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Although coercion literature has traditionally focused on two-actor dyads, coercion in three-actor settings is a prevalent yet understudied strategy in International Relations. Such cases of "triangular coercion" represent a phenomenon whereby a coercer who lacks direct leverage over a resilient target coerces a third party who does possess leverage over the target, and to whom the target is vulnerable, and manipulates it into a clash of interests with the target. By forcing an otherwise uninvolved intermediary to align with the coercer, a coercer can alter the balance of vulnerability vis-à-vis its otherwise resilient target and enhance its susceptibility to coercion, albeit by extension. Existing scholarship tackles triangular coercion from different angles and mostly focuses on actor typology. This article seeks to promote our understanding of this strategy by proposing a conceptual model that distills its logic into the abstract components of vulnerability, resilience, and leverage. To demonstrate the dynamics of triangular coercion, the article draws on three empirical cases: Israel's failed attempts to force Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah in the 1990s, Nazi Germany's successful manipulation of Britain and France into coercing Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the Soviet Union's success at forcing the United States to coerce Israel in 1973.

Although coercion literature has traditionally focused on two-actor dyads, coercion in three-actor settings is a prevalent yet understudied strategy in International Relations. Such cases of "triangular coercion" represent a phenomenon whereby a coercer who lacks direct leverage over a resilient target coerces a third party who does possess leverage over the target, and to whom the target is vulnerable, and manipulates it into a clash of interests with the target. By forcing an otherwise uninvolved intermediary to align with the coercer, a coercer can alter the balance of vulnerability vis-à-vis its otherwise resilient target and enhance its susceptibility to coercion, albeit by extension. Existing scholarship tackles triangular coercion from different angles and mostly focuses on actor typology. This article seeks to promote our understanding of this strategy by proposing a conceptual model that distills its logic into the abstract components of vulnerability, resilience, and leverage. To demonstrate the dynamics of triangular coercion, the article draws on three empirical cases: Israel's failed attempts to force Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah in the 1990s, Nazi Germany's successful manipulation of Britain and France into coercing Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the Soviet Union's success at forcing the United States to coerce Israel in 1973.

The principle of consensus is often used as a basis for the rules of procedure in modem multilateral conferences. It has been argued that this may lead to a practice which is identical to the requirement of unanimity prevailing on the international scene before the UN system introduced majority-based decisions. It has also been pointed out that the consensus rule tends to give the great powers a "real" veto while the smaller states tend to lack this possibility. The article is an inquiry into the process of joint decision- making by consensus in two fora, with a particular emphasis on the above-mentioned aspects. It is shown that the consensus rule does not have exactly the same meaning and implications in the CD in Geneva as it did in the part of the CSCE process known as the Stockholm Conference. There are indications that the two propositions are more relevant and valid in the former case than in the latter. This difference can perhaps be explained by the membership and composition of the conferences, the level of ambition of the respective agendas or the basic approaches to arms control that are pursued — a "structural" approach in Geneva vs. an "operational" approach in the CSCE and in Stockholm.

International Terrorism as it appears is the scourge of all nations in the globe. There is no particular nation that is shielded from its effects either in terms of a germane threat or outright infliction of destruction. The responses from the said menace have led to what is currently termed as "the war on terror", an approach that creates collateral damages of its own. This paper in the first instance, has examined the concept "war on terror" and its legal justifications and ramifications. While the military can engage in fighting wars, it is not quite correct to christen some conflicts as war on terror because we cannot conquer terror through war. War on terror can only lead to destruction of property and human suffering and cannot usher peace and stability. Finally, the authors are of the view that arbitrations, negotiations, diplomatic sanctions and economic embargo, could serve as a better option for peace and security than military expeditions.

World business, multinational company, and world enterprise are all terms being used with more frequency as a significantly larger number of businesses become international both in philosophy and in scope of operations. For a continually growing number of firms, the entire world is considered a marketplace for their products.

It is now commonplace to bemoan our field's lack of practical relevance, and to blame this sorry situation on our penchant for ever-more abstract theorising over the analysis of real-world phenomena. This article challenges this rendition of the problem. Not only is the theory versus relevance thesis difficult to sustain empirically, there are good reasons to believe that even the most abstract forms of metatheory are relevant to sound practical knowledge. More than this, though, the theory versus relevance thesis misconstrues the problem. The obstacle to practical relevance is not theoretical abstraction, but a series of other disciplinary problems: our lack of any real interest in the nature of politics as a distinctive form of human action (which so animated early scholars in the field); the loss of the field's early practical intent; the sadly too common bifurcation of explanatory and normative inquiry; and the disappearance of the figure of the international public intellectual.