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Increased reliance on the Internet and other networked systems raise the risks of cyber attacks that could harm our nation's cyber infrastructure. The cyber infrastructure encompasses a number of sectors including: the nation's mass transit and other transportation systems; banking and financial systems; factories; energy systems and the electric power grid; and telecommunications, which increasingly rely on a complex array of computer networks, including the public Internet. However, many of these systems and networks were not built and designed with security in mind. Therefore, our cyber infrastructure contains many holes, risks, and vulnerabilities that may enable an attacker to cause damage or disrupt cyber infrastructure operations. Threats to cyber infrastructure safety and security come from hackers, terrorists, criminal groups, and sophisticated organized crime groups; even nation-states and foreign intelligence services conduct cyber warfare. Cyber attackers can introduce new viruses, worms, and bots capable of defeating many of our efforts. Costs to the economy from these threats are huge and increasing. Government, business, and academia must therefore work together to understand the threat and develop various modes of fighting cyber attacks, and to establish and enhance a framework to assess the vulnerability of our cyber infrastructure and provide strategic policy directions for the protection of such an infrastructure. This book addresses such questions as: How serious is the cyber threat? What technical and policy-based approaches are best suited to securing telecommunications networks and information systems infrastructure security? What role will government and the private sector play in homeland defense against cyber attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, financial, and logistical systems? What legal impediments exist concerning efforts to defend the nation against cyber attacks, especially in preventive, preemptive, and retaliatory actions? ; "May 2013." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; 1. Introduction / Tarek Saadawi, Louis H. Jordan, Jr., and Vincent Boudreau -- Part I: Economics and social aspects of cyber security. 2. Exploring the economics of the malicious software market / Thomas J. Holt -- 3. The emergence of the civilian cyber warrior / Max Kilger -- Part II: Law and cybercrime. 4. Changing the game : social and justice models for enhanced cyber security / Michael M. Losavio, J. Eagle Shutt, and Deborah Wilson Keeling -- 5. An institutional and developmental analysis of the data breach disclosure laws / Melissa Dark -- 6. Cyber security and identity : solutions for critical infrastructure that protect civil liberties and enhance security / Joshua Gruenspecht -- 7. Exploring the utility of open source data to predict malicious software creation / George W. Burruss, Thomas J. Holt, and Adam M. Bossler -- Part III: Cyber infrastructure. 8. ISP grade threat monitoring / Abhrajit Ghosh -- 9. The challenges associated with assessing cyber issues / Stuart H. Starr. ; Increased reliance on the Internet and other networked systems raise the risks of cyber attacks that could harm our nation's cyber infrastructure. The cyber infrastructure encompasses a number of sectors including: the nation's mass transit and other transportation systems; banking and financial systems; factories; energy systems and the electric power grid; and telecommunications, which increasingly rely on a complex array of computer networks, including the public Internet. However, many of these systems and networks were not built and designed with security in mind. Therefore, our cyber infrastructure contains many holes, risks, and vulnerabilities that may enable an attacker to cause damage or disrupt cyber infrastructure operations. Threats to cyber infrastructure safety and security come from hackers, terrorists, criminal groups, and sophisticated organized crime groups; even nation-states and foreign intelligence services conduct cyber warfare. Cyber attackers can introduce new viruses, worms, and bots capable of defeating many of our efforts. Costs to the economy from these threats are huge and increasing. Government, business, and academia must therefore work together to understand the threat and develop various modes of fighting cyber attacks, and to establish and enhance a framework to assess the vulnerability of our cyber infrastructure and provide strategic policy directions for the protection of such an infrastructure. This book addresses such questions as: How serious is the cyber threat? What technical and policy-based approaches are best suited to securing telecommunications networks and information systems infrastructure security? What role will government and the private sector play in homeland defense against cyber attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, financial, and logistical systems? What legal impediments exist concerning efforts to defend the nation against cyber attacks, especially in preventive, preemptive, and retaliatory actions? ; Mode of access: Internet.

Este artículo examina los principales factores explicativos del empleo de presos y prisioneros de guerra en la ampliación y reconstrucción del tendido ferroviario durante la Guerra Civil Española y la posterior dictadura franquista. La primera parte, a partir del cruce de diferentes fuentes, presenta una lista los trabajos realizados por mano de obra cautiva en los ferrocarriles españoles entre 1938 y 1957. Posteriormente se pasan a analizar las tres grandes modalidades de trabajo en función del cambio institucional y la estructura empresarial del ferrocarril: prisioneros de guerra trabajando para compañías privadas, prisioneros de guerra trabajando en batallones militares y presos trabajando para compañías constructoras privadas. Gracias a esta variedad de situaciones podemos entender mejor en qué medida la oferta de trabajo en el mercado laboral y los niveles de productividad están en la base de la diversidad de las estrategias empresariales en diferentes coyunturas, como la economía de guerra, la reconstrucción postbélica o los años de dictadura, hasta 1957. ; This article deals with the main economic keys that explain the evolution in the deployment of prisoners and prisoners of war on extending and reconstructing the railways. The first part presents a list of the works carried out during the Spanish civil war and the Francoist dictatorship. Subsequently, an analysis is made of the three main variables of work according to institutional change and the business structure of the Spanish railway. Thanks to this variety of situation, we can better understand to which extent labour supply and productivity levels are on the basis of the evolution of enterprises strategies towards this kind of labour in different situations, such as war economy, after-war reconstruction, and dictatorship, until 1957. ; The article is part of the research project 'Un universo de prácticas punitivas: el sistema concentracionario y carcelario en la posguerra española / A universe of punitive practices: the concentration and prison system in Spain after the Civil War' (HAR2010-14845), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.

Expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn't travel the last mile. In nineteenth-century New York and modern Africa, disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money. Either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don't use sanitation infrastructure, but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion. Our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines, subsidies, both or neither are optimal. Contrary to Becker (1968), the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion. ; Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-830), and the Barcelona GSE.

It is by now a trite commonplace that we live in an increasingly integrated global economy, in which the barriers to the free movement of goods and capital, though not labor, are rapidly disappearing as a result of both policy reforms and the progress of technology in transport and communications. The rhetoric as well as the substance of national economic policy is now preoccupied with the problem of how each country can hope to survive and prosper in a world where capital controls and trade restrictions are off the agenda. Is the simple laissez-faire principle of simply doing nothing correct, or is there anything an activist government might usefully strive to accomplish? With the global pool of capital at any instant restlessly searching for the highest return, regardless of borders, a popular prescription has come to be the provision of public infrastructure and the training and education of the labor force. With these measures the nation can attempt to secure for itself a higher share of the global capital stock and thus ensure for itself higher wages and better quality jobs for its own labor force.

The dissertation, "Networks, Deregulation, and Risk: The Politics of Critical Infrastructure Protection," engages post-9/11 debates over the role of public policy and novel technologies in crafting and maintaining resilient infrastructure networks against the threat of terrorism. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, networks of communication, electric power, and transportation (as well as others) became sites of anxiety, debate, and, ultimately, intervention. The dissertation examines three separate infrastructures--the postal system, freight rail transportation, and the electric power grid--and considers the ways in which new regulations and technologies of control are introduced in an effort to counter the presumed disruptive impacts of terrorism. The study follows two related lines of inquiry: First, it examines the relationship between deregulation--the selective and incomplete restructuring of infrastructure regulation in deference to the market--and infrastructure vulnerability; Second, it considers how after 9/11 a cross-section of actors from inside and outside the sphere of traditional national security policymaking intervene in defining the terms on which critical infrastructure protection unfolds. The dissertation argues that deregulation, despite its other merits, creates new forms of infrastructure vulnerability. Critically, the partial deregulation of price-and-entry controls over infrastructure operations transformed the architecture of these networks in ways that make infrastructures both more efficient and more vulnerable to large-scale failure. By foregrounding the role of policy and law in shaping infrastructure networks, the dissertation demonstrates how previous regulatory regimes provided a hedge against large-scale failure and how deregulation, unintentionally, conspired to create networks beset by vulnerabilities. Additionally, the dissertation highlights the surprising conclusion that in the aftermath of 9/11 the perceived risk of terrorism ultimately contributes to the democratization of infrastructure governance. Drawing from the work of Ulrich Beck and notions of securitization, the dissertation examines how risk serves as a resource for otherwise marginalized interest groups to open infrastructure governance to a range of voices. In the reviewed cases, risk does not serve to support the suspension or diminution of democratic practices, but on the contrary enlivens particular aspects of practices of democracy