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Inhaltsangabe: Introduction: This book covers policy proposals and interim contracts, assesses the positions of various Iraqi political actors and examines the potential significance for international foreign policy goals in Iraq. Despite a lack of progress in reaching agreements on the hydro-carbon sector and revenue sharing legislation to set new conditions for the management of the country's significant oil and gas resources, development in Iraq's oil and gas sector is moving forward. The passage of the oil and gas sector framework and revenue sharing legislation will be seen as significant milestones by International governments and International Oil Companies (IOC´s). This would provide evidence of the Iraqi government's dedication to promoting political reconciliation and providing a solid foundation for long term economic development in Iraq. Interim revenue sharing mechanisms have been introduced due to the lack of new legislation. Additionally, both the Federal Government (the Federal Oil Ministry-MoO) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy) have made oil and gas development deals with foreign firms. The MoO is working with existing regulation from the previous political and administrational regime, while the Regional Ministry of Resource and Energy Kurdistan-Iraq has designed its own laws and regulations, which the Federal Government has not yet recognized. There is wide recognition among Iraqis of the importance of oil and gas revenue for the Iraqi economy. Most groups see the need for new legal and policy guidelines for the development of the country's oil and natural gas resources. However, Iraq's Council of Rrepresentatives (parliament) has not yet considered the proposed legislation due to ongoing political discord and general political instability. There are strong differences on key issues between Iraqi critics and supporters of various proposed solutions. These include the appropriate role and powers of federal and regional authorities in regulating oil and gas development; the conditions and degree of potential foreign participation in the oil and gas sectors; and proposed formulas and mechanisms for equitably sharing oil and gas revenue. Simultaneously, there are strong disagreements on related discussions about the administrative status of the city of Kirkuk and proposed amendments to articles of Iraq's constitution that outline federal and regional oil and gas rights. The U.S. and UK military strategy in Iraq seeks to lay the ground work for an environment in which Iraqis can resolve core political differences in order to ensure national stability and security. However, it is not yet certain whether the proposed oil and gas legislation and ongoing interim efforts to develop Iraq's energy resources will support harmony or create deeper political tension. The United States and its allies face difficult decisions regarding how to work with Iraqis on assorted policy proposals, related constitutional reforms and oil and gas development contracts, and at the same time encouraging their Iraqi counterparts to ensure that the content of proposed laws, amendments and contracts reflect acceptable political compromises. In the 1920s a wide-ranging concession was granted to a consortium of oil companies known as the Turkish Petroleum company and later as the Iraq Petroleum Company. This was the beginning of oil exploration in Iraq. The nationalization of Iraq's oil resources and production was finished by 1975. From 1975 to 2003, oil production and export operations were entirely state operated. However, from the early 1980s until the toppling of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003, the negative effects of war, international sanctions, a shortage of investments and technology and, in many cases, mismanagement caused difficulties for Iraq's hydrocarbon infrastructure. According to the Oil Ministry, Iraq has the third largest proven oil reserves in the world (115 billion barrels). Other estimates of Iraq's potential oil reserves vary. The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration notes that current estimates "have not been revised since 2001 and are largely based on 2-D seismic data from nearly three decades ago." In April 2007, oil industry consultants IHS assessed that Iraq's proven and probable reserves tally 116 billion barrels, with a potential additional 100 billion barrels in largely unexplored western areas. The U.S. Geological Survey's median estimate for additional oil reserves in Iraq is around 45 billion barrels. In 2004, Iraq's then Oil Ministry claimed that Iraq had "unconfirmed or potential reserves" of 214 billion barrels. My Reservoir Engineering Estimation is that Iraq's reserves can reach more than 320 bn bbl oil. Approximately 65 percent of Iraq's current proven reserves are located in southern Iraq, with a concentration in the southern most province of Al Basrah. Large proven oil resources have also been found in the northern province of Al Ta´mim near the disputed city of Kirkuk At present, crude oil provides over 90% of Iraq's domestic energy consumption and oil exports produce over 98% of Iraq's government revenue. Due to decreases in global oil prices from their 2008 high and lower oil production, Iraqi leaders revised their 2009 revenue and budget assumptions from a projected surplus to a projected $15.9 billion deficit. According to official U.S. assessments continued fluctuations in oil prices and production could put at risk Iraq's fiscal stability and the sustainability of its reconstruction and development plans. The expansion of oil production to the level of four million barrels per day (m/d) by 2013 and then upward to six m/d by 2017 is called for by current Iraqi plans. Iraqi officials have begun an international bid process for service contracts and renegotiated a series of Saddam era oil production agreements in order to support these goals. These include the transformation of a production sharing agreement into a service contract for Ahdab oil field with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of contents: 1.Introduction1 2.Iraqi Constitution7 3.Contract Conditions15 4.State-owned Oil Companies27 5.Restructuring of the Iraqi Oil Institutions33 6.Revenue-Sharing and Equalization36 7.Potential Geography50 8.Present Organization and Development56 9.Hydrocarbon Legislation Draft and Contracts59 10.Revenue Sharing65 11.Crisis Management of the Oil Industry in Iraq88 12.U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress99 13.China Investment in the Energy Sector112 14.Conclusion119 15.References127 16.Attachments129Textprobe:Textsample: Revenues and Arrangements: Under current arrangements, the responsibility for the sale and export of Iraq's crude oil is appointed to Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). The United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1483 (and updated under subsequent Security Council resolutions) stipulates that revenue from Iraq's oil exports is to be deposited into an Iraq-controlled account held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). Five percent of the funds are put aside for a United Nations Compensation Fund for reparations to the victims of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The remaining 95% are deposited into a Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account at the FRBNY and then transferred to an Iraqi Ministry of Finance account at the Central Bank of Iraq for further distribution to Iraqi government ministries. The terms of UNSCR1546 and subsequent resolutions mandate that the DFI be monitored by an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), which provides periodic reports on Iraq's oil export revenue, Iraq's use of its oil revenues, and its oil production practices. According to the IAMB, as of December 31, 2007, $23.43 billion had been disbursed from the United Nations Compensation Fund and Iraq owed $28.95 billion to the Fund. Iraq deposited another $3 billion. According to IAMB estimates in mid 2008 "at the present rate of Iraqi oil sales, it would take approximately 17 years for the compensation award to be fully paid."38 It is likely that this estimate is no longer current due to significant declines in the price of oil in the meantime. The IAMB has not yet announced a corrected date. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1859 (December 22, 2008) the IAMB authority ends on December 31, 2009. This refers to a 2009 "transition to successor arrangement" from the DFI and the IAMD to Iraqi-led auditing processes. In October 2006, the Committee of Financial Experts (COFE) was approved by the Iraqi cabinet. Its task is to oversee oil revenue collection and administration. The president of the COFE authorized its activities in April 2007, and it currently is working with the IAMB on audit procedures. The establishment of an audit oversight committee for the DFI and oil export revenues is a structural benchmark under Iraq's Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund currently satisfied by the extension of the IAMB arrangement and the creation of the COFE. Agreements with members of the Paris club made the approval of the SBA into a necessity.39 The IAMB said in 2009 that Iraq's Committee of Financial Experts "is ready and capable to succeed the IAMB and conduct competent and independent oversight of the DFI." Immunity provisions included in standing UN Security Council resolutions protect Iraqi funds in the DFI from property attachment motions instead of legal judgments rendered against the former Iraqi regime. President Bush extended the U.S. legal protections for the DFI and other Iraqi assets under Executive Order 13303 through May 20, 2009. President Obama prolonged the protections until May 2010.40 Iraq will receive continued support from the United States in its attempts to convince the UN to extend related protections for energy proceeds and the DFI under Article 26 of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement. Oversight of Oil Production and Revenue Management Between its creation in May 2003 until December 31, 2007, the DFI received over $121.7 billion in oil proceeds and other deposits. According to audit estimates, an additional $58.8 billion in net export proceeds were deposited in 2008. Intermittent audits done in conjunction with the IAMB have routinely found serious discrepancies in oil production and export figures and DFI account receipt and distribution amounts. The absence of reliable output measurements for oil has been a critical and ongoing problem. During the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period, there was no metering equipment available for oil production and exports. According to a May 2007 GAO report, there have been no improvements in reliable metering in Iraq's oil fields. This has contributed to the shortage of reliable data on Iraq's oil production and related revenue.42. In January 2008, an IAMB report claimed that Iraq's Ministry of Oil "does not have in place a full operational loading and metering system at production and loading points in order to determine produced and loaded quantities [of oil] accurately." An IAMB report in June 2008 established that "some metering has been installed at oil terminals, but there continues to be no metering in the oil fields." In April 2009, the IAMB stated that "much remains to be done before a fully operational control and measurement system over the oil production, distribution and export sales, can be comprehensively implemented," and added that, "Indications from the Ministry of Oil point to implementation by 2011 at the earliest." Financial audits completed by December 2005 established that "no comprehensive financial and internal controls policies and procedures manuals" existed in the Iraqi ministries that were spending oil export proceeds delivered through the DFI system. On June 12, 2007, the IAMB commented on its 2006 findings, noting that the audits proved "the overall financial system of controls is deficient." The audits showed there was "no overall comprehensive system of controls over oil revenues," and that "basic administrative procedures" were "outdated and ineffective." These conditions may have contributed to widespread corruption. Several Iraqi ministries spending distributed oil export revenue have been accused of corruption which is often associated with weak contracting and cash management policies. The Iraqi government's attempts to respond to IAMB recommendations were noticed by the IAMB's preliminary findings for 2007, but also noted that "the overall financial system of controls in place in the spending ministries, the U.S. agencies in respect of outstanding commitments using DFI resources, and the Iraqi administration of DFI resources remain deficient." The 2008 preliminary assessment, released in April 2009, concluded that "much remains to be done before a sound financial management system is operating effectively in Iraq".

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region has seen a decade of remarkable growth and income convergence. Growth has been a key driver for reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. It has been debated how much of this decade of growth has been driven by policy reforms and how much was due to the favorable external conditions. While external factors were supportive and relevant, the effect of domestic policies was just as relevant for explaining LAC's recent growth performance. The emphasis of domestic policy has shifted from stabilization policies to structural policies. In addition, a benchmarking exercise reveals which policy gaps will lead to the highest potential growth-payoffs for each country and helps identify potential trade-offs. The authors analyze growth in LAC using descriptive statistics and growth econometrics. The authors use these results for explaining the pattern of growth in LAC over the last decade, for looking ahead, and to identify potential policy gaps.

Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest and most densely populated countries, and subject to annual cyclones and flooding. Despite these challenges, it benefits from strong economic growth, good performance on health and education, and poverty reduction, alongside weak governance and pervasive corruption. The reasons include strong macroeconomic policy, pro-poor spending, credible elections, export growth and remittances, improved capacity for managing natural disasters, and a stronger civil society than comparable countries. After over a decade of intense engagement with the Bank on governance, Bangladesh adopted in 2006 a governance-oriented Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) with four main objectives: to improve implementation capacity; to 'tackle corruption' by fully operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Commission; to lay the foundation for comprehensive legal and judicial reform; and to strengthen 'voice, empowerment and participation.' The choice of a wide range of instruments and areas of intervention was appropriate, given the political instability at the time of 2006 CAS preparation. The Bank signaled it was ready to engage in all areas, and could scale up or pull back depending on emerging political and bureaucratic commitment. The 2006 CAS yielded mixed results, and the subsequent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) has been more selective on GAC issues. At the project level, governance has been a key priority, in line with the South Asia region's heavy emphasis on GAC-in-Projects. Investments in GAC-in-primary education, a local government project, anti-corruption efforts in the power sector, and projects strengthening the investment climate have yielded positive results. Investments in GAC-in-roads projects have had mixed results in terms of effectiveness. GAC activities were mainly adopted prior to the 2007 GAC strategy. Although Bangladesh was a Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) country, the country team chose not to use CGAC funds because the country had already been intensively using GAC approaches well before the GAC strategy was adopted.

This case study summarizes the findings of desk reviews and a field visit carried out in January 2011 as part of IEG's evaluation of the 2007 Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy. The case study sought to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of Bank support for GAC efforts over the FY2004-10 period, to assess the contributions of 2007 strategy implementation, and to identify early outcomes and lessons. This Background Paper is based on findings of the mission that visited Liberia in January 2011. The team is particularly grateful for informative meetings with officials from the Government of Liberia, Bank staff, and members of civil society. The evaluation aims to help enhance the Bank's approach to governance and anticorruption and to improve its effectiveness in helping countries develop capable and accountable states that create opportunities for the poor. Pursuant to this objective, the evaluation assessed the relevance of the 2007 GAC strategy and implementation plan, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of implementation efforts in making Bank engagement with countries and other development partners more responsive to GAC concerns. It also sought to identify early lessons about what works and what does not in helping to promote good governance and reduce corruption. The Liberia case study is based on an extensive desk review as well as a field visit to Monrovia from January 17-22, 2011. It evaluates the relevance and effectiveness of Bank support for governance and anticorruption efforts since the launch of the Bank's GAC strategy in 2007. It elaborates on a desk review of the GAC responsiveness of the Bank's Liberia program and reviews the following GAC entry points: core public sector reform (public financial management and decentralization); demand for good governance (including social accountability issues); GAC in the road sector; and the investment climate. The case study also examines the extent to which the Bank's GAC Strategy has made a difference in staff attitudes toward addressing GAC issues in their operational work. The mission interviewed government, Bank, donor, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff based in Washington and in Monrovia.

While diversification of exports is often a desirable trade objective, it is far from clear how best to tap into new opportunities. This paper discusses the range of avenues of diversification, including (i) expanding the range of markets into which existing products are sold (geographic diversification); (ii) upgrading the value of existing products, including agricultural exports (quality diversification); and (iii) taking advantage of opportunities to expand non-merchandise exports (services diversification), in addition to introducing entirely new export products. All offer opportunities for cost?effective positive policies relating to the incentive regime, backbone services, and export support institutions.

Abstract tesi IL FUNZIONAMENTO DEL SISTEMA DI GOVERNANCE EUROPEA ED IL RUOLO DELLE ISTITUZIONI "POLITICHE" NELL'INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA Il mio lavoro di ricerca, sul tema della governance europea, del processo di integrazione europea e dello sviluppo della mia ricerca, è stato quello di studiare ed analizzare come il concetto di governance, che fino a non molti anni fa era praticamente inutilizzato, ha conosciuto un così largo e rapido sviluppo? Come primo paso ho tentato di fare chiarezza sul campo di applicazione di questo concetto e del suo sviluppo, con particolare attenzione alla sfera delle relazioni politiche tra i vari attori della politica europea. Per capire le cause che hanno fatto emergere il concetto di governance a partire dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale, ho fatto riferimento all'assetto istituzionale creatosi nel dopo guerra ed ai modelli politici che si sono susseguiti tra i quali: il modello welfarista-keynesiano del dopo guerra, il modello neo-corporativo, il modello neo-liberale fino ad arrivare all'uso del concetto di governance come modello di implementazione delle politiche. Il lavoro di ricerca intrapreso, sul funzionamento del sistema di governance europea ed il ruolo delle istituzioni 'politiche' dell'Unione europea (Ue) nel processo di integrazione, è diviso in quattro parti. Prima parte La prima parte del lavoro di ricerca ho offre una chiara versione dell'insorgere del concetto di governance come modello-approccio per il processo di integrazione europea. Come punto di partenza è lo studio delle teorie classiche dell'integrazione europea: la teoria del federalismo, il funzionalismo, il neofunzionalismo, l'istituzionalismo, l'intergovernativismo e della governance multilivello la quale rappresenta il carattere dell'Unione europea e con riferimento al processo di integrazione europea, si fa riferimento alla divisione delle competenze tra UE e Stati membri. Il concetto di multilevel governance designa l'articolarsi della divisione di competenze e di rapporti non più soltanto tra UE e Stati membri, ma anche con il coinvolgimento dei livelli sub-nazionali insediando a Bruxelles uffici di rappresentanza, segnando una partecipazione delle autonomie locali all'integrazione europea, intesa come processo capace al tempo stesso di ridurre le disparità socio-economiche territoriali e rispettare le specificità locali. Si fornisce una panoramica delle teorie dell'integrazione europea evidenziando il contributo che ciascun approccio teorico ha fornito alla compressione del processo di integrazione nelle diverse fasi di sviluppo. La lettura esistente sulle teorie dell'integrazione europea è ampia e variegata ma nonostante ciò non è ancora emersa una grand theory che spieghi l'integrazione europea in complesso e spesso si è allontanati dal campo d'indagine dell'integrazione e che in un certo modo gli studi sulla governance hanno tentato di portare al centro dell'attenzione mirando a cogliere il processo di integrazione nella sua funzionalità e nei diversi livelli di manifestazione. Seconda parte Nella seconda parte del lavoro, ho concentrato lo studio di ricerca sull'evoluzione del quadro istituzionale e sulla modalità di produzione ed implementazione delle politiche nell'Unione europea facendo una comparazione interpretativa del governo dell'Unione europea, ho messo in evidenza i limiti ed i meriti delle modalità d'azione dell'originaria Comunità economica (Ce) e dell'attuale Unione europea. Ho concentrato i campi di indagine sul cambiamento del quadro politico istituzionale avvenuto con l'attuazione dei trattati, dal Trattato di Roma fino al Trattato di Lisbona, la ripartizione delle competenze istituzionali e dell'equilibrio istituzionale creato con l'adozione del Trattato di Lisbona. Ho approfondito lo studio sui ruoli e le competenze delle quattro Istituzioni "politiche" (Parlamento europeo (Pe), Commissione europea, Consiglio europeo e Consiglio) del quadro istituzionale europeo. Da questa analisi ho dedotto che l'Unione europea, nella sua evoluzione verso il rafforzamento del processo di integrazione è stata istituzionalizzata, politicizzata ed ha ottenuto una costituzionalizzazione dei Trattati. Ma comunque le sfide che l'Unione europea ha affrontato e sta affrontando hanno messo in evidenza i limiti del metodo classico dell'integrazione europea, facendo crescere l'insoddisfazione nella capacità di problem solving dell'UE e richiedendo una nuova fase della governance europea. Terza parte Nella terza parte del lavoro ho focalizzato l'analisi sullo studio del sistema di governance europea e del suo sviluppo nei meccanismi decisionali e di implementazione delle politiche dell'Unione europea. Il concetto di governance ha contrassegnato una svolta nella riflessione sulle istituzioni europee, ed ha posto l'accento sull'esistenza di un sistema di regole, di procedure e di poteri che ormai prescinde dalla volontà degli stati membri. Il contenuto e gli obiettivi del "Libro bianco sulla governance europea" pubblicato dalla Commissione europea nel luglio 2001, ha definiti i principi a partire dai quali ri-articolare il processo di policy making europeo dando inizio a quel processo di implementazione ed attuazione delle politiche. Visto il sistema creatasi, ho analizzato il sistema di governance europea dopo il trattato di Lisbona, concentrandomi sul processo decisionale, il ruolo delle istituzioni nell'influenzare il processo e dei metodi decisionali della governance europea quali: il metodo comunitario, quello intergovernativo e di coordinamento aperto. Ho comparato l'utilizzo e i risultati ottenuti da questi metodi al riguardo del processo di integrazione. Ho concluso con un'analisi del ruolo delle istituzioni e dei modelli decisionali, quello intergovernativo e sovranazionale, e la governance economica europea. Quarta parte La quarta parte e conclusiva del mio lavoro, l'ho agli sviluppi recenti dell'Unione europea. Ho analizzato le conseguenze della crisi finanziaria, che ha portato ad un arresto del processo di integrazione, le risposte che il sistema di governance ha dato ed il ruolo delle istituzioni europee nella crisi finanziaria. Ho affrontato anche il tema di legittimità e democrazia nel sistema di governance, la nuova governance europea secondo le teorie dei "nuovi intergovernamentalisti", dei "nuovi sovranazionalisti" e dei "nuovi parlamentaristi". Infine, ho tracciato una linea su alcuni sviluppi e proposte per far ripartire il processo di integrazione in quanto, l'Unione europea si è trasformata radicalmente nel corso della crisi dell'euro che si è sviluppata a partire dal 2008. Questa crisi ha messo in discussione l'equilibrio tra le due costituzioni previsto dal Trattato di Lisbona (intergovernativa e sovranazionale), rafforzando impetuosamente la costituzione intergovernativa a cui il Trattato ha affidato la gestione della politica economica e finanziaria. Quando esplose la crisi, l'UE aveva a disposizione il framework decisionale per affrontarla all'interno del quale quindi individuare gli strumenti necessari per governarla. Per questo motivo è improprio sostenere che l'UE si sia trovata impreparata ad affrontare le sfide della crisi finanziaria. Tuttavia, anche gli strumenti di cui ha potuto disporre non hanno funzionato come ci si aspettava. Tant'è che la crisi finanziaria si è protratta come mai era successo nel passato. Le decisioni prese sono risultate regolarmente troppo limitate e sono arrivate sempre molto in ritardo. La difficoltà nel gestire la crisi finanziaria ha accentuato le divisioni all'interno dell'Eurozona, tra gli stati debitori del Sud e gli stati creditori del Nord. La costituzione intergovernativa non ha funzionato a dare risposte e soluzioni alla crisi ed ha prodotto una mancanza di democraticità e legittimazione delle sue decisioni. Per far fronte al problema di democraticità e legittimazione delle decisioni molti analisti sono di comune accordo col fatto di rivedere i Trattati per ridurre il potere acquisito dal Consiglio europeo nel recente periodo. I risultati dell'analisi di ricerca dimostrano che la storia dell'integrazione europea ha avuto come principale strumento l'economia che però ha trovato nella politica il suo promotore, e che nella politica cerca nuovi traguardi e un nuovo rilancio. Gli eventi in questi anni di storia di integrazione europea hanno mostrato che il processo d'integrazione europea necessita di essere alimentato in continuazione, che mantiene un equilibrio fino a quanto risulta in movimento, mentre frana appena si ferma. Visto le difficoltà che l'Unione europea sta oggi incontrando sia nel implementare il processo di integrazione sia al interno del quadro politico istituzionale, e inevitabile una rivisitazione del processo di integrazione ove le sfide da affrontare sono enormi: dal prevalere della regola del consenso in ambiti chiave come la politica estera e quella di difesa, all'apparente rinazionalizzazione delle politiche, dalla crescente diffidenza del pubblico verso le istituzioni europee all'incapacità dell'Unione europea di fornire risposte adeguate ai bisogni sociali ed economici della popolazione dei suoi Stati membri. Dalla ricerca effettuata si sono presentati alcuni scenari che propongono soluzioni diverse ad un futuro sviluppo dell'Unione europea: dalla scelta di "integrazione intergovernativa" passando da quella funzionalista di un'"integrazione differenziata" fino ad un concetto di integrazione a più livelli con i caratteri forti di un nucleo centrale unitario di carattere sovranazionale e democratico. Fondamentale è partire dalle esigenze economiche, politiche, sociali e di sicurezza di un futuro sistema di governance dell'Unione europea, dove i termini di riferimento principali devono essere il governo, i valori e le finalità di quest'ultima. La crisi economica e finanziaria ha determinato un contesto sociale, economico e finanziario molto problematico, mettendo in contrasto l'efficienza del processo decisionale con il rispetto delle prerogative previste dal Trattato attuale. Durante la crisi finanziaria gli interessi differenti degli Stati membri e le difficoltà incontrate nell'apertura di un dibattito sulla revisione dei trattati hanno comportato un ritorno del ricorso all'integrazione differenziata come strumento per risolvere la dualità tra gli Stati membri sostenitori della scelta intergovernativa e quelli che invece propendevano per una soluzione sovrannazionale. Lo strumento dell'integrazione differenziata si è dimostrato indispensabile per il raggiungimento di una vera unione economica. Essa si può attuare, basandosi sul quadro istituzionale e giuridico esistente oppure, attraverso una revisione dei trattati e nell'ultimo dei casi, adottando soluzioni intergovernative. Tuttavia, la crisi economica e finanziaria ha favorito, su impulso del Consiglio europeo, il ricorso a meccanismi esterni ai trattati adottando soluzioni intergovernative. L'articolo 136 del TFUE che fornisce la base giuridica introdotto con il Trattato di Lisbona per approfondire l'integrazione della zona euro, è stata utilizzata solamente per l'adozione di alcune misure della governance economica come il six-pack e successivamente il two-pack, mentre il Meccanismo europeo di stabilità (MES) e il Fiscal Compact (il trattato sulla stabilità, sul coordinamento e sulla governance nell'Unione economica e monetaria (TSCG)), sono stati conclusi all'esterno ai trattati, seguendo il metodo intergovernativo. Dall'analisi svolta, si rileva che il Consiglio europeo ha svolto un efficace ruolo nel raggiungere una posizione consensuale sugli orientamenti generali dell'azione dell'Unione. Sembra tuttavia legittimo domandarsi se in ragione del carattere intergovernativo del suo status e del metodo decisionale, il Consiglio europeo possa rallentare l'evoluzione della costruzione europea. Inoltre, si evidenzia anche uno scarso livello cooperazione istituzionale. In particolare, nonostante in molti casi le negoziazioni tra le istituzioni riguardanti atti legislativi siano state caratterizzate dalle difficoltà di raggiungere una posizione comune in seno al Consiglio, il Consiglio europeo non ha fatto ricorso agli strumenti previsti dai trattati nel quadro della procedura di revisione semplificata. Si rileva infine, che la pratica istituzionale ha gradualmente modificato la distribuzione dei poteri stabilita dalle disposizioni del nuovo trattato, in seguito all'istituzionalizzazione del Consiglio europeo, e questo quest'ultimo ha saputo avvalersi della necessità di una forte governance dell'Unione europea e affermare una solida cooperazione con il Consiglio (a volte anche scavalcandolo), con cui condivide interessi e priorità in virtù della comune natura intergovernativa. Si è avuto una involuzione centralistica dell'Unione europea dovuta alle trasformazioni indotte sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea dalle crisi e dalla Brexit che hanno sollevano nuovi problemi istituzionali. L'Unione europea di impronta intergovernativa che è emersa dalle crisi ha poco a che fare con l'Unione europea sovranazionale che organizza il funzionamento del mercato unico. I governi nazionali si sono insediati al centro del processo decisionale, anche se non hanno potuto escludere da quest'ultimo la Commissione (anche se il suo ruolo è diventato marginale). Abbiamo assistito all'istituzionalizzazione di un sistema decisionale che ha accentuato le divisioni tra gli stati che ne fanno parte, ognuno di essi preoccupato di difendere o di imporre i propri interessi. Tuttavia, non vi è dubbio che la gestione delle crisi multiple ha fatto emergere divisioni tra stati che non sono coerenti con l'ispirazione che ha dato vita al processo di integrazione. In realtà in quelle crisi si sono viste gerarchie tra gli stati, divisioni tra stati, accentuate dalla governance intergovernativa, che hanno riflettuto profonde divergenze sullo scopo del processo di integrazione. È a queste differenti prospettive che occorre rivolgere l'attenzione.

Transport activity, a key component of economic development and human welfare, is increasing around the world as economies grow. For most policymakers, the most pressing problems associated with this increasing transport activity are traffic fatalities and injuries, congestion, air pollution and petroleum dependence. These problems are especially acute in the most rapidly growing economies of the developing world. Mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can take its place among these other transport priorities by emphasizing synergies and co-benefits (high agreement, much evidence). Transport predominantly relies on a single fossil resource, petroleum that supplies 95% of the total energy used by world transport. In 2004, transport was responsible for 23% of world energy-related GHG emissions with about three quarters coming from road vehicles. Over the past decade, transport's GHG emissions have increased at a faster rate than any other energy using sector (high agreement, much evidence). Transport activity will continue to increase in the future as economic growth fuels transport demand and the availability of transport drives development, by facilitating specialization and trade. The majority of the world's population still does not have access to personal vehicles and many do not have access to any form of motorized transport. However, this situation is rapidly changing. Freight transport has been growing even more rapidly than passenger transport and is expected to continue to do so in the future. Urban freight movements are predominantly by truck, while international freight is dominated by ocean shipping. The modal distribution of intercity freight varies greatly across regions. For example, in the United States, all modes participate substantially, while in Europe, trucking has a higher market share (in tkm1), compared to rail (high agreement, much evidence). Transport activity is expected to grow robustly over the next several decades. Unless there is a major shift away from current patterns of energy use, world transport energy use is projected to increase at the rate of about 2% per year, with the highest rates of growth in the emerging economies, and total transport energy use and carbon emissions is projected to be about 80% higher than current levels by 2030 (medium agreement, medium evidence). There is an ongoing debate about whether the world is nearing a peak in conventional oil production that will require a significant and rapid transition to alternative energy resources. There is no shortage of alternative energy sources, including oil sands, shale oil, coal-to-liquids, biofuels, electricity and hydrogen. Among these alternatives, unconventional fossil carbon resources would produce less expensive fuels mostcompatible with the existing transport infrastructure, but lead to increased carbon emissions (medium agreement, medium evidence). In 2004, the transport sector produced 6.3 GtCO2 emissions (23% of world energy-related CO2 emissions) and its growth rate is highest among the end-user sectors. Road transport currently accounts for 74% of total transport CO2 emissions. The share of non-OECD countries is 36% now and will increase rapidly to 46% by 2030 if current trends continue (high agreement, much evidence). The transport sector also contributes small amounts of CH4 and N2O emissions from fuel combustion and F-gases (fluorinated gases) from vehicle air conditioning. CH4 emissions are between 0.1–0.3% of total transport GHG emissions, N2O between 2.0 and 2.8% (based on US, Japan and EU data only). Worldwide emissions of F-gases (CFC-12+HFC- 134a+HCFC-22) in 2003 were 0.3–0.6 GtCO2-eq, about 5–10% of total transport CO2 emissions (medium agreement, limited evidence). When assessing mitigation options it is important to consider their lifecycle GHG impacts. This is especially true for choices among alternative fuels but also applies to a lesser degree to the manufacturing processes and materials composition of advanced technologies. Electricity and hydrogen can offer the opportunity to 'de-carbonise' the transport energy system although the actual full cycle carbon reduction depends upon the way electricity and hydrogen are produced. Assessment of mitigation potential in the transport sector through the year 2030 is uncertain because the potential depends on: • World oil supply and its impact on fuel prices and the economic viability of alternative transport fuels; • R&D outcomes in several areas, especially biomass fuel production technology and its sustainability in massive scale, as well as battery longevity, cost and specific energy. Another problem for a credible assessment is the limited number and scope of available studies of mitigation potential and cost. Improving energy efficiency offers an excellent opportunity for transport GHG mitigation through 2030. Carbon emissions from 'new' light-duty road vehicles could be reduced by up to 50% by 2030 compared to currently produced models, assuming continued technological advances and strong policies to ensure that technologies are applied to increasing fuel economy rather than spent on increased horsepower and vehicle mass. Material substitution and advanced design could reduce the weight of light-duty vehicles by 20–30%. Since the TAR (Third Assessment Report), energy efficiency of road vehicles has improved by the market success of cleaner directinjection turbocharged (TDI) diesels and the continued market penetration of numerous incremental efficiency technologies. Hybrid vehicles have also played a role, though their market penetration is currently small. Reductions in drag coefficients of 20–50% seem achievable for heavy intercity trucks, with consequent reductions in fuel use of 10–20%. Hybrid technology is applicable to trucks and buses that operate in urban environments, and the diesel engine's efficiency may be improved by 10% or more. Prospects for mitigation are strongly dependent on the advancement of transport technologies. There are also important opportunities to increase the operating efficiencies of transport vehicles. Road vehicle efficiency might be improved by 5–20% through strategies such as eco-driving styles, increased load factors, improved maintenance, in-vehicle technological aids, more efficient replacement tyres, reduced idling and better traffic management and route choice (medium agreement, medium evidence). The total mitigation potential in 2030 of the energy efficiency options applied to light duty vehicles would be around 0.7–0.8 GtCO2-eq in 2030 at costs <100 US$/tCO2. Data is not sufficient to provide a similar estimate for heavy-duty vehicles. The use of current and advanced biofuels would give an additional reduction potential of another 600–1500 MtCO2-eq in 2030 at costs <25 US$/tCO2 (low agreement, limited evidence). Although rail transport is one of the most energy efficient modes today, substantial opportunities for further efficiency improvements remain. Reduced aerodynamic drag, lower train weight, regenerative breaking and higher efficiency propulsion systems can make significant reductions in rail energy use. Shipping, also one of the least energy intensive modes, still has some potential for increased energy efficiency. Studies assessing both technical and operational approaches have concluded that energy efficiency opportunities of a few percent to up to 40% are possible (medium agreement, medium evidence). Passenger jet aircraft produced today are 70% more fuel efficient than the equivalent aircraft produced 40 years ago and continued improvement is expected. A 20% improvement over 1997 aircraft efficiency is likely by 2015 and possibly 40 to 50% improvement is anticipated by 2050. Still greater efficiency gains will depend on the potential of novel designs such as the blended wing body, or propulsion systems such as the unducted turbofan. For 2030 the estimated mitigation potential is 150 MtCO2 at carbon prices less than 50 US$/tCO2 and 280 MtCO2 at carbon prices less than 100 US$/tCO2 (medium agreement, medium evidence). However, without policy intervention, projected annual improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency of the order of 1–2%, will be surpassed by annual traffic growth of around 5% each year, leading to an annual increase of CO2 emissions of 3–4% per year (high agreement, much evidence). Biofuels have the potential to replace a substantial part but not all petroleum use by transport. A recent IEA analysis estimates that biofuels' share of transport fuel could increase to about 10% in 2030. The economic potential in 2030 from biofuel application is estimated at 600–1500 MtCO2-eq/yr at a cost of <25 US$/tCO2-eq. The introduction of flexfuel vehicles able to use any mixture of gasoline2 and ethanol rejuvenated the market for ethanol as a motor fuel in Brazil by protecting motorists from wide swings in the price of either fuel. The global potential for biofuels will depend on the success of technologies to utilise cellulose biomass (medium agreement, medium evidence). Providing public transports systems and their related infrastructure and promoting non-motorised transport can contribute to GHG mitigation. However, local conditions determine how much transport can be shifted to less energy intensive modes. Occupancy rates and primary energy sources of the transport mode further determine the mitigation impact. The energy requirements for urban transport are strongly influenced by the density and spatial structure of the built environment, as well as by location, extent and nature of transport infrastructure. If the share of buses in passenger transport in typical Latin American cities would increase by 5–10%, then CO2 emissions could go down by 4–9% at costs of the order of 60–70 US$/tCO2 (low agreement, limited evidence). The few worldwide assessments of transport's GHG mitigation potential completed since the TAR indicate that significant reductions in the expected 80% increase in transport GHG emission by 2030 will require both major advances in technology and implementation via strong, comprehensive policies (medium agreement, limited evidence). The mitigation potential by 2030 for the transport sector is estimated to be about 1600–2550 MtCO2 for a carbon price less than 100 US$/tCO2. This is only a partial assessment, based on biofuel use throughout the transport sector and efficiency improvements in light-duty vehicles and aircraft and does not cover the potential for heavy-duty vehicles, rail transport, shipping, and modal split change and public transport promotion and is therefore an underestimation. Much of this potential appears to be located in OECD North America and Europe. This potential is measured as the further reduction in CO2 emissions from a Reference scenario, which already assumes a substantial use of biofuels and significant improvements in fuel efficiency based on a continuation of current trends. This estimate of mitigation costs and potentials is highly uncertain. There remains a critical need for comprehensive and consistent assessments of the worldwide potential to mitigate transport's GHG emissions (low agreement, limited evidence). While transport demand certainly responds to price signals,the demand for vehicles, vehicle travel and fuel use are significantly price inelastic. As a result, large increases in prices or taxes are required to make major changes in GHG emissions. Many countries do heavily tax motor fuels and have lower rates of fuel consumption and vehicle use than countries with low fuel taxes (high agreement, much evidence). Fuel economy regulations have been effective in slowing the growth of GHG emissions, but so far growth of transport activity has overwhelmed their impact. They have been adopted by most developed economies as well as key developing economies, though in widely varying form, from uniform, mandatory corporate average standards, to graduated standards by vehicle weight class or size, to voluntary industry-wide standards. The overall effectiveness of standards can be significantly enhancedif combined with fiscal incentives and consumer information (medium agreement, medium evidence). A wide array of transport demand management (TDM) strategies have been employed in different circumstances around the world, primarily to manage traffic congestion and reduce air pollution. TDMs can be effective in reducing private vehicle travel if rigorously implemented and supported (high agreement, low evidence). In order to reduce emissions from air and marine transport resulting from the combustion of bunker fuels, new policy frameworks need to be developed. However ICAO endorsed the concept of an open, international emission trading system for the air transport sector, implemented through a voluntary scheme, or incorporation of international aviation into existing emission trading systems. Environmentally differentiated port dues are being used in a few places. Other policies to affect shipping emissions would be the inclusion of international shipping in international emissions trading schemes, fuel taxes and regulatory instruments (high agreement, much evidence). Since currently available mitigation options will probably not be enough to prevent growth in transport's emissions, technology research and development is essential in order to create the potential for future, significant reductions in transport GHG emissions. This holds, amongst others, for hydrogen fuel cell, advanced biofuel conversion and improved batteries for electric and hybrid vehicles (high agreement, medium evidence). The best choice of policy options will vary across regions. Not only levels of economic development, but the nature of economic activity, geography, population density and culture all influence the effectiveness and desirability of policies affecting modal choices, infrastructure investments and transport demand management measures (high agreement, much evidence).

The Sustainable Development Goals, the global development agenda for 2015 through 2030, will require unprecedented mobilization of resources to support their implementation. Their predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals, focused on a limited number of concrete, global human development targets that can be monitored by statistically robust indicators. The Millennium Development Goals set the stage for global support of ambitious development goals behind which the world must rally. The Sustainable Development Goals bring forward the unfinished business of the Millennium Development Goals and go even further. Because of the transformative and sustainable nature of the new development agenda, all possible resources must be mobilized if the world is to succeed in meeting its targets. Thus, the potential for Islamic finance to play a role in supporting the Sustainable Development Goals is explored in this paper. Given the principles of Islamic finance that support socially inclusive and development promoting activities, the Islamic financial sector has the potential to contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The paper examines the role of Islamic financial institutions, capital markets, and the social sector in promoting strong growth, enhanced financial inclusion, and intermediation, reducing risks and vulnerability of the poor and more broadly contributing to financial stability and development.

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Africa is on the rise and Ethiopia is at the forefront of this trend. On request of the Government, the World Bank surveyed 69 Chinese enterprises doing business in Ethiopia with a 95-question survey in May/June 2012. The survey covered various aspects of the foreign direct investment climate in Ethiopia, including infrastructure, sales and supplies, land, crime, competition, finance, human resources, and questions about general opportunities and constraints for doing business in Ethiopia. This report summarizes the results of survey and provides policy suggestions in light of the analysis; the report also provides some broader background of the expected benefits of FDI into Ethiopia as well as current policies and approaches to promote incoming investment. Addressing identified obstacles could help Ethiopia to take better advantage of foreign investors in order to accelerate the shift from a predominantly low-productivity agriculture-based economy towards a higher-productivity manufacturing and export-based economy. Experiences in successful countries around the world, and especially East Asia show that foreign investment is instrumental to facilitate such a structural transformation and to maintain sustained and broad-based economic development. This study recommends five main areas for policy adjustments to facilitate foreign investors coming into Ethiopia: adjust customs clearance procedures and trade regulations; facilitate currency convertibility and increase transparency of the exchange rate policy; improve tax administration consistency and efficacy; execute impartial labor regulation; and increase the supply and quality of skilled workers.

The social protection (SP) portfolio includes a number of operations that are focused on improving service delivery across a broad range of social services. These service delivery goals are typically oriented to improving access to and quality of social services, usually as part of broader government reform and decentralization strategies. There is one case of this type of a project in an emergency context, ensuring access to basic services as an important complement to a safety net strategy. There are other complementarities between safety nets and service delivery projects, for example many safety net programs like Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) rely on the basic functioning of health and education services in the vicinity of program beneficiaries. The cohort includes 12 social service delivery-oriented SP projects representing about 15 percent of the cohort with an average of 2 operations approved per year in the period FY05-09. Despite the relatively lower frequency of this type of SP operation, there was broad regional representation with 5 in AFR, 4 in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) and one each in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia Region (SAR) and Europe and Central Asia (ECA). The group is evenly divided between policy-based and investment lending, with six policy-based Development Policy Loan (DPL) and Private Sector Committee (PSC) projects, four specific investment projects, one technical assistance, and one emergency recovery project. The prominence of DPLs underscores the policy type of objectives often found in these projects. The DPLs range from PRSCs and DPLs with broader country focus, like Madagascar and Niger, to DPLs more narrowly focused on social services, as is the case of a series of DPLs in Peru. Investment lending ranges from stabilization of social services in response to crisis in the West Bank and Gaza, to longer-term institutional objectives of decentralizing social service delivery and financing in Serbia and Ethiopia. In terms of institutional objectives, these projects most typically focus on sector institutions and decentralization strategies. There is less of a focus on the community level than on sub-national government roles and responsibilities.

Chemicals are an essential part of our daily lives. They are used to produce consumer goods, to protect or restore our health and to boost food production, to name but a few examples — and they are also involved in a growing range of environmental technologies. Europe's chemical and associated industries have developed rapidly in recent decades, making a significant contribution to Europe's economy and to the global trade in chemicals. Whilst synthetic chemicals clearly bring important benefits to society, some of them are hazardous, raising concerns for human health and the environment depending on their pattern of use and the potential for exposure. Certain types of naturally occurring chemicals, such as metals, can also be hazardous. Emissions of hazardous substances to the environment can occur at every stage of their life cycle, from production, processing, manufacturing and use in downstream production sectors or by the general public to their eventual disposal. Emissions arise from a wide range of land-based and marine sources, including agriculture and aquaculture, industry, oil exploration and mining, transport, shipping and waste disposal, as well as our own homes. In addition, concern regarding chemical contamination arising from the exploitation of shale gas has grown recently. Hazardous substances in water affect aquatic life… Hazardous substances are emitted to water bodies both directly and indirectly through a range of diffuse and point source pathways. The presence of hazardous substances in fresh and marine waters and associated biota and sediment is documented by various information sources, including national monitoring programmes, monitoring initiatives undertaken by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), reporting under the Water Framework Directive (WFD), international marine conventions (e.g. HELCOM and OSPAR) and European research studies. These substances comprise a wide range of industrial and household chemicals, metals, pesticides and pharmaceuticals. Hazardous substances can have detrimental effects on aquatic biota at molecular, cellular, tissue, organ and ecosystem level. Substances with endocrine‑disrupting properties, for example, have been shown to impair reproduction in fish and shellfish in Europe, raising concerns for fertility and population survival. The impact of organochlorines upon sea birds and marine mammals is also well documented, as is the toxicity of metals and pesticides to freshwater biota. From a socio‑economic point of view, such impacts diminish the services provided by aquatic ecosystems, and consequently the revenue that can be derived from them. …and can pose risks to human health Human exposure to man-made chemicals has been implicated in a range of chronic diseases, including cancer as well as reproductive and developmental impairment. Exposure to toxic chemicals can occur via inhalation, ingestion and direct contact with skin, although the understanding of the relative risk posed by each of these exposure routes remains incomplete. However, exposure can be linked to the presence of hazardous substances in water, through the ingestion of contaminated drinking water and the consumption of contaminated freshwater fish and seafood. The exceedance of regulatory levels in seafood is documented for several hazardous substances in the seas around Europe. In addition, whilst human exposure to mercury in the Arctic, in part through the consumption of marine food, has declined, concentrations in the blood of more than 75 % of women sampled in Greenland exceed US guideline levels. Alongside concerns about exposure to individual substances, awareness is growing with regard to the importance of mixtures of several chemicals, as found in the more polluted water bodies of Europe. Laboratory studies have shown that the combined effects of chemicals upon aquatic life can be additive — resulting in observable detrimental effects for combinations of chemicals even if these are present, individually, at levels below which any adverse effects can be detected. Such concerns also extend to potential effects arising from human exposure to a mixture of chemicals via various pathways, including water. Biological effects‑directed measurements have proved to be effective in addressing the problems of complex chemical mixtures in European water bodies. In addition to the potential for adverse impacts upon human and ecosystem health, the presence of hazardous substances in drinking water supplies requires their removal. Alternatively, where the level of treatment involved is so high as to be uneconomic, a supply can be decommissioned. In both cases, significant costs are incurred. A key measure for reducing the level of purification required for Europe's drinking water is the establishment of safeguard or protection zones around the source. The creation of such zones, recognised in the WFD legislation, must be associated with regulatory powers to control polluting activities. Legislation designed to protect Europe's waters… The implementation of more established legislation related to chemicals has produced positive outcomes. Abatement measures established under the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive, for example, have contributed to a decline in metal emissions to water and air, whilst legislation relating to the production, use and disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) has resulted in declines in concentrations found in marine biota. A similar outcome has resulted from the banning of tributyltin (TBT) in anti‑fouling paints due to its endocrine-disrupting impacts on marine invertebrates, although high levels in marine sediments can still be observed in certain locations. Europe has also introduced a range of relatively recent legislation to address the use of chemicals and their emissions to the environment, including water. The Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), designed to improve the protection of human health and the environment from the risks posed by chemicals, has a key role to play in this respect. REACH attributes greater responsibility to industry with regard to managing these risks and providing safety information on substances used. The Regulation also calls for the progressive substitution of the most dangerous chemicals once suitable alternatives have been identified. The chemical quality of Europe's surface waters is primarily addressed by the recently adopted Environmental Quality Standards Directive (EQSD). This WFD 'daughter' directive defines concentration limits for pollutants of EU-wide relevance known as priority substances (PSs). The limits are defined both in terms of annual average and maximum allowable concentrations, with the former protecting against long-term chronic pollution problems and the latter against short‑term acute pollution. Some of these pollutants have been designated as priority hazardous substances (PHSs) due to their toxicity, their persistence in the environment and their bioaccumulation in plant and animal tissues. The EQSD requires cessation or phase-out of discharges, emissions and losses of PHSs. For any substance identified as being of concern at local, river basin or national level, but not as a PS or PHS at EU level, standards have to be set at national level. Compliance with this requirement is critical. …is facing new challenges Some recent information with respect to the chemical status of Europe's surface water bodies is available within the WFD river basin management plans (RBMPs) which indicate, in general terms, that a variety of hazardous substances pose a threat to good chemical status in Europe. These include certain substances, for example mercury, TBT and polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which can be described as persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic and which occur widely in the environment. Although regulation has led to documented reductions in the emissions of such substances to air and water (indeed, the presence of many is a legacy of past use), their persistence and ubiquity, particularly in sediment and biota, mean that they continue to pose a risk to aquatic environments even at sites far from human activity. The presence of these substances can cause widespread failure to achieve good chemical status under the WFD despite, in some cases, the absence of any significant risk from other types of substances. Some hazardous substances are hydrophobic and tend to accumulate in sediment and biota, with the result that their concentrations in these matrices are likely to be higher and, therefore, more detectable and measurable than in water. If measurements are made in the water column, the risk to the aquatic environment may be underestimated, and if different matrices are used in different locations and across different Member States, the results may not be directly comparable. A harmonisation at EU level is, therefore, desirable. For some pollutants, awareness and a currently incomplete understanding of potential effects have developed only recently. These emerging pollutants include substances that have existed for some time, such as pharmaceuticals and personal care products, but also relatively new substances, such as nanomaterials. Their inclusion in routine monitoring programmes has so far been limited, making it difficult to robustly assess the risks to the environment and human health, and thus to justify regulation and better monitoring. Targeted monitoring of selected emerging pollutants across the EU would be desirable to ensure timely awareness of potentially problematic substances that might need to be regulated. This monitoring should be supported by European research studies. The question of hazardous substances in Europe's fresh and marine waters is a complex issue, and climate change will add a further layer of complexity. In the absence of appropriately strong measures, this phenomenon is likely to adversely affect chemical water quality over the coming decades. In regions where more intense rainfall is expected, the frequency and severity of polluted urban storm flows is predicted to increase, whilst the flushing to water of agricultural pollutants, including pesticides and veterinary medicines, may be exacerbated. Hotter, drier summers and increasingly severe and frequent droughts will deplete river flows, reducing contaminant dilution capacity and leading to elevated concentrations of hazardous substances. Rising water temperatures and other stressors associated with climate change may interact with hazardous substances to impact the immune system health of aquatic organisms. Ocean acidification, driven by increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), may change the speciation of metals in seawater and, therefore, their interaction with marine organisms. In addition, coastal erosion — likely to be intensified by climate change — may lead to the exposure of historical landfill sites along the coastlines of Europe, releasing hazardous substances to coastal waters. Effective measures exist… A range of measures can be implemented to reduce the emission of hazardous substances to water. It encompasses product substitution, restrictions on marketing and use, requirements to demonstrate the implementation of clean production processes and best available techniques in applications for industrial permits, fiscal instruments, the setting of emissions and environmental quality standards, and action to raise public awareness. Whilst controls 'at source' are desirable, it is very likely that other measures to attenuate the emission of hazardous substances to water will remain essential. Such measures include advanced wastewater treatment, urban stormwater controls and specific agri-environmental practices such as riparian buffer strips. Reducing emissions of hazardous substances has been shown to yield economic and societal benefits. …but they rely on sound information It is not practical or affordable to sample and analyse at sufficient spatial and temporal resolution for hundreds of individual chemicals within fresh and marine waters, including aquatic biota and sediments. However, the focus upon a few pre‑selected priority substances bears a strong risk of missing other problematic substances. In addition, such an approach disregards the effects of chemical mixtures. To address these issues, recent European research studies have led to the development and testing of new assessment and modelling tools that help to link chemical contamination with observed deterioration of ecological quality. Such tools include approaches to evaluate existing chemical and biological monitoring data, together with site-specific experimental techniques to establish cause-effect relationships. Further development of biological effects tools integrated with analytical chemistry is desirable and could contribute, in due course, to the identification of substances associated with risks, in the wider context of the update of the WFD Article 5 'pressures and impacts' analysis. European research funds can play an important role in the further development of these tools. For many hazardous substances, information on industrial emissions to water must be reported under the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). To date, however, reporting under E-PRTR is incomplete as to the spatial extent and temporal resolution of data describing emissions to water — markedly so, for some substances. It is important not only to overcome this limitation in the reporting, but also to improve the quantitative understanding of the sources, emissions and pathways of all hazardous substances significantly. Advances in this area will facilitate the identification of appropriate measures to address chemical pollution of aquatic environments. Chemicals should be produced and used more sustainably Despite the comprehensive suite of legislation now implemented throughout Europe, the ubiquitous use of chemicals in society and their continuous release represent a major challenge in terms of the protection of aquatic ecosystems and human health. Efforts to promote a more sustainable consumption and production of chemicals are needed. They are likely to require a mix of policy responses, including regulation, economic incentives and information-based instruments. Implementing a more sustainable approach to the consumption and production of chemicals would not only benefit Europe's environment but also reduce the detrimental effects arising in other parts of the world as a result of the growing proportion of goods imported to Europe. To help achieve a more sustainable production of chemicals, wider implementation of 'green chemistry' is required. This approach involves developing new processes and technologies that maintain the quality of a product but reduce or eliminate the use and generation of hazardous substances. The adoption of sustainable, green chemistry techniques has been shown to generate financial benefits and hence provide competitive advantage. Currently, however, there is no comprehensive EU legislation on sustainable chemistry in place.

Summary of the Study Introduction Sudan is the third largest country on the African continent with a total area of 1,882,000 sq km. before the secession of South Sudan in 2011; Sudan was the largest country in Africa, covering I million square miles. Sudan is unique and complex in its climate, politics, environment, languages, cultures, religion and ethnicities. Demographically, Africans are the majority (52%), with Arab and Beja tribes constituting 38% and 6% of the population, respectively. Over 597 tribes live in Sudan that speak more than 400 dialects and practice different religions, live in Sudan. Muslims make up 70% of the total population of Sudan, followers of indigenous beliefs comprise 25% and Christians constitute 5% of the population. The complex mixture of the Sudanese social fabric renders it neither distinctly African nor Arab country. The Sudanese, however, have long disagreed about Sudan's identity. For some, Sudan should be Arab and Muslim. Other believe that the country should respect and accommodate all the cultures, religions and minorities within its territory. Most of Sudan constitutions stated that Islam and Arabic language should define the national identity. Politically, since the independence, Sudan has experienced a fluctuation between military rule and democratic rule. In fact, Sudan spent thirty years under the military rule, and only twelve years under democratically elected governments. The successive governments have frequently made use of emergency legislation to broaden the executive powers. These legislative measures have contributed to conflict and facilitated a range of human rights violations. In addition to the political instability, Sudan has the distinction in Africa in enduring a devastating civil war: that is: Sudan's north-south civil war. The conflict started just a year before the independence of Sudan, in 1956. The cumulative impact of that conflict has been massive. The conflict has caused horrendous loss of life in any interstate war, and has produced the largest internally displaced population (IDP) in the world. Sudan north-south conflict has long been perceived as ethnic or even religious conflict between the north and the south. Ethnicity has been used generously in the description of that conflict. Yet, a closer look at the history of the conflict reveals that the root-causes of that conflict are highly complex. But, this is by no means to say that conflict has had no ethnic, racial and religious overtones. The eruption of the north-south conflict was the result of a combination of factors. One could trace the root-causes of the conflict to the invasion of the south from the north by Turkiyya that expanded southwards, and the simultaneous development of slave trade. Thereafter, the British rule contributed in different ways to the crystallizing of the north-south dichotomy. After the independence of Sudan, successive governments, were unsuccessful in handling the growing southern problem, ranging from neglect to attempts to reverse the British isolation by enforced Arabisation and Islamization of the southern Sudan. The north-south conflict ended, in 1972, when Addis Ababa Agreement was signed by then President Nimeiry. But, the conflict broke out again, in 1983, when the Addis Ababa Agreement was abrogated by the then President Nimeiry. After a series of peace talks (which witnessed 'start and stop'), a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concluded, in 9 January 2005, between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/SPLA) to end the conflict. The CPA provides for a temporary solution for the conflict through, inter alia, the distribution of the power between the north and the south of Sudan by establishing a decentralised system of government with a significant devolution of powers within which the Southern Sudan is to enjoy a regional autonomy and share half of the resources with north Sudan for a period of six years. Furthermore, the CPA creates joint institutions, such as, the Government of the National Unity (GoNU) in which the Southern Sudan participate and share ministerial posts. The CPA also provides for the establishment of a number of commissions for implementing and monitoring the CPA, for instance, the Evaluation and Monitoring Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, etc. At the end of the interim period, a referendum on the self-determination is to be held, in 2011, in which the people of the Southern Sudan will decide whether to remain within a united Sudan or to secede and form an independent State. The Aim of the Study The significance of this study derives from the conclusion of the CPA and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC) that called for democratic transformation so as to bring an end to Sudan north-south conflict. While the CPA ended Sudan's north-south conflict, a lasting peace and a democratic transformation, in Sudan, may prove elusive unless the CPA provisions are translated into reality, especially the implementation of constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms, including human rights protection and respect for the rule of law. The study aims to answer whether the CPA and INC can fulfil their roles in securing peace and establishing a framework in which the constitutional protection of human rights are recognised and effectively implemented through the availability of the various mechanisms. In this respect, the CPA provided for the adoption of a new constitution (INC), with a view to embedding constitutionalism, rule of law promotion, and protection of human rights. It is, therefore, this study is meant to analyze the constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms of the CPA and INC with a view to examining whether such constitutional reforms may be conducive for a lasting peace, in Sudan, that is based on human rights protection, constitutionalism and the rule of law. The CPA stipulated the need for institutional and legislative changes to reduce the risk of recurrence of human rights violations. To this end, the CPA mandated the adoption of a bill of right (for the promotion and protection of human rights) and provided for re-restructuring of the courts system. Such institutional reforms are aimed at embedding constitutionalism. That is to say: establishing a system in which the constitution provides an agreed upon framework for the exercise of powers and the protection of human rights. In this respect, the study examines whether the outcome of the constitutional reforms process (to recognise, implement, and protect human rights as provided for in the INC) have been reflected in institutional and legislative reforms to protect and prevent human rights violations and address past violations and systemic factors that have contributed to violations. To that end, the human right jurisprudence of the constitutional court will be examined. The Organization of the Study a) The Structure of the Political/Governance System in Sudan under the INC With the devolution of the powers and resources to the Southern Sudan level and other States, the governance system, under the INC, is structured with four levels of government: the national level at the apex, the Government of South Sudan level, the State level (25 States), the local level. Now, the government responsibilities are decentralized and the national government allocates a significant proportion of revenues to the States. It is, therefore, that the first question that this study poses is: What is the impact of the current governance in giving greater equity of representation and decision-making influence to communities across Sudan, thereby facilitating conflict management to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan? In Sudan, previously appropriate design of institutions to ensure political accommodations for all social groups has not been established in a way that would give them the chance to function properly. Now, the INC restructures the prevailing governance system by establishing a decentralized system of government that bears the characteristics of asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism - asymmetrical in the structure and responsibilities of subunits, with the level of South Sudan having more powers and resources than other States across Sudan. Establishment of a federal structure may constitute a mechanism for preventing a relapse into conflict through the devolution of the powers to the State level. For a federal to work effectively, it requires a functional court system to decide on the jurisdictional limits of the different levels of government. Nevertheless, the relevance of the court system in resolving the intractably political contentions in federal countries, especially in transition situations, is uncertain. Noticeably missing from the literature is the study and analysis of the impact of the role of court system in post conflict countries. That said, the role of the court system in preserving democracy has grown in importance with the increase recognition of the judicial review of the constitutionality of the acts of the government organs and the recognition and the protection of human rights provisions. It is, therefore, that the involvement of the courts is necessary to ensure the successful operation of the federalism and thus the failure or the success of federalism is contingent on the implementation of the federal system by the courts. According to some scholars, 'federalism means legalism – the predominance of the judiciary in the constitution- the prevalence of a spirit of legality among the people'. As '[the] courts …are actually telling a government how far it can go with its assigned constitutional rights'. This leads to the second question that this study addresses which relates to the analysis of the constitutional reform as provided for in the INC, in general, but with a special focus on the role of the court system, through the application of judicial review and protection of human rights, to resolve not only disputes in litigations between private parties, but also to prevent the arbitrary exercise of the government power. b) The Structure of the Legal System (Court System) in Sudan under the INC The available literature presents different views as to the role of the court system in new democracies. On one hand, one view assumes that the courts have a fairly wide discretion to decide the outcome of the controversial cases to the needs of the political moment. The other view, on the other hand, takes the position that political actors do not exert any kind of influence at all on the way judges make their decisions. A third source, and with which I agree, argues that legal rules do put constrains over the exercise of the judicial discretion in controversial cases. A fourth view argues that in new fragile democracies constitutional courts/supreme courts should not be involved in judicial review, especially on adjudicating issues related to social and economic rights, which may profoundly affect the allocations of resources and violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In this respect, the study considers whether the court system, as restructured in the INC, and other constitutional guarantees introduced to the legal system as a whole, offer good prospects for constitutionalism that may control the power of the government so as not act arbitrarily. The role of court system in resolving disputes is highly contingent on the substantive law and the institutional structure within which the courts apply laws. Thus, this study examines to what extent the current structure of the legal system under the INC and the protection of human rights through the application of the Bill of Rights by the courts may signal the State's commitment to constitutionalism and respect to the rule of law. It is, therefore, that the role of the court system (in contributing to democratic transformation in Sudan) should be evaluated against the legal framework: that is the INC, with a focus on the independence of the judiciary, the application of the Bill of Rights and the rules governing the judicial review. c) The Legislative and Institutional Reforms under the INC The functions of the courts, in developing countries, have experienced increasingly transformative role as institutions that can hold the government organs accountable. The study aims to examine the practice of constitutionalism: that is, the implementation of the INC constitutional, institutional and legislative reforms, especially the compliance with the provisions of the INC and the CPA, in particular the role of the constitutional court as "a positive legislator". In this regard, the Sudanese Constitutional Court may play an important role in the law reform process given its power to annul laws found unconstitutional. This entails the non-applicability of such laws and, as a result, would compel the government institution/organ concerned to adopt new legislation that is in conformity with the INC. Thus far, the Sudanese constitutional court, under the INC, has received a number of human rights cases that involved issues related to violations of human rights or related to the constitutionality of key legislation, such as counter-terrorism laws, immunities for officials and statutes of limitation for torture. So what role the constitutional court has played in the law reform process under the INC? For the court system to play a role in the democratic reform, a comprehensive law reform process is seen as a prerequisite to bring the existing laws in line with the provisions of the INC and enacting new laws. Therefore, this study identifies what legislative and institutional reforms that have been undertaken by the parties to the CPA during the interim period to address human rights violations, root-causes of the conflict; inequality; marginalization, rule of law vacuum and weak democratic structures. Furthermore, this study offers empirical evidence for the judicial behavior of the Sudanese constitutional court through a systematic examination of selected human rights jurisprudence of the constitutional court to gauge its role in the law reform process in Sudan since the adoption of the INC. Overview of the Study and the Main Findings of the Study Introductory Chapter: Overview of the Study The Introductory Chapter provides an overview of the study, including, the key features of the State of Sudan, the aim of the study, the main objectives of the study, and a general overview of the study. Chapter One: A Historical Background of Sudan's North-South Conflict Chapter One gives a rich and deep account of Sudan north-south conflict. It looks at the root-causes of the conflict by elaborating on different factors that directly and indirectly contributed in making that conflict protracted. Chapter one moves on to consider the end of the first Sudan's north-south conflict which was ended when Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972. Chapter one further elaborates on Sudan's second north-south conflict which broke out in 1983. Finally, Chapter one touches on the various peace initiatives that ended by the conclusion of the CPA. Chapter One concludes by analysing the CPA. In the final analysis, the CPA made significant changes the prevailing governance and legal systems in Sudan by establishing a federal system, introduced a dual legal system a bill of rights, provided for the right to self-determination for the south Sudan, established institutions for the protection of human rights by establishing mechanisms such as National Human rights Commission, and distributed the wealth equally between the north and the south. However, the CPA failed to include the Sudanese people in the talks leading to the conclusion of the CPA, as the CPA was bilateral reflecting the views of the north and the south. Chapter Two: The Structure of the Governance System under the INC The INC describes Sudan as a decentralized State with different levels of government: the national level, the Southern Sudan level, the State level and the local level. It further grants the Southern Sudan autonomy status. A careful analysis of the current governance arrangements reveals that the INC provides for asymmetric/symmetrical federalism system of governance. Chapter Two discusses the allocation of legislative powers between the national government, the Southern Sudan and the rest of the country and the nature of the constitutional design of the INC to manage diversity of Sudan (ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity). At the outset of Chapter Three provides an overview the fundamental principles of federalism and provides a brief historical background of federalism in Sudan and how federalism arrangements can play a role as a tool for peace-building. In the final analysis, in contract with old constitutions of Sudan, the INC establishes a federal system, with four levels of government; national, south Sudan, State and local levels. The INC federal system guarantees the special characteristics of all ethnic and religious groups in Sudan through the creation of the Council of the States. However, all the States in Sudan are not treated equally, because (1) two States have special status (South Kordofan and Blue Nile States), and (2) between the ten States in the South and the national level, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is inserted to exercise authority in respect of the ten States at South Sudan level. This means the INC creates asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism, as the South Sudan level enjoys significant autonomy and exclusive authority over ten States in South Sudan. All the States in Sudan are not treated equally, because (1) two States have special status (South Kordofan and Blue Nile States), and (2) between the ten States in the South and the national level, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is inserted to exercise authority in respect of the ten States at South Sudan level. This means the INC creates asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism, as the South Sudan level enjoys significant autonomy and exclusive authority over ten States in South Sudan. The INC Schedules (A – C) distribute the exclusive and legislative powers to the national level (A), the GoSS level (B), and the state level (C). Schedule (D) lists the concurrent powers and Schedule (E) allocates the residual powers as per its nature. Schedule (F) is a provision to resolve conflict that might arise under Schedule (D). It should be noted that not all issues listed in the INC schedules are allocated to one level of government only. For example, several substantive issues are granted to the national level as an exclusive competence, to the South Sudan level as an exclusive competence and at the same time to all levels of government as a concurrent power, such as telecommunication. With regard to the legislative powers allocated to the tens states at the South level, the GoSS according to Schedule (B) has the competence to enact a kind of framework with regard to issues that fall under the exclusive South Sudan State competence, thereby limiting the legislative powers of the ten States in South Sudan. Finally, the INC has reinforced existing power relations and failed to provide structural changes for democratic transformation, as the INC asymmetrical federalism accommodates the demands of the South Sudan only. As the INC does not accommodate the demands of the different ethnic and cultural groups in the different regions of Sudan as demonstrated in Darfur Peace Agreement and East Sudan Agreement. Chapter Three: The Structure of the Legal System under the INC The INC altered the Sudanese legal system with a view to accommodating the competing views: Sharia law and secularism. For a proper understanding of the present Sudanese legal system and an assessment of the role of the court system in contributing to democratic governance, a glance at the Sudanese legal history is necessary. Firstly, Chapter Three reviews the constitutional developments in Sudan since the independence to the present day. Secondly, Chapter Three provides overview of the structure of the court system in a decentralized system and focuses on the contribution of the court system to democratic transformation through limiting the acts of the government. Chapter Three further discusses issues that may impact of the role of the court system in contributing to democratic transformation. Yet, the role of the court system in promoting democratic transformation is contingent on the constitution, the substantive law, etc. For instance, instituting the principles of constitutionalism is contingent on the independence of the judiciary, as an independent judiciary is required for the protection of constitutional rights and to restrain the actions of the government. Thus, it is important to understand under what conditions the court system develops such accountability functions: that is, what conditions favor the ability of the court system to exercise an effective accountability functions. It is, therefore, Chapter Three examines (a) how the INC re-structures the court system in the north and the south of Sudan so as to give effect to the principles of the federalism and legal pluralism; (b) the rules regulating the judicial review, and (c) the protection of human rights through the implementation of the bill of rights by the court, all of which signal the commitment of the State to establish democratic governance. Finally, Chapter Three attempts to evaluate the independence of the judiciary and the rules that govern the judicial review before and after the adoption of the INC with a view to assessing the fidelity of the government to the principles of constitutionalism, and whether the limitations observed in the actual conduct of the government. In the final analysis, the INC constitution making process was bilateral reflecting the views of the parties to the CPA and lacked inclusiveness, but provides for a pluralism legal system by providing for a constitution for south Sudan and 25 State constitutions. The INC introduces State judiciary and South Sudan judiciary and opted for an integrated the court system. That is: the State courts apply the State laws, the national laws and the South Sudan laws. In the North, the State courts are still organized by the national level, although the NC provides for the establishment of the State judiciary. At the South Sudan level, all State courts are organized and financed at the level. Towards the South Sudan, the National Supreme Court is the final court of on matters arising under national laws The INC emphasizes the importance of protecting; respecting and promoting human rights through the inclusion a bill of right and incorporation via Art. 27(3) of the INC all human rights treaties that Sudan has ratified, thereby the human rights contained in the INC directly applicable before the Sudanese courts. Also, the implementation of some human rights requires revision of the existing statutory laws. To date there has been limited legislative reforms to address human rights violations. A few laws have been reformed but fall short of Sudan international obligations, such as Criminal Act, Security Laws, Immunity Laws, etc. The INC differentiates between the north and the south regarding the sources of legislation. Art. 5 of the INC lists Sharia as one of the sources of legislation along with the consensus of the people at the national level. Art. 5(2) of the INC names popular consensus and the values and the customs of the people of Sudan as the sources of legislation in South Sudan. The INC contains special rules for national legislation if its source is religion or custom. In that case, a state where the majority of residents do not practice such religion or customs may introduce different legislation allows practices or establishes institutions in that State that are consistent with its own religion or customs. The INC establishes human rights commission for the implementation of the bill of rights as well as a commission for the protection of non-Muslims in the Capital. The INC has chosen a concentrated system of judicial review and a hybrid system of judicial review with respect to the South Sudan as the Supreme Court of South Sudan acts as a constitutional court and a high court of Appeal with respect to South Sudan. The newly enacted Judicial and Administrative of 2005 does not provide for concrete judicial review of law and bars the court from question the constitutionality of law by way of making referral to the constitutional court, thereby renders the judiciary unable to deal with crucial constitutional issues. Chapter Four: Institutional and Legislative Reform: Practice of Constitutionalism In order to understand whether the adoption of the INC has brought any changes may enhance the role of the court system in contributing to democratic transformation; Chapter Four scrutinizes the compliance of the statutory law with the provisions of the INC, the law reform process in Sudan and the implementation of law in practice. Chapter Four further presents an analysis of more pertinent provisions of civil and political rights in the light of the laws and practices prevailing in the country to assess the extent to which the principles laid down in the INC are complied with. It further assesses the involvement of the Sudan constitutional court in the law reform process by reviewing a selected human rights jurisprudence of the constitutional court. Finally, Chapter Four makes a reference to the jurisprudence of other constitutional courts (the German constitutional court, the Indian Supreme Court and the South African constitutional court) by way of comparison. In the final analysis, a) the INC does not set out procedure for concrete review and access to the court is not free; b) The court has a broad power to consider and adjudge and annual any law in contravention with the constitution and restitute the right to the aggrieved person and compensate for the harm. The court may also order interim measures to avoid any harm. As such, the court can abolish laws and compel the government to enact new law; c) the constitutional court has reviewed a number of cases that alleged the violation of human rights. The court has demonstrated reluctance to declare legislation unconstitutional. Interpretation of the bill of rights and reference to international human rights lacked consistency and the court has taken deference to the executive; d) the constitutional, legislative and institutional changes did not acknowledge past human rights violations through mechanisms that would question the way of governance and persisting inequalities and injustices; e) the constitutional court has institutional weaknesses and its jurisprudence has largely upheld existing laws such as immunities laws and the constitutional court made limited reference to international human rights law; f) the constitutional, legal and institutional reforms failed to generate the sense of constitutionalism and the fundamental change that were to remove the causes for human rights violations and provide effective remedies. A number of laws contravening the human rights are still in force, such as, Public Order Act, Immunity of police, security and army officers, inadequate laws for the protection of women's rights; and finally, the implementation of CPA as a means of democratic transformation left an unreformed government virtually intact Chapter Five: Post- Referendum Sudan Chapter Five looks at the constitutional developments after the secession of South Sudan, with a focus on constitution making process in Sudan. The Southern Sudan Referendum for self-determination, held in July 2011, clearly indicated that the absolute majority of those who participated in the referendum for the Southern Sudan favour separation of the Southern Sudan from Sudan. The secession of the South Sudan on July 9, 2011, as a result of the referendum on self-determination provided by the CPA has created a new reality in Sudan with far reaching economic, political and social implications. Economic and financial losses related to the secession are substantial and have affected all sectors of the economy. Sudan has lost three-quarters of its largest source of foreign exchange (oil), half of its fiscal revenues and about two-thirds of its international payment capacity. In general, the secession of South Sudan resulted in a 36.5% structural decrease in overall government revenues. The unresolved issue of Abyei constitutes a trigger for potential violent tension in the future between Sudan and South Susan. Abyei status is yet to be decided, as both Sudan and South Sudan claiming it as part of its territory. Its final status will be decided by a Referendum for which implementation mechanisms have not yet been agreed upon by the two countries. The end of the CPA necessitated a constitutional review process to decide on the new constitution to replace the INC. However, for a constitution to be able to win the affections of the citizens of the State, it will be necessary to involve those citizens in the constitution-making process that establishes such a constitution, so as to ensure that the process is inclusive and reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people at large. It is, therefore, important to increase public involvement in the constitution-making process by inviting public participation. In order for the design of a constitution and its constitution-making process to play an important role in the governance system, the design of the constitution has to be responsive to the aspirations of the ordinary people. A constitutional review process is currently under way but has not resulted in any clear proposals. That said, since 2011, a constitutional review has been underway in Sudan. The constitutional review process has not been participatory or inclusive. Lively debates on the new constitution in general, and the Bill of Rights and human rights protection in particular, have nevertheless ensued. These debates have been driven by a keen awareness of the importance of constitutional rights. These debates reflect both traditional concerns over the protection of civil and political rights, particularly in the administration of justice, and other issues that have also become a cause of acute concern. These include the desire for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, and the rights of members of groups who suffer discrimination, particular women, religious and ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities. Currently, public debate over the new constitution is proceeding, although the Government has not yet announced a timeframe for the constitution making process, amid a polarization of views on diverse issues such as the decentralization of power and wealth sharing between the different regions of Sudan. Since 2011, the Government of Sudan, in collaboration with the UNDP and other UN agencies, initiated the forum on public participation in constitution making to facilitate open and public dialogue. This approach has been based on the need to pursue the constitutional process/review inclusively, transparently and participatory to ensure all sectors of society including civil society organizations and opposition political groups participate fully in the process.

The Thai economy in 2012 rebounded from the severe floods but continues to be affected by the slowdown in the global economy. Real GDP in 2012 is projected to grow by 4.7 percent supported by the rebound in household consumption and greater investments by both the private and public sectors as part of flood rehabilitation and the government s consumption-stimulating measures. The economy is projected to grow by 5 percent in 2013 as manufacturing production fully recovers and the global economy sees a modest recovery. Exports in 2013 are therefore expected to grow by 5.5 percent compared to only 3.6 percent in 2012. Budget deficit will be 2.5 percent of GDP for FY2013 plus additional off-budget spending for water resource management projects in FY2013. Public debt is estimated to be close to 50 percent of GDP in 2013. The paddy pledging scheme is estimated to cost around 3.5 percent of GDP each year, while the actual losses will be realized once the rice stocks are sold. The minimum wages have been raised by 40 percent nation-wide in 2012 and will be raised to a uniform rate of THB300 per day. Developing higher skills is imperative for higher incomes, living standards, and for Thailand to grow sustainably and inclusively. Thailand can do better in enabling the poor and vulnerable groups to participate in productive economic activities by pursuing a coordinated approach between universal and targeted social policy.

This study examines Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) and Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS) carried out in Africa with the objective of assessing their approaches, main findings, and contributions. Section 2 investigates the context, motivations, and objectives of PETS and QSDS that have been carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 examines the institutional arrangements for resource allocation and service delivery in social sectors. Section 4 presents some of the main findings of tracking surveys. Section 5 analyzes methodological approaches used in previous tracking surveys in order to identify factors that could explain the difference in past surveys' success, and identify potential methodological harmonization. Section 6 presents a series of good practice principles that arise from past experience, and discusses how they could be implemented. Section 7 proposes potential future surveys and endeavors.

Tradicionalmente solo las grandes empresas se han vinculado a las Bolsas de Valores para la negociación de sus acciones y demás títulos valores emitidos por ellas. Por consiguiente los requisitos para las cotizaciones y, en general, para las transacciones se han fijado según sus características. Sin embargo, existe una nueva realidad económica que impone la necesidad de abrirle espacio a las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas (MIPYMES) en el mercado bursátil. Esta realidad esta compuesta por los siguientes hechos: • Este tamaño de empresas ha tomado una gran importancia en la estructura productiva del país. • Las pequeñas y medianas empresas industriales tienen gran potencial exportador. Tienen importantes requerimientos financieros que no se pueden satisfacer exclusivamente en el sistema bancario, ya sea por los costos, por los plazos o por los montos ofrecidos. • Poco a poco se rompe la resistencia al cambio así como al temor de los pequeños y medianos empresarios a dar a conocer su información con la sospecha de darles gabelas a la competencia. • El favorable tratamiento a las acciones. En estas condiciones, la Superintendencia de Valores ha planteado la conformación de un mercado paralelo al tradicional (o primer mercado) que se denomina "Segundo mercado" o "Mercado Balcón", al cual pueden acceder los títulos valores de micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas (MIPYMES) para inducirlas a una ampliación de la oferta de títulos, en beneficio del ahorro y la inversión. Las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas (MIPYMES), son aquellas que se definen a partir del tamaño de su planta de personal y del tamaño de sus activos ( medidos en salarios mínimos vigentes S.M.L.V ), según la ley MIPYME ( LEY 590 de Julio 10 de 2000. Las MIPYMES representan el 96 % de las empresas existentes en el país, éstas contribuyen con el 63 % del empleo nacional, con el 25 % del PIB, con el 25 % de las exportaciones totales y con el 50 % de los salarios generados de la nación. Los problemas que en general enfrentan las MIPYMES son los siguientes: Acceso limitado al financiamiento y en condiciones desfavorables, deficiencias de administración de sus unidades productivas, complicados procesos de legalización y falta de liderazgo gremial, se presentan disgregados, lo cual ocasiona desinformación de las medidas del gobierno. Con la presente investigación y teniendo en cuenta el marco conceptual anterior, se trata de responder a las preguntas siguientes: 1- ¿ Cómo facilitar a las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas (MIPYMES) el acceso al capital en condiciones favorables de manera que les permita desarrollar sus proyectos ? 2- ¿ Es el Mercado Balcón, el medio efectivo que ofrece el Mercado Público de Valores, como alternativa de financiamiento para las MIPYMES en Colombia ? 3- ¿ La actual legislación sobre la promoción y participación de las MIPYMES en el mercado de capitales del país, ofrece garantías de participación y desarrollo en ese mercado ? ; Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM); Corporación Universitaria Autónoma de Occidente ; INTRODUCCIÓN 19 1. MARCO DE REFERENCIA 23 1.1 ANTECEDENTES 23 1.2 DESCRIPCIÓN DEL PROBLEMA 25 1.3 FORMULACIÓN DEL PROBLEMA 26 1.4 JUSTIFICACIÓN DEL PROYECTO 26 1.5 OBJETIVOS DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN 26 1.5.1 Objetivo general 26 1.5.2 Objetivos específicos 27 1.6 MARCO METODOLÓGICO 27 1.6.1 Fuentes de información 27 1.7 MARCO CONCEPTUAL 27 1.7.1 El mercado público de valores 27 1.7.1.1 Ventajas que ofrece el mercado público de 27 valores. 28 1.7.1.2 Definición de inversión 29 1.7.1.2.1 Rentabilidad de la inversión 30 1.7.1.3 Superintendencia de valores 31 1.7.1.4 Registro nacional de valores e intermediarios 32 de la superintendencia de valores. 32 1.7.1.5 Títulos valores 33 1.7.1.5.1 Circulación de los títulos valores. 34 1.7.1.5.2 Clases de endosos 34 1.7.1.5.3 Títulos valores en los cuales se puede invertir 34 1.7.1.5.3.1 Acciones 36 1.7.1.5.3.1.1 Tipos de acciones 37 1.7.1.5.3.1.2 Características de la acción 38 1.7.1.5.3.1.3 Función económica de la acción 38 1.7.1.5.3.1.4 Ventajas que otorga la acción 39 1.7.1.5.4 Bonos y papeles comerciales 39 1.7.1.5.5 Sociedades y tipos de títulos que puede emitir 40 1.7.1.5.6 Pagos a seguir para emitir valores 40 1.7.1.5.7 Exigencias de la superintendencia de valores 40 para autorizar una oferta 40 1.7.1.5.8 Otras opciones de emisión de títulos valores los 41 inversionistas. 42 1.7.1.5.8.1 Inscripción anticipada 42 1.7.1.5.8.2 Segundo mercado 42 1.7.1.5.9 Requisitos especiales que las empresas 44 inversionistas deben cumplir para emitir títulos valores. 44 1.7.1.5.10 Inversionistas institucionales 46 46 1.7.1.5.10.1 Sociedades fiduciarias 46 1.7.1.5.10.2 Operaciones permitidas 47 1.7.1.5.10.3 Operaciones prohibidas 48 1.7.1.5.10.4 Operaciones prohibidas con los recursos del fondo común ordinario. 48 1.7.1.5.10.5 Posibles inversiones 1.7.1.5.10.6 Con recursos propios 1.7.1.5.10.7 Con recursos del fideicomiso 1.7.1.5.10.8 Con recursos del fondo común 1.7.1.5.10.9 De que pueden ser dueños 1.7.1.5.10.10 Posibles inversiones 49 1.7.1.5.10.11 Sociedades administradoras de fondos de pensiones y de cesantías 49 1.7.1.5.10.11.1 Operaciones permitidas 49 1.7.1.5.10.11.2 Operaciones prohibidas 50 1.7.1.5.10.11.3 Posibles inversiones 1.7.1.5.10.11.4 De que pueden ser dueños 1.7.1.5.10.12 Fondos mutuos de inversión 1.7.1.5.10.12.1 Características 1.7.1.5.10.12.2 Objetivos socio – económicos 51 1.7.1.6 Bolsas de valores 51 1.7.1.6.1 Orígenes de las bolsas de valores 52 1.7.1.6.2 Funcionamiento de la bolsa de valores 53 1.7.1.6.3 Características de las bolsas de valores 54 1.7.1.6.4 Funciones de la bolsa 55 1.7.1.6.5 Importancia de las bolsas en el desarrollo económico del país 55 1.7.1.6.6 Inicio de las bolsas de valores en Colombia 1.7.1.6.6.1 ¿Qué razones motivaron la integración de las bolsas de valores de Bogotá, Medellín y Occidente? 1.7.1.6.6.2 ¿Qué beneficios traerá la integración para Colombia, el mercado bursátil, los emisores y los inversionistas? 55 1.7.1.6.6.3 ¿Para qué sirve? 56 1.7.1.7 Compra y venta de títulos valores 56 1.7.1.8 Indicadores bursátiles 57 1.7.1.9 Indicadores para el mercado de renta fija 59 1.7.1.10 Indicadores económicos más utilizados 59 1.7.1.11 Escala de calificación de valores 59 1.7.1.11.1 Escala de certificación para títulos a largo y corto plazo. 60 1.7.2 Matriz para la formulación de estrategia. 62 1.8 MARCO TEÓRICO 64 1.8.1 Teoría Q de la inversión 65 1.8.2 Aspectos generales de la teoría de la valuación de las acciones. 65 1.8.2.1 Valuación de acciones comunes 65 1.8.2.1.1 Crecimiento nulo de los dividendos 67 1.8.2.1.2 Crecimiento constante de los dividendos 68 1.8.2.1.3 Valuación de las acciones con base en el valor futuro de la acción 68 1.8.3 Otras teorías generales sobre costo de emisión y el costo de capital. La estructura óptima de capital 70 1.9 MARCO JURÍDICO 71 1.9.1 Código de comercio 72 1.9.2 Decreto 400 de mayo 22 de 1995 73 1.9.3 Decreto 1200 de diciembre de 1995 75 1.9.4 Ley 590 de 2000 76 2. EXPERIENCIA DE SEGUNDOS MERCADOS EN EL MUNDO 78 2.1 FRANCIA 79 2.2 ESPAÑA 79 2.3 INGLATERRA 79 2.4 VENEZUELA 79 2.4.1 Importancia de la PYMI en el desarrollo económico y social 82 2.4.2 Componentes esenciales para incorporar las PYME al mercado de capitales 82 2.5 COSTA RICA 84 2.6 MÉXICO 85 2.6.1 Antecedentes 87 2.6.2 Definición 87 2.6.3 Propósito 88 2.6.4 Participantes 89 2.6.5 Requisitos de inscripción y mantenimiento 89 2.6.6 Procedimiento para la inscripción de acciones 90 2.6.7 Sistema de operación 90 2.6.8 Reglas básicas de operación 91 2.6.9 Suspensión de operaciones 91 2.6.10 Suspensión de registros 91 2.6.11 Índice de precios 92 2.6.11.1 Expresión matemática 92 2.6.12 Instituciones reguladoras 93 2.6.13 Marco jurídico y normativo 94 2.7 PORTUGAL 94 2.7.1 Requisitos para la emisión de títulos valores 94 2.7.2 Requisitos para la emisión de acciones 95 2.7.3 Requisitos para la emisión de bonos 95 3. CARACTERÍSTICAS PROPIAS DEL SEGUNDO MERCADO 96 3.1 GENERALIDADES 96 3.2 INVERSIONISTAS CALIFICADOS 96 3.3 TÍTULOS A NEGOCIAR 96 3.4 DOCUMENTOS REQUERIDOS PARA HACER PARTE DEL SEGUNDO MERCADO 97 3.5 EL PROSPECTO 98 3.6 PROCESO DE OFERTA PÚBLICA 101 3.6.1 Autorización de la oferta por parte de la superintendencia de valores. 101 3.6.2 Inicio del proceso promocional a través de comisionistas de bolsa, dirigido a potenciales inversionistas poniendo a disposición, información sobre la empresa emisora. 101 3.7 PROCESO DE OFERTA PRIVADA 102 3.8 PERIODICIDAD DE ENVIO DE INFORMACIÓN EN EL SEGUNDO MERCADO 103 3.9 CUADROS COMPARATIVOS ENTRE EL MERCADO PRINCIPAL Y EL SEGUNDO MERCADO 104 3.10 DERECHOS DE INSCRIPCIÓN Y LOS VALORES DE CUOTAS QUE DEBEN CANCELAR LOS EMISORES DEL SEGUNDO MERCADO. 104 3.10.1 Derechos de inscripción 104 3.10.2 Valor de las cuotas 104 3.10.2.1 Costos comparativos al emitir acciones y bonos 105 3.10.3 Periodo de liquidación 105 3.10.4 Derechos por reasignación de oferta pública 106 3.11 INTERMEDIARIOS FINANCIEROS 106 3.11.1 Sociedades comisionistas 107 3.11.1.1 Operaciones permitidas 108 3.11.1.2 Operaciones que pueden realizar por cuenta en el mercado primario. 108 3.11.1.3 Límites de estas operaciones 109 3.11.1.4 Operaciones que pueden realizar por cuenta en el mercado secundario 109 3.11.1.4.1 Segundo mercado 109 3.11.1.4.1.1 Inversionistas que participan 3.11.1.4.1.2 Títulos que pueden emitirse 109 3.11.1.4.2 Principios generales que se deben cumplir cuando se realizan estas operaciones 110 3.11.1.4.3 Límites que deben cumplir estas operaciones 110 3.11.1.5 Posibles inversiones 111 3.11.1.6 Inversiones prohibidas 111 3.11.2 Sociedades administradoras de inversión 112 3.11.2.1 Operaciones permitidas 112 3.11.2.2 Posibles inversiones 112 3.11.2.3 Límites de las administradoras de inversión 113 3.11.3 Sociedades fiduciarias 114 3.11.4 Banca de inversión 114 3.11.4.1 Actividades principales de la banca de inversión 115 4. EXPERIENCIA DEL SEGUNDO MERCADO EN SANTIAGO DE CALI 115 4.1 EXPERIENCIA DE LA BOLSA DE VALORES DE COLOMBIA 115 4.1.1 Motivos de la poca efectividad del segundo mercado en Santiago de Cali 115 4.1.1.1 Motivos Operativos 116 4.1.1.2 Motivos macroeconómicos 117 4.1.1.3 Motivos mesoeconómicos 117 4.1.1.4 Motivos macroeconómicos 119 4.1.1.5 Motivos del mercado 119 4.1.1.6 Motivos coyunturales Valle del Cauca 121 5. PLAN ESTRATÉGICO Y MERCADEO PARA LA REACTIVACIÓN DEL SEGUNDO MERCADO 121 5.1 CARACTERÍSTICAS GENERALES DEL ENTORNO DE LAS MIPYME EN SANTIAGO DE CALI 125 5.1.1 Entorno económico 126 5.1.1.1 Crecimiento económico 126 5.1.1.2 Comportamiento del sector industrial en el Valle del Cauca 127 5.1.1.3 Comportamiento del comercio en la ciudad de Cali, primer trimestre de 2000 128 5.1.1.4 Inversión neta de capitales en sociedades de Cali, enero – mayo de 2000 132 5.1.1.4.1 Índice de desempeño patrimonial de las sociedades de Cali 132 5.1.1.4.2 Concordatos 132 5.1.1.5 La inflación en Cali 133 5.1.1.6 Sector Externo 134 5.1.1.7 Política fiscal 135 5.1.2 Tamaño del mercado 140 5.1.3 Fuentes de financiación 141 5.1.3.1 Entidades (actores) públicas financieras 143 5.1.3.2 Entidades (actores) privadas financieras 143 5.1.3.3 Entidades (actores) públicas no financieras 149 5.1.3.4 Entidades (actores) privadas no financieras 151 5.1.3.5 La ley MIPYME y el entorno favorable a la creación 152 5.1.3.6 de nuevas empresas en Colombia. 160 5.1.3.7 Productividad 160 5.1.3.8 Tasas de Interés de colocación y captación 161 5.1.3.9 Entorno legal 161 5.1.4 Cultura bursátil 161 5.1.5 Entorno competitivo 161 5.1.5.1 Amenaza de nuevos entrantes 164 5.1.5.2 Poder del cliente 166 5.1.5.3 Amenazas de productos sustitutos 169 5.1.5.4 Poder de los proveedores 169 5.1.5.5 Rivalidad entre competidores 169 5.2 ANÁLISIS INTERNO 171 5.2.1 Definición de segundo mercado 171 5.2.2 Portafolio de servicios 173 5.2.3 Difusión 174 5.2.4 Dirección y manejo 174 5.2.5 Operación 174 5.2.6 Recursos 175 5.3 DIAGNÓSTICO 175 5.3.1 Oportunidades y amenazas 175 5.3.1.1 Amenazas 176 5.3.1.2 Oportunidades 176 5.3.1.3 Matriz de evaluación del factor externo (EFE) 176 5.3.2 Fortalezas y debilidades 177 5.3.2.1 Debilidades 177 5.3.2.2 Fortalezas 177 5.3.2.3 Matriz de evaluación del factor interno (EFI) 177 5.3.3 Matriz TOWN (DOFA) 177 5.4 PLAN ESTRATÉGICO Y DE MERCADO 178 5.4.1 Objetivo del plan estratégico y de mercado 179 5.4.1.1 Objetivo general 179 5.4.1.2 Objetivos específicos 179 5.4.2 Estrategias y programas 179 5.4.2.1 Disminución de costos 180 5.4.2.2 Fondo de garantías 182 5.4.2.3 Emisiones conjuntas 182 5.4.2.4 Vinculación de los inversionistas al segundo mercado. 182 5.4.2.4.1 Inversión del 1% de utilidades 182 5.4.2.4.2 Market makers 183 5.4.2.5 Captación de MYPIMES con apoyo de gremios y asociaciones. 183 5.4.2.5.1 Difusión y sensibilización de MIPYMES 184 5.4.2.5.2 Difusión y sensibilización a inversionistas institucionales 190 5.4.2.5.3 Capacitación y seguimiento a MIPYMES 196 5.4.3 Control 200 5.4.4 Cronograma de actividades 204 5.4.5 Caso práctico de apalancamiento (endeudamiento), con emisión de acciones o acudir a la consecución de pasivos. 207 CONCLUSIONES RECOMENDACIONES BIBLIOGRAFÍA ENTREVISTAS ANEXOS 208 ; Maestría ; Traditionally, only large companies have been linked to the Stock Exchanges to negotiate their shares and other securities issued by them. Consequently, the requirements for quotes and, in general, for transactions have been set according to their characteristics. However, there is a new economic reality that imposes the need to open space to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES) in the stock market. This reality is composed of the following facts: • This size of companies has become very important in the country's productive structure. • Small and medium-sized industrial companies have great export potential. They have important financial requirements that cannot be satisfied exclusively in the banking system, either due to costs, terms or the amounts offered. • Little by little, the resistance to change is broken, as well as the fear of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs to disclose their information with the suspicion of giving away to the competition. • The favorable treatment of the shares. Under these conditions, the Superintendency of Securities has proposed the formation of a market parallel to the traditional (or first market) called "Second market" or "Balcón Market", which can be accessed by the securities of micro, small and medium-sized companies (MIPYMES) to induce them to expand the supply of securities, for the benefit of savings and investment. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES) are those that are defined based on the size of their staff and the size of their assets (measured in current minimum wages SMLV), according to the MIPYME law (LAW 590 of July 10 from 2000. MSMEs represent 96% of the existing companies in the country, they contribute 63% of national employment, 25% of GDP, 25% of total exports and 50% of wages generated from the nation. The problems faced by MSMEs in general are the following: Limited access to financing and under unfavorable conditions, deficiencies in the administration of their production units, complicated legalization processes and lack of union leadership, are disaggregated, which causes misinformation of the measures of the government. With the present investigation and taking into account the previous conceptual framework, the aim is to answer the following questions: 1- How to facilitate access to capital under favorable conditions for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) so that they can develop their projects? 2- Is the Balcón Market, the effective means offered by the Public Securities Market, as a financing alternative for MIPYMES in Colombia? 3- Does the current legislation on the promotion and participation of MSMEs in the country's capital market offer guarantees of participation and development in that market?