fortunes, and if those investments cannot be proven to have flattened the curve of the Sahelian insurgency in the first place, then what are they worth?In terms of current policymaking, American officials don't seem to know what they want — an ambivalence that was easily detectable during the months of foot-dragging over invoking U.S. law that calls for suspensions of security assistance to coup-afflicted countries. The U.S. has sometimes appeared to view the Nigerien junta more favorably (or be more desperate to curry its favor) than the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, again due to the massive U.S. investments and sunk costs in Niger. Yet the U.S. also appears to lecture Niger over democracy, Russia, and more. Perhaps the delegation calculated that the might, prestige, and resources of the U.S. would continue to impress the Nigeriens— they calculated wrong, and so achieved neither of the two contradictory pulls in U.S. policy, advancing neither democracy nor security cooperation.I was not in the room, obviously, but it also strikes me that AFRICOM's preferred rhetorical frames may play very badly on the ground in the Sahel now. In their annual posture statements, successive AFRICOM commanders depict Africa as a place where outsiders (al-Qaida, the Islamic State, Russia, China, etc.) cause havoc, to be opposed by a stalwart coalition of the U.S. and its "partners." This is a view of Africa that offers little room for Africans to exist other than as victims of some outside force or as junior partners to the U.S., junior partners within their own story. That might play well to Congress — but it did not go over well in Niamey, and it would be received even less warmly in Bamako or Ouagadougou. The juntas could also easily read how negatively they are depicted by AFRICOM; while AFRICOM's criticisms of the juntas are largely fair (I shared many of them), U.S. officials cannot expect to dismiss the juntas as malevolent and incompetent but then go to make asks of them.Going forward, one thing to watch for advocates of restraint is whether and how easily the U.S. can pivot out of Niger. It may turn out that the drone base there, billed as essential to the fight against Sahelian jihadism, is not so essential after all. The critical question to ask will not be whether things get worse — security has steadily degraded since approximately 2015 in many parts of the central Sahel — but whether there is any proof that the presence or absence of vast American military expenditures makes any discernable difference.The U.S. may yet salvage something in Niger, but if it exits, that will not necessarily be a tragedy for Nigeriens or Americans. And sadly, U.S. policy incoherence and diplomatic missteps may have squandered, for the medium term, whatever opportunity had existed to place meaningful pressure on the junta over democracy and human rights.

Out of several countries in the coup-stricken African Sahel slated to hold elections this year, Senegal looked like the only one that might escape the threat of voter suppression, rigging, or other corrupt practices.But this is no more the case as a sudden turn of events last week plunged the West African nation into an unprecedented constitutional crisis, which pundits argue could lead anywhere at this point, from an uneasy elite pact to a total state collapse. On February 3, the eve of the official presidential campaign, Senegal's President Macky Sall announced a postponement of the election, citing dispute over the candidate list. His decision to postpone came weeks after a controversy erupted over the exclusion of opposition candidates from the ballot. The opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), whose candidate Karim Wade was among those excluded by the Constitutional Council from running in the election for possessing a dual French-Senegalese citizenship, had earlier filed a formal request to postpone the vote. Also excluded is the opposition PASTEF's popular leader Ousmane Sonko, who opposed Sall in 2019 and has been behind bars since last year for immoral behavior and plotting an insurrection. His candidacy in the 2024 election was rejected last month by the Constitutional Council in a move critics say was targeted at eliminating the most potent obstacle to Sall's preferred candidate, Prime Minister Amadou Ba, running and winning the forthcoming elections. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Sonko's substitute candidate, is also in jail on charges of contempt of court, defamation, and acts likely to compromise public peace.OutrageNever before has Senegal postponed a presidential election. Ordinary Senegalese are shocked by the strange turn of events in part due to the sense of security created by Sall's decision in July last year not to run for a third term."I feel sad for Senegal, a beautiful and peaceful country always considered as an example of democracy and for the Senegalese people who fought in 2011 in the name of democracy so that the current President Macky Sall could be elected," Awa Diouf, a Senegalese activist, told RS. Sall has repeated his stance not to run for a third term, but the opposition doesn't believe him, accusing Sall of premeditated plans to cling to power or to force his preferred candidate on the people. After the decision, protests resurfaced in the country's capital Dakar reminiscent of scenes of deadly clashes with police that were once a fixture of life from 2021 to 2023. One leading opposition politician was arrested in the renewed disturbance on Feb. 4, as police fired tear gas to disperse angry protesters amidst a growing crackdown which has seen a private television station, Walf TV, suspended for 'inciting violence' and internet cut. The crisis continued into last week at the country's parliament where a bill seeking to fix a new date for the elections and extend Sall's tenure led to a row with some opposition MPs forcibly removed by police clad in riot gear. At the end of proceedings, the parliament, which is dominated by the ruling coalition, Benno Bokk Yakaar (which includes President Sall's Alliance for the Republic party) voted for a 10-month extension of the election until December 15. Sall's term was originally meant to lapse in early April. In response, activists are once again mobilizing for new protests and many fear for more violent crackdowns.A diplomatic solutionThese developments, which occurred on the heels of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's tour of the region last month, have attracted widespread condemnation. The West African bloc, ECOWAS, whose credibility has taken a beating over its handling of a string of coups in the region, failed to condemn the postponement.In sharp contrast, a statement by the U.S. State Department was more decisive in describing the poll's postponement as a move that runs "contrary to Senegal's strong democratic tradition," while also calling the National Assembly's vote illegitimate, "given the conditions under which it took place." The U.S. also condemned the attacks on press freedom and the severing of internet communications in the country. "The U.S. is a strong all round partner with Senegal and is the leading provider of development assistance valued at $238 million per year," Dr. Joseph Siegle of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted to RS. Besides the significant economic ties and trade, it is in the area of regional security that Senegal is most important for the United States. As one of the most stable democracies in Africa and a model for religious and ethnic tolerance, Senegal has been a longtime partner of the U.S. in promoting peace and security in Africa. "[Senegal's] importance has become even more outsized in the wake of recent coups and military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea," Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, a research analyst with the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-West Africa) explained. Although an outlier in the region's anti-democratic trends, this does not mean Senegal's democracy has been free of turmoil. For instance, out of four Presidents that have governed Senegal since it gained independence from France in 1960, only two have taken office in peaceful transfers of power — the first of which occurred in 2000. In 2012, Sall was only elected following a period of widespread protests against his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade's attempt to undemocratically cling to power. After 12 years at the helm of the country, critics now accuse Sall of the same crimes as Wade's, which include eroding the country's democratic credentials through a pattern of jailing political opponents under spurious charges and bending Senegal's justice system to his will. What is most significant, however, is that even in the midst of chaos "the struggle of the Senegalese people always takes place within the framework of institutions as much as peaceful and unarmed resistance," activist Louise M. Faye told RS. The hope is that today's disagreements won't be litigated in a coup like Senegal's Sahelian neighbors.By and large, experts believe what is likely is an uneasy pact within the elite, which has been brought about as a result of rising opposition to conventional politics. "The US [needs to start] talking directly to all of the relevant Senegalese actors as well as ECOWAS to navigate a stable, constitutionally-based, democratic outcome," Siegle explained. The Biden administration's playbook for the continent, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, mandates Washington to "stem the recent tide of authoritarianism and military takeovers by working with allies and partners in the region to respond to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses."While doing this, however, Washington needs to be mindful that recent anti-French sentiment has played into Russia's plans to expand its influence in the region. "While that does not necessarily mean direct anti-American perceptions, it will also need to ensure it can retain backchannels to the different factions if it wants to diplomatically intervene. Washington's important role will be to maintain pressure on Dakar to ensure a fair and transparent review process, or national dialogue as President Sall has put it, ahead of the elections," Adekaiyaoja added.

A continuación presentamos en resumen los contenidos del libro en sus 15 capítulos divididos en tres partes temáticas. Estas deben entenderse como círculos concéntricos con sus solapamientos. Son como tres grandes hilos conductores de los capítulos desarrollados en esta publicación que abarca diferentes perspectivas: 1. Educación y cooperación como reto de Desarrollo comunitario en contextos indígenas; 2. Identidad cultural y Derechos de los Pueblos indígenas y 3. Interculturalidad, Evangelización y Desarrollo. En cada parte se encuentran exposiciones desde diferentes experiencias y países. Cada capítulo se puede leer de manera independiente, y para facilitar esta lectura selectiva, el lector encuentra siempre un pequeño resumen tanto en español como en inglés. Como Introducción hemos considerado que una reflexión etimológica e histórica sobre "indígena" y conceptos y términos vinculados debe abrir la obra y facilitar un aterrizaje en la complejidad del asunto. Por su larga experiencia como investigador y docente en Perú, y actualmente en la UCAM, además de su vivencia personal, el historiador José María Sesé aporta con una explicación fluida e histórica bajo el título "Los indígenas: orígenes tribales y realidad social actual" una pieza angular, que posteriormente se inserta en las edificaciones de los otros autores. El autor expone desde teorías del significado de indígena y su historiografía, la complejidad de las identidades culturales en América Latina, así como la relación existente entre símbolos y significados. Consideramos este capítulo de vital importancia para comprender muchos conocimientos socioculturales en relación a los pueblos del Mundo, en este caso protagonizado sobre todo en América Latina. A continuación se presenta la primera parte de Educación y cooperación como reto de Desarrollo comunitario en contextos indígenas. Con las temáticas y experiencias de Ecuador, Guatemala, Perú, Colombia y México, se muestra una forma colaborativa de aprender de los pueblos, indígenas y no indígenas en el encuentro con sus realidades únicas y diversas, partiendo de un compromiso democrático pluricultural. Observamos y visibilizamos procesos experimentales de una educación bilingüe e intercultural, que se fortalece desde estrategias de aprendizaje sobre estas experiencias, y sobre todo de la inquietud de maestros y maestras que creen en una educación democrática intercultural. La sección muestra las capacidades comunitarias logradas por diversas realidades en América Latina que en base a proyectos comunitarios, enfatizan en la educación, apoyan un desarrollo comunitario y están transformando situaciones de subdesarrollo y abandono estatal, convirtiéndose en pequeños y grandes ejemplos de desarrollo. Educación comunitaria, ¿cómo la entendemos? Como la palabra indica es abrirse a conocimientos de la propia comunidad, tanto con factores endógenos como exógenos. Nuestro interés ha sido enfatizar en la política, política entendida como cambio, como práctica hacia mejoras, desarrollo también entendido desde cada uno y cada una, y es la educación una vía muy importante para que esto se produzca. Comenzando por Ecuador, el autor, sociólogo Philipp Altmann de la Universidad Libre de Berlín, con el capítulo "El movimiento indígena ecuatoriano - educación como estrategia, interculturalidad como fin", expone la realidad que subyace en la educación bilingüe intercultural y los procesos gubernamentales, a la vez que se politiza la creación de movimientos sociales. Aplicando el concepto de "espacios libres" (Fantasia & Hirsch, 1995), realiza un paseo histórico por el origen de la educación intercultural, íntimamente relacionados con el movimiento político indígena, como puede verse también en otros escenarios como en Guatemala y en Méjico. El autor expone los procesos que han llevado a los movimientos indígenas en Ecuador a crear iniciativas singulares así como una autonomía indígena. Desde Guatemala, la autora María Jesús Vitón, como investigadora pedagoga comprometida con la investigación acción desde hace más de 20 años expone en "Equidad educativa y calidad del ejercicio democrático intercultural. Actuación formativa y reflexión pedagógica en un contexto de complejidad y crecientes asimetrías", toda una línea de acción que se mueve desde la experiencia y la teoría junto a la docencia, entre escenarios educativos diferentes como Guatemala y España. Su perspectiva es sociocrítica y plantea retos en la educación bilingüe intercultural a partir de estrategias de acción para incidir en el marco del derecho al desarrollo (1986) y del convenio 169 para pueblos indígenas (1989) de la OIT. En el avance de este modelo formativo se busca contribuir a la construcción pluricultural y la equidad educativa. La autora considera que solo desde el empoderamiento en las comunidades se podrá forjar un cambio hacia el desarrollo comunitario desde el ámbito educativo. Son los docentes quienes son dueños de sus saberes y pueden tener estas estrategias de cambio. En cuanto a la realidad educativa indígena bilingüe en Perú, la historiadora Patricia Gutiérrez, de la UCAM, junto a María Yulianna Córdoba, profesora de literatura y lengua de Secundaria en Piura, aportan en "Educación intercultural bilingüe en el Perú. Situación social y educativa de las comunidades indígenas del Perú", un recorrido histórico de una situación a la que se enfrenta la población indígena peruana. A partir de un proyecto educativo y de salud se marcan las características de un proyecto de educación intercultural bilingüe, enlazando lo que se aprende por y para la vida y la dificultad que existe en la formación de maestros en el Perú. Las autoras nos señalan las necesidades para fomentar la elaboración de didácticas y estrategias socioeducativa que incluye a la población amazónica. A partir de la etnografía, la antropóloga Práxedes Muñoz Sánchez en "Movimientos sociales surgidos por una educación indígena intercultural: casos en Guatemala y México", expone dos realidades que convergen en procesos de resistencia y desarrollo de proyectos de educación interculturales – dos realidades que están vinculados al análisis de la misma, así como a la construcción de la toma de conciencia e historia desde sus propios procesos. La apuesta por una investigación acción de tipo colaborativo es el camino para reconocer y visibilizar los saberes de los propios pueblos, y por eso la autora defiende un apoyo desde la antropología comprometida, responsabilizando a la academia. Desde México, los autores Jaime Mondragón, María Isabel Miranda y Jacinta Toribio plantean en "Interculturalismo, vinculación y comunicación: experiencias de la Universidad Veracruzana Intercultural, sede regional Huasteca", una educación intercultural con miras a consolidar una sociedad democrática. Buscan desarrollar competencias interculturales a través de la docencia y la didáctica por medio del currículum del plan de estudios de su oferta educativa: la Licenciatura en Gestión Intercultural para el Desarrollo (LGID). Es de interés destacar su vinculación con el diálogo en torno al desarrollo local, regional y nacional, así como el intercambio de saberes con las comunidades e individuos donde se fortalecen relaciones, reconociendo como herramientas clave la tradición cultural y las prácticas que resguardan la identidad nahua, ñuhú, tepehua, totonaca, tenek, y mestiza, buscando trascender al aula con las redes sociales. La segundo sección "Identidad cultural y Derechos de los Pueblos indígenas", reúne autores y experiencias de Colombia, Guatemala, Brasil y Méjico y el trabajo de investigadores en España. El fuerte impulso que ha tenido el desarrollo de unos marcos jurídicos para proteger y garantizar los derechos de los Pueblos indígenas culminó con la declaración de la Asamblea General de la ONU en 2007(A/RES/61/295). Para alcanzar este punto había que recorrer un camino muy largo, todavía sin concluir del todo, porque aunque el marco jurídico está ya establecido, las cortes internacionales configuradas, las prácticas y políticas quedan atrapadas en las lógicas y hábitos anteriores. El acceso a estos sistemas judiciales también debe mejorar. Es verdad que sin un marco jurídico adecuado, la lucha por los derechos y las garantías de los pueblos indígenas se encuentra sin el amparo internacional necesario, pero también es importante acompañar el progreso jurídico con modelos de desarrollo participativo, respetando las necesidades de las comunidades, y reconstruyendo su identidad cultural. De ahí la exigencia de no solo incluir en esta parte el análisis de los marcos jurídicos internacionales, sino también una serie de reflexiones desde la historia de los pueblos indígenas y sus modelos de resistencias. Son aportaciones de alumnos indígenas con sus propios proyectos que son apoyados desde su institución pública, la Universidad Veracruzana Intercultural en Méjico, donde estudiantes indígenas trabajan con sus comunidades y junto con los docentes del Centro, desde la perspectiva de la interculturalidad y del desarrollo sostenible, con el objetivo de fomentar el desarrollo comunitario y social de la zona. El perfil de la "Licenciatura en Gestión Intercultural para el Desarrollo (LGID)", es el resultado de un trabajo importante de responder más adecuadamente a las necesidades comunitarias de los pueblos indígenas de la zona. También hemos visto oportuno incluir aquí la problemática de los desplazamientos forzados,que privan las comunidades de sus derechos y crean presiones añadidas de pérdida de identidad cultural. Para la profesora e investigadora de la UCAM, María Méndez Rocasolano, este Segundo Decenio con las actividades en nuestra Universidad ha sido un momento de reencontrarse con sus experiencias de convivencia en una comunidad Guaraní en Brasil y el trabajo por sus derechos. Su capítulo "El derecho a la tierra de los pueblos y poblaciones indígenas, una exigencia de los derechos humanos", responde a una línea de investigación que desde el ámbito jurídico internacional con las regulaciones del derecho a la Tierra de los pueblos y poblaciones indígenas promueve e introduce mejoras sustanciales a través de procedimientos que representan un avance lento pero progresivo en el respeto por los Derechos Humanos. Imprescindibles en estos procesos son los medios de comunicación que puedan informar y crear la necesaria concienciación y solidaridad de todos los pueblos. Susana Ardanaz Iriarte del Instituto de Derechos Humanos (Universidad de Deusto), revisa en su contribución "Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, Derechos Humanos y Desarrollo" los modelos de desarrollo subrayando las aportaciones de los pueblos indígenas. Muchas veces obligados a ceder sus tierras ofrecían los recursos naturales necesarios para el desarrollo de las naciones, pero sin embargo sin tener en cuenta las necesidades de estos pueblos. Contra los modelos económicos de desarrollo con sus efectos de etnocidios, la autora propone como alternativa la aplicación de modelos etnodesarrollistas (autodesarrollo, desarrollo con identidad o buen vivir) en un marco del derecho al desarrollo como parte de los derechos humanos. Respecto a la realidad de Colombia, el historiador Daniel Ricardo Martínez Bernal presenta un diálogo sobre la "no-violencia", con el capítulo de: Más allá de la resistencia civil: Juan Tama y la Cacica Gaitana en los antecedentes de la resistencia noviolenta de los pueblos Nasa. Realiza todo un recorrido desde el método histórico comparativo, desde el S. XVI al S. XVIII, sobre estrategias de resistencia y aportaciones teórico-doctrinales de la resistencia civil noviolenta a partir de dos personajes históricos y su memoria, la Cacica Gaitana y el Cacique Juan Tama de la Estrella comoprototipos de la actual resistencia noviolenta comunitaria de los indígenas Nasa. Cecilia de la Cruz Sánchez de la Universidad de Veracruz (Méjico) subraya con su trabajo de investigación "la importancia de la tradición oral en la animación de la lengua náhuatl en el ámbito educativo de la localidad de Ixhuatlán de madero, Veracruz". El idioma, como parte esencial de cualquier identidad cultural y de sus tradiciones, requiere una práctica y presencia en los ámbitos educativos para no sentirse excluido y reducido a marginado. Diferentes estrategias y herramientas educativas como los cuentacuentos y la interacción entre jóvenes, niños y maestros de la comunidad de Tzocohuite facilitan la apropiación y utilización cotidiana en los espacios escolares del idioma materno náhuatl. La intervención en las comunidades para garantizar sus derechos al desarrollo está conectada a las estructuras y procesos políticos. A veces una dificultad menor para una administración del estado impide un avance importante de las comunidades. La autora Lucina Martínez Sánchez de la Universidad Veracruzana Intercultural en Méjico analiza en su contribución "El puente como una necesidad principal para hacer efectivo el derecho al desarrollo, en la comunidad de Alahualtitla, Chicontepec (Veracruz)", los procesos y problemas relacionadas con actores políticos y privados, y su mayor significado para la comunidad. Los conflictos armados, luchas por tierras, expropiaciones, crisis agrarias y económicas junto a desastres naturales obligan a muchas comunidades indígenas abandonar sus zonas de origen y moverse a nuevos territorios. Este proceso, especialmente traumático para los pueblos indígenas por su estrecha vinculación de sus tradiciones, su historia, la forma de subsistir y su identidad con sus tierras, tienen un impacto fuerte en la identidad cultural. Ruperto Hernández Meza busca como herramienta de recuperar esta identidad "factores que favorecen la identidad cultural en una población migrante náhuatl en la comunidad de Alfredo V. Bonfil del municipio de Álamo Temapache (Veracruz, Méjico)."Hablante de la lengua náhuatl y perteneciente a una comunidad indígena, su investigación lleva a descubrir factores que impiden el uso de la lengua originaria y, en un esfuerzo entre padres, maestros y elementos educativos de la tradición náhuatl, se puede luchar contra la pérdida de identidad y conocimiento. Para miles de guatemaltecos, sobre todo de la población indígena, el desplazamiento y refugio en Méjico ha sido una realidad desde 1981. El proceso de Paz en Guatemala y un proceso de naturalización para esta población en Méjico, crearon nuevas oportunidades, pero también enseñan nuevas dificultades para los grupos que ni se sienten de aquí ni de allá. La investigadora Verónica Ruiz Lagier del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH, Méjico), explora con un video documental, las narraciones y su capítulo "El refugio guatemalteco en Méjico, ¿proceso inconcluso?" situaciones y biografías dramáticas para miles de personas que viven en la clandestinidad, sin derechos ni recursos. La tercera parte "Interculturalidad, Evangelización y Desarrollo"cierra el libro agrupando tres capítulos que desde el enfoque intercultural analizan prácticas profesionales terapéuticas, y en el ámbito religioso reflexiones institucionales que figuran como referentes para la práctica, como los programas de promoción y de acogida del ejemplo de Bolivia. La convivencia y el trabajo de construir un Centro de Terapia Ocupacional en una comunidad en Houndé (Burkina Faso) han sido para Inmaculada Zango Martín, profesora de Terapia Ocupacional y del Máster en Desarrollo Social (UCAM) el punto de enriquecer este libro con unas perspectivas desde África y la diversidad cultural. Su capítulo "Diversidad cultural y terapia ocupacional: reflexiones sobre la práctica en Burkina Faso" analiza la cultura profesional de la terapia ocupacional aplicando una etnografía "doblemente reflexiva" e intercultural. En todos los procesos relacionados con los pueblos indígenas, no debe faltar el espacio religioso, que tanto como parte de su propia identidad cultural pero también como puente con otras civilizaciones y modelos del buen vivir está presente en los actores personales e institucionales. Por su inmensa presencia en América Latina, su vínculo histórico con los pueblos y su capacidad de promover un desarrollo integral, la Iglesia Católica ocupa un lugar privilegiado en el escenario. Rainer Gehrig (UCAM) analiza en el plano documental de las cinco conferencias del episcopado latinoamericano desde 1955 a 2007 en su capítulo "Los pueblos indígenas y la Doctrina Social de la iglesia" para extraer los roles que asume la Iglesia en estos documentos en relación con las reivindicaciones de los pueblos indígenas. Conceptos claves son el tema de la "Evangelización" y la "Inculturación" en relación con lo que denomina la "religiosidad popular". Desde Bolivia, Daniel de la Traba, codirector de la Casa Oikía, presentó: Una casa de acogida para niños y niñas en situación de calle. En su aportación explica detalladamente el origen y desarrollo del proyecto que conlleva la Casa Oikía. Se vincula totalmente con un proyecto educativo de voluntariado. Las lecturas desde los espacios profesionales y religiosos concluyen este libro, que dentro de nuestra Universidad Católica con un Máster en Desarrollo Social y para los lectores interesados quería reunir unos trabajos en relación con la clausura del Segundo Decenio de los Pueblos Indígenas. Más que una publicación muy especializada, los capítulos son una muestra de la amplitud de enfoques, muchos muy prácticos, algunos muy recorridos como es la educación y los derechos, otros más bien como sendas pocas conocidas. Trabajamos en nuestra Universidad para que este espacio de diálogo abierto siga continuando con los proyectos de investigación, los grupos de investigadores, los programas educativos y futuras jornadas, extendiendo la Universidad al Campo práctico de desarrollo, a la formación de futuros agentes con un conocimiento, compromiso y sensibilidad para los pueblos indígenas y una competencia intercultural adquirida, una profesionalidad reflexiva que es capaz de crear los espacios participativos y comunitarios necesarios para un desarrollo integral y sostenible. Para la etapa posterior de los objetivos del milenio (post-2015) va a ser crucial, que los logros alcanzados hasta ahora en esta materia no se queden relegados a un segundo plano, adelantados por unos enfoques pragmáticos y funcionales de apagar los fuegos extremos como el hambre, la pobreza extrema, los catástrofes naturales y los desplazamientos forzados por las guerras actuales. La Conferencia Mundial sobre los Pueblos Indígenas (Nueva York, 23 y 24 de septiembre del 2014) brindó otra oportunidad. La resolución (A/RES/69/2) de la Asamblea General resume en sus 40 puntos los compromisos adquiridos con los pueblos indígenas, entre ellos precisamente en el punto n.37 "el derecho a determinar y establecer las prioridades y estrategias para el ejercicio de su derecho al desarrollo" – un aspecto sumamente importante ahora en el momento de elaborar las agendas de desarrollo post 2015. Con esta publicación queremos mantener vivo en nuestra Universidad y en la sociedad la importancia de la temática y animar a nuestros alumnos e investigadores a interesarse y comprometerse con la riqueza que significan los pueblos indígenas para el mundo. Terminamos esta presentación expresando nuestro agradecimiento al maestro Carlos Jacanamijoy que permitió compartir la riqueza artística con una de sus obras para la portada de nuestra publicación. ; Este libro es un compendio de reflexiones, acciones, posturas de cambio e investigaciones desde la perspectiva de los saberes de los pueblos del Mundo, indígenas y no, de espacios rurales y urbanos. Fueron expuestos en las XIII. Jornadas Internacionales de Voluntariado de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia, conmemorando la clausura del II Decenio Internacional de los Pueblos Indígenas (2005-2014), a través del Vicerrectorado de Extensión Universitaria de la UCAM. Índice Presentación pp.11-23 Introducción Los Indígenas: Orígenes tribales y realidad social actual José María Sesé Alegre pp.27-53 1. Educación y cooperación como reto de desarrollo comunitario en contextos indígenas I. El movimiento indígena ecuatoriano - educación como estrategia, interculturalidad como fin Philipp Altmann pp.57-79 II. Equidad educativa y calidad del ejercicio democrático intercultural. Actuación formativa y reflexión pedagógica en un contexto de complejidad y crecientes asimetrías María Jesús Vitón de Antonio pp.80-100 III. Educación intercultural bilingüe en el Perú. Situación social y educativa de las comunidades indígenas del Perú Patricia Gutiérrez Rivas y María Yulianna Córdoba Gutiérrez pp.101-113 IV. Movimientos sociales surgidos por una Educación Indígena Intercultural: casos en Guatemala y México Práxedes Muñoz Sánchez pp.114-132 V. Interculturalismo, vinculación y comunicación: Experiencias de la Universidad Veracruzana Intercultural, Sede Regional Huasteca. Jaime Mondragón Melo, María Isabel Miranda Landa, Jacinta Toribio Torres pp.133-147 2. Identidad cultural y derechos de los pueblos indígenas VI. El derecho a la tierra de los pueblos y poblaciones indígenas, una exigencia de los derechos humanos María Méndez Rocasolano pp.151-162 VII. Derechos de los pueblos indígenas, Derechos Humanos y desarrollo Susana Ardanaz pp.163-176 VIII. Más allá de la resistencia civil: Juan Tama y la cacica Gaitana en los antecedentes de la resistencia noviolenta de los pueblos Nasa Daniel Ricardo Martínez Bernal pp.177-201 IX. La tradición oral en la animación de la lengua náhuatl en el ámbito educativo de la localidad de Ixhuatlán de Madero, Veracruz (Méjico) Cecilia de la Cruz Sánchez pp.202-207 X. El puente como una necesidad principal para hacer efectivo el derecho al desarrollo, en la comunidad de Alahualtitla, Chicontepec, Veracruz (Méjico) Lucina Martínez Sánchez pp.208-224 XI. Factores que favorecen la identidad cultural en una población migrante náhuatl en la comunidad de Alfredo V. Bonfil del municipio de Álamo Temapache, Veracruz (Méjico). Ruperto Hernández Meza pp.225-233 XII. El refugio guatemalteco en Méjico, ¿proceso inconcluso? Verónica Ruiz Lagier pp.234-242 3. Interculturalidad, Evangelización y Desarrollo XIII. Diversidad cultural y terapia ocupacional: reflexiones sobre la práctica en Burkina Faso Inmaculada Zango Martín pp.245-256 XIV. Los pueblos indígenas y la Doctrina Social de la iglesia. Rainer Gehrig pp.257-291 XV. Oikía, una casa de acogida para niños y niñas en situación de calle Daniel de la Traba pp.292-304 ; Educación ; Derecho ; Educación ; Arte y Humanidades

Ausführliche Diskussion der von Leutnant Jerry Rawlings nach einem erfolgreichen Staatsstreich seit 1982 eingeleiteten Reformpolitik, nachdem dieser erkannt hatte, daß er einen praktisch bankrotten Staat übernommen hatte. Kurzer Rückblick auf die Kolonialzeit und die postkoloniale Politik vor seiner Machtübernahme. Maßnahmen der neuen Militärregierung (Provisional National Defence Council - P.N.D.C.) auf den Gebieten der Verwaltung, des Rechtswesens, der Wirtschaft, der internationalen Beziehungen. Beurteilung der Entwicklung. Größte Herausforderung der Zukunft wird sein, wie das Regime auf weitere Demokratisierungswünsche seiner politisch wachen Bevölkerung reagiert. (DÜI-Hlb)

El G-20 es un bloque de países constituido en 1999 por las ocho naciones más industrializadas y los once países con las principales economías emergentes de diversas partes del globo y la Unión Europea como unidad. Este bloque se reunió en Washington para realizar un foro de cooperación y consultas entre los países sobre temas relacionados en encontrar una solución a la crisis financiera mundial. Los asistentes a la cumbre rechazaron el proteccionismo y coincidieron en renunciar a establecer en los próximos 12 meses "nuevas barreras a la inversión y al comercio de bienes y servicios". Varios medios informan al respecto: "El País" de Madrid: "El G-20 acuerda una acción pública masiva: La cumbre fija que los Gobiernos usen estímulos fiscales a la economía - Se crean grupos de trabajo para la reforma financiera - Impulso a la liberalización comercial": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/G-20/acuerda/accion/publica/masiva/elppgl/20081116elpepieco_2/Tes"Bush: "Ha sido un éxito, pero queda mucho por hacer": Los líderes del G-20 se muestran satisfechos con los resultados de la cumbre de Washington": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Bush/Ha/sido/exito/queda/mucho/hacer/elppgl/20081116elpepueco_1/Tes""Es el momento de que el G-20 sustituya al G-7"": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/momento/G-20/sustituya/G-7/elppgl/20081116elpepieco_12/Tes "Le Monde":"Le G20 se donne 4 mois pour renouer avec la croissance": http://www.lemonde.fr/la-crise-financiere/article/2008/11/16/le-g20-se-donne-4-mois-pour-renouer-avec-la-croissance_1119294_1101386.html#ens_id=1118383"Les pays du G20 s'accordent sur des grands principes et un plan d'action": http://www.lemonde.fr/la-crise-financiere/article/2008/11/15/les-pays-du-g20-s-accordent-sur-des-grands-principes-et-un-plan-d-action_1119261_1101386.html#ens_id=1118383"Le G20 tout près d'adopter un "plan d'action" contre la crise": http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2008/11/15/le-g20-tout-pres-d-adopter-un-plan-d-action-contre-la-crise_1119225_3234.html#ens_id=1118383 "New York Times":"World Leaders Vow Joint Push to Aid Economy":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/business/worldbusiness/16summit.html?ref=world"As Leaders Wrestle With Economy, Developing Nations Get Ringside Seats": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/16leaders.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin "New York Times" presenta sitio con links a artículos relacionados a la cumbre: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/g/group_of_20/index.html "CNN": "CNN" presenta sitio con links a artículos relacionados a la cumbre: http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/business/2008/11/15/quest.intv.hennessey.g20.cnn "Time":"Europe's Hopes for G-20 Summit Risk Being Dashed":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1858863,00.html "MSNBC":"Reshaping of world financial system outlined: China, Brazil, India would take a greater role, G-20 leaders say": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27742573/ "Los Ángeles Times":"G-20 economic summit brings pledges of teamwork": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-summit16-2008nov16,0,3993269.story"Text of Bush's remarks on economic summit": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-bushtext16-2008nov16,0,4618769.story"Summit of G20 nations is unlikely to produce quick solutions": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-summit14-2008nov14,0,2420401.story "Times":"Brown claims G20 success as world leaders agree tax and interest rate cuts": http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article5163072.ece"G20 declaration: text in full.Summit on financial markets and the world economy": http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article5162735.ece "La Nación":"Bush, en una cena que tuvo el sabor de la despedida: Fue la última que compartió como presidente con otros mandatarios":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1070719"El G-20 impulsó más regulaciones: Acordó mejorar los controles sobre los mercados internacionales y coordinar los esfuerzos para evitar una nueva debacle mundial": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1070714 "The Economist": "The global economic summit: After the fall. World leaders are meeting in Washington, DC, to fix finance. They have their work cut out": http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12610564&source=features_box_main "After the fall: On November 15th world leaders are due to sit around a table in Washington, DC, to fix finance. They have their work cut out": http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12597176"BBC":"Summit shows times have changed": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7731889.stm"G20 summit: In quotes : Global leaders at the G20 financial summit in Washington have pledged to work together to restore world economic growth, and to carry out reforms of the economic system.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7731735.stm "China Daily": "G20 summit adopts action plan to implement principles of reform: Washington summit targets at crisis": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/16/content_7208365.htm "El Mercurio" de Chile: "Líderes mundiales acuerdan mayores medidas fiscales y reformar el sistema financiero": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/16/internacional/_portada/noticias/9F784923-2CE0-437E-B629-3DA069CC6711.htm?id={9F784923-2CE0-437E-B629-3DA069CC6711} AMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: " Nicaragua rechaza la mediación internacional": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Nicaragua/rechaza/mediacion/internacional/elpepuint/20081116elpepiint_4/Tes"The Economist" analiza: "Nicaragua: How to steal an election. Daniel Ortega sets an ugly precedent": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12607338"La Nación" publica: "Nicaragua: la oposición desafía al oficialismo con una nueva marcha. Se manifestarán en reclamo por los resultados de las últimas elecciones": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1071330"CNN" plantea: "Chinese president visits Cuba to strengthen ties": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/18/hu.cuba.ap/index.htmlA horas de elecciones en Venezuela: "La Nación" informa: "Opositores venezolanos afirman que son vigilados: El gobierno graba conversaciones y viola la vida privada, sostienen": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1070612"El Universal" de México publica: "Los nervios de Hugo Chávez: El presidente venezolano anda de malas. Las encuestas vaticinan que su partido sufrirá golpes en las elecciones del 23 de noviembre": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/59638.html"El Mercurio" de Chile plantea: "Hugo Chávez amenaza con cerrar medios de prensa: Mandatario prepara medidas para las municipales del 23 de noviembre.": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/16/internacional/internacional/noticias/2BBAC319-5E8F-4C75-942E-8A7FC8670098.htm?id={2BBAC319-5E8F-4C75-942E-8A7FC8670098}"Le Monde" anuncia: "Dans l'Etat vénézuélien de Barinas, fief des Chavez, les élections locales sont une affaire de famille": http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2008/11/18/dans-l-etat-venezuelien-de-barinas-fief-des-chavez-les-elections-locales-sont-une-affaire-de-famille_1119994_3222.html#ens_id=1120093"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Se toman la justicia en sus manos y linchan a supuestos ladrones. Once presuntos delincuentes fueron golpeados y quemados por una turba. Dos de ellos murieron.": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/18/internacional/internacional/noticias/C0644F52-B588-4564-B90C-41CBEDD128B1.htm?id={C0644F52-B588-4564-B90C-41CBEDD128B1}"MSNBC" anuncia: "Alleged Pinochet victim turns up alive in Chile: Discovery fuels outrage in nation mourning 1,196 other political prisoners": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27789538/"El Mercurio" de Chile plantea: "Diputados rebeldes fracturan el kirchnerismo : "Hoy no hay libertad de opinión en el peronismo", sostuvo anoche Felipe Solá, el parlamentario que anunció la división.": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/18/internacional/_portada/noticias/8A1B80A2-22D2-4A10-A9D6-31A9D9C23EA8.htm?id={8A1B80A2-22D2-4A10-A9D6-31A9D9C23EA8} ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"El Universal" de México publica: "Insulta Al-Qaeda a Barack Obama: En un mensaje difundido en internet, el segundo dirigente más importante de la organización terrorista, Ayman al-Zawahri afirmó que Obama es 'justo lo contrario de los honorables negros estadounidenses', como el activista Malcolm X, asesinado en 1965": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/556491.html"El País" de Madrid informa: " Obama se despide de Chicago: El presidente electo de EE UU agradece el apoyo prestado por la gente de Illinois en su adiós al Senado": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/despide/Chicago/elpepuint/20081116elpepuint_11/Tes"CNN" publica: "Bill Clinton could pose Cabinet problem":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/17/clinton.cabinet/index.html"BBC" anuncia: "Obama promete gobierno bipartidista : El presidente electo de Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, prometió a su ex rival republicano, John McCain, trabajar juntos en una "nueva era de reformas" para restablecer la confianza de los ciudadanos en el gobierno.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7734000/7734679.stm"The Economist" analiza:"Launching Hillary at the world: The surprising idea that Hillary Clinton could become Barack Obama's secretary of state": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12627393&source=features_box_main"Change.gov: The transition to a new administration is already well under way": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12607222"La Nación" plantea: "Obama y McCain unen fuerzas: Ayer se reunieron para coordinar acciones que permitan resolver los problemas de EE.UU.":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1071204 "El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Obama recibe a McCain en un gesto que muestra su interés por el trabajo bipartidista": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/18/internacional/_portada/noticias/B0C58433-C5F2-4D5C-AB4C-B4832D06443C.htm?id={B0C58433-C5F2-4D5C-AB4C-B4832D06443C}En su columna para "La Nación" Andrés Oppenheimer analiza: "El nuevo equipo para la región": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1071205"El País" de Madrid informa: "El fuego destruye 600 casas móviles en su avance hacia Los Ángeles: El alcalde de la ciudad no descarta cortar el suministro eléctrico por motivos de seguridad": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/fuego/destruye/600/casas/moviles/avance/Angeles/elpepuint/20081116elpepuint_1/Tes"La Nación" publica: "Hay 10.000 evacuados: Se extiende el incendio que afecta Los Angeles": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1070638 EUROPA"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Cumbre bilateral extraordinaria sobre lucha antiterrorista celebrarán Zapatero y Sarkozy":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/cumbre-bilateral-extraordinaria-sobre-lucha-antiterrorista-celebraran-zapatero-y-sarkozy_4670349-1"El País" de Madrid informa: "El congreso socialista francés fracasa y finaliza sin líder: El alcalde de París, Bertrand Delanöe, se ha retirado de la contienda para presidir la formación": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/congreso/socialista/frances/fracasa/finaliza/lider/elpepuint/20081116elpepuint_10/Tes"BBC" analiza: "Atrapan al "jefe" militar de ETAEl presunto jefe militar de la organización separatista vasca Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) fue arrestado en la madrugada del lunes en el sur de Francia, informó la ministra del Interior francesa.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7732000/7732693.stm"La Nación" publica: "Giro en España: Garzón renunció a investigar la represión franquista: El magistrado español lo hizo para evitar que se lo declare incompetente por el máximo tribunal":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1071313"El País" de Madrid plantea: "Reino Unido estudia enviar otros 2.000 soldados a Afganistán: Altos cargos militares expresan dudas sobre el aumento del despliegue": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Reino/Unido/estudia/enviar/otros/2000/soldados/Afganistan/elpepuint/20081115elpepiint_8/Tes"Le Monde" anuncia: "La CIJ instruira la plainte pour génocide de la Croatie contre la Serbie":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/11/18/la-cij-instruira-la-plainte-pour-genocide-de-la-croatie-contre-la-serbie_1120200_3214.html#ens_id=1120203"CNN" informa: "Croatia, Serbia genocide case to proceed": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/11/18/croatia.serbia.icj/index.htmlAsia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"New York Times" informa: "Maritime Hijackings Decrease in Asia": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/world/asia/19asiaships.html?ref=world"CNN" publica: "Markets mixed following falls across Asia": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/11/18/world.markets.down/index.html"China Daily" anuncia: "Powerful Indonesia quake kills 4": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/18/content_7214022.htm"China Daily" plantea: "Japan's economy unlikely to achieve growth in 2009: official": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/18/content_7215971.htm"La Nación" analiza: "Japón, otro gigante económico afectado por la recesión: La segunda economía del mundo se sumó a Estados Unidos y Europa; el FMI reclama fondos": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1071225"Miami Herald" publica: "Schoolgirls' bus bombed in Iraq; 2nd blast hits rescuers: Two deadly explosions during Baghdad's rush hour -- the first wrecking a bus carrying girls -- marked a surge in violence in Iraq.":http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/765709.html"MSNBC" informa: "Beijing to Tibet: Any independence bid will fail: Comments come as Tibetan leaders meet to re-evaluate their strategy": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27789054/"Miami Herald" publica: "Bush's Mideast peace efforts ending, with few gains: The attempt to broker an accord between Israel and the Palestinians now falls to the incoming Obama administration.": http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/764370.html"New York Times" anuncia: "Iran's Parliament Confirms Interior Minister": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/world/middleeast/19iran.html?ref=world"CNN" plantea: "NATO forces fire on militants in Pakistan": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/18/pakistan.nato/index.html"MSNBC" publica: "Gaza militants killed in retaliatory airstrike": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27754100/"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "El Consejo de Ministros iraquí aprueba el pacto de seguridad con EE UU: El acuerdo estipula la retirada de las tropas estadounidenses del país árabe para finales de 2011": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Consejo/Ministros/iraqui/aprueba/pacto/seguridad/EE/UU/elpepuint/20081116elpepuint_8/Tes"New York Times" informa: "Iraqi Leader Defends Security Agreement":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/world/middleeast/19iraq.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin AFRICA"El País" de Madrid informa: "El líder rebelde Nkunda acepta abrir un proceso de paz en Congo: Tras la reunión con el enviado especial de la ONU, los disidentes están de acuerdo en cesar las hostilidades y negociar con el Gobierno": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/lider/rebelde/Nkunda/acepta/abrir/proceso/paz/Congo/elpepuint/20081116elpepuint_9/Tes"New York Times" plantea: "CongoViolenceReachesEndangeredMountain Gorillas": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/world/africa/18congo.html?ref=world"CNN" anuncia: "Congo: Rebel leader orders troops out of town": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/11/18/congo.ceasefire.rebels/index.html"Miami Herald" publica: "UN expects to police new Congo buffer zones": http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/AP/story/776032.html"BBC" informa: "Congo: Líder rebelde apoya proceso de paz. El enviado de la ONU a la República Democrática del Congo, el ex presidente de Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, dijo que el líder de las fuerzas rebeldes, Laurent Nkunda, reafirmó su disposición a mantener el cese el fuego siempre y cuando lo respeten también las tropas del gobierno.":http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7731000/7731974.stm"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Al menos 59 muertos en accidente de tráfico al sur de Burkina Faso: Un autobús que transportaba a 75 personas y un camión se incendiaron tras colisionar en las inmediaciones de Boromo": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/59/muertos/accidente/trafico/sur/Burkina/Faso/elpepuint/20081115elpepuint_9/Tes "The Economist" analiza: "Rwanda and Europe: Judicial politics of a genocide. The arrest of a senior Rwandan official causes a storm": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12609912 ECONOMÍA"New York Times" informa: "Emerging Countries Called Key to Global Recovery": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/worldbusiness/19yuan.html?ref=business "BBC" analiza: "¿Crisis alimentaria en ciernes?: El precio de los alimentos se ha encarecido 45% en los últimos nueve meses y en diciembre pasado se registró el alza de precios mensual más alta en casi 20 años, de acuerdo a las estadísticas de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación, la FAO": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_7340000/7340988.stm"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week": http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12609735 OTRAS NOTICIAS"La Nación" informa: "Un barrio de Berlín alienta un inédito baby boom en Alemania: Allí viven familias jóvenes que tienen un promedio de 2,1 hijos contra 1,5 en Europa": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1070597"CNN" publica: "Pirates grab more ships, captured tanker docked": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/11/18/kenya.tanker.pirates/index.html"BBC" plantea: "Piratas con 2 millones de barriles de crudo": http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7735000/7735001.stm

When Napoleon Bonaparte staged a coup d'état to oust the civilian government of the Directorate in France, he justified his actions as necessary to save the spirit of the Revolution. The army, in Napoleon's view, had a solemn obligation to defend the nation against threats both at home and abroad.The notion that a military, as guardians of a national spirit, has the right to seize the authority of the state became known as Bonapartism. This seemingly persistent belief in certain militaries in Africa emphasizes the need for comprehensive reform.Military regimes can perceive themselves to be better at governance than civilians. The simplicity of efficiently carrying out orders stands in stark contrast to the seemingly endless bureaucracy impeded by incompetence and corruption. In crises where politics leads to impasses in service delivery, the military's projection as being "above politics" can help it seize and keep power in fragile states.Despite the anti-French rhetoric of coup leaders in Africa, many of them nonetheless invoke this spirit of Bonapartism in acting to "save" the state. As the French Revolution began to eat itself under the Reign of Terror, for Napoleon the only means to preserve the Revolution was for its defenders to remove the civilian leadership by force.This was no singular event. Several times in the 19th and 20th centuries, the French army forced dramatic changes in the state whenever the national spirit had been challenged. Bonapartism furthermore formed a significant part of military formation in France's colonies, particularly in Africa.The problem with Bonapartism is that it has greatly undermined attempts to professionalize security forces. When we speak of professional soldiers outside of a (former) colonial setting, we mean a trained soldier who readily accepts and defends civilian authority. Such a situation is so taken for granted today that we do not always appreciate how necessary this is for a thriving democracy.If a military perceives itself to be better, more competent, or in some way less fallible than the civilian government, then a risk of Bonapartism can persist regardless of how well trained they might be. U.S. training of officers, such as those in Niger, may unintentionally lead to a growing confidence in the military about their competence and increase the risk of a takeover.The officers leading the coups in Niger and Gabon cite persistent civilian misrule, aided in no small part by continued French dominance in domestic political and economic policies in both countries, as the primary justification for their intervention. They present themselves as acting in the best interests of the nations they are nominally intended to protect. Seizing power away from incompetent civilians is merely a continuation of their duty.Scenes of crowds celebrating the removal of decades-long dictatorships do indicate at least a modicum of legitimacy for the military's actions in Gabon. Many coup leaders across Africa have justified their actions on the demonstrable misrule by civilian governments. In almost every scenario, however, the coup leaders merely became the new dictators. These actions further emulate Napoleon's hold on power, although few did so as blatantly as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, who declared himself Emperor 4 December 1977.Bonapartism is not solely a francophone problem and can exist in any state with weak democratic institutions. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Egypt, despite the civilian façade, the spirit of Bonapartism still lingers. For both states, the military has long been the true source of the state's authority.Zimbabwe's elections are a mere formality, a political tradition rather than any substantive effort to change the civilian authority. Aside from the Egyptian military's brief foray into relinquishing power to the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, the civilian leadership serves at the pleasure of the military, not the electorate. When the military felt that Egypt was at risk under the leadership of the Brotherhood, they acted to save the state by retaking authority, a quintessential Bonapartist action.The coup in Sudan that ousted Omar al-Bashir was a remarkably similar instance of a military acting to change the civilian leadership during a crisis. However, the current infighting among senior officers points to an entirely different matter. It's actually a misnomer to refer to states like Sudan as "weak." Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the state is too powerful in relation to other aspects of the society, particularly the economy.Such states are the 'only game in town' in terms of attaining mobility, income, and basic security. Fights over who controls the state become so violent because of a lack of options. As long as other sectors remain underdeveloped, the risks of coups will persist. In such cases, it may well be counter-productive to invest too much in the militaries, and making control of the military all the more tempting.There are steps the African Union and other international bodies can take to militate against Bonapartism. The first concerns the AU's Lomé Declaration of 2000, which established a norm against unconstitutional regime changes by stating that any extra constitutional changes in a government is grounds for immediate suspension. In practice, this commitment has been far from rock solid, with the AU making numerous exceptions over the years.Moreover, tougher penalties could be applied, especially in the form of mandating Security Sector Reform (SSR) as necessary processes to return to the AU.SSR entails a comprehensive overhaul of a state's security sector. The security sector includes not only the military but also the police, judiciary, and any intelligence services. Importantly, SSR requires more than mere training, as the Niger and Burkina Faso cases demonstrate. Therein lies the rub of military governance and strengthening democracies: the only body with the authority to restructure the military is the military itself.Save for the odd counter-example, democratic promises by army officers have rarely been realized. Even in instances where elections have been held, the military nonetheless retains inordinate influence over the civilian leadership, and the threat of future coups persists.SSR is neither cheap nor easy to adequately implement. One of the most important factors is rewriting a constitution with sufficient judicial strength to ensure that an elected legislative body has the ultimate authority over all security forces. Doing so must result in the end of Bonapartism for the military and the conclusion that they are not the sole nor ultimate defenders of the nation.The rush to hold elections after a coup is often seen as an act of good faith by coup-leaders to return a country to democracy. However, to be a democracy does not only mean having elections, as democracy contains a set of values, including civilian oversight and regulation of all coercive forces in a state.Every soldier needs to be educated on the importance of civilian leadership as they are far more likely to know what is in the best interests of the civilian population than a general. Military training by foreign experts without complementary democracy training is, as Niger bears out, counter-productive to the overall mission objectives of combating Islamist insurgencies. US foreign military training reportedly includes instruction on safeguarding democracy and human rights.While US policy is to immediately halt all military aid following a coup, the policy has not always been strictly enforced, more rigorous enforcement may be more effective in the long term. These recent coups raise the difficult question on the efficacy of democracy and human rights training for militaries who are evidently not receptive to the message.Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte attempted a similar overthrow of a civilian government as his more illustrious uncle in 1851. This more foolhardy power grab led Karl Marx to quip that "history repeats itself, the first as tragedy, the second as farce." Unless the right lessons are learned, the Bonapartism lurking in African militaries will continue the tragedy of military rule.

In questo saggio Schneider espone dettagliatamente alcune generalizzazioni da lui sviluppate nel corso di un interesse più che decennale ai problemi dello sviluppo. Il suo scopo è mostrare come il modo di considerare e di affrontare lo sviluppo differenzi l'antropologo dall'economista o dal teorico dello svililppo, essendo diverso il tipo di esperienze e di "coinvolgimento" con le realtà e le situazioni su cui si vuole intervenire.Fra le dieci generalizzazioni proposte dall'autore possiamo distinguere quelle che mirano ad evidenziare il "comportamento economico" delle popolazioni del Terzo Mondo nel loro sistema di vita tradizionale, e quelle che riguardano alcune caratteristiche dei piani di sviluppo finora adottati e le loro conseguenze sul sistema sociale e culturale delle popolazioni "beneficiarie" degli interventi.Dal primo gruppo emerge la considerazione che l'uomo del Terzo Mondo è al pari di noi homo oeconomicus e come tale dimostra capacita di decision-maker, cioé valuta varie e reali possibilità e sceglie quelle che gli permetteranno di migliorare i profitti.L'applicabilità di concetti presi dall'economia neo-classica a realtà etnografiche è stata dimostrata proprio dall'evidenza empirica del comportamento razionale delle popolazioni su cui l'autore ha lavorato a lungo. L'esperienza antropologica ha inoltre contribuito a eliminare il pregiudizio che le popolazioni del Terzo Mondo siano orientate alla produzione unicamente per la sussistenza. Oggi è chiaro che questa gente non produce solo per il sostentamento, ma per ricavare un profitto. Un esempio a riguardo ci è offerto dai Turu del Tanganyika studiati da Schneider nel 1959-60. I Turu considerano il bestiame da loro allevato deposito di valore ed aspirano ad avere mandrie sempre più numerose per poter migliorare la loro posizione e aumentare il loro potere nellla società. Per raggiungere un tale obiettivo prima regola da seguire è sposarsi. Alla moglie infatti compete la produzione di grano e più ne produce più aumenta la quantita da immagazzinare e conservare per i periodi di siccità. Un grosso surplus di grano permetterà di ottenere bestiame a basso prezzo. I piu ricchi allevatori infatti, avendo investito poco nella produzione di grano in tempi normali, quando capitano anni di siccità sono costretti a vendere bestiame a prezzi ridotti per ottenere il grano necessario.L'orientamento al profitto è quindi presente nelle attivita di gestione e produzione delle genti del Terzo Mondo. Il suo riconoscimento, come aspetto importante del loro comportamento economico, comporta una necessaria revisione dei principali obiettivi dei progetti sviluppo, fino ad oggi miranti soprattutto ad aumentare la produzione di cibo per migliorare l'alimentazione.Altra generalizzazione, implicita in quanto detto sopra, è che questa gente è motivata ad ottenere potere. È errato quindi considerare queste societa statiche ed il loro ordinamento del potere una rigida tradizione mantenuta dal sistema sociale.Fra i Tiv della Nigeria nel 1920, come riporta la Mead (1955), gli uomini più giovani trovarono un immediato vantaggio dalla situazione creatasi dalla abolizione, da parte del governo coloniale britannico, del tipo tradizionale di matrimonio per scambio delle "sorelle" da cui dipendcvano il potere e l'alta posizione degli uomini piu vecchi. I giovani poterono procurarsi mogli attraverso i normali compensi (bridewealth), minacciando seriamente il potere degli anziani che avevano invece un controllo assoluto sugli scambi tradizionali.Questo ed altri casi citati da Schneider mostrano che quando si presentano particolari situazioni alcune sezioni della popolazione cercano di sfruttarle a loro vantaggio per ottenere potere a scapito di altri, provocando modificazioni nel sistema sociale. La constatata frequenza del fenomeno nega inoltre la possibilità di reputarlo "eccezionale".Altri preconcetti devono essere abbattuti, come quello di ritenere che la gente del Terzo Mondo necessariamente debba essere guidata o indirizzata nelle scelte di sviluppo. Questa gente ha invece dimostrato di essere capace di realizzare per proprio conto forme concrete ed utili di sviluppo. Ne sono un esempio l'industria del cacao creata in Ghana dagli Akwapim e quella del caffé ad opera dei Chagga in Tanzania che si rivelarono le iniziative più vantaggiose per i rispettivi paesi al tempo dell'indipendenza.Un caso particolarmente interessante e quello dei Teso dell'Uganda che iniziarono a coltivare il cotone all'inizio del secolo su pressione del governo coloniale britannico. Sebbene il cotone fosse in competizione con il miglio, loro prodotto tradizionale, il piano non fallì. I Teso infatti seppero integrare la coltivazione del cotone con il loro sistema di produzione di miglio, arrivando ad ottenere un notevole profitto da entrambi. L'aumentata quantità di miglio prodotto permise loro sia di venderlo sia di usarlo per fare birra. Inoltre, resistendo ai tentativi del governo di aumentare la produzione del cotone, mantennero con profitto le loro mandrie e i loro tradizionali sistemi di gestione.Dal secondo gruppo di generalizzazioni proposte da Schneider, emergono due considerazioni: la prima riguarda il carattere etnocentrico della maggior parte dei programmi di sviluppo, l'altra l'impossibilita di raggiungere uno sviluppo con "equità".Sarà sufficiente riportare il caso dei Somali dell'Africa orientale per chiarire la sua prima valutazione. Questa gente è fra le popolazioni africane allevatrici di cammelli quella che ne possiede di più. Questo fatto ed un confronto con gli agricoltori, ritenuti meno ricchi, hanno creato nei Somali una sensazione di benessere economico ed una alta considerazione del loro bene rimario, i cammelli. Lo sviluppo dal loro punto di vista consisterehbe solo in un aumento del numero dei capi per persona. I teorici dello sviluppo invece, attribuendo un valore economico molto basso ai cammelli per i quali non esiste un mercato mondiale, considerano i Somali uno dei popoli più poveri della terra. Le loro proposte di sviluppo quindi consistono nel sostituire l'allevamento dei cammelli con l'agricoltura e la pesca, i cui prodotti hanno un mercato mondiale. Ma nessun Somalo vede in questa sostituzione una soluzione "razionale" per il proprio sviluppo.I piani di sviluppo hanno per Schneider anche un carattere dottrinario poiché, gasandosi in minima parte su una valutazione obiettiva dei fatti, sono dettati soprattutto dall'ideologia di chi è addetto alla loro programmazione. Per esempio il piano proposto per l'area Mbeere in Kenya che mira a individualizzare il possesso della terra, é solo in apparenza un tentativo di scongiurare il degrado dell'ambiente attraverso la creazione di una più responsabile agricoltura. In realta è l'espressione dell'idea inconscia che la privatizzazione e lottizzazione della terra costituiscano un buon sistema poichè è il sistema usato in Europa ed in America. Altro esempio è la sostituzione in Burkina Faso della produzione della birra che costituiva una importante fonte di reddito, con l'industria del cotone che rende meno ma che ha una migliore reputazione.La seconda considerazione riguarda l'impossibilità di raggiungere uno sviluppo equo. Ad essa Schneider arriva partendo dal presupposto che lo sviluppo è un processo politico o sociale. Ciò significa che quando per intervento del governo o delle nazioni interessate allo sviluppo del Terzo Mondo, vengono introdotte nuove o più avanzate tecnologie, oppure nuove forme di produzione, o innovazioni nella gestione ed uso delle risorse, si verificano fenomeni di polarizzazione sociale. Un esempio: in Kenya per disposizioni governative i Tugen, agricoltori, hanno interrotto il loro legame commerciale con gli Il Chamus, popolazione prevalentemente pastorale. Questi ultimi allora hanno cercato di incrementare la loro produzione agricola intensificando l'irrigazione. Ma solo i più ricchi hanno potuto accaparrarsi le poche aree irrigabili. Ora questi hanno il controllo sulle provviste di grano e possono aumentare ancora le loro mandrie vendendo grano ai più poveri della loro gente.Quindi poichè lo sviluppo è spesso accompagnato da polarizzazione sociale non si potrà raggiungere uno sviluppo equo. È meglio allora puntare all'equità o allo sviluppo?Nel Punjab in India l'introduzione di una nuova specie di grano a più alto rendimento contribuì a risolvere in parte i problemi alimentari del paese nel 1970, ma contribuì anche ad aumentare la ricchezza di chi, già più ricco di altri, possedeva un numero di acri tale da permettergli di sostenere le spese che il nuovo prodotto comportava. Una situazione opposta si è verificata in Tanzania che ha seguito la via dell'equità. Il denaro destinato allo sviluppo del paese è stato infatti usato soprattutto per migliorare i servizi legati alla salute e all'educazione, mentre sono stati trascurati investimenti per attività produttive. Ciò ha impedito una polarizzazione sociale ma anche un vero sviluppo del paese.Per Schneider, una risposta a quale delle due vie sia più saggio seguire è suggerita dalla previsione degli effetti dell'una e dell'altra a lungo termine.

NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year.
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Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled.
Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.

Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.

I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?

JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.

I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.

It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.

So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.

CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.

So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.

I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.


JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.

Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.

It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.

In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.

CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.

I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?

JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.

He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.

Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.

It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.

CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.

Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-

JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.

So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.

President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.

CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.

We'll be right back after this quick message.

And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.

Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.

I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.

The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.

It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.

It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.

He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.

Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.

CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.

Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.

Thank you for listening.


Ambassador Johnnie Carson





Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience,

Trotz des erheblichen Ausmaßes der Bodenerosion in vielen Entwicklungsländern ist bislang weitgehend unklar, welches ihre wesentlichen anthropogenen Ursachen sind, und damit auch, wo Politiken und Maßnahmen für den Erhalt der Nahrungs- und Produktionsressource Boden ansetzen sollten. Jenseits unmittelbarer natürlicher und landnutzerischer Ursachen stehen heute sozioökonomische Faktoren im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion, von denen angenommen wird, daß sie die Anbau- und Bodenschutzentscheidungen der Landnutzer und darüber das Ausmaß an Bodenerosion beeinflussen, insbesondere: (i) verstärkte Armut, (ii) zunehmender Bevölkerungsdruck, (iii) verzerrte Agrarpreise, (iv) unangepaßter technischer Fortschritt sowie (v) unsichere Landbesitzverhältnisse. Der Bedeutung dieser Bestimmungsfaktoren wird vorwiegend im Rahmen produktionsökonomischer Ansätze und der Theorie der Induzierten Innovation nachgegangen. Allerdings wird die Wirkung einzelner Ursachen in der Literatur sehr unterschiedlich eingeschätzt. So wird beispielsweise in eher optimistischen Szenarien davon ausgegangen, daß Armuts- und Bevölkerungsdruck langfristig zur Entwicklung und Verbreitung bodenschonender Innovationen führen. In negativen Szenarien überwiegen hingegen Stimmen, die gerade in diesem Druck bei gleichzeitigem Preisdruck die wesentlichen Ursachen für die kurzsichtige Übernutzung des Bodens sehen. Empirische Studien zur Fundierung der kontrovers diskutierten Hypothesen liegen bislang nur für einen jeweils begrenzten lokalen Kontext vor und sind kaum verallgemeinerbar. Vor diesem Hintergrund bieten die Daten der ersten weltweiten Erhebung zum Stand der Bodenerosion (GLASOD, UNEP/ISRIC, 1991) nunmehr die Möglichkeit, sozioökonomische und landnutzerische Determinanten der Bodenerosion auf überregionaler Ebene empirisch zu untersuchen. Anhand der Aggregation und Analyse der im GLASOD enthaltenen Informationen wird zunächst deutlich, daß Afrika und Südostasien flächenmäßig mit jeweils rd. 4,5 Mio km2 am meisten zur Degradation durch Bodenerosion und Nährstoffverluste[1] in Entwicklungsländern beitragen, während der Anteil erodierter Fläche an der jeweiligen Gesamtfläche des Subkontinents[2] in Südwestasien (37%), Mittelamerika und Südostasien (jeweils rd. 25%) am höchsten ist. Extrem stark erodierte Länder finden sich v.a. in Mittelamerika und Afrika: In El Salvador, Haiti und Costa Rica sind zwischen 60% und 90% der jeweiligen Landesfläche betroffen. In Afrika sind vor allem die nord- und westafrikanischen Sahelländer Tunesien, Mauretanien, Libyen, Niger, Burkina Faso und Mali, im Osten die Hochlandstaaten Burundi und Rwanda sowie schließlich die Kapverdischen Inseln, besonders stark erodiert (40% bis 80% der Landesfläche). Wassererosion hat den größten Anteil an der Erosionsfläche, in Mittelamerika und Südostasien sind sogar mehr als 70% der erodierten Fläche von Wassererosion betroffen. Für die empirische Analyse der Zusammenhänge zwischen Bodenerosion und möglichen Bestimmungsfaktoren wird ein exploratives, ökonometrisches Vorgehen auf Grundlage nationaler Daten gewählt[3]. Die spezifische Aufeinanderfolge verschiedener Korrelations-, Faktoren- und Regressionsanalysen wird der großen Anzahl in Frage kommender Indikatorvariablen für mögliche Erosionsdeterminanten sowie den zu erwartenden Problemen der Multikollinearität und Modellspezifizierung in besonderem Maße gerecht. Letztere ergeben sich einerseits aus anzunehmenden Abhängikeiten unter verschiedenen Erosionsdeterminanten. Andererseits macht der latente Charakter[4], den die aus einem mikroökonomischen Kontext abgeleiteten Erosionsursachen auf aggregierter Ebene haben, es notwendig, für jede der angenommenen Determinanten verschiedene, u.U. korrelierte Indikatorvariablen zu definieren, was zusätzlich Kollinearität bedingt. Für Bodenerosion werden auf der Basis der national aggregierten GLASOD-Daten verschiedene Erosionsindizes definiert, die prinzipiell den von Wasser- und Winderosion sowie durch Nährstoffverluste betroffenen Anteil der nutzbaren Landesfläche wiedergeben. Die Datengrundlage für mögliche Erosionsdeterminanten wird ausgehend von Datensammlungen internationaler Organisationen für den Zeitraum 1961-1990 zusammengestellt. Für eine große Anzahl der in der Literatur diskutierten sozioökonomischen, landnutzerischen und auch natürlichen Rahmenbedingungen können repräsentative Indikatorvariablen definiert werden. Mangels geeigneter Indikatoren und Daten bleiben allerdings die Art und Sicherheit der Landbesitzverhältnisse unberücksichtigt. Insgesamt umfaßt die Datengrundlage rund 150 Variablen. Die Ergebnisse der Einfachkorrelationsanalysen zwischen den Erosionsindizes und möglichen Determinanten dienen einer ersten Einschätzung der Zusammenhänge. Sie zeigen, daß länderübergreifend insbesondere Variablen des Bevölkerungsdrucks sowie der durchschnittliche Waldanteil mit dem Ausmaß Bodenerosion in Zusammenhang stehen. Die Abholzungsraten in den 80er Jahren sind vor allem mit dem Ausmaß der Wassererosion korreliert. Bei Betrachtung der Länder mittleren Klimas[5] können Zusammenhänge mit Variablen nachgewiesen werden, die die Landnutzungsintensität und die Ausdehnung der tatsächlichen Nutzfläche in Relation zur potentiellen Nutzfläche wiedergeben. Weiterhin stehen in der mittleren Klimazone tendenziell sinkende Produzentenpreise für Agrarprodukte in Zusammenhang mit dem Ausmaß der Erosion. Erwartungsgemäß ist die Bedeutung natürlicher Faktoren für einzelne Erosionsformen und Klimazonen charakteristisch. Insgesamt scheinen Variablen, die das Ergebnis einer vermutlich längerfristigen Entwicklung wiedergeben, mehr Bedeutung für das Ausmaß der Erosion zu haben als solche, die Veränderungen im Referenzzeitraum 1961-1990 erfassen. Anhand verschiedener Faktorenanalysen für 62 Variablen und 73 Länder mit annähernd vollständigen Datensätzen können sodann strukturelle Zusammenhänge unter der Vielzahl möglicherweise relevanter Erosionsdeterminanten aufgedeckt und die Variablenanzahl auf Grundlage dieser Zusammenhänge auf eine geringere Anzahl weitgehend voneinander unabhängiger Größen reduziert werden. Es zeigt sich, daß die Struktur der Variablen durch etwa zehn gut interpretierbare Faktoren bei rd. 75% erklärter Gesamtvarianz klar wiedergegeben werden kann, und daß diese Faktoren auch bei Variation der Ausgangsvariablen sowie der Faktorextraktions- und Rotationsmethode stabil bleiben. Bemerkenswert ist, daß viele der Faktoren einen deutlichen Bezug zu den in der Literatur diskutierten Wirkungsketten unter möglichen Erosionsdeterminanten haben. So werden in dem für die Erklärung der Gesamtvarianz wichtigsten Faktor Variablen gebündelt, die die langfristige Intensivierung der Landnutzung im Zusammenhang mit strukturellem Bevölkerungsdruck und begrenzter Verfügbarkeit landwirtschaftlich nutzbarer Flächen erfassen. Weitere wichtige Faktoren beziehen sich auf strukturelle Armut in Verbindung mit erhöhtem ländlichen Bevölkerungswachstum; auf die mit Bevölkerungsdruck einhergehende langfristige wie auch rezente Expansion der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche und Abholzung von Naturwald; auf Entwicklungswege, die eher auf die Produktion hochwertiger Produkte statt auf eine Flächenexpansion abzielen. Für die Preisentwicklung im Referenzzeitraum kann anhand einer Faktorenanalyse mit reduzierter Länderanzahl[6] gezeigt werden, daß ein Zusammenhang zwischen langfristig geringen oder negativen Preiszuwächsen im Agrarsektor und dem Faktor "Rezente Abholzungsraten" besteht. Um die relative Bedeutung dieser Faktoren für Bodenerosion zu quantifizieren, werden schrittweise Regressionsanalysen mit Bodenerosion als abhängiger Variablen und ausgewählten Repräsentantenvariablen für jeden Faktor als angenommenen unabhängigen Variablen durchgeführt[7]. Es lassen sich drei besonders relevante anthropogene Entwicklungen identifizieren, anhand derer das Erosionsausmaß bis zu rund 75% erklärt werden kann: (1) die langfristige, historische Ausdehnung der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche auf Kosten des Waldbestandes in Zusammenhang mit einem Gesamtbevölkerungsdruck, der gegen Ende der 80er Jahre die agrar-ökologische Tragfähigkeit überschreitet; (2) die rezente Abholzung von Naturwald, die in Zusammenhang mit dem Wachstum der Gesamtbevölkerung zu sehen ist. Hier scheinen weniger der Druck der Agrarbevölkerung und die Ausdehnung der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche - also die Produktionsseite - im Vordergrund zu stehen, als vielmehr der Druck der Nachfrageseite, in Kombination mit einem tendenziell sinkenden Agrarpreisniveau, das den Expansionsdruck auf das Land verstärkt hat. (3) Die langfristige, bevölkerungsdruckinduzierte Intensivierung der Agrarproduktion, vor allem durch Umwandlung von Dauergrünland in Ackerland, verkürzte Brachezeiten und erhöhte Viehbesatzdichten. Ein weiteres Ergebnis ist, daß in keinem Fall ein wesentlicher Einfluß von Armut auf das landesweite Ausmaß der Bodenerosion nachgewiesen werden kann - wie bereits die Ergebnisse der Einfachkorrelationsanalysen für immerhin 15 verschiedene Armutsindikatoren vermuten lassen. Es bestehen Unterschiede in den Erklärungsmustern für verschiedene Erosionsformen und Klimazonen. Die rezenten Abholzungsraten haben für Wassererosion, insbesondere in Ländern der extrem humiden Klimazone, herausragende Bedeutung. Zusätzlich zu den Faktoren (1) und (2) ist die Intensität der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion (3) vor allem für Wassererosion und in Ländern der mittleren Klimazone von Bedeutung. Hier ist auch die negative Wirkung einer sinkenden Agrarpreisentwicklung am stärksten. Gleichzeitig gilt hier: je eher der eingeschlagene Entwicklungsweg auf die Produktion hochwertiger Produkte im Gegesatz zur reinen Flächenexpansion abzielt, desto geringer ist das Erosionsausmaß. Für das Ausmaß der Winderosion und der Degradation durch Nährstoffverluste hingegen sind insbesondere die agroklimatischen Bedingungen ausschlaggebend. Die als erosionsrelevant identifizierten anthropogenen Rahmenbedingungen sind mit zentralen theoretischen Hypothesen konsistent. Fraglos gehören sie eher zu den Größen, deren kurzfristige Beeinflussung durch politische Maßnahmen schwierig ist. Dennoch können folgende Ansätze für eine Schwerpunktsetzung bei der Gestaltung von Politikmaßnahmen zur wirksamen Erosionsverminderung abgeleitet werden: Die Reduktion des Bevölkerungsdrucks durch eine an die natürlichen Bedingungen und relativen Faktorknappheiten angepaßte Erhöhung des Produktionspotentials, gerade auch in Regionen mit relativ niedrigem Potential. Eine stärkere Fokussierung auf Forstpolitiken bzw. auf eine Regulierung der kommerziellen Nutzung von Wäldern, vor allem in humiden Klimazonen. .Eine selektive, langfristig angelegte Verbesserung der incentive-Struktur für bodenschonende Produkte und Anbaumethoden über wirtschaftspolitische Eingriffe sowie durch verbesserte institutionelle und rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen. Von Politiken zur Armutsbekämpfung ist hingegen nicht zu erwarten, daß sie maßgebliche Impulse zur Verminderung der Bodenerosion geben können. Es muß jedoch immer präsent bleiben, daß arme Landnutzer sicherlich am stärksten und häufig existentiell von Erosionsschäden betroffen sind. Die Qualität zukünftiger Forschungsbemühungen auf globaler Ebene wird vor allem von der zukünftigen Datenverfügbarkeit und -qualität bestimmt: Für den Stand der Bodenerosion sind Informationen für verschiedene Zeitpunkte erforderlich; für anthropogene Erosionsdeterminanten eröffnen georeferenzierte Daten der Forschung gänzlich neue Perspektiven. Parallel zu überregionalen Analysen sind weitere lokale, sub-nationale Studien unbedingt notwendig, um umfassend zu ergründen, warum und welche Landnutzer die Ressource Boden in einem konkreten sozioökonomischen Kontext degradieren. Fußnoten: [1]Neben der Wasser- und Winderosion wird eine weitere Degradationsform, der Verlust von Nährstoffen und organischer Substanz, mitberücksichtigt und vereinfachend mit "Nährstoffverluste" bezeichnet.[2]Gemeint ist die nutzbare Landesfläche, Ödland ausgenommen. [3]Georeferenzierte Daten liegen derzeit für sozioökonomische Erosionsdeterminanten noch nicht vor.[4]D.h. Größen, von denen a priori nicht bekannt ist, wie sie beobachtet und gemessen werden können. [5]Dies sind Länder, in denen weder extrem aride noch extrem humide Bedingungen vorherrschen. [6]Für die entsprechende Variable liegen nur Daten für 56 Länder vor.[7]Umgekehrte Wirkungen der Erosion auf die als unabhängig angenommenen anthropogenen Variablen sind im Betrachtungszeitraum - bis auf die Armutswirkung starker Erosion - unwahrscheinlich. ; By the end of this century, soil erosion has reached an alarming extent in many developing countries. Still, uncertainty prevails regarding the human-induced causes of soil erosion. In consequence, many efforts to design efficient anti-erosion policies and instruments remain erratic. The actual discussion about human-induced causes of soil erosion focusses on socioeconomic factors that assumably influence the land users´ decisions on agricultural production and soil protection, and, hence, the degree of soil erosion. The most frequently discussed factors are: (i) poverty, (ii) population pressure, (iii) biased agricultural prices, (iv) the introduction of inadequate technical innovations and (iv) insecurity of land tenure. They are basically deduced from and discussed on base of production theory and the theory of induced innovation. Nevertheless, the different views on the importance to be assigned to the single factors are quite controverse. For example, in a rather optimistic scenario, it is argued that poverty and population pressure lead to the development of soil-conserving innovations in the long run. On the other side, poverty and population pressure, in combination with falling agricultural prices, are assumed to lead to a short-termist overuse of the soil. Empirical evidence that supports some of the controverse hypotheses on the causes of soil erosion is restricted to local studies based on local data on soil erosion, their results can hardly be generalized. In this context, the spatial data compiled within the global assessment of human-induced soil degradation (GLASOD; UNEP/ISRIC, 1991) for the first time permits a large-scale empirical analysis of socioeconomic and landuse factors relevant to erosion. By aggregating the information of the GLASOD data, countries and regions whith marked soil erosion can be identified. While Africa and Asia most contribute to the extent of soil erosion and the loss of nutrients[8] in absolute terms (4,5 mio sqkm each), it is in Southwest Asia (37%), Central America and Southeast Asia (25% each), where the proportion of of the land area - excluding wastelands - that is affected reaches the highest levels. Looked at on a national level, countries with an extreme extent of soil erosion are to be found in Central America and Africa: In El Salvador, Haiti and Costa Rica, 60 to 90 percent of the land area[9] are affected. In Africa, Sahelian Countries as Tunesia, Mauretania, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as the eastafrican highlands of Burundi and Rwanda, and also Cape Verde show the highest proportions of eroded land area2 (40 to 80 %). Water erosion is the most widespread type of erosion, in Central America and Southeast Asia it even contributes with about 70% to the area affected by erosion and the loss of nutrients1. The methodological approach chosen for the empirical analysis of human-induced causes of soil erosion is an explorative, econometric one, based on national cross-country data[10]. A specific combination of correlation analyses, factor analysis, and regression analysis is designed, that can handle the great number of possible indicators for the assumed causes of erosion, and cope with related problems of multicollinearity and model specification. Those problems result from supposed interrelationships among different human-induced causes of soil erosion. At the same time, many of the causes of erosion have a latent character when considered on a national level[11], since they are deduced from a microeconomic context. This makes it necessary to define various indicator variables for each of them, which, again, implies additional multicollinearity. On the basis of the aggregated GLASOD data, a set of operational variables for soil erosion is defined. They basically indicate the proportion of a country´s degradable land area (i.e. land area minus wastelands) that is eroded through wind, water, or degraded by the loss of nutrients and organic matter by the end of the 80´s. In turn, the database for possible determinants of erosion is compiled departing from standard international data sets for the time span 1961-1990. Representative indicators can be defined for many of the causative factors discussed in literature, as well for socioeconomic ones, as for landuse, and also for natural factors. They are adapted in a way that they not only best fit and capture the hypothesized determinants, but also the ecological and timely dimension of the analysis. One important field that is not covered is land tenure. The resulting database comprises about 150 variables for possible causative factors, with a varying number of country-data available. The results of correlation analyses between the indicator variables for soil erosion and for possible causative factors facilitate a first assesion of relevant relationships. They show, that variables that quantify population pressure and the proportion of forested area are correlated with soil erosion for all countries. Deforestation rates in the 80´s are especially related to water erosion. Considering only countries without extreme climatic conditions[12] correlations are found between soil erosion and variables for the intensity of land use and the degree of expansion of the agricultural frontier. Producer price declines for relevant agricultural products are also found to be correlated with soil erosion in these countries. Corresponding to theoretical assumptions, the importance of different natural factors vary for different types of erosion and climatic zones. Altogether, variables that express structural conditions and can be regarded as the outcome of historical, long-term developments, seem to have stronger correlation with the extent of soil erosion than variables that quantify changes that took place within the time span under consideration, 1961 to 1990. The next methodological step consists in different factor analyses for 62 of the variables that express possible causative factors and for 73 countries with approximatively complete data sets. The principal objectives are to detect structural interrelationships among the multitude of variables and to reduce their number on the basis of these interrelations, in a way to obtain a set of variables that are largely independent of each other. It turns out that the structure of the 62 variables under consideration can clearly be reproduced by about 10 factors, with about 75% of their total variance being explained. These factors prove to be robust with respect to changes in the set of included variables, and in the methods of extraction and rotation. It is noteworthy, that many of the identified factors refer to cause-effect relationships that are discussed in literature. For instance, the factor that explains the greatest part of total variance, combines variables that quantify the long-run intensification of land use with others that stand for structural population pressure and a limited buffer for the expansion of the agricultural area. Other important factors relate to structural poverty, in combination with high rates of rural population growth; to the long-term and recent deforestation and to total population pressure; to development paths that aim at sopisticated animal procuction and permanent culture rather than at a mere expansion of the agricultural area. Other factors stand for the prevailing natural conditions. Based on a factor analysis for a reduced number of countries, it can be shown that declinig aggregate agricultural producer prices[13] are associated with the factor ´recent deforestation rates´. To quantify the relative importance of the identified factors, stepwise regression analyses are then carried out, with soil erosion as the dependent variable and selected representative variables for each of the factors as presumed independent variables[14]. Three human-induced factors, or developments, show to have particular relevance for the extent of soil erosion, that they can explain to up to 75%: (1) the long-run historical expansion of the agricultural frontier at the expense of the forested area, in combination with a population pressure well above the corresponding supporting capacities in the 80´s; (2) recent deforestation rates in conjunction with total population growth. This effect can rather be associated with a growth of demand for agricultural and forestral products and declining agricultural prices than with pressures directly resulting from agricultural population and expansion; (3) the long-run intensification of land use, mainly throug the conversion of permanent pastures to arable land, the shortening of fallow periods, and the increase of animal densities. This type of intensification is associated with and possibly induced by high structural population pressure in agricultural areas. Another important result is that poverty seems to have minor impact on the extent of soil erosion at the aggregate, national level. None of the included variables that represent the factor ´poverty´ shows a significant relative impact, neither in the models for the sum of erosion nor for specific types of erosion or climatic zones. This fact supports the low correlation coefficients for altogether 15 different poverty indicators that were calculated in the context of simple correlation analysis. Specific models for specific types of erosion and climatic zones show that there exist characteristic patterns of explanation for each type and zone. Recent deforestation rates and the associated features (factor (2))are particularily important in the explanation of water erosion, especially in countries with predominant humid climate. The impact of production-intensity in terms of factor (3) is specific for water erosion, and for countries without extreme climatic conditions, together with the factors (1) and (2). This is also where the negative effect of declinig agricultural prices appears to be strongest. At the same time, the development of sopisticated animal procuction and the growth of the area under permanent culture in contrast to a mere expansion of the agricultural area seem to be favourable to the soil in this context. In the explanation of wind erosion and loss of nutrients, natural factors are in the foreground. The identified, human-induced pressures related to long-term population growth, intesification, agricultural price decline and recent deforestation are consistent with important theoretical hypotheses. Those pressures are clearly not of the type that can be overcome over night through political intervention. Nevertheless, they lead to the following areas of intervention that should be given priority in the design of policy measures for the reduction of soil erosion: A reduction of population pressure through an increase in site-specific production potentials, based upon innovations that match the prevailing agro-ecological and economic conditions. Special attention should be given to low potential areas.A stronger focus on forest policy and the regulation of commercial forest use especially in the humid zone.A selective, long-term improvement of economic incentives for the production of soil-conserving crops with soil-conserving methods, by means of economic policy as well as through improved institutional conditions. Policies that aim at the reduction of poverty can not be expected to play a decisive role in the reduction of soil erosion. In spite of that, it is most necessary that policy makers keep in mind that the poor certainly are most affected by and vulnerable to erosion damages. At a global scale, the quality of future research on the topic will largely be determined by data availability and quality: concerning soil erosion, information at different points in time is necessary; for anthropogenic factors, spatial datasets will bring a new dimension into scientific research. Parallel with global analyses, further in depth local studies are necessary for a comprehensive and detailed insight into why and which land users degrade the resource they depend on in a specific socioeconomic context. footnotes: [8]The loss of nutrients and organic matter, independent of soil erosion, is also considered and is abbreviated with the term ´loss of nutrients´ in this text. [9]Again, it is the land area excluding wasteland that is being referred to. [10]Spatial data sets are not avaiable yet for socioeconomic factors related to soil erosion. [11]I.e. it is not known a priori, how these causes can be measured and quantified. [12]I.e. countries without predominant arid, hyper-arid or humid agroclimatioc conditions. [13]The availability of data for the variable in cause is limited to 56 coutries. [14]Reciprocal effects that soil erosion might have on anthropogenic factors are not very likely to occurr within the considered time span, except a possible increase of poverty due to erosion.

Every so often I am reminded of how counter-productive US engagement in the world has become. Of how, after miserable failure after failure, this country's foreign policy makers keep trying to run the globe and fail again. From the strategic defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan to the feckless effort to sway the excessive Israeli military operation in Gaza, the US has squandered its power, exceeded its capabilities, and just plain failed.My reminder was a recent New York Times piece lamenting the failure of US efforts to keep terrorists out of the Islamic areas of West Africa.For more than 25 years, spending billions of dollars, the US has been providing weapons and training for African militaries, has established a separate US military regional command for Africa, has provided both intelligence and military support for counter-terror operations, and established operating military bases or deployed forces in West Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea. The Times report is incomplete; it does not include Chad, Somalia, or Djibouti, where the US has deployed and operated forces for more than two decades.Ostensibly the goal of all these military efforts has been to strengthen the ability of African militaries to prevent and defeat terrorism and, secondarily, to build or strengthen democratic governance.The Times, which has reported on these efforts rather uncritically for two decades, acknowledges that there are more terrorists than ever in these countries. Moreover, Christopher Maier, DoD Assistant Secretary for special operations policy in the Pentagon, admitted to the Times that "our general desire to promote democratic governments and having healthy governance there has not gone particularly well."That's an understatement. Beyond increasing the number of terrorists and terrorist organizations, the military forces trained and armed by the US have taken over governments. This year, those new leaders began throwing the US military out of their countries, along with the French military, who have been deployed there for years. In Niger, the US military is closing down its new $110 m. operating base, from which the US used drones to spy on and attack terrorist groups in the region."It's about time," is my reaction. The US military should never have been in these countries to begin with or, if they were, only as a secondary aspect of US efforts to help strengthen governance and the economies of these impoverished nations. Even then, it is not clear the US has any capability either to stop terrorists, train other militaries to stop terrorists, or "strengthen governance" in another country. We certainly can't do that using military force. But military force has been at the heart of US policy in Africa for more than two decades.So what went wrong and what to do about it? Is this just a case of adjusting US policy to be more effective, as the Times article suggests? Or is something fundamentally wrong with US policy? After years of working on security assistance and cooperation policies, I think it is the latter. The US way over-militarized the security problem. The US does not do the training and equipping job particularly well – military effectiveness is uneven, at best. And US programs have proven counterproductive with respect both to counter-terrorism and democratic governance. It's not time to reform the policy; it is time to close down US security cooperation and assistance in Africa.It has been clear to me for nearly 15 years that these programs were doomed. As Becky Williams and I concluded in a 2011 report for the Stimson Center, the fundamental flaw in US security assistance and cooperation programs, especially in Africa, is that the Pentagon is in charge. Over the past three decades, the Defense Department and, specifically, the US military has taken over how these policies and programs are defined, what their goals are, and how they are implemented. The State Department, which once had the lead in security assistance programs, has lost a good deal of its authority to oversee and evaluate these efforts.The military's definition of security in Africa is a major part of the problem. I call it a "security first" approach. The focus of the military's view is that you can't have a functioning government unless the border and interior of a country are "secure" or safe. From this point of view, one cannot have a responsive government before there is military security. Democracy and good governance have to wait. As the West African experience is amply demonstrating, "security first" actually leads to greater insecurity. Militaries in these countries consume more and more of the nation's budget, impoverish their economies, and, through their operations, stimulate the very threat the military says it is trying to eliminate. Too many of these US-trained and supported military leaders seize political power, with greater arbitrary oppression the result. More terrorists and less democracy are certain to follow. Research suggests, instead, that security depends on strong civilian governing capabilities and more effective civilian administration. The administration of a nation needs to be in place before the military can be properly controlled and used. Governance and stronger states actually come before strong militaries.That's a fancy way of saying militaries that are too powerful in nations where government is too weak, are a threat to security and to democracy, and are an incentive to greater terrorist activity and internal unrest.So I have thought for some time, that if anything can be done to help other nations with a security problem, strengthening the governance of that nation and, alongside that, its economy need to take precedence over bulking up their armed forces.Consulting with the State Department between 2008 and 2012, I made a stab at trying to link security funding to good governance, as an incentive to the African countries with which we were engaged. I wrote a paper for State that proposed a challenge fund – some of US security assistance dollars would be put in a pool. Countries that wanted help could compete for the funds, but the criteria for getting them would include such practices as a free press, legislative oversight, publicly disclosed military budgets, a civilian ministry of defense, among other things. Good governance, in other words, would be the road to support for security needs. I wish I could direct you to the paper, but like many ideas, it was killed before it made the State Department's budget request.I even took a shot at consulting with the World Bank to make the examination and reform of military institutions in the countries they assisted part of their regular budget reviews of those countries, something the Bank had never done before. They produced a great report, but it sank like a stone at the Bank, which has been averse to examining this growing sector of government spending in places like West Africa lest the scrutiny alienate the Bank's more authoritarian members.So here we are, at what could be the end of the line. Lots of money, lots of failure, and sent packing by the militaries the US supported. And today I wonder whether even the reforms I was suggesting would have made any difference. These now seem to be the reforms the policy makers are examining; the Times piece indicates that people at State and DoD are now saying " gee, we need to integrate this military stuff with governance and economic development stuff."I have no doubt we are about to see lots of budget requests for programs that purport to do just that. But based on the abysmal failure of US governance and economic reform plans in Iraq and Afghanistan, I have little faith that the US civilian institutions can properly define and implement such reforms from the outside.The world is not hungering for such reforms, especially in Africa where authoritarianism and corruption are expanding. Moreover, the Chinese and the Russians have made it clear they will provide plenty of assistance without any such governance and reform strings attached. What's more, the US is now at the brink of being a failed democracy itself; hardly a model for anyone else.So I think it is time for restraint; to bring these military forces home and bury US assistance programs. They don't work; they don't achieve the projected goals; they waste funds; and they are counter-productive.Real reform can only come from within. Were an outside power, say France or Britain, to intrude into the dysfunctionality of US politics and try to change things, that intrusion would be unwelcome.As with the US, so it is with any country, the prospects for change in Africa depend on the awareness and willingness of the population in these countries to own their own change processes, demand accountable and responsive governance, and then seek the external support they need to make it happen. Then, and only then, can outside support become useful and effective. This article was republished with permission from The Sheathed Sword.