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In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. Excise taxes may emerge in political equilibrium when domestic firms and unions lobby for protection and the government is unable to use alternative protective policies because of international agreements. In so far as the government is prepared to exchange tax revenues for political contributions, under some conditions the excise tax rate will be higher than the one chosen without lobbying.

Recently, various Central and Eastern European countries have experienced a regression of democratic quality, often resulting in the emergence of competitive (semi‐)authoritarian regimes with an illiberal governing ideology. This has often been accompanied by a closing political space for civil society groups. Based on a survey of more than 400 Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovenian interest organizations, we explore, in the context of backsliding, the conditions under which organized interests shift their lobbying activities to alternative, i.e., EU or regional levels. Our statistical analyses indicate that it is rather exclusive policy‐making in general than a lack of individual group access to domestic policy networks that motivate organizations to engage in multilevel lobbying. However, it appears that organizational self‐empowerment and inter‐group cooperation are the "name of the game." Even under the adverse conditions of democratic backsliding, organizations that are accumulating expertise, professionalizing their operations, and cooperating with other organizations not only can sustain access to (illiberal) national governments but also branch out their operations to the European and regional levels.

Critics contend that corporations subvert democracy by using their economic resources to lobby for corporate-friendly policies and to elect accommodating politicians.' Those who take a more sanguine view-notably, a majority of the Supreme Court-reject the claim that corporate dollars corrupt the political process. Yet, there is general agreement that corporate political activity includes financial contributions, lobbying efforts, participation in trade groups, and political advertising, all of which give corporations a "voice" in public decisionmaking. This Essay contends that the accepted definition of corporate political activity is too narrow and overlooks the importance of "exit." When faced with objectionable laws or regulations, corporations can take their business elsewhere. Consequently, in order to preserve jobs and tax revenue, elected officials often cater to corporate interests. Put differently, exit gives corporations, individually and collectively, the leverage to influence public choices. The ongoing fight for LGBT civil rights provides a striking example of the power of corporate exit.' By making clear that they are unwilling to do business in places that deny equal treatment to LGBT people, corporations have been instrumental in defeating proposed state laws that would restrict transgender bathroom access or permit business owners to refuse services to gay, lesbian, or transgender people. For example, after corporations signaled their intention to remove business from the state, Georgia's governor vetoed a bill that would have legalized discrimination against same-sex couples. Although a question of democratic legitimacy arises when corporations stand between public officials and the will of the majority, we argue that corporate exit should be understood as a part of the democratic process. When conventional political channels are inaccessible, citizens can harness corporate economic power instead. Corporations are not democratic institutions, but they answer to consumers, employees, investors, ...

La ricerca intende analizzare le regole esistenti in materia di lobbying presso le istituzioni dell'Unione europea e presso quelle del Parlamento inglese. L'analisi è impostata distinguendo tra norme "interne", vale a dire quelle indirizzate ai decisori pubblici, e norme "esterne", ossia tutte le regole che valgono per coloro che svolgono attività di pressione. Il primo capitolo introduce al tema della rappresentanza degli interessi fornendo una serie di definizioni relative ai soggetti attori della stessa, chiarendo cioè cosa si debba intendere per attività di lobbying, gruppi di interesse e di pressione, lobbisti e decisori pubblici, indicando le relazioni esistenti tra gli stessi. Il secondo capitolo analizza la normativa in materia di lobbying indirizzata ai decisori pubblici presso le istituzioni europee (norme "interne") e quella valida per i gruppi di pressione (norme "esterne"). Vengono studiati, tra le altre cose, il Regolamento parlamentare del 2014 ed il suo allegato I, l'accordo interistituzionale tra Parlamento e Commissione del 2011, il nuovo accordo del 2014 e la proposta della Commissione Juncker del 2016 per un ulteriore accordo valido per tutte e tre le istituzioni europee e contenente un registro obbligatorio di tutti i lobbisti. Il terzo capitolo classifica i principali soggetti che esercitano influenza e pressione presso le sedi delle istituzioni europee, a seconda della natura dell'interesse rappresentato, della struttura interna del gruppo e della modalità con cui lo stesso esercita la propria attività. Il quarto capitolo indaga le regole esistenti in materia di lobbying nel Regno Unito. Vengono individuati i procedimenti legislativi nei quali le lobbies svolgono maggiormente la propria attività di influenza, così come le norme "interne" indirizzate al policy maker del Parlamento inglese, specificamente i registri degli interessi economici ed i codici di condotta dei deputati, dei loro assistenti, dei collaboratori, dei giornalisti accreditati e degli All – party Groups. Per quanto attiene alle norme "esterne", sono riportate le forme di autoregolamentazione dei gruppi di interesse, ossia i registri e i codici di condotta dei lobbisti, disposti autonomamente dalle loro associazioni di categoria, così come anche la legge Transparency of Lobbying, Non – party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014, la quale ha introdotto un registro obbligatorio solo per i lobbisti consultants. Alla fine del quarto capitolo vengono esaminati una serie di casi concreti, a partire dalle note vicende scandalistiche Cash for questions affair e Cash for influence, per giungere ad episodi anche più recenti riguardanti l'integrità del decisore pubblico, la trasparenza degli incontri con i lobbisti e le problematiche relative all'equo accesso al processo decisionale. Le conclusioni riportano una sintesi della ricerca insieme ai commenti dell'Autore. Seguono i riferimenti bibliografici.

Im Zentrum dieser Masterarbeit stehen die politischen Prozesse rund um die Wahldes Ausgabemechanismus von Verschmutzungsrechten im EU ETS. Von besonderemInteresse ist hier die Frage, wie sich die Wahl des Allokationsmechanismus auf asymmetrischeInformationsprobleme im EU CO2 Markt auswirkt.Es finden deskriptive, theoretische und empirische Ansaetze Verwendung, um diepolitischen Prozesse, die zur Wahl des EU Allokationsmechanismus fuehren, offenzulegen:Die relevanten Akteure, die die gesetzlichen Bedingungen des EU ETSgestalten, werden analysiert. Darunter befinden sich die EU Kommission, das EUParlament, der EU Ministerrat und Lobbygruppen. Mithilfe der Agency-Theoriewerden politische Befehlswege im EU ETS ermittelt. Weiters werden Informationsproblemezwischen EU Institutionen und Lobbygruppen sowie zwischen der Kommissionund den Mitgliedsstaaten beschrieben. Ein politisches Lobbying-Modellvon Yu-Bong Lai wird im Detail beschrieben und auf seine Anwendung hin getestet,um die Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Lobbyzuwendungen und der Gesetzgebungaufzueigen. Als Werkzeuge dafuer dienen einerseits das Lai-Modell und andererseitsdie Prozesse der Entscheidungsfindung in der EU Politik.Meine Analyse zeigt, dass Lais Lobbying-Modell den Wechsel hin zu mehr Auktionenin der 3. Phase des EU ETS erklaeren kann, jedoch nur, wenn einige Unstimmigkeitenin Lais Modellannahmen ignoriert werden. Das Modell ist aber nicht inder Lage die Ausnahmen, die einigen Industrien in diesem Handelszeitraum gewaehrtwurden, zu begruenden. Werden hingegen verteilungstechnische und institutionelleAspekte von verschiedenen Ausgabemechanismen beruecksichtigt, so koennen auchdiese Ausnahmen begruendet werden.Die Wahl des Allokationsmechanismus dient hauptsaechlich dazu die Zustimmungvon wichtigen Akteuren im politischen Markt zu Aenderungen am CO2 Markt abzukaufen. Gesichtspunkte der oekonomischen Effizienz sind fuer die Wahl des Ausgabemechanismuseher zweitrangig. ; This masters thesis focuses on political processes around the allocation methodchoice in the EU ETS. The main focus lies on the choice of the allocation methodand its role to decrease asymmetrical information in the EU carbon market.This thesis uses descriptive, theoretical and empirical approaches to highlight thepolitical processes leading to the EU allocation method choice: An analysis of theactors taking part in EU ETS legislation is presented, including the EU Commission,the EU Parliament, the Council of Ministers and interest groups. Agency theoryis used to deduce the delegation chains determining political decisions in the EUETS. Furthermore, informational problems between EU bodies and interest groupsand between the EU Commission and the member states are described. Technicaland distributional aspects of free allocation and auctioning of emission permits aresummarized. A political support function model of Yu-Bong Lai is presented andtested to depict the interplay between lobbying contributions of interest groups andregulators. Moreover, the choice for more auctioning in the 3rd EU ETS phase isrationalized by using the lobbying model and decision making procedures in EUinstitutions.My findings are that, by ignoring some inconsistencies on the model assumptions,Lais lobbying model can explain the shift to more auctioning in the 3rd EU ETSphase. However, the model discussed is not able to describe the exemptions grantedto several industries. But by using distributional and institutional aspects of theallocation method choice also these exemptions can be explained.The choice of grandfathering is generally used to allocate rents to crucial policystakeholders to get the needed majorities for changes in the carbon market. Otherefficiency considerations are rather secondary to the choice of the allocation method. ; Rainer Bromann ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2015 ; (VLID)444936

New management tools are required to enhance interaction between Russian companies and government agencies for innovation development. A major interactive tool are Government Relations (GR) communications promoting a new relationship model in terms of innovative system management. Interaction with the authorities is a major factor in innovation development, and the company's excellent reputation in the eyes of the authorities is a key element for business success and implementation of innovations. The study provides an explanation of the notion of 'Government Relations' (GR) and examines various academic approaches to GR in modern economics. We investigated the reasons for the development of GR at its present stage. The article looks at several GR tools in Russia public Relations (PR), public-private partnership and corporate social responsibility. We analyzed differences between lobbying and GR and demonstrated that lobbying is one of the key components (active phase) of GR activity. Data are provided on activities of the GR departments of major corporations of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, we examined the characteristics of PR development in Russia and substantiated the need for the implementation of GR into Russian enterprises and for training of highly qualified GR managers in Russia. ; peer-reviewed

The land campaign -- The Bowler boys -- New York's big secret -- The canal canary sings -- The prison In the park -- Mary-Arthur and me -- Well, I'll be damned -- Timber rustlers -- The new chairman -- Year of the moose -- The air campaign -- The art of lobbying.

The new unelected --A research field in the making --Glocal political action : generic skills, local application --Power without responsibility --The peculiar market for political skills /with Niels Selling --Lobbying for profits : the Swedish case /with Anna Tyllström --Policy professionals and the future of democracy

Diese Studie untersucht erstmals den Markt für externe PR-Beratung auf Bundesebene in der Politik und klammert damit andere Formen wie die wissenschaftliche Politikberatung oder das Lobbying in diesem Bereich aus. PR-Berater und Klienten aus Ministerien und Parteien geben Auskunft über die jeweils erwarteten Beraterrollen, und es werden die Strukturen der Interaktion erläutert. Die Auswertungen verdeutlichen, dass es sich um einen sehr überschaubaren Markt handelt, bei dem den PR-Dienstleistern vor allem die Rolle einer verlängerten Werkbank zukommt. Dies geschieht einerseits, um personel

Welchen Einfluss kann die deutsche kommunale Ebene auf den Politikgestaltungsprozess der EU ausüben? Dieser Frage wurde anhand konkreter Fallbeispiele des legislativen Lobbying aus dem Politikfeld der europäischen Ordnungspolitik auf den Grund gegangen. Die Arbeit schließt neben Schlussfolgerungen politikwissenschaftlicher Art zur aktuellen Europa- und Lobbyforschung mit konkreten Handlungsempfehlungen für die Praxis. Das Werk geht also nicht der Frage nach, welchen Einfluss die EU auf das Handeln kommunaler Akteure hat, sondern schließt eine Forschungslücke im Bereich der Sozialwissenschaften

AbstractHardball Lobbying for Nonprofits: Real Advocacy for Nonprofits in the New Century, by Barry Hessenius. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 222 pp., $65.00 cloth.Lobbying for Social Change (3rd ed.), by Willard C. Richan. Binghamton, N.Y.: Haworth Press, 2006. 320 pp., $59.95 cloth, $32.95 paper.

AbstractIn the United Kingdom, out‐of‐school‐hours learning (OSHL) is incorporated into education policy. This is the story of how demonstration projects, political lobbying, and funding combined with training, youth work, and schools to make such innovation mainstream "across the pond."

This article contributes to the discussion surrounding involvement of interest groups in the political process on the European and global level. My purpose here is to examine how groups of interest can affect EU's role as a global actor and find out which mode of lobbying regulation could strengthen Europe's position in global governance. In this article, I am trying to bind concepts which at first glance might seem quite remote: groups of interests and global governance. By analyzing Europe's position on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), I argue that European ambitions on international arena are undermined by inner tensions. These tensions are mainly caused by discrepancy in positions of different groups of interest who try to infl uence the outcome of the political process and, thus, make it less stable and predictable. At the same time, adequate lobbying regulation could increase accountability and transparency and, therefore, help to overcome inconsistencies in EU's position in global governance system. The results suggest that without proper backing from inside actors like business groups and civil society associations the EU will constantly wobble and will not be able to fully achieve its global goals

How did credit unions in Ireland move from the margins to become a nationally recognised movement? More generally, how do co-operatives promote their economic and organisational models in the public sphere? This article examines the importance of having a supportive legislative environment to enable co-operative development. It does this by exploring Irish parliamentary debates on credit unions between 1959 and 1999, including the lobbying for and debates about the Credit Union Act, 1966, and the revised Credit Union Act, 1997. The article traces the shift in public debate from advocacy in the early years of the credit union movement to a more complex mixture of advocacy and critique in later decades. The article offers three contributions. First, not only is legislation important for helping the credit unions to grow, the wider debates about legislation play a crucial legitimising role. Second, the paper demonstrates a relatively rare example of successful lobbying by community activists. Finally, it underscores the importance of training and education in order to maintain public awareness of the co-operative economic and organisational model.