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The following bulletin focuses on remittance inflows into Georgia in 2020 and its development in 2021. The social and economic stability of Georgia strongly relies on the money sent from emigrants to their families. Based on World Bank Data1, in 2019, in terms of dependence on remittance inflows, Georgia ranked 21st in the world, with remittance inflows to GDP ratio. Moreover, the study conducted by the State Commission on Migration Issues revealed that in 2016 money sent by every second emigrant to their families accumulated half or 3/4 of family budget, and for the 15% of families remittance was the only source of income in Georgia.

Remittances are considered a lifeline of developing countries and are especially vital for migrants and their families. Digital data technology can help alleviate many of the "pain-points" in the remittances industry. For example, it can significantly enhance the convenience, speed, security, and affordability of sending and receiving remittances. This publication discusses the importance of remittances in Asia and the Pacific, the key challenges faced by the industry, and the impacts of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. It also includes country case studies that demonstrate the benefits of digitization and makes recommendations on how the digitization of remittances across the region can be further advanced.

This report analyzes labor migration trends in Asia and puts them in the context of demographic and policy trends. It provides an overview of the population trends in different Asian countries and looks at policy settings in several sending and destination countries of labor migrants. It examines different approaches to effective labor migration management, including the imposition and regulation of fees and costs, and reviews the relevant policies in Asia and the Pacific. The report also looks forward to new approaches, examining the concept of skills mobility partnerships and how existing migration channels in Asia could be innovated using this concept. The chapters reflect the discussions that took place at the "Ninth Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia: Innovative Approaches for the Effective Management of Labor Migration in Asia," held in Tokyo in February 2019. The event, co-organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labour Organization, brought together regional experts and policy makers. The report provides the most up-to-date comparative statistics on labor migration flows in and from Asia. The introductory chapter reviews the recent regional trends and newly available data on the changes in the stock of Asian migrants, while two statistical annexes offer detailed country fact sheets and coverage of intra-Asia and cross-regional migration flows.

This paper will focus on the xinyimin in Indonesia, an undertaking that forms part of my larger project on Chinese migration in Southeast Asia. There have been copious descriptions of the diverse nature of Chinese migration into the region, but statistics have been less forthcoming both as a result of the sensitive nature of the subject and the uneven data collection of country-level surveys. However, from scattered information that is available, it is still possible for us to gain a rough picture of the xinyimin in Southeast Asia and to understand their activities (see Table 1). To a limited extent, their impact on the local socioeconomic and political scene can also be assessed.

Remittance inflows, in other words, money sent by migrants to their home countries, provide a lifeline for a sizable share of populations in developing countries. Remittances are especially important due to the ability to act as a countercyclical buffer during the periods of crisis, as migrants tend to send more money when the crisis hits their home economy. However, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent "Great Lockdown" is different, as it stalled economic activity in nearly every country, resulting in drying up of remittance inflows when they were needed the most. The World Bank estimate for the growth of global remittance flows in 2020 is -20%1, while the IMF forecasts a 15% decline in remittance inflows for Georgia2. In the subsequent analysis, the pre-COVID snapshot of remittance inflows in Georgia will be discussed, followed by the developments of remittance inflows during the first half of 2020.

This research paper describes the many ways that individuals and families living in refugee camps in Bangladesh cope with hardship and life in displacement. It presents new information on family separation as an additional source of hardship, but also as a source of support through which remittances sometimes flow, and often as a risky but hopeful investment in a better future for those who manage to reach a third country beyond Myanmar and Bangladesh. The study also looks at economic hardship and the coping strategies of refugee households, presenting new evidence on the cost of living in the camps, income sources and indebtedness, remittances, and the equivocal role of dowry payments. It includes data on the gendered implications of displacement, mobility, and economic hardship. The study addresses important knowledge gaps by emphasizing the vantage point of camp households. It is based on a representative survey of 1,611 camp households and 50 in-depth interviews with camp residents. Respondents were asked to share information about their family members in other countries and the livelihood circumstances they face in the camps. Field research took place from August 2019 to January 2020.

The study investigates the impact of migration and remittances on the financial behaviour of left behind family members in Sri Lanka, using data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2016. The analysis includes propensity score matching estimates and a three stage least squares estimates to examine the impact of having a migrant in the household or receiving remittances on the saving and borrowing behaviour of the left behind family members. A holistic view of the empirical findings of the study show that migration and remittances promote savings in left behind households, and the broader picture of debt repayment, indebtedness and loan income hints that migration and remittances make left behind family less likely to borrow, less likely to be indebted, and the more likely to be repaying debt. Such ongoing debt repayment is more likely to be associated with debt that was taken before migration (either to cover cost of migration or for some other reason unrelated to migration). This empirical evidence on capacity of migration and remittances to improve savings and reduce unproductive borrowing is found on the basis of the status quo in Sri Lanka - where minimal guidance is provided to left behind households on financial management. As such, exposure to appropriate interventions would enhance the capacity of migration and remittances to uplift the financial behaviour and related outcomes for left behind households. Such positive effects would have multiplier effects on all migration and remittances related outcomes at the household level and beyond.

Non-traditional security (NTS) issues continue to threaten the well-being of nations and communities in Asia and around the world. National governments alone cannot solve the multifaceted problems associated with NTS, ranging from climate change and disasters to mass movement of people in search of refuge and safety. Given that traditional multilateralism is in retreat, a more sustainable approach to multilateral cooperation is critically needed, requiring the collaborative participation and engagement of multiple stakeholders from local communities, civil society organisations, the private sector, governments, regional organisations, and other international agencies. The Annual Conference of the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security in Asia (NTS-Asia),1 held in Singapore on 25 and 26 March 2019, examined the relevance of multi-stakeholder collaboration in facilitating efforts to address a number of NTS challenges including, among others, (i) irregular and forced migration; (ii) economic inequality; (iii) environmental degradation; (iv) digital threats; and (v) social friction.

The catalyst for capitalist growth in Vietnam—often dubbed Asia's next Tiger economy1—is frequently ascribed to market reforms starting in 1986 and subsequent foreign investment flows. But diaspora capital sent from abroad has also contributed significantly to Vietnam's economic growth over the last 30 years. Many of Vietnam's so-called "overseas Vietnamese" left as refugees and migrants after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. International remittances to Vietnam are estimated at around USD 15 billion annually,2 making it one of the top ten destinations in the world for money sent by diaspora populations back to home communities in the Global South. About 7-8 percent of households in Vietnam receive remittances from abroad.3 International remittance flows are higher than overseas development assistance to Vietnam, of which Vietnam is also a top ten recipient. This article examines developments in Vietnam's remittance sector, including how they are being framed and embedded by new monetary policies, technologies, banking and finance trends, and consumer patterns that both enhance and complicate cross-border mobility. The material is drawn in part from my book, Currencies of Imagination: Channeling Money and Chasing Mobility in Vietnam (Cornell University Press 2018).

Migrant workers make a critical contribution to Myanmar's economic and social development, however, decades of isolation from the international community and gaps in the policy framework governing labour migration have meant that their situation at places of origin is still inadequately understood. To obtain further information about safe migration knowledge, attitudes and practices, the ILO's GMS TRIANGLE project partnered with the Myanmar Development Resource Institute's Centre for Economic and Social Development to conduct a survey of 625 potential migrant workers at three target sites within Myanmar. The pioneering study will be used to shape the design and evaluate the impact of policy measures, capacity building trainings and support services to protect the rights of migrant workers throughout the migration process.

This Policy Insight highlights the SOE 2015 chapter, which focuses on Migrant Labour Reforms and analyzes the issues concerning the Family Background Report (FBR) requirement and provides recommendations for its reform.

Remember when the Fed's most pressing policy concern was missing their 2% inflation target from below for most of the decade following the financial crisis of 2008-09?  The concern never failed to puzzle me in all my time at the St. Louis Fed. I once let out how I really felt:All those years I was expecting low inflation and low interest rates to make the political opposition to ever-higher deficits melt away. As I recall explaining to my colleagues at the time "Either we'll get the biggest free-lunch of all time (increased government spending and/or tax cuts) or we'll get inflation." The inflation was inevitable, to my of thinking. I just didn't know when it would return. I certainly did not see the point of encouraging it! Well, inflation returned. But not exactly for the reasons I was expecting. What happened? ShocksWhat happened was COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war. These two shocks were large, disruptive, and persistent. A great many people died. Large parts of the economy were shut down with the hope of slowing the spread of the virus so as not to overwhelm our limited ICU capacity. The leisure and hospitality sector was crushed, and other sectors as well. There was a massive (and highly unusual) reallocation of production and consumption away from services to goods--a phenomenon that has not fully reversed to this day. We learned about the delicate and interconnected nature of global supply chains. People modified their behavior in dramatic ways. Work-from-home seems here to stay. And then, of course, as if a global pandemic was not enough, Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, leading to the usual sickening consequences of war: death, destruction, and displacement--as well as energy disruptions and food shortages that reverberated across the global economy. This is not, of course, the only thing that happened. We also had policy responses. Policy: What was neededI want to limit attention to economic policy here (health policy is another matter). The COVID-19 shock disrupted some sectors of the economy more than others. Some sectors, like leisure and hospitality were virtually shut down. But in many other parts of the economy, people were able to work from home. Since not many people purchased pandemic-insurance, a large number of Americans were in for a whole lot of economic hurt. Most of those adversely affected were in the bottom half of the income distribution. What could and should have been done?I should like to think that most Americans would have been in favor of a social insurance program that supported those most in need; i.e., targeted transfers for as long as the pandemic remained disruptive. Most people would have recognized that this is the right thing to do. And even those few who seemingly do not care much for their fellow Americans might have recognized how redistribution would have been desirable, perhaps even necessary, to maintain social cohesion. We should not have wanted a replay of what happened in the last crisis, where the financial sector was bailed out while American many households were largely left flailing in the foreclosure winds that blew in the aftermath of 2008-09. How might such a program be financed? A consumption tax would have been one way. Imagine a "transitory" 5% federal sales tax to fund a targeted transfer program. The program parameters could, in principle, be calibrated in a manner that requires little or no adjustment in the deficit. Ideally, such an emergency program would have already been put in place. (As far as I know, there is still no such plan in place--a significant policy failure, in my view.)How might things have
played out with such a policy, given the sequence of shocks that unfolded? To a
first approximation, my guess is "probably not much different." With the balanced-budget
policy described above, inflation would have almost surely been lower. Imagine
shaving 300-500bp off the "inflation hump" we've experienced so far:

We would almost surely still have had some inflation stemming from supply disruptions and energy
costs (associated with the war). But inflation would have been less pronounced. Naturally, rather than complaining about high inflation, people would instead have
been complaining about high consumption taxes. ("They told us they'd be
transitory!") There's no such thing as a free lunch. 

Under this higher-tax/lower-deficit policy, most Americans would have felt worse off relative to
2019. The blame for this feeling, however, properly lies with the shocks and
not the policy response. Yes, work-from-home types would not have received
transfers and they would have been paying more for goods and services. This is
the nature of redistribution, which I believe most people would have supported. Policy: What we gotTo a large extent--and all things considered--we pretty much got what was needed: a set of redistributive policies with transfers targeted (mostly) to the bottom half of the income distribution (yes, yes, we can talk at length about how things could have been done better). Except that there was no surtax to fund the transfers. Our representatives in Congress chose to deficit-finance the programs. The resulting large quantity of treasury paper had to be absorbed by the private sector at a time supply was constrained and interest rates were not permitted to rise (I'll get to monetary policy in a moment). How does one not expect some additional inflation in this case? So, instead of a "transitory" consumption tax, we got a "transitory" inflation tax. There's no free lunch. By the way, by "transitory" I mean to say that inflation is expected to revert to target, instead of remaining elevated or even increasing. In the fall of 2020, I expected a "temporary" inflation (see here) because I thought the supply disruptions and CARES Act were not permanent. Inflation turned out to be higher and more persistent than I expected. But the supply disruptions have largely alleviated and the ARP expired at the end of 2021 (though the RUS-UKR war continues). Up until recently, I remained optimistic that--absent further shocks and with responsible fiscal policy--inflation would make its way back down to target in 3-5 years without a recession. I'm not as optimistic today, but let me return to this below. What about monetary policy? Well, I was very pleased with the way the Fed calmed financial markets in March 2020, as I expected it would.Well done, Fed. But what about monetary (interest rate) policy?Well, to be honest, monetary policy seemed a bit bonkers. Lowering the policy rate in response to recession engineered by a manufactured shutdown did not make much sense to me. My view was more in line with Michael Woodford's, as expressed here in his 2020 Jean Monnet lecture. What was needed was insurance, not stimulus. And this insurance needs to be delivered through fiscal policy. My own view is that many economists could not resist interpreting the severe decline in output as reflecting a conventional "output gap." To be fair, there may very well have been a decline in aggregate demand in the first half of 2020. The economic outlook at the time was very uncertain, which likely increased the desire for precautionary savings. Remember, monthly inflation rates for March, April and May of 2020 were negative. The monthly inflation rate only became positive in June 2020 (5.4% annualized rate), though it remained fairly subdued for most of  2020. Heading into 2020, the Fed's policy rate was around 1.6%. Was it really necessary to lower it any further? Especially in light of the fiscal transfers taking place throughout 2020?  But apparently, in the minds of some, perhaps even most, the economy needed "stimulating." In any case, it seems clear now, in retrospect at least, that the cut should probably not have happened or, conditional on happening, should have been quickly reversed once the financial panic had subsided. The main effect of interest rate policy according to many was an undesirable asset-price boom (stocks, bonds, and real estate). The increase in private sector wealth coming from higher asset valuations surely added some fuel to the inflationary fire.  We can now see how that Fed-induced wealth effect is being undone. The rapidity of the rise in the Fed's policy rate is wreaking havoc on wealth portfolios. This is not a huge concern to the extent the policy is just reversing an undesirable asset-price inflation. But to the extent that these assets sit on bank balance sheets, to the extent these positions are not hedged against duration risk, to the extent that depositors are skittish, and to the extent that capital buffers are running low, then the banking system--or at least parts of it--are subject to runs. We are seeing this play out now in the United States. Where are we heading? I fear we may be in a bit of a pickle. One reason is China. To be more precise, the risk of the U.S. entering a long and costly proxy war with China. Let's hope it doesn't happen. But I can't help thinking of Rome vs. Persia. I'm not sure about the Persian perspective, but my reading of history suggests that the late Roman Empire devoted considerable resources to defending its eastern frontier against its great rival. Such a fiscal strain requires taxes (or inflation).  If the Sino-American proxy war scenario fails to materialize, then I think we stand a reasonable chance of getting out of this decade without a recession, but with inflation hovering above target for the indefinite future. The Fed might want to sell this as part of its "symmetric" inflation targeting regime. After all, we tolerated undershooting the target inflation rate for a decade (see here). In my view, much will depend on the course of fiscal policy--the deficit, in particular--in relation to the global demand for U.S. Treasury securities (see here). Needless to say, these are very difficult objects to forecast. (In fact, there's no point in forecasting them -- we should just make contingency plans instead.)There is a chance that the Fed overdoes its policy tightening and starts to "break things." Given the recent events in the U.S. banking sector, the FOMC would, in my view, be wise to pause and see how things play out. This is not an issue of "financial dominance." It is based on the deflationary impulse induced by the recent bank failures. I expect all banks to redouble their efforts to repair their balance sheets. This means a fear-induced tightening of lending standards and slower loan growth beyond what one might consider to be a normal reaction against higher policy interest rates.  If the Fed does pull a Paul Volcker, then we'll get a sharp recession. Inflation will come down--temporarily, at least. Where inflation goes from there will depend, as always (in my view), on fiscal policy.  If the proxy war scenario does come to pass, then get ready to pay the necessary taxes. And remember: wars are typically inflationary. In fact, an inflation tax may not be a bad way to finance a part of this endeavor. The U.S. would effectively be collecting a greater amount of seigniorage on its U.S. Treasury securities held abroad. And why shouldn't our allies be prepared to shoulder some of the expense? (There are other ways, of course.) A proxy war may or may not be worth fighting. Either way, remember: there ain't no such thing as free lunch.  As for monetary policy in a period in which the government has a set objective and wants to deficit-finance its spending, I'm afraid the Fed will just have to learn how to stop worrying and "love" inflation (in case you're unfamiliar with the reference, see here). Raising interest rates sharply can break things and create disinflation. But without fiscal reform, the respite on inflation is likely to be temporary. In fact, inflation is likely to reemerge even higher than before since the Treasury will now have to issue paper at an even faster pace, first, to cover the shortfall created by the recession, and second, to cover the higher interest expense of the debt. This is a version of Sargent and  Wallace's "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," see here and here. Need I add that creating a recession is no way to win a proxy war.  How will U.S. policy evolve to meet our many challenges? No one knows how the future will unfold. Perhaps we can take some comfort in Winston Churchill's observation: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing--but only after they've tried everything else." Alas, the quote is apocryphal. Nevertheless, I am hopeful that we will "do the right thing" eventually (and before it's too late). 

One year after a national election in which the Democrats won not only the presidency but 18 congressional seats and 9 new senators, the party lost two major gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey, but won an unexpected congressional seat in upstate New York. Clearly, Obama's coattails did not prove strong enough to bring out the two groups that helped him go over the top in last year's election, namely, the youth vote and the African American votes. There are many lessons to be learned by both parties from this past week' s elections, but there is also the risk of over interpreting results as a prequel of next year's mid-term elections. First, in an "off-off" year, most of the electorate was indifferent to the elections, worried as they are about more pressing issues such as higher taxes, the ever-expanding deficit and more than anything else, about unemployment, which has just surpassed the 10% mark in spite of reported GDP growth of 3.5% this quarter. Second, the state gubernatorial races were played out at the local level and had more to do with the candidates themselves than with the voters 'discontent with the President. Indeed, in a Virginia exit poll, 60% of the voters said that they had based their vote on state issues, while only 24% of those polled said they had used their vote to express their dissatisfaction with the President and 20% to express their support for him. On the other hand, Congressional elections reflect more of the national mood, and here the Democrats were winners: due to an inner brawl among Republicans, they unexpectedly won a seat the Republicans had held since the 1870s in the twenty-third district of New York. still, just as it would be a mistake to give national significance to the state races, it would also be silly to miss the obvious: the preponderant mood in the country is anti-incumbency, and this affects both parties. But clearly, independents who voted for Obama are re-directing their votes toward the Republicans and becoming savvier, more issue specific voters. In addition, both parties have base problems: the Democrats need to figure out how to get their base to the polls during off-year elections, and the Republicans must find ways to control their base so that it does not destroy the party. Turnout was the definitive factor in both gubernatorial races: it fell from 3.7 million to under 2 million in Virginia, and from almost 4 million to 2.3 million in New Jersey. The Republicans and Independents were more energized than the Democratic base, so they voted in larger numbers. Young voters between 18 and 29 years of age represented only 10% in Virginia and 9% in New Jersey. In contrast, in the 2008 presidential race they represented 21% and 17% respectively, and are credited for delivering the states to Obama in both cases. In New Jersey, an unpopular Democratic incumbent, albeit an Obama ally, lost to a new Republican face that ran on a fiscally conservative platform. Obama's appeal was apparently weaker than the voters' aversion for Jon Corzine, so U.S district attorney Chris Christie won, becoming the first Republican to win that position in 12 years. In Virginia, Bob McDonnell underplayed his extreme socially conservative views and his connection to Christian Right leader Pat Robertson. Instead, he ran a positive campaign based on job creation, quality of life for Virginians and fiscal responsibility. His opponent, Creigh Deeds, ran a negative TV ad campaign based on his opponent's social conservatism and his ideology as reflected in a misogynist twenty-year old thesis. In a calculation that backfired, Deeds distanced himself from President Obama for most of his campaign, only to turn to him towards the end. It proved to be too late. On that sunny autumnal day, Democratic voters, especially African Americans and young voters, the two groups than gave Obama his victory in Virginia, were absent from the polls. After eight years of two outstanding Democratic governors, the Executive Mansion in Richmond reverted to Republicans. Unlike Governor Warner who in 2005 prepared the way for his successor, Tim Kaine had spent most of 2009 out of the state, in his new national role as chairman the Democratic National Committee, and did very little to help Deeds. Kaine's national ambition seems to have gotten in the way of his local role as Deeds' promoter and cheerleader, and he became, in the words of Professor Larry Sabato, more of a "partisan rather than a unifying figure" at home. However, the apathy of Democratic voters has deeper roots than just civic irresponsibility or lack of engagement. It is also a reflection of disillusion and even rage with the failure of the Obama administration to create jobs and to deal with Wall Street in stricter terms, for example by breaking up the "too-big-to-fail" banks, introducing stricter regulation of derivatives trading and by reducing of CEO's compensation. Again, in spite of all the rhetoric, Obama seems to have bailed out Wall Street at the expense of middle-class tax payers and small businesses. In sum, Obama's young followers and liberals stayed home because Obama is moving too slowly in crucial issues; independents switched parties because of their own fears of losing their jobs and facing higher taxes, as well as to punish the Democrats for too much government spending with little results for higher employment; and McDonnell benefited as much from a weak, erratic opponent who ran a terrible campaign as he did from his own smart strategy and pragmatic style.While the main problem then for Democrats is how to energize the base so that they can fulfill their civic duty and vote, the Republicans have the opposite problem: how to control their base so that it does not get in the way of allowing the party to field moderate candidates that can get the Independent vote. In this sense, what happened in New York 23rd district may be a blessing in disguise for the Republicans, as it will teach them a lesson in time for next year mid-term election. In this previously little known congressional district near the Canadian border, the Republican Party nominated moderate Assemblywoman DeDe Scozzafava in a special election called to fill the seat of Representative JohnMcHugh (R-NY) who had been appointed Secretary of the Army by President Obama. This was regarded as a safe Republican seat given that the party had held it for over 100 years. However, in a twist of events that took both parties by surprise, Conservatives rebelled against the party nominee, whose social values were deemed too liberal, and fielded their own candidate, Doug Hoffman, with the support of talk show celebrities Rush Limbaugh, Glen Beck and Sarah Palin. The Club for Growth, main supporter of Tea Partiers and Birthers, poured a lot of money in support of Hoffman, and consequently Scozzafava, the official Republican Party nominee, started training in the polls. On the weekend before the election, Scozzafava abandoned the race and endorsed the Democratic candidate! The Right was jubilant, confident of a victory in this rural district, which has very few immigrants and is 93% white. Indeed, Fox news insisted on predicting a "tidal wave" in favor of the Conservative candidate all throughout Election Day, only to be forced to concede at past midnight that instead, the Democratic candidate, Bill Owens, had won. The election in the 23rd district, then, served as a warning to Republicans of whatnot to do in 2010. While the two Republicans that won the gubernatorial races did so by moving to center, thus appealing to Independents and moderates, the main losers in New York state were the Tea Partiers and Birthers who have taken advantage of the vacuum of leadership at the top, have hijacked the Republican Party and made the country at times seem ungovernable. Let it be noted here that both conservative candidates then- to- be governors elect, Chris Christie in New Jersey and Bob McDonnell in Virginia, had rejected Palin's offer to campaign for them. Recognizing the relevance of this kind of wisdom, as well as his good looks and ability to persuade, McDonnell is already being touted as a possible candidate for the 2012 national ticket.2009 will be remembered as the year of anti-incumbency, but this anti-incumbent mood is not so much about Obama, who still enjoys close to 60% of popularity, as it is about government in general. Indeed, every special Congressional election since Obama assumed the presidency has been won by Democrats even in seats previously held by Republicans. In politics, one year is an eternity, so it is difficult to extrapolate the November 3rd results to next year's mid-term election. It all depends on whether the economic stimulus starts to work more consistently and is translated into jobs. The passage of health care reform by the House is undoubtedly a victory for Democrats, but it was a narrow one, with 39 Democrats voting against it, in spite of serious compromises by House Speaker Pelosi, including one amendment that prohibits the use of federal money for abortion and that is already under fire by the party's liberals. If the so-called Stupak amendment is not taken out in House-Senate conference, then the Party may see a huge backlash by women and other groups. Still, health care reform will be a reality by year's end, and once it passes it will become sacred: voters will embrace it (as they did with Medicaid and Medicare, as well as Social Security) and, together with job recovery, it may become the basis of a better mid-term election for Democrats than most pundits are predicting now.Finally, while the two gubernatorial races were won by the Republicans, and can be read as a warning to incumbent governors everywhere in next year's elections, it is clear that the largest group that went to the polls were mainly McCain voters, as well as disgruntled independent voters who shifted to the right. And while this trend is good news for the Republicans, the inexorable weight of demographics is against them: these races were won by an overwhelmingly white and older, more male than female, electorate who constitute at the same time an increasingly smaller percentage of the population as a whole. The fastest-rising voting groups do not vote for the Republican Party, which they consider the party "without ideas". To win next year, the GOP needs to regroup fast, get rid of the Palin-Limbaugh baggage and find new leadership. A year has gone by since their huge electoral loss and they have yet to find it. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

For different reasons, Bossier Parish voters should
reject all four property tax renewals on Saturday's ballot and tell the various
powers-that-be to try again before it's too late.

Bossier City has two such items on tap, both of which
are identically dedicated to public safety operations and maintenance. Both are
ten years in length starting in 2026, pitched at current levies (rolled back
from previous authorized maximums, as property values have risen in recent
years) of 8.32 and 2.71 mills that would generate about $8.6 million in annual
revenue. These do not cover salaries, which are supplemented by a 5.98 mill
measure approved at 6.19 mills in 2020.

The city was smarter this time around than back
then. Four years ago, with that millage then set at 6.00, in essence it allowed
for a future tax increase by the city asking for 6.19 and received
negative publicity for that although the measure passed. Then as now, it
occurred within a year of city elections; the next year the mayor and two city
councilors got dumped by voters. So, this time the city pinned the renewals at
the current rates, and hopes the assessment report from the parish that soon
will be completed will show increased values and allow for a roll back later
this year, just in time for elections next year.

In 2022,
the latest date for which figures are available, the city spent net of charges
for service $27.6 million on public safety, so the amount in question
represents 31.2 percent of that kind of spending. That amount is a bit less
than the $9 million the city spent on interest for non-enterprise debt – that
is, money that goes to paying off a parking garage for a private concern in and
out of receivership, a high-tech office building (and expansions around it), a
money-losing (about $10 million so far) arena, playing fields and recreational buildings
that only private organizations often of non-residents can use, and a
duplicative roadway complete with statute extolling past and present
politicians – and significantly less than the $11.8 million paid out that year
to extinguish a portion of that debt, which stood at $214 million.

Meanwhile, at the end of that year the city sat on
$37.6 million in the general fund, $30 million in its Riverboat Gaming Special Revenue
Fund, and $18.9 million in the Public Health and Safety Permanent Fund. By
ordinance (and in the case of the Permanent Fund, permission of the attorney general),
the entire amounts could be used to fund current operations, meaning even
missing a few years of these taxes could be offset without service reductions.

Therefore, city voters should send a message to their
elected officials by voting negatively on the taxes. By law, the city could get
a couple of more cracks at approval before expiration, and voting down these
now could tell officials to get debt under control that would facilitate, among
other things but perhaps the most crucial priority now a pay
raise for public safety employees, where after that show of good faith
would demonstrate the merits of future approval. For example, the city could
sell the Brookshire Grocery Arena, revoke already-authorized tens of millions
of dollars in unissued debt, and/or scratch from capital outlay plans what
appears to be yet
another attempt to foist an unneeded recreational center onto taxpayer's
backs.

Bossier Parish's 7.43 mill renewal (rolled back
from 7.73) for library operations also needs rejection, as a different message
sent. That would collect $9.5 million annually, which is well above the 2022
expenditures of $7.3 million. In fact, there was so much excess that $2 million
was shoveled from it towards construction of the just-opened Central Library.
Both the Library Fund and Library Construction Fund had healthy balances of $3.4
million and $6.9 million (although estimated remaining costs for the new
library of $5.3 million had yet to be realized).

Still, a year without this funding would leave a
gaping hole in the library's budget. Nor could the general fund provide much
cushion, as most recently the parish has run a deficit in it after transfers to
prop up other areas of parish government, leaving a balance at the end of 2022 of
just $7.2 million.

Yet perhaps that's the lesson the Police Jury
needs to have delivered, which is the only known body in the state to appoint its own
members to a library board of control, a legally questionable practice
subject to a pending attorney general's opinion (which over a month ago was
described as nearing completion, but perhaps timed so that it comes out after
the election?). Absolutely unambiguously it violated R.S. 25:214 by appointing
more than seven members to the Board and allowing them to meet in that fashion
and in the past also violated R.S. 25:215 by
appointing for several months Parish Administrator Butch Ford as head librarian,
when the law stipulated that this officer had to have certifications that Ford
lacked.

Bossier Parish police jurors have shown they are a
hard-headed lot and more than willing to break the law when it gets in their
way. Parish voters telling them to go back to the drawing board by rejecting
the renewal might be the only way to make them more accountable and stay within
the law, which then would merit future renewal.

Finally, the Cypress Black Bayou Water
Conservation and Recreation District renewal of 1.54 mills that most parish
voters will have to assess also deserves defeat. Unlike with the other measures
where elected officials can show behavioral changes that induce later voter
acceptance, this one may be beyond any hope.

This levy actually is a slight decrease from the
1.56 authorized last time and currently assessed, putting it at the level of
the previous reauthorization in 2014. Undoubtedly, setting it at that is a
reaction to the debacle in 2019 when district board – comprised of five
unelected commissioners appointed by various Bossier governments – basically
wanted to double the tax five years early, and got drubbed at the polls as
most but not all of parish residents are subject to the tax and 97 percent don't
own land regulated by the district.

The new version, which would last from 2025 to
2034, would raise a bit under $1.5 million annually, which would be around
three-quarters of its total 2022
revenue haul. Debt service for the 2025-27 period, which is when all its debt
will be extinguished, runs just over $1 million. Other expenses, which are all
cultural and recreational in nature, net of charges
for services cost $1.2 million. About five-eighths of those charges come
from fees charged to users of the park area and waterways, and around
three-eighths come from landowners around the waterways who have to pay
mandatory fees.

However, the fact remains that few of the 97
percent ever visit the area (which they have to pay to enter whether they
already paid property taxes for it) and it has strayed very much from its
original intent as a water management entity. In fact, in its entire history stemming
back to 1958 it
only ever has made one water sale, which otherwise could be a major source
of revenue, as its management has focused on running it like a park.

Almost all of its expenses come from its
recreation activities, even though those tied to landowners make up a tiny
portion of that, who end up subsidizing others' recreation. Most expenditures would
go away, and the need for property tax subsidization, without its acting like a
park.

So, don't let it act like a park, at least as it
currently is governed. It should return to a basic duty of water sales, which has
low expenses, and user fees for boat launching or even beach usage should be
enough to pay for minimal staff, and chuck the rest of its activities. Better,
have the state adopt it as a park by extinguishing its debt and taking it into
the state park system, and conduct water sales through the Department of Energy
and Natural Resources. Covenants can be put on landowners but there would be no
need for them to pay fees.

Or for most of the rest of the parish's residents
to pay the property tax. Voters can kickstart this conversion process of going from
a patronage sinkhole with largely unaccountable governance too willing to chase
grandiose schemes on the taxpayer dime to focusing on state objectives with
streamlined management, if not operations, by rejecting its taxpayer funding,
and again in November when it would be guaranteed to try again less than two
months before loss of this revenue.

Bossier voters just need to remember one thing
when they hit the polls on Apr. 27 – no, in quadruplicate.

ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk meneliti alasan efisien dan inefisien anggaran belanja daerah bidang kesehatan di Provinsi Kalimantan Barat baik secara teknis biaya maupun teknis sistem dan bertujuan untuk memberikan gambaran perbaikan input maupun output pada daerah yang inefisien agar bisa mencapai efisiensi. Objek penelitian ini adalah kabupaten/kota di Provinsi Kalimantan Barat. Kurun waktu tahun 2012 hingga 2015. Metode analisis yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kuantitatif.Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa secara umum Kabupaten Kubu Raya, Kabupaten Landak, dan Kabupaten Sanggau tidak efisien dikarenakan rasio jumlah perawatnya yang dibawah standar ideal, infrastruktur jalan yang tidak memadai dan produksi listrik yang rendah. Anggaran belanja daerah kesehatan yang tinggi juga menyebakan Kabupaten Sanggau tidak efisien secara teknis biaya. Sementara Kabupaten Kayong Utara bisa efisien dikarenakan anggaran belanja daerah kesehatannya yang rendah dan juga rasio jumlah perawat yang tinggi disebabkan oleh jumlah penduduk yang rendah. Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu bisa mencapai efisisensi teknis biaya dikarenakan rasio jumlah puskesmas yang tinggi dan juga produksi listrik yang tinggi. Kota Singkawang bisa mencapai efisiensi karena rasio jumlah perawat yang sangat tinggi, produksi listrik tinggi dan jalan yang rusak sedikit. Untuk daerah yang tidak efisien secara teknis sistem, seperti Kabupaten Sambas, Kabupaten Kayong Utara, dan Kabupaten Ketapang dikarenakan outcome berupa AHH masih rendah, distribusi air bersih yang rendah, dan AKB yang tinggi. Selain itu, wilayah Kabupaten Ketapang yang luas juga menyebabkan tidak efisien secara teknis sistem. Kabupaten Bengkayang bisa efisien dikarenakan memiliki AHH yang sangat tinggi, rasio jumlah puskesmas yang tinggi dan rasio jumlah perawat yang tinggi. Kabupaten Landak bisa mencapai efisiensi teknis sistem dikarenakan AHH yang tinggi dan AKB yang rendah. Kabupaten Kubu Raya bisa mencapai efisiensi karena AKB yang rendah, pertumbuhan ekonomi yang tinggi, jaraknya dekat dengan Ibu Kota Provinsi. Kota Pontianak bisa efisien karena AHH yang tinggi, AKB yang rendah, dan distribusi air bersih yang tinggi. Kata kunci: Efisiensi, DEA, Anggaran Belanja Bidang Kesehatan, Efisiensi Teknis Biaya, Efisiensi Teknis Sistem DAFTAR PUSTAKA Adisamita, R. (2011). Pengelolaan Pendapatan dan Anggaran Daerah: Edisi Pertama. Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu. Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Pendapatan Daerah Kabupaten Kayong Utara. (2014). APBD Murni Kabupaten Kayong Utara Tahun Anggaran 2015. Kayong Utara: BPKPD. Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Pendapatan Daerah Kabupaten Melawi. (2014). APBD Murni Kabupaten Melawi Tahun Anggaran 2015. Melawi: BPKPD. Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Pendapatan Daerah Kabupaten Sambas. (2014). APBD Murni Kabupaten Sambas Tahun Anggaran 2015. Sambas: BPKPD. Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Pendapatan Daerah Kabupaten Sanggau. (2014). APBD Murni Kabupaten Sanggau Tahun Anggaran 2015. Sanggau: BPKPD. Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Pendapatan Daerah Kota Singkawang. (2014). APBD Murni Kota Singkawang Tahun Anggaran 2015. Singkawang: BPKPD. Badan Pusat Statistik Bengkayang. (2013). Bengkayang dalam Angka 2013. Bengkayang: BPS. _________ . (2014). Bengkayang dalam Angka 2014. Bengkayang: BPS. _________ . (2015). Bengkayang dalam Angka 2015. Bengkayang: BPS. _________ . (2016). Bengkayang dalam Angka 2016. Bengkayang: BPS. Badan Pusat Statistik Kalimantan Barat. (2013). Kalimantan Barat dalam Angka 2013. Pontianak: BPS. _________ . (2014). Kalimantan Barat dalam Angka 2014. Pontianak: BPS. _________ . (2015). Kalimantan Barat dalam Angka 2015. Pontianak: BPS. _________ . (2016). Kalimantan Barat dalam Angka 2016. Pontianak: BPS. Badan Pusat Statistik Kapuas Hulu. (2013). 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Diakses tanggal 23 Februari 2018. https://kalbar.bps.go.id/dynamictable/2017/03/22/63/umur-harapan-hidup-menurut-kabupaten-kota-di-provinsi-kalimantan-barat-2010-2017.html. Diakses tanggal 26 februari 2018.