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The Houthis are creating a global shipping crisis as they draw support and tribute from other Muslim countries and peoples for standing up for Palestinians in Gaza. But how far will it go before the West punches back in defense of "world trade" and regional security?On December 18, the Department of Defense announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian. The ten-nation force aims to ensure maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb, which is a shipping chokepoint between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since October 7, the Houthis have launched more than a hundred armed drone and missile attacks — including several aimed at US warships on Saturday — claiming that they are targeting any and all vessels with links to Israel.These threats have caused global shipping companies to divert away from the Red Sea. Many are now sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, which can add over a week to sailing times and as much as 20% to shipping costs. The diversions are also impacting Egypt's fragile economy. Tolls from the Suez Canal are a significant source of hard currency for the Egyptian government. Additionally, the Israeli port of Eilat has seen its revenues decline by 80%. While the global costs of the Houthis' attacks on shipping are steadily increasing, the attacks are paying hefty political and even strategic dividends for the Houthis, who appear to be winning on the public relations front both in and outside Yemen. In Yemen, support for the Houthis, even among some enemies, has increased. In many other Muslim nations, the Houthis are viewed as being "the only Muslim group standing against Israeli aggression." The high profile attacks, including the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, have stoked national pride among many Yemenis. The Houthis' sophisticated strategic communications operations draw all of these attacks to the attention of domestic and international audiences. According to Yemeni sources who spoke to this author, this has supercharged recruitment for the Houthis and has also led to an influx of donations to the war effort from Yemeni businesses and individual citizens. The attacks are also a demonstration of the Houthis' geographical reach and of their emergence as a regional power.The only negative consequence of the anti-Israel campaign, at least so far, has been a reduction of the number of ships docking in the Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah and Salif. Yemen imports well over 90% of its food and a majority of the imports arrive via Hodeidah. Duties and taxes arising from the port are an important source of revenue for the Houthis. Reduced dockings at Hodeidah and rising maritime insurance costs will begin to bite, too.However, it is the Yemeni people who will pay the heaviest price. The Houthis enjoy multiple revenue streams which include everything from a range of efficiently collected taxes, the seizure of businesses and properties, to interests in illicit activities that range from human and arms trafficking to the manufacture and distribution of various drugs.The Houthis are hardwired for resilience and adaptability. Nearly two decades of war have honed the Houthis' war fighting capabilities. After the effective fall of the Yemeni government in September 2014, the Houthis further enhanced these capabilities by grafting their organization into what remained of the Yemeni military and intelligence services. Since 2014, the Houthis have systematically taken over almost every aspect of civil governance, security, education, and the economy in northwest Yemen.While the Houthis were and remain one of the finest guerrilla fighting forces in the region, if not the world, their success on and off the battlefield in Yemen has been aided by the ineptitude and disunity of their enemies. Yemen's Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the cobbled together Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) have consistently failed to unify the dozens of militias that operate in those areas outside Houthi control. Additionally, the IRG has failed to reign in endemic corruption. A considerable portion of the Houthis' arms and materiel comes from what Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide to their proxies in Yemen. Many of these Saudi and Emirati supported militias sell weaponry into Yemen's thriving arms market where the Houthis or their agents buy the weapons. This is not to argue that there isn't corruption within the Houthi organization. There is. However, the corruption is managed and largely limited to senior members of the organization. The Houthis exercise tight command and control over their arsenals, weapons assembly facilities, government ministries, and a burgeoning economic empire in Yemen. Northwest Yemen has never had a more efficient or brutal government than the current Houthi-led regime.Since October 7, the U.S. and its allies have focused on defensive measures aimed at intercepting the Houthis missiles and drones. The costs of these measures are steadily increasing. The U.S. and its allies cannot easily continue to expend large numbers of scarce multimillion-dollar missiles to take out drones that can cost as little as a thousand dollars. The Houthis have factories, many of which are located in hard-to-target dense urban areas, which can manufacture — supplies permitting—dozens to hundreds of low-end drones per week. More sophisticated drones are produced at a slower pace, but the Houthis can still assemble several hundred of these over the course of a few months. While the Houthis have and continue to receive assistance and materiel from Iran, almost all the Houthis' drones and missiles are assembled in Yemen. The Houthis are also increasingly focused on modifying and adapting Iranian designs for missiles and drones to suite their own particular requirements.To date, the Houthis have only used a fraction of the armed drones and missiles that they currently possess. Nor have the Houthis made use of their more sophisticated longer-range drones and missiles. The Houthis also possess large numbers of naval mines, including hard to detect influence mines.The U.S.-led collation of ships that is now assembled in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, combined with the on-shore assets in neighboring countries, possesses enough firepower to degrade the Houthis' military capabilities, at least over the short term. However, such a campaign will need to be sustained for what could be months and will come at a tremendous cost for all involved. The Houthis are masters of asymmetric warfare—as clearly evidenced by their Red Sea campaign—and will respond to U.S.-led strikes by attacking energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis will also deploy more sophisticated missiles and armed drones. While U.S. and coalition warships will likely be able to defend themselves against these weapons, commercial shipping, especially tankers, will be increasingly vulnerable. The Houthis have already effectively closed the Bab al-Mandeb to many global shipping companies. Higher-intensity conflict in and around the Bab al-Mandeb could mean that Red Sea shipping traffic is diminished—or even stopped altogether—for months. The Houthis have largely achieved their objectives: impose costs on Israel and its allies, demonstrate their regional reach, and bolster domestic support. The U.S. and its allies have no good options when it comes to dealing with the Houthis. Apart from acting to constrain Israel's unrelenting offensive in Gaza, the only way of avoiding entering an escalatory loop is for the U.S. to continue to support Saudi and Omani led efforts aimed at reining in the Houthi's threats and attacks. Yet, at the same time, the Houthis only respect force. The current U.S. response is viewed as toothless by the Houthis, and many other nations and non-state groups will view the response or lack thereof in the same way. The conflict in the Red Sea is a harbinger of what the future holds as the diffusion of low-cost but increasingly capable weapons systems continues. The U.S. and its allies are inevitably going to face more and more situations in which there are no good options as the asymmetry between high and low-cost weapons systems increases.

Following Houthi missile attacks aimed at Israel and third-country-flagged vessels in the Red Sea, the Biden administration is reportedly considering targeting northern Yemen while creating a new international maritime alliance to try to ensure secure transit. As a result of the Houthi attacks, international merchant shipping is being rerouted with inflationary consequences for vital global supplies. Washington is weighing whether military strikes would either deter or incite further Houthi action and risk undermining desirable attempts by Saudi Arabia at ending its conflict with the Houthis following Yemen's stalled but unresolved civil war. The Houthis' Red Sea military intervention is attempting to combine ideologically-driven anger at Israel's military campaign in Gaza with leverage for funding the long-unpaid salaries of northern Yemenis under Houthi control. However, oil revenue, in part limited due to Houthi missile attacks on southern Yemeni oil and related facilities, is managed by the internationally recognized Yemen government based in Aden in southern Yemen. For the so-called "Legitimacy Government," or LG, to give the Houthi money to pay northern "civil servants" — who include armed fighters — U.S. pressure and Saudi and Emirati backing are needed. But this is highly unlikely. In southern Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), founded in 2017 with the backing of the UAE, is preparing to lead the formation of a new state by secession from what it considers a failed, and northern-dominated, Republic of Yemen, or RoY. The STC hopes to exploit what they see as the Houthis shooting themselves in the foot by destabilizing the Red Sea area. After all, the Houthis have, despite a 20-month formal ceasefire, been waging an economically motivated war against the south designed to deprive the LG of revenues and boost the appeal of the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. For the STC to reemphasize southern ports and oil facilities as an alternative to Houthi-controlled Hodeidah, it needs to somehow secure the whole southern Yemeni coast and to incentivize more inbound shipping. The Houthis' relationship to Iran makes it easy for the STC to label it a Tehran proxy. Despite membership in Iran's "Axis of Resistance," and Iran's aid in extending their missile technology's literal reach, the Houthis have their own motivations. The STC is seizing on the Houthi threat to Red Sea security to underline the prospective role of its own "shadow state" in boosting international maritime stability. In this context, this southern state-in-waiting is willing to uphold western security interests and is thus presenting itself as a proactive partner in securing the Red Sea's Bab Al-Mandab strait and the Gulf of Aden against Houthi attacks. The STC argues that the proven Houthi threat to Red Sea security is a cynical exploitation of popular Yemeni anger over Israel's actions against Gaza. A recent STC press conference, headed by the self-styled president of the south, Maj-Gen Aidaroos Zubaidi, called on those seeking to secure the area to beef up the STC's "naval forces."The STC, however, does not actually have its own navy or any regular armed forces. In fact, it is debatable if it has any armed units that can be properly described as under Zubaidi's command. Southern Yemen exists in an almost parallel universe. Zubaidi enjoys recognition, as does the STC he leads, by virtue of his position as vice-president of the Saudi-backed eight-man Presidential Leadership Council, or PLC, heading the version of the RoY that sits in Aden. The PLC includes Zubaidi's STC deputy, the former governor of the huge southern governorate of Hadramawt, Maj-Gen. Faraj Bahsani. Yet another military figure in a leading STC political role, Bahsani previously headed the RoY's 2nd Military Division.But neither Zubaidi nor Bahsani can offer an armed underpinning to the STC's claims to be an all-inclusive movement for southern independence. These men, like other LG members, enjoy their international recognition via the LG, a Yemeni government that is neither a state nor one in waiting. While the LG enjoys the loose loyalty of some RoY military remnants in the south and in some parts of the north, its armed capacity is uncoordinated and riven by unreliable tribal components. And the LG itself lacks popular political support. By contrast, the STC, based on much anecdotal evidence, enjoys some popular support in Aden and in the other southwestern governorates: Abyan, Lahej and Dhale, and in coastal Hadramawt. In the Wadi area of Hadramawt, however, local saadah (descendants of the Prophet Mohammed) and tribal leaders are more circumspect. What the STC lacks, even in its Aden base where leading STC figure Ahmed Lamlas is governor, is direct control of armed forces. The Emirati-trained and -backed "police," the Hizam Al Amni ("Security Belt") operating in Aden, are formally speaking STC-aligned but are not in practice directly controlled by Gen. Aidaroos, the nominal supreme commander of "the Southern Armed Forces." The Amaliqa ("Giants Brigade"), another Emirati-formed force which in 2022 played a decisive role in pushing Houthi fighters out of the energy-rich southern governorate of Shabwa, are only loosely connected to the STC. A rival, Emirati-founded army, the Nokba ("Elite Forces"), was in operation in Shabwa but was displaced by "Shabwa Defense," which is associated more closely with Saudi Arabia. In Aden, the STC is busy creating parallel bodies to those of the governorate. It does not see this as unnecessary duplication but rather as trying to fill the vacuum in services provision in a formal governorate structure that it ostensibly runs. The STC is intent on a similar "shadow state" project in Mahra (the governorate that borders Saudi Arabia to its north and Oman to its east). However, the STC is doing this in far less auspicious circumstances than in Aden. In Mahra, "northern" political and security influence, including that of Al-Islah (Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood) is profound, due in part to demographic realities created by the large numbers of people who have fled Houthi advances and security services that are seen by critics as RoY loyalists. The Mahran version of Amn Al-Watan ("National Security") struggles to communicate with its notional "National Security" partner in neighboring Hadramawt. Oil and other essentials carried by road from southwest to southeast Yemen are not protected for their safe arrival in Mahra by any coordination with supposed parallel security bodies in other southern governorates. To be a plausible partner state of the U.S. and the other western powers who are now moving to protect Israel and Red Sea shipping from the Houthis, the south needs a single unified form of control of the different military and security services that, at best, operate on a governorate basis only. But the south's main external sources of support, the Emiratis and the Saudis (the latter having formed separate "National Shield" forces in Aden and Hadramawt), are not interested in promoting an integrated southern security body. One reason is that these two Gulf states have competing interests in different parts of southern Yemen, and a common unwillingness to push for a sovereign southern stateSouthern Yemen under the STC's would-be leadership is seeking to burnish its western-friendly security and political credentials. However, southern Yemen remains a would-be nation made up of different countries only partly united in opposition to perceptibly northern rulers. For the time being, it looks as if the role of any southern Yemeni state in Arabian Peninsula security will remain rhetorical.

Every year, the State Department issues its new "Country Reports on Terrorism," and each year, the rationale for Cuba's listing among the state sponsors of international terrorism gets thinner. The 2022 report, issued just last month, justifies the inclusion of the other countries on the list — North Korea, Iran, and Syria — by citing specific acts of state terrorism or ongoing support for terrorist groups. The report on Cuba, however, is simply an historical account of how Cuba ended up on the list in the first place rather than a rationale for keeping it there.In 1982, President Ronald Reagan designated Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism for supporting revolutionary movements in Central America. In 2015, President Obama determined, based on an intelligence review, that Cuba was not a state sponsor of terrorism and took it off the list. In January 2021, just days before leaving office, President Trump put Cuba back on the terrorism list in a transparent political pay-off to conservative Cuban American supporters in south Florida, and a last-ditch attempt to complicate Joe Biden's stated intention to resume normalizing relations with Havana. Trump's rationale was that Cuba, which had been hosting peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN guerrilla movement, refused to extradite the ELN negotiators to Colombia's new conservative government after it broke off the talks — despite the fact that Colombia had previously signed a protocol specifying that if talks collapsed, the ELN negotiators would be guaranteed safe passage back to Colombia. Norway, co-guarantor of the talks along with Cuba, sided with Havana. (Norway was not designated a state sponsor of terrorism.)Even that thin rationale disappeared when Gustavo Petro was elected president of Colombia in 2022, restarted the peace talks, and demanded that Washington remove Cuba from the terrorism list, calling its inclusion "an injustice."Not until its final sentence does the 2022 Terrorism Report offer any rationale for Cuba remaining on the list: "Cuba also continues to harbor several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades."Cuba has, in fact, given political asylum to a handful of U.S. political exiles accused or convicted of politically motivated acts of violence in the 1970s. The United States, of course, has given political asylum to many more Cubans who engaged in politically-motivated violent attacks in Cuba — some of them trained by the CIA as soldiers in its secret war against Cuba in the 1960s. But does harboring U.S. fugitives qualify as sponsoring international terrorism? Although the fugitives have been in Cuba since the 1970s, they were not cited as a rationale for Cuba's designation as a state sponsor until 1988, by which time, the annual reports admitted, there was no longer any evidence of Cuba supporting any foreign revolutionary groups. The law requiring the annual State Department terrorism report defines international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." That does not fit the U.S. fugitives, whose violent acts were committed in the United States before they sought asylum in Cuba. Some of their actions might qualify as domestic terrorism, but not international terrorism. Nor does giving alleged terrorists political asylum constitute providing them with a terrorist sanctuary, which the law defines as territory from which terrorists are allowed "to carry out terrorist activities… or as a transit point." None of the U.S. fugitives have planned or plotted terrorist attacks against the United States since arriving in Cuba half a century ago. In 2015, when President Obama took Cuba off the list, Secretary of State John Kerry implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. fugitives were not a valid reason to keep Cuba on the list.In short, there is no longer any legitimate rationale whatsoever for Cuba being designated a state sponsor of terrorism. Cuba stays on the list because the Biden administration does not have the political courage to remove it — even though Cuba and the United States have a Memorandum of Agreement and active dialogue on counter-terrorism cooperation! Various U.S. officials have offered different stories about whether the Biden administration is reviewing Cuba's designation. Shortly after Biden's inauguration, then-White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said it was under review, along with the rest of Trump's Cuba policies. More recently, in March 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was browbeaten by Rep. Maria Salazar (R-Fla.) into declaring it was not being reviewed. A number of Democratic members of Congress who have been pushing the administration to take Cuba off the list were given the impression by Biden officials that the policy was being reviewed — until Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Jacobstein told them last week that it was not. They were livid, according to a report in The Intercept.Treating Cuba's listing like a political poker chip has real costs, not only to Cuba but to the United States as well. Most obviously, it delegitimizes the list itself, reducing it to little more than an arbitrary political cudgel. Cuba's designation has alienated important U.S. allies in Latin America and Europe. For Latin Americans, it is a symbol of Washington's broader policy of regime change, a policy universally opposed in the region. Colombia has taken the lead in organizing Latin American governments to pressure the Biden administration to take Cuba off the list. When Secretary Blinken visited President Petro in Bogotá in October 2022, Petro made a point of publicly calling for Cuba to be removed from the list. Blinken replied, "We have clear laws, clear criteria, clear requirements, and we will continue as necessary to revisit those to see if Cuba continues to merit that designation." But since the administration refuses to actually "revisit" Cuba's designation, the clear laws, criteria, and requirements never come into play. Most Europeans are able to visit the United States without seeking a visa under the ESTA (Electronic System for Travel Authorization) visa waiver program — unless they have recently traveled to a country on the state sponsors of terrorism list. The impact of this sanction on European travel to Cuba has been significant. The number of visitors from the major European countries (Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany) remains significantly depressed from pre-COVID levels while the number from Canada, which is not part of the ESTA program, has returned to pre-pandemic levels. European governments regard this restriction on their citizens as utterly unjustified and their representatives in Havana are as vocal as the Latin American diplomats in complaining about it to U.S. officials. But thus far, to no avail.As campaign 2024 kicks off, the chances that the Biden administration will admit the obvious and take Cuba off the terrorism list appear increasingly remote. There have been 16 U.S. presidential elections since Fidel Castro rode into Havana in 1959, and only once has the incumbent U.S. president relaxed sanctions during an election year — Obama in 2016 as part of his normalization policy. No president running for re-election has ever relaxed sanctions during a campaign.Cuba is living through its worst economic crisis since the 1990s, unable to access the international financial system because of the terrorism designation. But apparently, Cubans will be condemned to suffer for at least another year, branded with the Scarlett Letter T for terrorist, while the Dimmesdales of Biden's campaign try to curry favor with Cuban Americans in south Florida who are not going to vote for him anyway.

As conflicts ignite around the world, dragging on in Ukraine while sparking off in the Middle East, venture capital is banking on defense.Indeed, United States-based venture capital investment in defense start-ups has doubled in four years. Only investing about $16 billion in 2019, U.S.-based VCs went on to seal over 200 defense and aerospace deals worth nearly $17 billion in the first five months of 2023 alone. Meanwhile, VC giant Sequoia invested in its first defense group, Mach Industries, earlier this year.Who are the defense VCs?Through their collective efforts, prominent venture capital firms including billionaire Peter Thiel's Founders Fund, Andreessen Horowitz (a16z), and Lux Capital are upstarts among today's rising stars in the defense sector, including Anduril, Hadrian, and Rebellion Defense. And in the process, VCs accrue not only high investment returns, but also growing influence over U.S. foreign policy.Moreover, VC-backed groups in the defense space are giving established defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and RTX (formerly Raytheon) a run for their money. As Jamie Martin noted on BookForum four years ago, Founders Fund-backed Palantir had beaten out RTX to secure an $800 million army contract, and Elon Musk's VC-powered SpaceX had been gobbling up satellite sector funds, forcing Boeing and Lockheed Martin to develop their own venture capital operations, Horizon X and Lockheed Martin Ventures respectively, to compete.Fast forward to 2023 and VC's domination of the defense space has crystallized in a conflict-mired era. Newcomer machine-parts startup Hadrian was founded only in 2020, but has already soared to the defense industry's forefront, raising almost $100 million in funding as of late 2023,Likewise, venture capital has buoyed defense newcomer Rebellion Defense's rapid rise to prominence, with Rebellion raising $63 million in 2019 through the likes of former Google CEO Eric Schmidt's new venture capital firm Innovation Endeavors, Founders Fund, and angel investor James Murdoch, son of FOX News Founder Rupert Murdoch. Schmidt, Murdoch, and In-Q-Tel (the CIA's venture capital firm) Trustee Ted Schlein sit on Rebellion's Board. "It doesn't seem to be that working for the Pentagon is a dirty word anymore," explains William Hartung, a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. "It seems like a lot of these startups are very much seeking that, and then the VC companies are facilitating it."Defense VCs thrive on conflictAt its heart, venture capital is a risky form of private equity financing. Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars U.S.-based VCs invest each year, about 75% of venture capitalist backed start-ups fail.Success in venture capital, therefore, depends on heavy-handed risk-taking in the hopes of big returns from a few investments. In the defense sector, however, high returns comparable to other VC-frequented industries, like tech, are uncommon, rendering VC investing choices complex. Ultimately, these coveted, yet elusive returns become more plausible in periods of tension and conflict, when governments — which VC-backed defense groups "depend" on for business-sustaining contracts — have a greater appetite for weaponry and adjacent tech.Mastering the influence game In any case, defense-focused VCs are gaming this primary client in their favor: like the U.S. government-defense contractor revolving door's advocacy for perpetual conflict, VCs are now becoming major Washington influencers while simultaneously jumpstarting defense's newest and biggest names.In this respect, billionaire VCs like Peter Thiel and Eric Schmidt are conspicuous for involvement in both sides of government-defense sector relations. While Thiel says he won't fund candidates in the 2024 race, he's previously supported a slew of successful Republican congressional campaigns. And after stints as Chief Financial Officer for Thiel's now-defunct Clarium Capital Management and Chief of Staff at Thiel Capital, Michael Kratsios took White House and Defense Department positions in the Trump administration, giving Thiel closer proximity to power.Furthermore Rebellion investor Schmidt is a member of the Defense Innovation Board, which advises lawmakers and the Pentagon on tech policies and, as the American Prospect former managing editor Jonathan Guyer writes, is "allocating resources toward the exact technology Rebellion [is] selling." Rebellion Defense obtained U.S. Air Force contracts worth up to $950 million in 2020. According to Guyer, the arrangement suggests "no firewall between Schmidt's work for the government and the private sector." Two Rebellion Defense employees also served on the Biden Administration's Presidential transition team.Indeed, VCs' lack of transparency and visibility in the public eye shields their activities in the defense space from critical scrutiny."If the head of the Joint Chiefs goes on the board of Lockheed Martin, everybody knows about it," says Hartung. "If a general goes on the board of some small tech company or as an advisor, that's not as visible. But their activities may actually be more dangerous because they're helping launch a whole new generation of technologies where we don't really know what the consequences will be as they apply to military issues."Meanwhile, talk from defense-focused VCs and their beneficiaries' suggests an urge to stir global tensions, or otherwise convince the Pentagon to prepare for the worst. For starters, VC-powered defense organizations are making their allegiance with Israel clear as it continues to pummel Gaza, with Palantir and Anduril making public pro-Israel statements and Israel employing VC-backed Shield AI's Nova 2 drone in besieged Gaza.Moreover, VC groups are poking the stick at China, now a nemesis in what Palantir senior policy adviser Jacob Helberg deems a brewing "tech war." (Helberg is also a member of the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, putting him in a prime position to focus lawmakers' national security-related policy concerns). Meanwhile, Lux Capital's website plainly states that China is "a serious threat to U.S. global hegemony." And a16z Cofounder Marc Andreesen has observed he has more success in policy conversations with lawmakers when he mentions China: "[A]ll of a sudden it's like, 'Oh well we need American A.I. to succeed, and we need American technology companies to succeed, and we need to beat the Chinese.'"Teaming up earlier this year, further, a group of 13 prominent tech companies and adjacent VC groups signed an open letter requesting defense procurement reforms to better open the U.S. defense budget to start-ups. The letter warns that if no changes are made, U.S. "competitors will continue to gain ground on the technological battlefield" leaving American warfighters at a disadvantage on the physical one.Anduril's Palmer Luckey even characterized VCs as "hawkish" for the sake of protecting existing investments in a recent interview, observing that "[e]veryone who cares about Ukraine is also watching Taiwan, because…Taiwan going south is an actual existential threat to many of their investments [based there]. And so I think you're seeing a lot of hawkishness on the part of venture capitalists" as a result. More bluntly, VC America's Frontier Fund (AFF) representative gloated that "if there is a kinetic event in the Pacific," referencing Taiwan,"some of our investments will [go up] 10x, like overnight."Meanwhile, cash flows suggest VCs' efforts are paying off: Anduril has earned an estimated $342 million in revenue in 2023, telling investors it's slated to score $625 million in new government contracts this year. Rebellion Defense's contracts doubled in 2023 alone. And, despite years of unprofitability, Palantir's stocks jumped 20% after impressive third-quarter results, in which the company made $72 million in net income. As Palantir's Alex Karp previously put it, "[b]ad times are very good for Palantir." Ultimately, VCs' success in this sector relies on conflict. In other words, they're looking for a fight.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

It is now clear that the Ukrainian offensive of the summer and fall of 2023 has failed, with minimal gains and enormous losses. There has been no repeat of the sweeping Ukrainian victories of 2022. Ukrainian army chief General Valery Zaluzhny has admitted that the war has now entered a stalemate.Russia is now attacking in its turn; and although so far its forces also have made only very slow progress, time does not appear to be on Ukraine's side. Russia has some four times Ukraine's population and 14 times its GDP, which give it huge advantages in what has become a war of attrition. Serious imbalances in the U.S. and European military industries mean that Russia is also producing far more shells than Ukraine is receiving from the West.Ukraine's victories in the first months of the war were due to the courage and grit of Ukrainian soldiers, certain particularly effective Western weapons, and extremely bad Russian planning. They were also, however, attributable to the fact that Ukraine was able to mobilize more men than Russia, due to President Putin's hesitation over increasing conscription. That advantage has now been reversed. Moreover, as recent developments in the U.S. Congress and in Europe make clear, there can be no guarantee that Western aid will continue at levels sufficient to allow Ukraine to continue the fight successfully.There is therefore no realistic prospect that Ukraine can significantly improve its existing position on the battlefield. The West can provide more weapons, but it cannot generate additional Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine is facing greater and greater difficulties in recruiting troops; meanwhile, Russia is calling up reserves and continually strengthening its defensive lines in southern and eastern Ukraine. Voices in the West that promote the idea of complete Ukrainian victory are becoming increasingly desperate; an example is the suggestion by retired American generals that, with additional U.S. missiles, Ukraine can somehow force Russia to evacuate Crimea through bombardment alone — something that the entire history of this war contradicts. To achieve this, Ukraine would also need massive amphibious forces that it altogether lacks.A ceasefire and negotiations for a peace settlement are therefore becoming more and more necessary for Ukraine. Indeed, if the fighting stopped along the existing battle lines, more than 80 percent of Ukraine would be fully independent of (and bitterly hostile to) Russia and free to do its best to move towards membership of the European Union. Given the Kremlin's original aims when it launched the invasion last year, and of the history of Russia's domination of Ukraine over the past 300 years, this would be not a Ukrainian defeat, but, on the contrary, a tremendous Ukrainian victory. If, on the other hand, the war continues indefinitely, there is a real possibility that Ukrainian resistance may collapse, whether through the exhaustion of its manpower or because Russia's additional forces allow it to reopen the fronts in northern Ukraine that it pulled back from last year and that Ukraine lacks the troops to defend.Recognizing this, the Biden administration is reported to be privately advising the Ukrainian government to start talks with Russia. It is however exceptionally difficult for the Ukrainian government to initiate talks. President Zelensky and other leading officials would have to reverse their repeated statements that they will not negotiate with Putin and that the only acceptable terms for even a provisional agreement are complete Russian withdrawal from all the territory that Russia has occupied since 2014. Ultra-nationalist groups are passionately opposed to any compromise. The Russian government for its part is naturally uninterested in a temporary ceasefire at present, since it, too, can see that time is on its side.In these circumstances, it is not enough for Washington to urge talks on the Ukrainians from behind the scenes, while insisting in public that only Ukraine can negotiate peace. Nor is it wise to defer any diplomatic initiative until after the next U.S. presidential election almost a year from now in the hope that both the Ukrainian forces and U.S. aid will hold up that long, and also that an embarrassing about face in the middle of the election campaign can be avoided.Ukraine may not be able to hold out that long, and a major Russian success, involving the conquest of significantly more Ukrainian territory, would confront the Biden administration with an agonizing choice: accept a Ukrainian defeat that would be a grave humiliation for the U.S. and NATO, or threaten direct intervention and risk nuclear war with Russia. Moreover, as the disaster in Israel and Gaza so vividly demonstrates, it is never sensible to trust that an inherently volatile situation like the U.S.-Russian struggle over Ukraine will remain stable. At any time, an accidental clash between (for example) the Russian and U.S. air forces over the Black Sea could precipitate a terrifying increase in tension and a lurch towards nuclear war. Even if the worst outcomes were avoided, such a crisis would have a dire effect on the global and U.S. economies.The full engagement of the United States in the peace process from the outset will be necessary if negotiations are to have any chance of success. Only a U.S. administration can bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Ukrainian government, while also offering reasonably credible security guarantees for the future. And only a U.S. administration can threaten Moscow that, for some time to come, massive U.S. military and economic aid to Ukraine will continue, while at the same time offering the Kremlin compromises on wider issues of vital importance to Russia. If Moscow is to be brought to the negotiating table when the military situation is developing in its favor, it will need to be assured that Washington is prepared to discuss seriously a final settlement involving neutrality for Ukraine (of course, including international security guarantees), mutual force limitations in Europe, the lifting of sanctions, and some form of inclusive European security architecture to reduce the danger of more wars in the future.Initiating such engagement will be extremely difficult for the Biden administration, given its repeated promises of Ukrainian victory and declarations that only Ukraine can negotiate peace. The administration therefore will need outside help if it is to engage in peace talks with Russia.The administration should therefore reach out in private to India, Brazil, and other leading countries of the "Global South" and urge them to issue a strong collective call for a ceasefire and peace talks. In initiating talks, Washington could then present itself as bowing to the will of the global majority. This may also help counteract the disastrous impact on U.S. relations with the "Global South" of the war in Gaza. The U.S. will also need to build support among European allies for a peace effort, including strong public U.S. commitment to NATO.Full Chinese participation will also be essential if a peace process is to succeed. Chinese influence on Moscow will be critical if Russia is to be persuaded to abandon its maximalist ambitions in Ukraine and accept a compromise peace. Amid dangerously rising tensions between the United States and China, such an invitation from Washington would signal to Beijing Washington's willingness to accept China as a partner and legitimate stakeholder in the solution of global problems.None of this is going to be easy, and there will be a strong temptation in Washington to let things slide in the hope that something will happen to let U.S. diplomacy off the hook. To follow this path would, however, be a tragic error and a betrayal of the vital interests of both Ukraine and the United States. The present trajectory of the war is towards disaster. Only the United States can change that trajectory, but it will need a lot of help from its friends.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

It's easy to forget now, but the shocking and horrific violence that set off the current hostilities in the Middle East, where Hamas militants slaughtered and kidnapped innocent Israeli civilians, was predicted. Specifically, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Donald Trump warned in October 2020 that terrorist violence was set to be imminently inflamed.
Trump's DHS didn't claim it was because, in President Joe Biden words, of "sheer evil" from those who exist only "to kill Jews." Rather, it pointed to the Abraham Accords: the U.S.-led effort to normalize relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which Trump claimed would shift the course of Middle Eastern history from "decades of division and conflict" and which the Biden administration claimed would make the region "safer and more prosperous."
So how did we end up with the exact opposite?
For decades, the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, meaning the provision of an independent state for the Palestinian people and the end of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, was central to the task of engineering peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This was a problem, since between successive Israeli governments steadily chipping away at the possibility of a two-state solution to the conflict and dwindling U.S. interest in pressuring the Israeli state to follow through on the commitment, that resolution started to look increasingly impossible.
But over time, the priorities of the Arab states shifted away from the Palestinians, too. Their largely authoritarian leadership became more preoccupied with matters like maintaining political control in the wake of the Arab Spring protests — for which support from an advanced military power like Israel might prove useful — and an increasingly assertive Iran, which then-newly appointed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman called a "much more urgent and more important" issue.
This shift dovetailed with the Trump administration's ultra-Israel-friendly stance and its own goal of further isolating Iran in the region. The resulting Abraham Accords were, at least in the neoconservative world, considered a stroke of "genius." Rather than finding a solution to the seemingly intractable question of Palestinian statehood, it simply sidelined it.
The signers dropped this long-standing precondition as they re-established diplomatic relations and deepened security and economic cooperation with Israel, while Trump lavished them with rewards, like an arms deal for the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and U.S. recognition of the annexation of West Sahara for Morocco. It effectively supplanted the Saudi government's Arab Peace Initiative, which since its 2002 introduction had been the foundation of the Arab world's program for resolving the conflict, placing the Palestinians front and center.
The new normalization agreements' foundational and cynical assumption was that the plight of the Palestinians could and would be safely ignored and forgotten about by both the region's governments and the broader international community. Both the Trump administration and, reportedly, bin Salman, pressured Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to assent, while the states that signed continued paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, claiming this normalization push would halt Israel's annexation plans for its illegal West Bank settlements.
In reality, the text of the agreements barely mentioned Palestinians, outside of a few vague assurances to keep working toward a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that Morocco maintained a "coherent, constant and unchanged position" on the matter. This was, to put it mildly, far short of what both Palestinians and their supporters in the U.S. Congress demanded.
As Arab states began gradually deepening ties with Israel, they increasingly backed away from their historic positions. Bin Salman declared (and subsequently walked back) that Israelis "have the right to have their own land," effectively sanctioning the loss of what the Muslim world viewed as Palestinians' historic land. When violence broke out in April 2021 at the Al-Aqsa mosque, with Israeli forces raiding one of Islam's holiest sites, the UAE response was notably muted. That the normalization process continued despite what would earlier have been viewed as an unacceptable provocation against both Palestinians and Islam itself was celebrated by the accords' supporters, as proof that ongoing repression of Palestinians could indeed be safely ignored.
But the Palestinian issue could not simply be wished away, and the signing of the pacts created a set of contradictions that fueled the tensions that erupted October 7. The vast majority of the populations of Israel's Arab neighbors opposed the accords, as did some leaders, like Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who charged that the signers had "lost their moral compass," and Jordan's King Abdullah, who declared that "no architecture for regional security and development can stand over the burning ashes of this conflict."
So did Palestinians themselves, across opinion surveys, with both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas calling it a "betrayal," a "treacherous stab," and "grave harm." Hamas also called for "an integrated plan to bring down normalization." Protests against the accords erupted in Morocco, one of the signers.
The signing of the Accords was particularly fraught in Saudi Arabia. The country's powerful clerics continued to oppose Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. But beyond that, the Saudi leadership's internal legitimacy and its standing as the region's leader of the Islamic continued to rest in part on its commitment to the Palestinians. Regional rival Iran quickly stepped in to fill this vacuum left by Saudi support for the deals, sharply criticizing the normalization effort as a "betrayal of Palestinian aspirations for freedom."
Meanwhile, Israeli policy didn't change as promised, and in fact, only hardened. Since 2020, when the accords were signed, illegal settlements have expanded and even ramped up alongside settler violence. The Netanyahu government has now advanced a record number of settler housing units, and transferred administration of the occupied territories from military to civilian hands, widely interpreted as signaling plans for annexation, even as figures like former Abbas adviser Ghaith al-Omari claimed the accords had "already delivered to the Palestinians" by stopping this policy. This past September, the UAE's ambassador to the United States admitted annexation hadn't actually stopped.
The Biden administration could have reversed Trump's efforts, and placed pressure on Israel to halt these plans, as well as end its settlement expansion while making good on its promises and obligations under the peace process. Instead, the president continued Trump's normalization efforts while breaking from presidential precedent and not even attempting to advance the peace process, all while issuing little to no criticism of the Israeli government's violations. He has in fact escalated the issue, pushing for an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement, with the only concession to Palestinians the mere preservation of the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian peace — an agreement that would also entail further nuclear proliferation in the region and giving Saudi Arabia security assurances. Even so, Biden's secretary of state continues to claim that this could "be used to advance" such a peace.
So while Hamas had reportedly planned this operation for two years, and claimed it was motivated by years of violence at Al-Aqsa, its attack also can't be understood without the bipartisan push for Israeli-Arab normalization at the Palestinians' expense, and the outrage, anger, and despair it has inspired.What is clear — from Hamas's extraordinary violence, the wider regional war it threatens to spark, as well as the major pro-Palestinian protests across Arab countries in response to Israel's bombing campaign — is that almost every assumption that undergirded the Abraham Accords was disastrously wrong, not least the idea that dismissing the Palestinians would make for a more peaceful Middle East.

On September 14, a Houthi delegation and a team of Omani diplomats flew to Riyadh for talks on resolving the Yemeni conflict(s), constituting the highest-level Houthi-Saudi official negotiations on Saudi soil since Yemen's civil war began nine years ago. On September 20, Saudi officials said the visit produced "positive results." The talks followed a five-month hiatus in peace negotiations since after the last round of Omani-facilitated Houthi-Saudi negotiations that took place in Sana'a in April. The most recent talks appeared to offer more hope for a sustained truce between the Houthis and the kingdom, which would be necessary for bringing lasting peace to Yemen. But concerns persist that a final peace accord between those two parties to what has been a devastating conflict may lead to renewed warfare between the Houthis and other Yemeni factions.New Saudi LanguageIn Riyadh, the Houthi delegation met with Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, who referred to the visiting Houthi representatives as the "Sana'a delegation," rather than "the Houthis" or "Ansar Allah," the official name of the Houthi militia. Such terminology appeared to signal Riyadh's recognition that the Houthis are indeed running a government, underscoring Saudi Arabia's growing willingness to find a modus vivendi with the powerful force that has effectively consolidated power in northern Yemen. "The shift in language to 'Sana'a delegation' is significant," according to Elisabeth Kendall, who teaches Arab studies at the University of Cambridge. "The Houthis and Ansar Allah have long been vilified in the Saudi media, so removing references to them appears designed to de-stigmatize the talks and avoid any notion of a Saudi climb-down," she told RS."The significance of new naming stems from re-positioning and pre-understandings: the desire to improve [the] diplomatic atmosphere, flip the page of full tensions at any cost, confer symbolic recognition, and gradually shift public perceptions," agreed Ibrahim Jalal, a non-resident scholar at the Washington-based Middle East Institute. (Editor's note: MEI counts the Saudi government among its major donors.)Obstacles to a Houthi-Saudi PactDespite recent progress, the Houthis and Saudis have yet to finally reach a permanent truce, and more work will be required. At least four delicate issues remain unresolved. First is the issue of salary payments for public sector employees in the Houthi-controlled north, where approximately 80% of Yemen's population lives. The Houthis demand payments of salaries of public sector workers in areas under their control. But their adversaries worry that the money will fund Ansar Allah's war machine. Nonetheless, there is some vagueness to this Houthi demand because sometimes Ansar Allah frames their demand as if the Houthis want all the back payment while on other occasions making it seem as though they are only demanding salary payments moving forward.The second issue deals with the distribution of Yemen's national oil and gas revenues. "The Houthis will get what they've been demanding for a long time — their share. Or they won't allow the export of oil and gas to proceed in peace," Nabeel Khoury, the former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen who is currently a non-resident Fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC, told RS.The third concern has to do with Houthi demands that the Saudis permit the unrestricted- reopening of Sana'a international airport, as well as other airports in Yemen, and the country's seaports. While these airports and ports have already opened up significantly over the past year, the Houthis demand that they fully reopen. Additionally, Ansar Allah demands flights to and from Sana'a airport from more countries than currently permitted.The final issue regards the Houthis' access to funds in Yemen's Aden-based Central Bank. The talks thus far have addressed how the Central Bank can be reunited, either in Yemen or possibly in another country such as Oman or Jordan. "The idea is again a Houthi demand that money going into the central bank should be available to them as well. The logistics of this will be an important consideration," according to Khoury.Largely thanks to Oman's much-lauded mediation skills, momentum behind the negotiations appears to have accelerated. However, these talks will probably move slowly, with progress coming incrementally given the long-standing distrust that exists between the Houthis and the Saudis. Although trust-building between the two sides can't happen overnight, it is significant that the Houthis sent a senior delegation to Riyadh.Moreover, a September 25 Houthi drone attack along the Yemeni-Saudi border, which resulted in the death of at least three Bahraini soldiers, may set the talks back. According to Jalal, this attack was part of a Houthi effort to "exercise pressure to secure more Saudi concessions…and flip the page at any cost." It will be important to see if and when the Houthis carry out more such attacks and how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might respond.Yemen's Bigger Picture There is more to the Yemeni civil war than the Houthi-Saudi conflict. There are many other conflicts in the country that will require hard work to resolve. If a Houthi-Saudi pact is in fact achieved, it will not guarantee peace between Ansar Allah and other armed groups in Yemen. Many communities in Yemen fear that the Houthis could turn their formidable military power on them after they sign a potential truce with Riyadh."This issue is that the Houthis will have reached a deal with the Saudis, not with their domestic enemies and rivals," according to Kendall. "If the Houthis no longer face any military threat from Saudi, they may feel empowered to push their advantage domestically to gain further territory, more resources and greater political power." "Currently, there is no shared domestic vision for the future shape of Yemen, neither between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government, nor even between the nominally allied members of that government. With the domestic parties themselves so heavily factionalized, the risk of civil war or a frozen conflict remains high," she added.Jalal echoed those concerns. "While efforts to end the conflict are welcome, all non-Houthi Yemeni groups and political parties have legitimate concerns, as they should, given the very domestic root causes of the conflict and multiplicity of stakes and interests. "Ongoing Saudi-Houthi talks are one layer but have yet to address the complexity of what matters most to Yemenis, who shall the seek to improve the quality, content and design of any peace agreement because in the past [they] paid the price of fragile peace," he noted.The weak and fragile Presidential Leadership Council, which is Yemen's internationally recognized government, has not participated in the Houthi-Saudi talks. Nor has the UAE. As Khoury told RS, there are signs that Abu Dhabi is "quite miffed" by its exclusion. What this means is that a potential Houthi-Saudi Arabia truce could result in Ansar Allah consolidating its hold on the north, while a regime led by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) that governs Aden and other parts of southern Yemen declares its independence. The STC has been clear that it will not accept a Houthi-Saudi pact imposed on all of Yemen without its agreement.Ultimately, the latest talks held in Riyadh with the Houthi delegation will ideally pave the way for inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni talks to establish a roadmap toward broader peace across all of Yemen. But the fear is that Yemen's civil war will reignite once Saudi Arabia exits. Time will tell whether a Houthi-Saudi pact would push Ansar Allah toward making concessions to other Yemeni groups or wage war against them.

China and the United States, like sports captains picking sides, have been engaged in a considered effort to enlist partners. In the recruitment rush, the Biden administration has given short shrift to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its much vaunted balancing, or "centrality" in the Asia Pacific. Washington, like Beijing, has favored certain ASEAN members over others, frustrated no doubt by the group's lack of cohesion and effectiveness. But in the new multipolar world, these hinge countries and their groupings can be as important as power poles. There has been a lot of coalition building lately. In August, the BRICS bloc — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — invited six new members to join at the start of 2024. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia reestablished ties after years of antagonism in a deal brokered by Beijing. In July, China signed an accord on law enforcement and security with the Solomon Islands and announced a strategic partnership with Georgia. This month, China upgraded its relationship with American bugaboo Venezuela to an "all-weather" partnership.The U.S. has been similarly busy — perhaps more so to make up for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridge-building over the past decade. In August, President Joe Biden and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts launched a trilateral grouping at Camp David. The U.S. and the Philippines in February revived an agreement giving increased American access to Filipino military facilities. In May, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea concluded a defense pact. At the G20 summit in New Delhi this month, the leaders of the U.S., the European Union, India, Saudi Arabia and other countries committed to developing an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor for cooperation on clean energy, power grids and telecommunications. After the G20, Biden traveled to Hanoi where the U.S. and Vietnam announced that they were elevating relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," deepening cooperation in cloud computing, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — all areas of contention between Washington and Beijing. In a 2021 lecture, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan described how the administration was assembling a "latticework of alliances and partnerships globally." This was "not just about refurbishing the old bilateral alliances," he explained, "but modernizing those elements of the latticework and adding new components." Sullivan cited as examples the upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), to leader level and the creation of AUKUS, the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra and collaborate on advanced technologies.Both Washington and Beijing say they are not forcing countries to pick sides, though the impression that they do just that is unavoidable. Beijing has applied economic pressure on states for actions that it perceives to hew too closely to American positions — Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan have had to deal with such coercion. In network building, the U.S. has offered more carrots than sticks, particularly when it comes to courting pivotal states that Washington deems to have distinct geostrategic importance and — more to the point — the capacity to contribute to countering or containing China. In the Indo-Pacific, India, the Philippines and Vietnam have been the chief recipients of American courtship. But what about ASEAN? Washington insists that it values ASEAN centrality, but the proof of its perspective is in its actions. Biden skipped ASEAN's annual leaders' jamboree with dialogue partners, leaving it to his vice president to go to Jakarta, but squeezed in a visit to Hanoi just days later. The president's participation in the G20 was a not-to-be-missed opportunity to butter up Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who only in June had been feted at the White House. India is the most-prized pivot country in the Indo-Pacific (that status so obvious in the term). Under Modi, it sees itself as a power pole in its own right. New Delhi has proven its multi-alignment credentials, with its participation in the Quad, the BRICS and the China/Russia-conceived Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and its refusal to turn against traditional ally Moscow since the Ukraine war broke out. Biden is oiling the Indian hinge so it swings more Washington's way — and may be succeeding, given India's border clashes with China and its participation in joint military activities in the Pacific, Quad initiatives and Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).ASEAN should be as critical a hinge player if not to win over, at least to keep "central" as the region's balancer — a crucial section of the lattice that would act as a security blanket for peace and stability. Some member states, worried that the China-U.S. rivalry undermines their agency, have warned the two great powers against forcing them to choose sides. ASEAN has not bought into the American Indo-Pacific construct, merely articulating an "outlook" on the concept. Southeast Asian nations will profit more not by putting on any one team's jersey, but instead playing the field as something of a referee or honest broker in good stead with both sides, however heated the competition.U.S. administrations have never taken the centrality of ASEAN seriously, largely because member states themselves have failed to show what it means to be the region's ballast. It is a systemic problem — ASEAN is no EU in either form or practice. Even though it has launched an "economic community" and has sought to address thorny problems, such as Myanmar and the South China Sea, as a group, it remains a politically divided, economically diverse collection of states, with a reputation for glacial progress and ineffectiveness. It was born this way, though it was successful in its founding mission to be a bulwark against communism's spread.But ASEAN has strengths beyond being the world's fifth largest economy. Its convening power is unmatched, reaching across economic and strategic spheres. Its ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus are as evolved and inclusive a strategic framework for the region as is possible. ASEAN-led platforms offer a neutral space for the great powers to interact on a wide range of issues. By lavishing attention on certain ASEAN members — the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (host of a U.S. military facility) — Washington is mimicking the Chinese divide-and-conquer approach (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are reckoned to be on Team Beijing). But even small gaps weaken a lattice. The ASEAN way may be slow and plodding — negotiations with Beijing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea have dragged on for years — but this tortoise cannot be written off.In a speech on September 13 outlining "the power and purpose of American diplomacy," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tellingly never mentioned ASEAN. Yet, the Biden administration may be smartening up. Seven of the ASEAN 10 are part of the IPEF, the American answer to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), from which the U.S. withdrew, and the ASEAN-China concocted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade accord. And guess who's coming to the White House for a bilateral with Biden in November? Indonesian President Joko Widodo, the very leader whom Biden "snubbed" in favor of one night in Vietnam. With its sizable population, strategic geographical position, participation in China's BRI, a maritime dispute of its own with Beijing, a growing strategic relationship with Washington, and a critical presidential election next year, Indonesia is the key hinge power in Southeast Asia. Like India, it has proven its agency and pragmatism, particularly in vital areas such as data security standards and infrastructure development. Giving Jakarta more attention would bolster ASEAN's position in the American Indo-Pacific latticework, especially with Laos, a country that tilts towards Beijing and is taking over from Indonesia as ASEAN chair next year.

The Gulf – where petrostates and psychodrama hold sway – is a critical field for jockeying in the global shift to multipolarity, and the Ukraine war is recasting what each player wants, and thinks it can get.To wit: The Biden Administration wants to extend the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, so it can point to a key foreign-policy win before next year's presidential election while moving Riyadh back inside the U.S.-Israel tent. Saudi Arabia's Mohammad Bin Salman (Crown Prince MBS) wants instead to distance Riyadh from Washington so he can lead non-aligned talks and take the credit for resolving Ukraine's war with Russia — though, as an aside, he has demanded a nuclear enrichment plant and a fleet of F-35 fighter jets to consider Washington's request in return.Iran, which came in from the cold after the past year's "Women, Life Freedom" protests by signing a China-brokered normalization deal with Saudi Arabia, wants to stymie any Abraham Accords expansion beyond Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates and is working hard on becoming everyone's best friend outside the West — read: Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia.Israel wants to expand the Accords to include Riyadh, seeing it as a rare foreign policy opportunity to both balance Netanyahu's domestic woes triggered by his controversial far-right government and to promote the anti-Iran U.S. alliance in the Gulf.The Gulf's oil and staggering wealth, its divide down the middle between Iran and pro-Western states, and its unwieldy balance of two global energy producers facing each other across the absurdly narrow and strategic Strait of Hormuz all make the region one of the highest-stakes playing fields in the world. And the Ukraine war is shifting the goalposts. The Russians have arrived; China is quietly offering prizes, like nuclear plants, to regional actors; and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are flexing new muscle in the ongoing geo-strategic realignment.Russian Moves Russians are flooding the Gulf. They are buying up everything from lampshades to heavy equipment in Iran's bazaars and avoiding sanctions by shipping them over land and across the Caspian Sea. Saudi Arabia is in talks with Russian weapons manufacturers sanctioned by the U.S. Meanwhile, the hotels in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and down the Omani coast have seen a 200-percent jump in Russian bookings this year (376,000 guests a month in Abu Dhabi alone, triple last year's average) despite the weakening ruble.Both MBS and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE's Emir, have entered the field to negotiate a peace accord between Moscow and Kyiv. MBZ, as he is called, visited Russia in June presenting his mediation skills to President Putin, while MBS hosted a round of peace talks in Jeddah in early August, while voluntarily cutting oil output in July to boost prices, upsetting Washington (yet again) as the move will likely shore up Russian oil revenues.U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's attempt during his trip to Riyadh in July to promote the Abraham Accords and convince MBS not to move the goalposts, as well as to join the sanctions regime against Russia fell well short of success.MBS, touting ties to both Ukraine and Russia, instead drew his own line in the turf, gathering 42 countries to his "peace" summit, including the U.S. and China while excluding Iran and Russia. Western critics dismissed it as a soapbox for MBS to parade his new-found role as peace broker (and Moscow blasted it as pointless). But, with China floating a revised 10-point peace formula at the meeting, it established the kingdom's credentials as an emerging power offering new avenues for global conflict mediation, creating more daylight between Riyadh and Washington.Iran ReconstructedWith a new round of protests to mark the anniversary of the women's demonstrations that began last September, the clerical leadership marks a year of surprising rehabilitation in the Gulf as well as wider afield.Saudi Arabia and Iran have reestablished embassies in their respective capitals, offering a green light to warmer (and more substantive) relationships between Tehran and capitals up and down the Gulf's western littoral. For Riyadh, Tehran's warming relations with Moscow and its military support to Russia's war effort have not posed major hurdles, as its own diplomatic proximity to Russia has grown. Both states recognize that their relations with Moscow are pragmatic, if not entirely problem-free, and, as with much in their own ongoing detente, are more focused at the moment on compartmentalizing points of contention to build, rather than damage, goodwill. Despite their respective reputational black marks for human rights, the two oil heavyweights were just warmly welcomed into the BRICS (along with the UAE). This signals the Global South's growing clout and diversity, as well as a clear willingness to challenge established great power rules, prompting White House National's Security Advisor Jake Sullivan seemingly to dismiss the BRICS after the meeting as geopolitically inconsequential.Israel and the U.S. seeking purchaseAlthough U.S. military engagement and financial commitments remain dominant in the Gulf, Washington is no longer leading the action, and is often caught up short these days by Beijing moving the goal posts behind its back. Following its diplomatic coup with the surprise Iran-Saudi normalization deal, China just last week offered to build a nuclear plant on the Saudi border with Qatar and the UAE without including the same conditions demanded by the U.S. to prevent enrichment and possible nuclear weaponization.This comes hard on the heels of Blinken's trip to Riyadh to promote the Abraham Accords, which he described as the "cornerstone" of the Biden administration's Middle East policy on the basis that "Israel's further integration into the region contributes to a more stable, a more secure and more prosperous region." But with tensions still rising between Netanyahu's far-right government and the Palestinians, Riyadh is unconvinced that a public declaration of amity with Israel is politically wise or would contribute to stability in the Gulf, especially as trade, trust and diplomacy between the two countries have grown steadily without the fanfare of normalization. For MBS, the risks of joining the Accords include not only outraging the kingdom's own population and the wider Muslim community if it is seen as downgrading the Palestinian issue. But it could also stymie progress with Tehran, which would view such a move as Riyadh buckling to U.S. pressure and rejoining the anti-Iran camp. As the kingdom spreads its wings, it is clearly prioritizing Gulf neighborliness and détente over U.S. chumminess.Where Washington has made progress, albeit without Israel's support, is in backroom arrangements with Iran to tone down its nuclear enrichment in exchange for access to $6 billion of its frozen reserves held by South Korea.Under the umbrella of a prisoner swap, which Washington hopes to finalize in two or three weeks, bank transfers have been prepared and Iran has quietly slowed its uranium enrichment to 60 percent and is in the process of diluting its stockpile. It's the first breakthrough on the nuclear front since Donald Trump withdrew from the six-party JCPOA in 2018. And, although it means negotiating with a sworn enemy — and only then through intermediaries, notably Oman and Qatar — it shows that Washington can maneuver adeptly even when the Gulf's goal posts are shifting. What's less clear is whether the U.S. can be as flexible in expanding the Abraham Accords, with both China and Israel nipping at its heels, its hopes for a Libya-Israel rapprochement now dashed, and its erstwhile Team USA — aka the GCC states — heading off in different directions.Though the Ukraine war is playing out in the European arena, its repercussions in the Gulf are striking. It has opened new horizons for Russia and China to engage meaningfully in the region's security and energy, while giving new impetus to the region's mid-level powers to pursue not only their own expanding agendas, but to find common cause in a Gulf-centered community that can sidestep the vicissitudes of Great Power competition.

This post is co-authored by Susanna Berkouwer, Eric Hsu, Edward Miguel, and Catherine Wolfram, based on a study supported by CEGA. This post was originally posted on the Energy for Growth Hub blog.Electrician from Kenya Power | Rod WaddingtonGovernments and foreign aid institutions routinely finance large infrastructure construction projects in developing and emerging markets. In 2015, for example, the Government of Kenya launched the Last Mile Connectivity Project, designed to connect all Kenyan households to electricity by 2022 using financing from the World Bank (WB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). To complete construction at the approximately 20,000 villages selected for the program, Kenya Power awarded dozens of private sector contracts to procure goods and services. However, distinct processes and regulations applied to villages where construction was financed by the WB and villages where construction was financed by the AfDB. We combined this natural variation with a randomized audit experiment to understand how procurement policies impacted the timing, cost, quantity, and quality of construction on the ground in a new research paper, titled "Donor contracting conditions and public procurement: Causal evidence from Kenyan electrification."Kenya's Last Mile Connectivity Project (LMCP)In a May 2015 Presidential Address, Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta launched the LMCP with the goal of connecting "one million new customers to electricity each year." As of 2017, there were around 60,000 electrical transformers across Kenya, which convert high- and medium-voltage power lines (33kV or 11kV) to low voltage (usually 0.415kV) that can be connected to households. The LMCP was to connect all unconnected households within 600 meters of a transformer by extending the local LV network through a process called 'maximization'. Phase I targeted the maximization of 8,520 transformers, with the AfDB financing 5,320 and the WB financing 3,200: Kenya Power assigned these in a largely arbitrary manner. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that AfDB- and WB-funded villages are distributed evenly across Kenya.FIGURE 1: Locations of Last Mile Connectivity Project villages across Kenya. Panel A plots LMCP sites that were funded by the WB and AfDB Phase I across all of Kenya. Panel B zooms in on the sites in the five study counties (Kakamega, Kericho, Kisumu, Nandi, Vihiga). Panel C shows the random assignment to an audit treatment.World Bank and the African Development Bank procedural conditionsThere are two key differences in the procedures used by the WB and the AfDB in this context. First, the AfDB used a bundled contracting style known as 'turn-key', or bundled, contracting (Panel A of Figure 2). Each AfDB turn-key contract comprised the entire construction process of all LMCP transformers in one of ten geographical clusters of counties. This included designing an efficient extension of the LV network to reach all unconnected households at a site, procuring the materials required to complete those designs, and installing materials according to the designs. Together with a metering contract and a consulting contract, Kenya Power awarded 12 LMCP contracts under the AfDB component. The WB, on the other hand, opted for an unbundled approach for the LMCP (Panel B of Figure 2), awarding 35 contracts, including four consulting contracts, eight design contracts, six contracts to procure wooden poles, three for concrete poles, three for conductors, three for cables, two for meters, and finally six contracts for installation.FIGURE 2: Contracting structures. Panel A displays the structure of bundled contracting employed by the AfDB. Panel B displays the structure of unbundled contracting employed by the WB.The second key difference between the funders is that the WB required an additional inspection report after construction. To understand the impact of such an ex-post inspection, we implemented a randomized controlled trial. Panel C of Figure 1 shows which sites were in the control and treatment arms. Members of our research team met with contractors in person to inform them of the randomly selected subset of treatment sites, which we tell them will be audited after construction. Given that the WB procedures already included a round of ex post audits, this additional round of audits should have a larger impact at AfDB sites than at WB sites.Collecting on-the-ground construction and power quality dataTo understand how the procedural differences affect construction outcomes on the ground, we collected data on 380 LMCP villages (shown in Panel B of Figure 1):GPS and engineering quality measurements of transformers, poles, and wires, as well as accessories like struts and stays.Household surveys on connection cost, timing, and experience.Minute-by-minute outage and voltage data quality from 600 households collected using nLine's PowerWatch devices.Original contracts signed between Kenya Power and contractors.Qualitative interviews: with senior leadership at Kenya Power, the WB, and the AfDB.FIGURE 3: Example of a Last Mile Connectivity Project (LMCP) Village. Each LMCP site is centered around a transformer from which low-voltage wiring extends to connect households and businesses to the grid. The gray circle denotes the 600m eligibility radius and the blue circle denotes our 700m surveying threshold.In addition to these primary data, we analyze 2009 Census data, VIIRS nighttime radiance data, land gradient data, and HERE Maps travel data.ResultsWe identified three main results:Households in villages funded by the AfDB are connected to electricity on average 8 months sooner than households in villages funded by the WB. This delay is caused primarily by the increased bureaucratic requirements resulting from the larger number and heterogeneity in WB contracts, as well as poor coordination between the various stages of WB contracting.Second, more poles and household connections were constructed at AfDB sites, driven in part by the WB's stricter adherence to the rule that only households within 600m of the transformer were to be connected.Third, WB processes, while taking longer, do generate tangible benefits: on-the-ground construction quality is 0.6 standard deviations higher at WB sites than AfDB sites, driven largely by the increased presence of pole caps, stays/struts, and grounding wires. While this does not lead to any improvements in voltage quality or power outages, these improvements are likely to improve grid longevity, lowering long-term maintenance and replacement costs.We also found that the additional audit treatment improved construction quality at AfDB sites but not at WB sites, which already saw rigorous ex-post inspections. These results hold across three different outcomes: the audit treatment increases the number of poles constructed at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites), improves average voltage by 5V at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites), and improves household installation quality and electricity usage at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites). Taken together, these results suggest that the additional inspection prescribed by WB procedures has an important effect on construction quality.Evaluating the relative net benefits of the two approaches requires understanding the long- and short-term costs and benefits: the WB procedures delayed the household connection date but reduced long-term maintenance costs when compared with AfDB procedures. We calculate that even a reasonable set of assumptions indicate anywhere from a USD 5.6mn net benefit of AfDB processes to a USD 2.8mn net benefit of WB processes. Neither method is necessarily the best option, and the optimal contracting structure will depend on the project's goals. Governments looking to spur short-term electrification may prefer the bundled method used by AfDB, whereas governments prioritizing longer term trade-offs may want to employ the unbundled method used by WB.Power Quality in Donor-Funded Infrastructure Projects was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Ukrainan kriisin seurauksena transatlanttinen turvallisuuskehys on noussut keskiöön. Euroopan turvallisuustilanteen kärjistyessä Donald Trumpin valinta Yhdysvaltain presidentiksi on edelleen korostanut alueellisen turvallisuuspolitiikan merkitystä, varsinkin Trumpin vaalikampanjan aikaisten Eurooppaa ja NATO:a kritisoivien lausuntojen kyseenalaistettua USA:n sitoutumisen Euroopan turvallisuuteen. Tässä epävakaassa kontekstissa Yhdysvaltain ulkopolitiikan kokonaisvaltaiselle tutkimukselle on yhä enemmän tarvetta. Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on ymmärtää Yhdysvaltain kongressissa vallitsevia asenteita suhteessa transatlanttisiin suhteisiin ja turvallisuuteen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kongressin toimintaa eri ulkopolitiikan aloilla joukkojen sijoittelusta kansainvälisiin sopimuksiin, sotavoimien käyttöön, kahdenvälisiin suhteisiin ja puolustusjärjestelmien sijoituksiin. Väitöskirja tutkii kongressin toimintaa kahdessa ulkopoliittisesti merkittävässä valiokunnassa; senaatin ulkoasiain- ja puolustusvaliokunnassa. Ajallisesti tutkimus sijoittuu Barack Obaman ensimmäiseen presidenttikauteen vuosille 2009-2012 (111. ja 112. kongressi). Tälle ajalle mahtuu kuusi transatlanttisen turvallisuuden kannalta merkittävää kysymystä: Yhdysvaltain Eurooppaan sijoitettava ohjuspuolustusjärjestelmä, ydinaseriisunta (START-sopimus), Libyan sota, Yhdysvaltain sotilaallinen läsnäolo Euroopassa, NATO ja Euroopan turvallisuus, ja USA-Venäjä suhteet. Tutkimus keskittyy valiokunnissa käytyyn keskusteluun Yhdysvaltain ulkopolitiikan suunnasta. Tutkimuskysymys kuuluu: kuinka kongressin ulkopoliittisesti merkittävissä valiokunnissa määriteltiin ja ymmärrettiin USA:n ulkopolitiikka Euroopan kannalta merkittävissä ulkopoliittisissa kysymyksissä? Mitä tämä tarkoittaa valiokuntien roolista ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa? Kuinka sisäpolitiikka vaikuttaa ulkopolitiikan käsittelyyn? Mitä voidaan sanoa puoluepolitiikan ja ideologian vaikutuksesta ulkopoliittiseen debattiin? Metodologisesti tutkimuksessa käytetään kvalitatiivista tutkimusmetodia, tarkemmin sanottuna induktiivista kehysteoriaa. Kehysteorian avulla kartoitetaan yksittäisten senaattorien puheenvuoroja transatlanttisissa turvallisuusdebateissa. Tutkimusmetodi on lyhyesti seuraava: 1) poliittisen, historiallisen, ideologisen ja institutionaalisen kontekstin analysointi, 2) dominanttien ja kilpailevien kehysten tunnistaminen, 3) tärkeiden toimijoiden ja kilpailevien näkökulmien tunnistaminen, 4) keskustelun purkaminen kontekstissa. Analyysin keskiössä on politiikkasubstanssin argumentointi, eikä tarkoituksena ei ole tehdä retorista tai kielellistä analyysia. Näin yksittäisten poliitikkojen tekemät tulkinnat ja käsitteelliset näkemykset eri politiikkakysymyksistä ja toimintavaihtoehdoista korostuvat, ja on mahdollista luoda kokonaisvaltainen kuva siitä, miten transatlanttiset turvallisuuskysymykset määriteltiin Yhdysvaltain kongressissa. Tutkimuksen empiirinen osio korostaa ulkopolitiikan ideologisia aspekteja. Puoluepoliittisen polarisaation ja puolue-eliitin polarisaation seurauksena myös ulkopolitiikkaan liittyvät ideologiset eroavaisuudet korostuvat vaalikontekstissa. Näin yksittäisten poliitikkojen on syytä olettaa, että heidän tekemänsä kannanotot ulkopolitiikan kannalta merkittävissä kysymyksissä vaikuttavat mahdollisuuksiin menestyä esivaaleissa ja vaaleissa. Politiikkakysymykset voidaan jakaa ideologisiin tai distributiivisia aspekteja korostaviin kysymyksiin, joista molemmat tuottavat toisistaan poikkeavan poliittisen reaktion kongressissa. (Milner & Tingley, 2015). Ideologia määritellään tässä väitöskirjassa paitsi Republikaanien ja Demokraattien välisenä ideologisena erimielisyytenä (Gries, 2014), myös laajemmassa ideologisessa kuvassa Meadin (2002) nelijakoiseen teoriaan perustuen (Jacksonians, Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians.) Näin on mahdollista luoda kokonaisvaltaisempi ja syvempi käsitys Yhdysvaltain ulkopolitiikan ideologista näkemyseroista, samalla korostaen sisäpolitiikan merkitystä ulkopoliittisessa debatissa. Tulosten perusteella uskallan haastaa kyynisimmät ja puoluepoliittista polarisaatiota korostavat näkemykset Yhdysvaltain ulkopoliittisesta debatista. Refleksiivinen puoluepoliittinen polarisaatio ei määrittänyt tutkittuja transatlanttisen turvallisuuden kannalta merkittäviä keskusteluja. Kaikista kysymyksistä ainoastaan Yhdysvaltain Eurooppaan sijoitettava ohjuspuolustusjärjestelmä jakoi keskustelun puhtaasti puoluerajojen mukaisesti. Distributiiviset kysymykset – NATO ja USA:n joukot Euroopassa – tuottivat pääosin yksimielisen reaktion valiokunnissa, kun taas ideologisesti määritellyt kysymykset aiheuttivat joko puoluepoliittisen (ohjuspuolustus) tai puolueita sisäisesti jakavan (Libya, START, USA-Venäjä suhde) reaktion. Republikaanisen puolueen jakautuminen selittyi Meadin nelijaon pohjalla, Demokraattien ollessa pääosin yksimielisesti puolueensa presidentin linjausten takana. Ideologia ja politiikkakysymyksen yksityiskohdat määrittivät kongressin vastauksen, ei niinkään puoluepoliittinen polarisaatio. Obaman hallinon linjaa arvostellessa Obaman pehmeänä esitetty suhde Venäjään oli määrittävä tekijä. Tästä huomionarvoista tekee se, että se Republikaanisen puolueen siipi joka kiivaimmin arvosteli Obaman Venäjä-politiikkaa liian pehmeäksi, asettui monilta osin vahvimmin tukemaan Donald Trumpia tämän Venäjä-kannoista huolimatta. ; Crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the continued importance of transatlantic security framework, while the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States raised concern over American commitment to European security. Given the political instability in Europe and U.S., and changes in European security situation, a comprehensive understanding of American policy towards Europe is required. The purpose of this dissertation is to first fill a gap in understanding of congressional attitudes towards transatlantic relations, more specifically transatlantic security. This study will examine congressional behavior across different types of policy areas; i.e. defense procurement, international agreements, war-powers, bilateral relations and deployment of both troops and defense systems. This dissertation is a study of congressional foreign policy hearings in two relevant foreign policy committees in the Senate; Foreign Relations and Armed Services during the 111th (2009-2010) and 112th (2011-2012) Congress. The timeline included six significant transatlantic security issues: American missile defense system in Europe, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Libyan intervention, American troop presence in Europe, NATO and European security, and U.S.-Russia relations. The focus lies in the debates over the direction of American foreign policy in transatlantic security matters. Given the dynamics affecting congressional influence - and activity - in foreign affairs, how are transatlantic security issues defined and framed in Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees? And further, what does it say about the role of congressional committees in foreign policy debates, about the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy deliberation, and perhaps most importantly, what does it say about the influence of both partisan and long-term American foreign policy ideology on congressional attitudes towards transatlantic security? Methodologically, this study uses qualitative analysis to examine congressional hearings. More specifically, inductive framing analysis is used to examine how individual senators discussed transatlantic security issues. In short, 1) political, historical, ideological and institutional context in examine, 2) dominant and competing framings are recognized, 3) key players and competing factions are recognized, and 4) the debate is deconstructed in context. The analysis will have a specific focus on argumentation and the substance, rather than on rhetorical or linguistic characteristics. This way the interpretation and conceptualization of issues and policy options by individual members of Congress are highlighted to produce a comprehensive idea of how transatlantic security issues are debated in the United States Senate, how are the issues defined and which interpretations of reality are made more salient than others. The empirical part of the dissertation emphasizes ideological aspects of American foreign policy debate. Given the rise in partisan polarization and the extreme polarization of the party elites (see Souva & Rohde, 2007), the relevance of foreign policy in electoral context has gained importance. Thus, there is a reason to believe that members of Congress are concerned over the influence of their respective foreign policy attitudes on their electoral success. Using Milner and Tingley's (2015) distinction into distributional and ideological factors affecting congressional foreign policy behavior, I will evaluate the case studies both in the partisan context of "Democratic doves" and "Republican hawks" (see Gries, 2014) and in the context of long-term American foreign policy ideology (see Mead, 2002), dividing American long-term foreign policy ideology into four schools; Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians, Jacksonians. Based on the results of the frame analysis, I would conclude that the more parochial and partisan views of congressional foreign policy decision-making can be challenged. Reflexive partisanship did not define the debate. Of all the issues examined, only missile defense produced a dominantly partisan response (see figure 41.), although it should be note that missile defense was debated only in the Armed Services. I would argue that the overall results in this study do challenge some of the more cynical views of partisan conflict and parochial nature of congressional behavior. Issues defined in distributional terms – NATO and American troop presence in Europe - produced a cohesive congressional response, whereas Libya, START and U.S.-Russian relations produced a factional response. All the issues producing either partisan or factional response were debated on mainly ideological basis. Republican factionalism could be explained by Mead's distinction into Jacksonians, Hamiltonians, Wilsonians and Jeffersonians – Jacksonians being most vehemently against administration policy -, whereas the Democrats were united with regard to every issue examined. Thus, ideology and the specifics of the issue at hand explained congressional response better than reflexive partisanship. Of specific interest was the Jacksonian insistence of not compromising with Russia on any issue, yet at the same time many Republicans defined as Jacksonians were eager to support candidate Trump when he voiced his rather unorthodox – at least for a Republican presidential candidate – views of U.S.-Russian relations.

The changeover of the ruling of the modern Ukrainian territory between East and West had lasted for around 800 years beginning from the Mongol-Tatar invasion. It was that time when Batu Khan defeated Ancient Rus that the present territory of Ukraine came under complete and absolute ruling of the Tatar East. In the 16th century as a part of Lithuania Ukraine was included into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and then passed under the rule of the Polish magnates, under the yoke of the Western Polish civilization. In 1569 the Union of Lublin was signed that formalized the accession of the Ukrainian territory to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the period from the 10th to the 19th centuries there was no such state as Ukraine on the world political map. In the 10th century some part of the territory of present Ukraine was taken by Kievan Rus, in the 13th century — by Golden Horde, in the 14th-15th centuries — by Lithuania, Golden Horde and Russia. In the next centuries the territory of Ukraine was controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Poland and Russia. And only in 1918 the state of Ukraine appeared on the political map.Single Soviet Ukraine created by Bolsheviks did not present any internal cultural and language unity as it was always shared by different empires being the hostile and irreconcilable centers of force in Europe — the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire.In 1917-1920 about dozens of different republics were established in the territory of Ukraine. They were isolated within the borders of their formations. Accordingly, it may be said that in 1917-1920 Ukraine presented a mosaic of different formations which were often formed due to ambitions of some scoundrels and political adventurers striving to get to power and to become the leader of a state. But only the tough policy of Bolsheviks aimed to prevent the disintegration process permitted Ukraine to preserve its territory. After its election the Supreme Council started preparation of the Draft Declaration of Ukraine State Sovereignty simultaneously with the Draft Law on Ukraine State Sovereignty. Both drafts were considered in May 1990. After their discussion it was decided to develop the Draft Declaration of State Sovereignty.On July 16, 1990 the Ukrainian Parliament after long discussions adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine by majority voting. This declaration which did not change and substitute the Constitution of Ukrainian SSR became a very important document for establishment of the Ukrainian statehood having laid the basis for the future Constitution of Ukraine.The concept of the new Constitution of Ukraine envisaged the establishment of the presidential republic. As a result, in June 1991 the laws «On Establishment of the Office of President of Ukrainian SSR with Making Alterations and Additions in the Constitution», «On President of Ukrainian SSR" and "On Election of President of Ukrainian SSR». The office of president was established to strengthen the vertical of executive power and to make it in the future independent of executive power of union bodies. The law assigned broad authorities to the president. Thus, the president acquired the right to cancel the decisions of the USSR bodies of executive power in the territory of Ukrainian SSR if they contradicted its constitution.By mid-1991 the legislative base was created in Ukraine which, in fact, made it an independent state as the laws adopted in 1990 and in the first half of 1991 brought out Ukraine from subordination to the USSR powers. The single economic, political and military space of the USSR practically ceased to exist. By this time Ukraine subordinated only nominally to union authorities. On August 24 the Extraordinary Meeting of Supreme Rada passed the Act on Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. That time it was also decided to conduct on December 01 the republican referendum to confirm the Act of Independence. This was done with a view to demonstrate to the union authorities that the Ukrainian people were endeavoring to become independent, thus, making legitimate the Act of Independence. After becoming independent in 1991 Ukraine entered the new stage of its development. The regional system of Ukraine revealed two clear poles — Donbass and Galichina which determined the country's development for decades ahead. ; Изменения территории современной Украины между Востоком и Западом тянется уже почти 800 лет — со времен монголо-татарского нашествия. Именно тогда после уничтожения ханом Батыем Древней Руси современная территория Украины оказалась под полным и безраздельным правлением татарского Востока. В XVI веке в составе Литвы Украина была включена в Речь Посполитую и перешла в подчинение к польским магнатам, попав под гнет западно-польской цивилизации. В 1569 году была подписана Люблинская уния, результатом которой стало присоединение украинских земель к Речи Посполитой.Если брать отрезок времени с X по XIX век, то такого государства, как Украина, на политической карте мира не существовало. На части территории нынешней Украины в X веке была Киевская Русь, в XIII веке — Золотая Орда, в XIV–XV веках — Литовское государство, Золотая Орда и Россия. В последующие столетия территория Украины находилась под контролем Оттоманской империи, Польши, России. И лишь в 1918 году на политической карте появилось государство Украина.Созданная большевиками единая советская Украина не представляла собой внутреннего культурно-языкового единства, поскольку всегда была разделена между разными империями, являвшимися враждебными и непримиримыми центрами силы в Европе, — Речью Посполитой, Российской и Австро-Венгерской империями.В период 1917–1920 годов на территории Украины было образовано около десятка разных республик. Все они предполагали обособление в границах тех территорий, которые охватывали новые образования. В соответствии с этим можно говорить о том, что территория Украины периода 1917–1920 годов представляла собой мозаику различных образований, которые зачастую были результатом амбиций отдельных проходимцев и политических авантюристов, желающих получить в свои руки власть и провозгласить себя руководителем государства. Лишь жесткая политика большевиков, направленная на то, чтобы не допустить разбегания земель, позволила Украине сохранить свою территорию.После своего избрания Верховный Совет приступил к разработке проекта Декларации о государственном суверенитете Украины. Одновременно разрабатывался проект закона о государственном суверенитете Украины. Оба проекта — закона и декларации — были рассмотрены в мае 1990 года. После их обсуждения было принято решение о разработке проекта в виде Декларации о государственном суверенитете.16 июля 1990 года украинский парламент после длительного обсуждения подавляющим большинством принял Декларацию о государственном суверенитете Украины. Декларация, которая не меняла и не заменяла собой Конституцию УССР, стала важным документом в становлении украинской государственности, заложив основы будущей Конституции Украины.Концепция новой Конституции Украины предусматривала создание президентской республики. В итоге в июне 1991 года были приняты законы «Об учреждении поста президента Украинской ССР и внесении изменений и дополнений в конституцию», «О президенте Украинской ССР» и «О выборах президента Украинской ССР». Учреждение поста президента было направлено на усиление вертикали исполнительной власти, чтобы в перспективе сделать ее независимой от исполнительной власти союзных органов. Закон наделял президента широкими полномочиями. Например, он обладал правом останавливать действия решений органов исполнительной власти СССР на территории Украинской ССР, если они противоречили ее конституции.К середине 1991 года на Украине была создана законодательная база, которая фактически делала ее самостоятельным государством, поскольку законы, принятые в 1990 году и в первой половине 1991 года, практически вывели Украину из подчинения органов власти СССР. Единое экономическое, политическое и военное пространство СССР фактически было разрушено. К этому периоду времени Украина лишь номинально подчинялась союзным органам власти.24 августа на внеочередной сессии Верховной рады был принят Акт провозглашения независимости Украины. Тогда же было принято решение о проведении 1 декабря республиканского референдума, который должен был подтвердить Акт провозглашения независимости. Расчет был сделан на то, чтобы продемонстрировать союзным властям стремление к независимости украинского населения, тем самым придав Акту провозглашения независимости легитимность.После обретения независимости в 1991 году начался новый этап развития Украины. В региональной системе Украины проявилось два четких полюса — Донбасс и Галичина, которые определили развитие страны на последующие десятилетия.

El propósito de este proyecto es conectar zonas antes inaccesibles, afectadas por el conflicto que tienen un enorme potencial turístico de aventura y ecológico, con turistas del mundo interesados en encontrar alternativas diferentes de viaje; mediante el desarrollo de una aplicación para dispositivos móviles que provea opciones seguras y confiables de alojamiento, alimentación, transporte e información de interés general para turistas que deseen visitar la región de los Llanos Orientales. Este informe presenta los resultados del proyecto evaluado en fase de prefactibilidad: perfil, alineación estratégica, formulación y evaluación financiera. En la formulación se realizan los estudios legales, técnicos, de mercados, ambiental, administrativo, de costos y financieros; finalmente se realiza la evaluación financiera y se presenta el libro de gerencia. El proyecto se alinea estratégicamente con la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y la Organización Mundial del Turismo; adicionalmente y dado que para la fecha de elaboración de este informe el país se encuentra en período electoral, el proyecto se alinea con los diferentes programas de gobierno de los principales candidatos presidenciales. Una vez realizada la alineación estratégica se realiza el estudio legal en el cual se presentan las principales regulaciones aplicables al proyecto desde la perspectiva tecnológica, protección de datos, protección al consumidor, comercio electrónico, turismo, normatividad ambiental, protección de menores y teletrabajo. Con los aspectos legales analizados se realiza el estudio técnico, el cual detalla todos los aspectos que deben ser tenidos en cuenta: ecosistema digital, alternativas de plataforma y desarrollo técnico. Una vez definidos los aspectos técnicos se presentan los procesos, flujos de usuarios y servicios a ofrecer para finalmente presentar la capacidad técnica requerida para operar. Una vez definida la viabilidad técnica de la iniciativa se continúa con los demás estudios requeridos para determinar la viabilidad del negocio El estudio administrativo presenta la formación de la organización, estructura y organigrama, planeación, procesos de reclutamiento y selección. El modelo administrativo presenta una alternativa flexible de teletrabajo con el cual podemos operar sin dificultad. El estudio ambiental identifica los factores bióticos, abióticos y socioeconómicos, sobre los cuales se puede generar afectación al desarrollar la aplicación. Dado que los impactos son mínimos de acuerdo con el estudio presentado, el plan de manejo ambiental se basa en estrategias pedagógicas relacionadas con cuidado y manejo del medio ambiente para los turistas. En el estudio de mercado se toma como base el análisis de entorno, se realiza el análisis de competitividad, el cálculo de la demanda y el planteamiento de la estrategia de comercialización. Adicionalmente se identifica la forma en que se van a generar los ingresos del proyecto los cuales están basados en un cobro de porcentaje por cada reserva de alojamiento realizada. Para calcular la demanda y teniendo en cuenta que el cliente es el turista que desea hacer turismo ecológico o de aventura, se tomará la información de visitantes a los principales Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia (PNN) como base. En este punto es importante mencionar que en el modelo de desarrollo de plataformas digitales los aspectos técnicos no son un limitante para el tamaño del mercado: con la estructura técnica recomendada se pueden cubrir muchas más zonas de las aquí planteadas. Con el desarrollo de la nube y el acceso a las tiendas de aplicaciones de los diferentes sistemas operativos se puede llegar a millones de usuarios a un mínimo costo. Por lo anterior para calcular la demanda requerida se propone una meta comercial que debe ser capturada. El estudio de mercado finaliza con las diferentes estrategias de comercialización sugeridas. Como resultado de los estudios detallados se elabora el estudio de costos. Este estudio recoge todos los costos de inversión y operación necesarios. Con el estudio de costos y los beneficios del estudio de mercado se realizan los estudios financieros. Finalmente se realiza la evaluación financiera donde se presentan los supuestos, análisis financieros, de sensibilidad y el resultado de la evaluación. ; The purpose of this project is to connect previously inaccessible areas, affected by the conflict that have an enormous potential of adventure and ecological tourism, with tourists from the world interested in finding different travel alternatives; through the development of an application for mobile devices that provides safe and reliable options for accommodation, food, transport and information of general interest for tourists who wish to visit the Llanos Orientales region. This report presents the results of the project evaluated in pre-feasibility phase: profile, strategic alignment, formulation and financial evaluation. In the formulation, legal, technical, market, environmental, administrative, cost and financial studies are carried out; finally the financial evaluation is carried out and the management book is presented. The project is strategically aligned with the United Nations Organization and the World Tourism Organization; Additionally, given that the country is in the electoral period at the time of preparing this report, the project is aligned with the different government programs of the main presidential candidates. Once the strategic alignment is made, the legal study is carried out in which the main regulations applicable to the project are presented from a technological perspective, data protection, consumer protection, electronic commerce, tourism, environmental regulations, child protection and teleworking. With the legal aspects analyzed, the technical study is carried out, which details all the aspects that must be taken into account: digital ecosystem, platform alternatives and technical development. Once the technical aspects have been defined, the processes, user flows and services to be offered are presented to finally present the technical capacity required to operate. Once the technical feasibility of the initiative is defined, the other studies required to determine the viability of the business are continued The administrative study presents the formation of the organization, structure and organization chart, planning, recruitment and selection processes. The administrative model presents a flexible alternative of telework with which we can operate without difficulty. The environmental study identifies biotic, abiotic and socioeconomic factors, which can be affected when developing the application. Given that the impacts are minimal according to the study presented, the environmental management plan is based on pedagogical strategies related to care and management of the environment for tourists. In the market study, the analysis of the environment is taken as a basis, the competitiveness analysis is carried out, the calculation of the demand and the marketing strategy approach. Additionally, the way in which the project income will be generated, which is based on a percentage charge for each accommodation reservation made, is identified. To calculate the demand and taking into account that the client is the tourist that wishes to make ecological or adventure tourism, the information of visitors to the main National Natural Parks of Colombia (PNN) will be taken as a base. At this point it is important to mention that in the development model of digital platforms, the technical aspects are not a limitation for the size of the market: with the recommended technical structure, many more areas can be covered. With the development of the cloud and access to the application stores of the different operating systems, millions of users can be reached at a minimum cost. Therefore, to calculate the required demand, a commercial goal is proposed that must be captured. The market study ends with the different marketing strategies suggested. As a result of the detailed studies, the cost study is elaborated. This study includes all the necessary investment and operation costs. With the study of costs and the benefits of the market study, financial studies are carried out. Finally the financial evaluation is carried out where the assumptions, financial analysis, sensitivity and the result of the evaluation are presented. ; Especialización ; Especialista en Desarrollo y Gerencia Integral de Proyectos

Досліджено процес підписання, ратифікації та імплементації Угоди про асоціацію між Україною та ЄС. Підписання Угоди про асоціацію (УА) відбулося лише з другої спро­би, після гучного провалу у Вільнюсі та революційних подій в Україні, що призвело до зміни політичного керівництва країни і реанімації євроінтергаційного курсу Української держави. Цей процес відбувався у два етапи, коли українська та європейська сторони підписали спочатку політичну частину (березень 2014 р.), а після президентських ви­борів в Україні економічну частину Угоди (червень 2014 р.). Після певного зволікання ратифікація УА також розтягнулася у кілька етапів. Започаткували цей процес ратифіка­ції тексту Угоди український та європейський парламенти 16 вересня 2014 р. Однак під тиском Росії, яка послідовно та наполегливо намагається нейтралізувати європейський курс України, тимчасове застосування найбільшого розділу Угоди про запроваджен­ня поглибленої та всеосяжної зони вільної торгівлі між Україною та ЄС відкладалося 14 місяців, до 1 січня 2016 р.Охарактеризовано режим тимчасового застосування цього договору. З 1 листопада 2014 р. розпочинається її тимчасове застосування, суть якого полягає в тому, що міжнарод­ний договір стає юридично обов'язковим для договірних сторін, навіть якщо цей договір ще не набув чинності. Тимчасове застосування Угоди про асоціацію стосується лише частини Угоди: верховенства права, боротьби зі злочинністю та корупцією, а також посиленого секторального співробітництва. Обмеженість тимчасового застосування Угоди полягає також у тому, що воно встановлює взаємні юридичні зобов'язання передусім у відносинах між Україною і ЄС, а для держав-членів ЄС такі юридичні зобов'язання дотримуватися положень Угоди випливають лише із її статусу як держави-члена ЄС, як це передбачено засновницькими договорами ЄС. Це означає, що юридична сила тимчасового застосування не може виходити за межі компетенції ЄС. Саме тому в рішеннях ЄС про обсяг тимчасового застосування дано спеціальні роз'яснення, що обмежують дію низки положень Угоди про асоціацію. Якщо виникає якась специфіка дії положень Угоди про асоціацію у внутрішньому правопорядку її сторін, тоді це питання вирішують згідно з конституційним правом кожної договірної сторони. Положення Угоди про асоціацію у повному обсязі стануть юридично обов'язковими для договірних сторін лише після набуття чинності Угоди. До того часувони мають обмежене і невизначене юридичне значення, коли договірні сторони повинні утримуватися від дій, які позбавили б Угоду про асоціацію об'єкта і мети.Угода про асоціацію між Україною та Європейським Союзом набере чинності лише після завершення процесу її ратифікації всіма державами-членами ЄС відповідно до національних процедур, а також Радою Європейського Союзу. Для цього потрібно, щоб кожен з учасників Угоди (Україна, кожна держава-член ЄС, Європейський Союз і Євроатом) утвер­див рішення про його ратифікацію й інформував про цей факт Генеральний секретаріат Ради ЄС, приславши спеціальне повідомлення. Останнє повідомлення про ратифікацію поступає від самого Європейського Союзу.Підписання Угоди про асоціацію між Україною та Європейським Союзом виявився болісним та драматичним процесом. Не менш драматичним є процес ратифікації Угоди про асоціацію, і лише після того, як усі 28 країн-членів ЄС, Європейський Союз та Євроатомом ратифікують текст Угоди (Україна вже її ратифікувала), Угода про асоціацію між Україною та ЄС набуде чинності. Росія цілеспрямовано і наполегливо намагається нейтралізувати європейський курс України. Кремль не полишає надії взяти реванш, привести до влади проросійські сили і знову розвернути Україну в бік Митного союзу Росії, Білорусі та Ка­захстану. Нейтралізувати цей сценарій Кремля можна лише шляхом швидких, ефективних та результативних реформ, використовуючи режим тимчасового застосування Угоди про асоціацію між Україною та ЄС.Ключові слова: Угода про асоціацію між Україною та ЄС, тимчасове застосування, зона вільної торгівлі. The process of signing, ratification and implementation of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine has been researched in this contribution. The signing procedures for the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine took place from the second attempt, after the failure in Vilnius and revolutionary events in Ukraine, which led to the changes in the political leadership of the country and the reanimation of the Eurointegration aspirations of the Ukrainian state. This process took place in two stages, when Ukrainian and European leaders signed the political part of the agreement (March 2014), and after the presidential elections in Ukraine the economic part of the agreement has been signed (June 2014). After some stagnation the ratification process is evolving few stages. The start of the ratification procedures was set up simultaneously by the Ukrainian and European Parliaments on September 16, 2014. However under the pressure of Russia, which gradually and insistantly tries to neutralize the European course of Ukraine, the temporary application of the provisions regarding the deep and comprehensive free trade area was postponed for 14 months, namely until January 1, 2016.The temporary application of the current agreement has been also analyzed. Starting from November 1, 2014 its temporary application starts, where the underlining idea is that the international treaty becomes legally binding for its parties even when it was not dully ratified by all Contracting Parties. The temporary application of the agreement only partly covers the chapters dealing with the rule of law, the fight against corruption and criminality, as well as the activization of the sectoral cooperation. The limited character of the temporary application is manifested also in the fact, that it determines the mutual legal obligations between the EU and Ukraine. For the member states the fulfillment of the legal obligation takes place exclusively according to their status as the EU members as provided by the EU founding treaties. It means that the legal force of the temporary application of the Association Agreement cannot override the EU powers. That is why in the EU's decision regarding the volume of the temporary application the special explanations are included, which limit the applicability of the provisions of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. In case some special features appear as with the regard to the application of the Association Agreement in the internal legal order of the contracting parties, so they are to be solved in accordance with the constitutional legal order of each contracting party. The provisions of the Association Agreement will become mandatory legal forces for contracting parties only when the Association agreement will enter into force. Until that time they will have quite uncertain and limited legal meaning, where the contracting parties shall abstain from any actions, which would lead to the denial of the object and purpose of this Association Agreement.The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine will enter into force only when the ratification procedures are completed by all EU member states in according to their national provisions and by the Council of the European Union. In order to complete the ratification procedures each contracting party (Ukraine, each EU member state, the European Union and Euroatom) has to adopt the decision about the ratification and to inform about it the General Secretariat of Council of the EU about it while sending special notification letter. The last notification about the registration will come from the European Union itself.The signature of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine was a complicated and dramatic issue. The ratification process seems to be not less dramatic. And only after all 28 EU member states, the European Union and Euratom will ratify the text of the Association Agreement (Ukraine did ratify it already), it will enter into force. Russia constantly tries to neutralize the European course of Ukraine. The Kremlin hopes to get the revanche, to bring to the power the pro-Russian forces and redirect Ukraine again towards the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The only way to skip this scenario of Kremlin lays in quick, efficient and result-oriented reforms based upon the usage of the regime of the temporary application of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European UnionKey words: EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, temporary application, free-trade area.

Professional civil service recruitment is a core component of governance for development, as it is necessary for ensuring the capacity of civil servants, service delivery, fiscal sustainability, and proper salary management. Through an ambitious mixed method approach, this study seeks to provide a political economy analysis of civil service recruitment in Comoros—a fragile and decentralized state with a relatively large portion of spending on government salaries. More specifically, it aims to explain the recent dramatic increases in the number of civil servants in Comoros. The paper presents three main findings from the analysis. First, in 2010, elections at the national and local levels were associated with the largest recruitment in the past decade, due in part to the interplay of informal institutions such as political clientelism with the current public financial management system. Second, the institutions involved in recruitment are not permanent; they are evolving with the balance of power between the national and island governments. Third, civil service recruitment respects qualification standards.