REVIEWS: Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 4th Edition
In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Band 37, Heft 6, S. 975-976
ISSN: 1369-183X
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In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Band 37, Heft 6, S. 975-976
ISSN: 1369-183X
In: Gender Studies in Wales
This innovative collection offers a reappraisal of gender as a category of analysis in modern Welsh history. Beginning with sex work in the eighteenth century and concluding with women s late twentieth-century anti-nuclear activism, the contributors show how gender has been constructed, represented, performed and experienced by men and women at different times and places throughout Wales s modern past. Using a variety of approaches, the collection interrogates gender as a concept that encompasses both femininity and masculinity, provides fresh perspectives on familiar themes, and demonstrates the value of gender analysis for our understanding of the political, social, cultural and economic history of modern Wales. Chapters by leading historians and early career academics each set an agenda for exploring the intersection of gender with nationality, race, class, age and sexuality
Concise yet comprehensive, this one-volume reference examines the history of terrorism in the modern world, including its origins and development, and terrorist acts by groups and individuals from the French Revolution to today. Organized thematically and regionally, it outlines major developments in conflicts that involved terrorism, the history of terrorist groups, key aspects of counterterrorist policy, and specific terrorist incidents.Initial chapters explore terrorism as a social force, and analyze the use of terrorism as a political tool, both historically and in the contemporary world
Abstract:The article analyzes the application of the principle of proportionality, or rather of the proportionality test as interpretative criterion of the Italian Constitutional Court, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. This criterion was originally adopted within the German legal order and then, thanks to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, it has spread in many countries including common law countries. Therefore, the proportionality test became one of the central concepts of global constitutionalism, as an instrument fostering the dialogue between the courts through the circulation of legal models and argumentative standards. The paper starts with an introduction relating to the development of European constitutions from the end of World War II up to now and containing mostly principles that are characterized by open and heterogeneous cases. Then, the paper analyzes the techniques of balance that are particularly used both in new legislation and case-law. The analysis continues with an examination of the case study, with special attention to Sentence n. 1 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (which declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral system for the election of Parliament) and the Decision of the EuropeanCourt of Justice of 14 June 2015 relating to the assessment of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, this paper examines European and non EU doctrine that has shown its main concern due to the wide discretion that these decision-making instruments allow. In fact, the most recent international theoretical debate has focused on the deficit of democratic legitimacy occurring in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and has drawn the attention to the inherent danger in the scrutiny of proportionality and, more generally, in all the interpretative techniques of balance.The above-mentioned fear involves the fact that the principle of proportionality,which is the «par excellence» instrument of the «AGE of balancing», ends up stifling the democratic political autonomy.Despite the undeniable risk that courts can go into a non-allowed land, subverting the delicate balance of the decisions of the representative bodies, this paper accepts the idea that the existence of an oversight body, aimed at criticizing and, when appropriate, correcting the majority decision, is an indispensable instrument to protect the fundamental values both of national and international legal orders. In short, constitutional courts do not find the basis of their democratic legitimacy in popular election, but in their function itself, so asthat the majority decision is also accepted by the minority forces if and to the extent it is the expression of shared values. ; Resumen:El estudio analiza el principio de proporcionalidad, o mejor dicho el test de proporcionalidad como técnica argumentativa aplicada por la Corte constitucional italiana, por el Tribunal de Justicia y por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Esta técnica argumentativa, nacida en el ordenamiento alemán, ya se ha expandido, gracias al obrar del Tribunal de Justicia entre otras cosas, a muchos países no solo de la Unión Europea, sino también de common law. Hasta podría decirse que el principio de proporcionalidad se ha convertido en uno de los conceptos centrales del constitucionalismo global, en calidad de instrumento que favorece el diálogo entre los Tribunales a través de la circulación de modelos jurídicos y standards de argumentación.Después una premisa sobre las constituciones de la segunda posguerra en la Europa occidental, en la que se enuncian más que nada principios, caracterizados por circunstancias abiertas y heterogéneas, se tratan por separado las técnicas de equilibrio elaboradas por el legislador y también por el juez ordinario. El estudio prosigue señalando la existencia de diversos precedentes, prestando atención especial a la sentencia n.º 1 del 2014 de la Corte constitucional italiana, que declaró incostitucional la ley electoral n.º 270 de 2005 para la elección del Parlamento italiano y a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (14 de junio de 2015) en materia de control de las políticas monetarias del BCE. Para terminar, se tiene en cuenta la doctrina europea y de países del common law, que expresa su preocupación por el alto nivel de discrecionalidad que acompaña a la utilización de estos instrumentos decisorios. El debate teórico internacional más reciente se centró en el déficit de legitimación democrática de los Tribunales constitucionales y llamó la atención sobre los peligros inherentes al escrutinio de proporcionalidad y más en general sobre las técnicas argumentativas de equilibrio. El temor que subyace es que el principio de proporcionalidad, instrumento por excelencia del age of balancing termine sofocando la autonomía de la política democrática.A pesar de los innegables riesgos inherentes a las operaciones de control efectuadas por los Tribunales constitucionales sobre las decisiones de losórganos representativos, el estudio acepta la tesis de la doctrina según la cual la existencia de un órgano de garantía, llamado a controlar y, llegado el caso, a corregir la decisión de la mayoría, constituye una herramienta irrenunciable de tutela de los valores fundamentales del ordenamiento, ya sea interno o supranacional. Los Tribunales constitucionales hallan el fundamento de su legitimidad democrática no en la elección popular, sino en la función llevada a cabo, gracias a la cual las las minorías aceptan las decisiones mayoritarias, en los casos y como expresión de valores compartidos.Abstract:The article analyzes the application of the principle of proportionality, or rather of the proportionality test as interpretative criterion of the Italian Constitutional Court, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. This criterion was originally adopted within the German legal order and then, thanks to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, it has spread in many countries including common law countries. Therefore, the proportionality test became one of the central concepts of global constitutionalism, as an instrument fostering the dialogue between the courts through the circulation of legal models and argumentative standards. The paper starts with an introduction relating to the development of European constitutions from the end of World War II up to now and containing mostly principles that are characterized by open and heterogeneous cases. Then, the paper analyzes the techniques of balance that are particularly used both in new legislation and case-law. The analysis continues with an examination of the case study, with special attention to Sentence n. 1 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (which declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral system for the election of Parliament) and the Decision of the EuropeanCourt of Justice of 14 June 2015 relating to the assessment of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, this paper examines European and non EU doctrine that has shown its main concern due to the wide discretion that these decision-making instruments allow. In fact, the most recent international theoretical debate has focused on the deficit of democratic legitimacy occurring in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and has drawn the attention to the inherent danger in the scrutiny of proportionality and, more generally, in all the interpretative techniques of balance.The above-mentioned fear involves the fact that the principle of proportionality,which is the «par excellence» instrument of the «AGE of balancing», ends up stifling the democratic political autonomy.Despite the undeniable risk that courts can go into a non-allowed land, subverting the delicate balance of the decisions of the representative bodies, this paper accepts the idea that the existence of an oversight body, aimed at criticizing and, when appropriate, correcting the majority decision, is an indispensable instrument to protect the fundamental values both of national and international legal orders. In short, constitutional courts do not find the basis of their democratic legitimacy in popular election, but in their function itself, so asthat the majority decision is also accepted by the minority forces if and to the extent it is the expression of shared values.Summary:1. PREFACE. 2. LEVELS OF BALANCE. 3. EQUALITY AND REASONABLENESS. 4. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE GERMAN MODEL. 5. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: a) Proportionality as legitimacy parameterof measures restricting fundamental freedoms. b) Proportionality as validity parameter of acts of the European institutions: the monitoring on the monetary policies. 6. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY: THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION FOR EU MEMBER STATES.7. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/chi.24963284
"Together with sketches of its cities, villages and townships, educational, religious, civil, military, and political history; portraits of prominent persons, and biographies of representative citizens." ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: Visnyk Charkivsʹkoho nacionalʹnoho universytetu imeni V.N. Karazina: The journal of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Serija "Pytannja politolohii͏̈" = Series "Issues of political science", Heft 37
ISSN: 2523-4005
The growing challenges of the emergence of totalitarianism of a new format generated by the information age are investigated. The features of the new totalitarianism are revealed. Classical totalitarianism manifested itself in the form of a totalitarian state and used measures to ensure control over people, including terror. Today, totalitarianism is much more hidden in nature, because it makes use of modern fashion for the «transparency» of everything (the state, companies, personal life) and the tools for obtaining information about people and events. The trend of the state monopoly leaving the sphere of control, storing personal information, and its manipulation, but it creates conditions for private organizations to initiate their own mechanisms with the same tasks is analyzed. It is explained that these may be algorithms that exploit human behavior for a commercial or political purpose. It turns out that in the context of polarization and politicization, commercial organizations have their own agenda, which allows them to demonstrate themselves as a more significant political actor. As an example, the fact is given that the amount of information and its accuracy that large Internet companies possess about their users is likely to surpass in these indicators the information that the most influential intelligence organizations in the past had. Examples of countries in which mass surveillance of their own citizens on the Internet are openly and implicitly gradually deploying digital totalitarianism are considered. The phenomenon of the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is analyzed as a factor of an attack on human rights for privacy, including individual digital privacy. We study the trends of how, both democratic and authoritarian states, use resonant events and catastrophes as an opportunity to usurp power and gain more control over their citizens. The assumption is made that the digital era implemented the world of cyberpunk in life. It concludes that escape from the situation of elusive privacy through civic activism, pressure groups, and supranational bodies such as the European Union and competition laws.
In: Intellectual history of the modern age
In: Histoire sociale: Social history, Band 53, Heft 106, S. 712-714
ISSN: 1918-6576
In: European history quarterly, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 130-131
ISSN: 1461-7110
In: European history quarterly, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 101-109
ISSN: 1461-7110
In: Internationale spectator, Band 68, Heft 7, S. 50-54
ISSN: 0020-9317
In: A Dell book
In: Idées ećonomiques et sociales
ISSN: 2116-5289