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This paper evaluates the circumstances under which affluent interest groups wield influence over policy outcomes. Interest group scholarship is ambiguous about the beneficial role of economic resources for lobbying influence. Economically resourceful groups are often presumed to provide more and better expert information to decision-makers and, in exchange, receive more favourable policy concessions. We argue that the beneficial role of economic resources is contingent on the media salience of policy dossiers. We expect that resourceful groups are more influential when issues are discussed behind the public scenes, while their competitive advantage dampens once issues grow salient in the news media. We test our expectations in the context of European Union policymaking, drawing from 183 expert surveys with lobbyists connected to a sample of 41 policy issues. Our empirical findings demonstrate that economic resources matter for lobbying influence, but that their effect is conditional on the media salience of policy issues.

Love is often a key factor in migration decisions. Partner relationships and union formation have also been identified as forming an intrinsic part of intra-European migration. Nevertheless, empirical research into intra-European love migration remains rather scarce. In this paper, we focus on the often neglected but substantial intra-European moves. We analyse the relationship between bi-national couple formation, identification as a European and European transnational solidarity. The analyses are based on the EUMARR survey, investigating bi-national marriages in a unified Europe, comparing European bi-national and uni-national couples. In this paper, we focus on the Netherlands ( n = 898) and compare Dutch–Dutch with Dutch–EU couples. Our findings indicate that bi-national couples are more likely to identify as European compared to uni-national couples, but this is not reflected in more solidarity to European countries in times of crisis. Implications of these findings are discussed in light of the European integration process.

In order to capitalize on its increasing legislative powers, the European Parliament (EP) has had to specialize internally. The scholarly literature has predominantly studied the structural manifestations of specialization, such as the allocation of committee seats among parliamentarians. This article sheds light on a second selection process: participation in legislative negotiations. For every given legislative dossier, parliamentarians have to decide whether and how strongly to participate in the negotiations. The literature on office allocation contains assumptions about the role of office-holders in negotiations. The first aim of this article is to test the validity of these assumptions. The second aim is to apply theories used in studies on office allocation to negotiations and gain insight into the following questions: Are actors with extreme preferences more active than others? What is the role of experts? How do party politics play out? Although we find effects of preferences and expertise on negotiations, the evidence is most compatible with the view that negotiations serve EP party groups to form and exchange policy positions.

In order to capitalize on its increasing legislative powers, the European Parliament (EP) has had to specialize internally. The scholarly literature has predominantly studied the structural manifestations of specialization, such as the allocation of committee seats among parliamentarians. This article sheds light on a second selection process: participation in legislative negotiations. For every given legislative dossier, parliamentarians have to decide whether and how strongly to participate in the negotiations. The literature on office allocation contains assumptions about the role of office-holders in negotiations. The first aim of this article is to test the validity of these assumptions. The second aim is to apply theories used in studies on office allocation to negotiations and gain insight into the following questions: Are actors with extreme preferences more active than others? What is the role of experts? How do party politics play out? Although we find effects of preferences and expertise on negotiations, the evidence is most compatible with the view that negotiations serve EP party groups to form and exchange policy positions. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This textbook introduces undergraduate and graduate students to the politics of the European Union using a comparative politics approach. This enables students to utilize their knowledge of domestic politics in understanding the EU and better grasp the specific character of its politics.

The European Union's ambitious Mediterranean policy has the declared goal of bringing about economic and political transformation by explicitly linking reform with rewards. Drawing on mechanism design theory, we argue that the EU's Mediterranean policy has the potential to reveal information about the respective partner countries' reform 'types'. However, the current incentive structure of the EU's Mediterranean policy does not fit with the requirements of incentive compatibility, which would allow for screening, because it does not encourage partner countries to reveal the costs of reform. Data on the political and economic reform performance of Mediterranean partner countries reveal the pooling pattern that we would expect from a screening model. By offering two differentiated reward agreements that are not specifically targeted towards each country's progress on reform, the European Commission could learn which countries are sincere about reforming.

We present an automatically updatable database of background information about Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 1979 until the present. Although this information is already directly accessible through the European Parliament's web page, it is presented in a manner that makes it ideal only for those interested in finding information about individual MEPs, but difficult for anyone interested in doing large-N analysis. We provide an online 'live' source of background information about MEPs that is tailored towards the need of the latter group. Our web page allows researchers to specify the time period in which they are interested & to obtain data on committee, party group & delegation membership, as well as leadership positions within seconds. As the collection of the data is fully automated, we are able to keep the data updated as long as the European Parliament (EP) continues its current practice of making background information about members available online. Researchers will be able to combine this information with other data sources at a substantively lower cost than is currently the case. As such, we hope to encourage a new generation of research into the EP. The research note is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature. It highlights how our database may be used to extend the already extensive quantitative literature on the ER The second section gives the reader an overview of how the technology behind the database works & how to access the information. We leave the technical aspects of the principles behind the data collection scripts to the web appendix. The third section describes the database. References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2009.]

At the end of its sixth legislative term the European Parliament adopted a rule change subjecting all final passage votes on legislative matters to roll call votes. Some studies use this rule change to assess whether roll call votes are characterized by more or less party discipline. Cautioning against such simple comparisons I propose to estimate in this article the extent to which members of the European Parliament are subject to party pressure. Comparing the results from the beginning of the sixth and seventh legislative term shows that in final passage votes the average party pressure has decreased considerably after the rule change.

"South Korea and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

The European Union has progressively communitarised its migration policy. The formation of public support for this integration of a core state power presents an intricate puzzle. On the one hand, immigration is part and parcel of the conflict around the opening and closing of nation states, and thereby mobilises nativist views and Euroscepticism. On the other hand, the European Union may serve as a shield against external threats such as uncontrolled immigration. This article sheds light on this conundrum by examining how refugee arrivals affect public support for a common European migration policy across 28 European Union member states between 1992 and 2021. The results lend support to a post-functionalist logic of an identitarian backlash against integration and a collective action logic of instrumental solidarity in line with national interests.

Powerful political actors in the international system quite frequently adopt unilateral policies whose implications extend beyond their respective borders. Examples include financial market regulation as well as taxation, trade and environmental policies. They do so to avoid lowest common-denominator outcomes in areas where they desire more ambitious international policies, and to motivate or coerce other countries to shoulder a part of the burden associated with problem solving. This article explores whether and how such unilateralism affects public opinion in other countries, arguing that such analysis can point to external constraints on unilateralism and is worthwhile also for normative reasons. Empirically, we examine the effect of a major unilateral European Union (EU) climate policy initiative, which regulates emissions from aircraft, on public opinion in India and the United States, the two largest democracies outside the EU. Based on survey experiments, we study the effects of cost and sovereignty considerations on people's evaluation of the EU's new policy. The results show that both types of concern play a significant role and may act as a constraint on unilateral European climate policy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Trust in the European Union is strongly related to trust in national political institutions through extrapolation, i.e. cues from national politics. Most evidence for this mechanism, however, is based on surveys using question blocks that present several institutions at once in non-randomized order. We conducted six split-ballot survey experiments in five European countries, asking about trust in national and European Union institutions (a) separately or in the same question block and (b) in different question orders. Our findings demonstrate survey context effects: asking about two institutions within the same question block increases the correlation of reported levels of trust in these institutions. Furthermore, our findings indicate that national primes decrease reported trust in the European Union, providing novel micro-level evidence for extrapolation and cue-taking from national politics in the formation of public opinion about the European Union.

Three books studying European immigration from the perspectives of economics, political science and sociology reach different conclusions on some key aspects of this policy. I suggest three avenues for future research. First, there is a need to develop institutionally richer political economy models of migration to examine the conditional nature of state control over immigration. Second, case selection bias in assessing the legacy of immigration for nationality laws should be redressed starting with a more encompassing theory of policy reform. Third, the impact of national welfare policies on the mode of integration of immigrants in the receiving countries could be a promising area of investigation. I illustrate this using employment protection legislation and family policies.

Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left—right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.

While Europe is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaty, there is much doubt about the extent of citizens' emotional attachment to Europe. In this article we examine whether young Belgians show a sense of European citizenship, using a range of questions about the European Union (EU) from a survey administered to more than 6000 secondary school students. We show that a genuine identification with Europe — one that is not purely based on a positive evaluation of the EU from a utilitarian point of view — is related to higher levels of tolerance towards ethnic minorities, Muslims and immigrants. In addition, we will provide an overview of the literature on European citizenship and its potential connection to a higher degree of tolerance towards different cultures.