Suchergebnisse

"Hot returns" is the term coined popularly to the action carried out by the law enforcement authorities and consists of handing the foreign citizens who have been intercepted by those authorities in the area under Spanish sovereignty over to the Moroccan authorities on a de facto basis without carrying out the legally established procedures or meeting the internationally acknowledged guarantees. Images, witnesses and other numerous sources with evidential value accredit such practices in the cities of Ceuta" and Melilla and the small islands under Spanish sovereignty. This report is aimed at (I) establishing that "hot returns" breach the immigration legislation (II) and the lack of a legal basis of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior's attempts to justify the "hot returns" based on the concept of an "operational" border (III), the irregular entry through unauthorised border posts (IV) and the agreement between Spain and Morocco regarding the circulation of people, transit and readmission of foreigners who enter illegally (V). Likewise, this report sets out the reasons why a possible reform of the immigration legislation to provide legal coverage to these types of practices would contravene EU regulations and international human rights law, which would expressly discredit them (VI). This report ends with reflections about the criminal implications for those who order, execute or allow "hot returns"

The report is categorized into three categories: (I) Religious Law and Its Application in U.S. Courts, (II) First Amendments Issues Related to Prohibition on Religious Laws in Courts and (III) Selected Proposed Prohibitions on Application of Religious Law.

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Herstellung eines rechtlich relevanten symbolischen Objektes, des "Notfalls". Die Untersuchung wird aus phänomenologischer Perspektive durchgeführt. Als theoretischen Einstiegsrahmen verwende ich HUSSERLs Kritik der Mathematisierung der Lebenswelt. Dadurch zeige ich, dass der Notfall als zeitlicher Zustandsmodus aufgefasst werden kann. Unter Zuhilfenahme der workplace studies exportiere ich phänomenologische Einsichten in eine sozialwissenschaftliche Sphäre. Aus dieser Perspektive stellt sich der rechtliche Notfall als ein Mittel dar, das dazu dient, ein lebensweltliches Original (die Narration des Klienten) in ein im Rechtsdiskurs und seinen Materialitäten gründendes rechtsspezifisches zeitliches Ereignis zu minimieren, mechanisieren, transformieren und rekonstituieren. Gemäß diesem Verständnis ähnelt eine Rechtsanwaltskanzlei einem Labor, dessen Ziel epistemische Enkulturation ist. Bei meiner Analyse des rechtlichen Notfalls als "Werden" verwende ich datenbasiertes Material, das im Rahmen von umfangreichen Feldforschungen in einer Rechtsanwaltskanzlei in den Vereinigten Staaten gesammelt wurde. Abschließend stelle ich ausgehend von Gilles DELEUZE, der das Recht an der Schnittstelle von "Material" (Diskurs) und "Kräften" (Handlungen) sieht, theoretische Überlegungen zu den sozialen Konsequenzen des rechtlichen Notfalls an.

This Article presents a comprehensive survey of civil protection order statutes and state appellate opinions in all fifty jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. We examine recent developments and trends, and highlight innovations. We include recommendations for further legislative reform and for creative development of case law. We have incorporated available social science research, the published policies and recommendations of judicial authorities, and the legal literature written by domestic violence experts. Moreover, our recommendations are based on our experience as domestic violence advocates. Each of us has represented battered women in court for more than a decade. In addition to civil protection orders, we discuss and analyze statutes and judicial opinions from related areas of the law, including custody and criminal laws specifically addressing domestic violence issues. Advocates seeking to explore the full potential of the civil protection order statutes in their states should use this research in preparing briefs and arguments to persuade judges to issue bold and effective protection orders in domestic violence cases.

This article critically navigates the complex debate surrounding free will and criminal justice, challenging traditional assumptions of moral responsibility and culpability. By exploring hard incompatibilism, which denies free will, I question the ethical justification of punitive sanctions and critically analyze the alternative models such as the public health-quarantine and nonconsensual neurobiological "moral" enhancements. These alternatives, however, introduce practical and ethical concerns. Advocating for a neuro-abolitionist perspective, through the proposition of five initial principles/debates, the article suggests a shift in integrating sociological abolitionism with insights from neuroscience. The discussion extends to the implications of hard incompatibilism and the pursuit of more humane and effective approaches to deviant behavior, ultimately calling for the abolition of punitive models and criminal law itself.

In his final speech at the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) in 1975, Prime Minister Wilson called the Final Act of the Conference a "moral commitment", not an international treaty. Thus, the Act is not binding as a matter of international law, though it is quite clear from the historical context, and from the wording of the Final Act itself, that the participating states have some sort of obligation ("commitment") to base their future conduct on the provisions of the Final Act. The Act formulates norms, rules intended to determine state behaviour, but these rules are not of a legal character. This is, apparently, the assumption underlying the Wilson statement, to which many similar statements could be added. As will be shown, a considerable body of state practice based on the same concept has developed, and points to the existence of non-legal (pre-legal, para-legal, moral, political) obligations as distinguished from legal ones. Is it a valid distinction, can a distinction really be made between legal and non-legal norms? If so, what constitutes the difference? What is the basis of obligation in both cases?

This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

Die vorliegende Arbeit steht im Kontext der Regionalisierung im Internationalen Strafrecht. Sie untersucht die Faktoren, die der entsprechenden Entwicklung des afrikanischen internationalen Strafrechts unter der Ägide der Afrikanischen Union (AU) zugrunde liegen und beleuchtet die Inhalte dieser sich entwickelnden Disziplin. Primäres Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die theoretischen und praktischen Grundlagen für die Entwicklung eines tragfähigen Systems afrikanischer Strafjustiz zu untersuchen, das in der Lage sein soll, mit Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und die Sicherheit in Afrika umzugehen, die die öffentliche Ordnung des Kontinents bedrohen. Im Weiteren entwickelt die Arbeit das Verhältnis des regionalen, afrikanischen Strafrechts zu dem globalen System des internationalen Strafrechts, in dessen Mittelpunkt der Internationale Strafgerichtshof (IStGH) und der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen stehen. Die Kombination der Analysen dieser verschiedenen Bereiche führt die Arbeit zu drei zentralen Schlussfolgerungen: Erstens ist die Entwicklung eines afrikanischen internationalen Strafrechts nicht nur eine Konsequenz der aktuellen Krise des internationalen Strafrechts. Sie ist ebenso und zuvorderst das Ergebnis einer Politik der Eigenständigkeit der AU und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten. Diese zielt darauf ab, die regionale öffentliche Ordnung durch regionale Institutionen und strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit zu schützen. Die zweite Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass die AU ein System regional- afrikanischer Strafjustiz vorantreibt, das auf drei optionalen Modellen aufbaut: Der Delegation von Rechtsprechungsbefugnissen an Mitgliedsstaaten, der Errichtung hybrider Gerichte mit regionalen RichterInnen sowie dem Aufbau eines regionalen Strafgerichtshofs. Zusammen mit solchen Straftatbeständen der Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und die Sicherheit, die den Kontinent spezifisch betreffen, bilden diese Modelle den Kern des afrikanischen internationalen Strafrechts. Allerdings bleiben Tragfähigkeit und Effizienz des Systems problematisch. ...

The paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the connection of law and legal science, on the one hand, and the Big Data phenomenon, on the other. The connection of Big Data and law can be thematised in several ways. This article makes a distinction whereby there are two levels of interplay between Big Data and the law (and legal science). Big Data on the one hand can be the subject of legal regulation and legal science, but it also can be a tool for better, 'predictive' law making and lawyering. This latter is also true for legal science: Big Data opens a whole range of possibilities as a new tool. Thus, this article discusses three fields and questions in three sections: 1. Big Data as the subject of legal regulation. What kind of moral questions does Big Data, and the predictive potential it has, raise? How does law recently frame, define and regulate the Big Data phenomenon? How does Big Data affect existing legal framework rules regarding privacy, data protection, competition, business regulatory, etc.? What will the new rules, regulating Big Data look like? 2. Big Data as a tool in the regulator's and the lawyer's hand. How can we exploit the new possibilities provided by Big Data in law making, policy creation and the application of law? How can we design new ways of 'Big Data-based social engineering'? How can we create predictive tools and inferencing techniques based on Big Data in policing, law enforcement and litigation? Finally in part 3. I discuss the impact of Big Data on legal science. How can Big Data, as a research tool help legal science? How do we use legal data-sets and textual corpuses as BD? How will these 'super-empirical' research methods affect legal scholarship? What is the relationship between traditional doctrinal scholarship and the new types of BD-based research? How can we use statistical analysis, natural language processing, content analysis, machine learning, behavioural prediction, etc. in legal science?