This article deals with the analysis of the coverage of the Second Karabagh War by the influential British press. The mass media plays an important role in shaping or influencing people's opinions on conflicts. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno Karabakh Conflict is one of the conflicts that has got and presently is getting international press coverage. The news coverage has great importance in informing the world how Armenia invaded and destroyed Karabakh. And as the British press is enough influential in western countries and plays an important role in shaping the opinions, its coverage of the conflict is very important. Another important point is that the United Kingdom has long been one of the important geostrategic actors in the system of international relations. Although the UK's international influence is relatively weak in modern times, the country is still considered one of the world's power centers. The United Kingdom is also home to concepts such as parliamentarism, democracy, liberalism, and freedom of thought, speech, and press. All these factors make the analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the British press especially relevant. One more important fact that is worth to mention that Azerbaijan is a country rich in oil and gas reserves. This fact draws the attention of many individuals and legal entities in the United Kingdom, including BP, to Azerbaijan. The economic interests of transnational companies coincide with the development trends of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, as a result, take different directions. Taking this into account, Azerbaijan is objectively interested in gaining access to the political and intellectual elite of the United Kingdom through these individuals and legal entities. The links of transnational companies to Azerbaijan's national security are one of the subjects of research in the British press. This, in turn, increases the relevance of the study of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the British press. ; Стаття присвячена аналізу висвітлення Другої Карабахської війни впливовою британською пресою. Засоби масової інформації відіграють важливу роль у формуванні думки людей про конфлікти або вплив на нього. Конфлікт між Вірменією і Азербайджаном, Нагорний Карабах - один з конфліктів, який отримав і в даний час отримує освітлення в міжнародній пресі. Освітлення в новинах має велике значення для інформування світу про те, як Вірменія вторглася і зруйнувала Карабах. А оскільки британська преса досить впливова в західних країнах і відіграє важливу роль у формуванні громадської думки, висвітлення конфлікту дуже важливо. Інший важливий момент полягає в тому, що Великобританія довгий час була одним з важливих геостратегічних гравців в системі міжнародних відносин. Хоча міжнародний вплив Великобританії в наш час відносно невелике, країна як і раніше вважається одним зі світових центрів сили. Сполучене Королівство також є батьківщиною таких понять, як парламентаризм, демократія, лібералізм і свобода думки, слова і друку. Всі ці фактори роблять особливо актуальним аналіз вірмено-азербайджанського нагірно-карабахського конфлікту в британській пресі. Ще один важливий момент - Азербайджан - країна, багата нафтогазовими ресурсами. Цей факт привертає увагу багатьох фізичних і юридичних осіб в Великобританії, в тому числі BP, до Азербайджану. Економічні інтереси транснаціональних компаній збігаються з тенденціями розвитку нагірно-карабахського конфлікту і, як наслідок, різняться. Беручи це до уваги, Азербайджан об'єктивно зацікавлений в отриманні доступу до політичної та інтелектуальної еліти Сполученого Королівства через цих фізичних і юридичних осіб. Зв'язки транснаціональних компаній з національною безпекою Азербайджану є предметом дослідження в британській пресі. Це, в свою чергу, підвищує актуальність дослідження нагірно-карабахського конфлікту в британській пресі. ; Стаття присвячена аналізу висвітлення Другої Карабахської війни впливовою британською пресою. Засоби масової інформації відіграють важливу роль у формуванні думки людей про конфлікти або вплив на нього. Конфлікт між Вірменією і Азербайджаном, Нагорний Карабах - один з конфліктів, який отримав і в даний час отримує освітлення в міжнародній пресі. Освітлення в новинах має велике значення для інформування світу про те, як Вірменія вторглася і зруйнувала Карабах. А оскільки британська преса досить впливова в західних країнах і відіграє важливу роль у формуванні громадської думки, висвітлення конфлікту дуже важливо. Інший важливий момент полягає в тому, що Великобританія довгий час була одним з важливих геостратегічних гравців в системі міжнародних відносин. Хоча міжнародний вплив Великобританії в наш час відносно невелике, країна як і раніше вважається одним зі світових центрів сили. Сполучене Королівство також є батьківщиною таких понять, як парламентаризм, демократія, лібералізм і свобода думки, слова і друку. Всі ці фактори роблять особливо актуальним аналіз вірмено-азербайджанського нагірно-карабахського конфлікту в британській пресі. Ще один важливий момент - Азербайджан - країна, багата нафтогазовими ресурсами. Цей факт привертає увагу багатьох фізичних і юридичних осіб в Великобританії, в тому числі BP, до Азербайджану. Економічні інтереси транснаціональних компаній збігаються з тенденціями розвитку нагірно-карабахського конфлікту і, як наслідок, різняться. Беручи це до уваги, Азербайджан об'єктивно зацікавлений в отриманні доступу до політичної та інтелектуальної еліти Сполученого Королівства через цих фізичних і юридичних осіб. Зв'язки транснаціональних компаній з національною безпекою Азербайджану є предметом дослідження в британській пресі. Це, в свою чергу, підвищує актуальність дослідження нагірно-карабахського конфлікту в британській пресі.
The publication is devoted to the analysis of the UK exit from the European Union as a manifestation of the systemic crisis of the liberal democracy model. The causes and difficulties of this process are analyzed under the conditions of the failure of the political system to make political decisions. The problematic issues of liberal ideology and the model of liberal democracy were examined. The differences in the ideological convictions of the two founders of liberalism – Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as well as the role of these differences in the modern functioning of liberal democracy in the United Kingdom. The role of globalization processes in the world in the context of the development and functioning of liberal democracy is analyzed. Some features of the course of globalization processes in the world are highlighted. The features of the existence of the European Union as an international supranational organization in the context of its influence on the functioning and stability of the political system of the United Kingdom are examined. The features of the functioning of the model of liberal democracy under conditions of strengthening the international way of making political, economic and legal decisions are emphasized. Particular attention is paid to the political motives of organizing of start of the process of the UK's exit from the European Union, as well as the consequences of such a decision. In addition, the role of populist movements in this process, that have Euro-skeptical positions, has been established. The features of the functioning of populist movements are highlighted. The essence of the crisis of the model of liberal democracy in the United Kingdom is determined. The author analyzes the risks of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union in the context of a peace settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland as one of the indicators of the crisis of the liberal political system. In conclusion is performed analysis of some results of the referendum on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. ; Проанализирован процесс выхода Соединенного Королевства из Европейского Союза как проявление системного кризиса модели либеральной демократии, выяснены причины и сложности этого процесса в условиях несостоятельности политической системы к принятию политических решений. Рассмотрены проблемные вопросы либеральной идеологии и модели либеральной демократии. Установлены различия в идеологических убеждениях двух основателей либерализма – Томаса Гоббса и Джона Локка, а также роль этих различий в современном функционировании либеральной демократии в Соединенном Королевстве. Проанализирована роль процессов глобализации в мире в контексте развития и функционирования либеральной демократии. Выделены некоторые особенности протекания процессов глобализации в мире. Рассмотрены особенности Европейского Союза, как международной наднациональной организации в контексте его влияния на функционирование и стабильность политической системы Соединенного Королевства. Подчеркнуты особенности функционирования модели либеральной демократии в условиях усиления международного способа принятия политических, экономических и юридических решений. Особое внимания уделено политическим мотивам организации начала процесса выхода Соединенного Королевства из Европейского Союза, а также последствиям принятия такого решения. Выяснена роль популистских движений в этом процессе, имеющих евроскептические позиции. Выделены особенности функционирования популистских движений. Определена сущность кризиса модели либеральной демократии в Соединенном Королевстве. Проанализированы риски выхода Соединенного Королевства из Европейского Союза в разрезе миротворческого урегулирования конфликта в Северной Ирландии в качестве одного из индикаторов кризиса либеральной политической системы. Рассмотрены некоторые результаты анализ результатов референдума о выходе Соединенного Королевства из Европейского Союза. ; Здійснено аналіз процесу виходу Сполученого Королівства з Європейського Союзу як прояв системної кризи моделі ліберальної демократії, виявлено причини та складнощі цього процесу в умовах неспроможності політичної системи до ухвалення політичних рішень. Розглянуто проблемні питання ліберальної ідеології та моделі ліберальної демократії. Встановлено відмінності у ідеологічних переконаннях двох засновників лібералізму – Томаса Гоббса та Джона Локка та роль цих відмінностей у сучасному функціонуванні ліберальної демократії у Сполученому Королівстві. Проаналізовано роль глобалізаційних процесів у світі в контексті розвитку та функціонування ліберальної демократії. Виокремлені деякі особливості протікання глобалізаційних процесів у світі. Розглянуто особливості Європейського Союзу, як міжнародної наднаціональної організації в контексті його впливу на функціонування та стабільність політичної системи Сполученого Королівства. Підкреслено особливості функціонування моделі ліберальної демократії в умовах посилення міжнародного способу прийняття політичних, економічних та юридичних рішень. Особливу увагу приділено політичним мотивам організації початку процесу виходу Сполученого Королівства з Європейського Союзу, а також наслідкам прийняття такого рішення. З'ясовано роль популістських рухів у цьому процесі, що мають євроскептичні позиції. Виділено особливості функціонування популістичних рухів. Визначено сутність кризи моделі ліберальної демократії у Сполученому Королівстві. Проаналізовано ризики виходу Сполученого Королівства з Європейського Союзу в розрізі миротворчого врегулювання конфлікту в Північній Ірландії в якості одного з індикаторів кризи ліберальної політичної системи. Розглянуто деякі результати референдуму про вихід Сполученого Королівства з Європейського Союзу.
From the pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx and understanding the political and social events in France between 1848 and 1852, several interpretations have been made, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, regarding the role played by the lower middle class in moments of crisis. Particularly, after the advent of fascism in 20th century Europe, many voices have risen to signal the XVIII Brumaire as Marx's call of attention on the dangers set by the lower middle class's counterrevolutionary and reactionary spirit. Even more, some think of the XVIII Brumaire, and Marx's take on Bonapartism as the first, and extremely prophetic, definition and description of a modern fascist regime. The purposes of this essay are to: first, define and describe the lower middle class and its social and political consequences according to Marx; and, second, to explore how the lower middle class has been analyzed by a selection of Marxist and non-Marxist authors as a crucial sociological and historical problem. The latter has been taken to the extent of even comparing the political phenomenon of Bonapartism to Fascism and the lower middle class historical relationship in both of them. Bonapartism and Fascism are very distinct types of political regimes, even if they share some similarities. Nevertheless, it would be ahistorical to describe Louis Bonaparte's regime as fascist. Even so, Marx's typically coined reactionary or counter-revolutionary role played by the lower middle class in both cases was similar. (1)Several designations have been used to differentiate the lower middle class from the higher middle class or big bourgeoisie: petite bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertumand, the unpleasant, lumpen-bourgeoisie. It is impossible to assign fixed meanings in distinct times and places to those concepts. What they mean, and enfold, in different historical moments is determined by historically concrete political, social and economic structures and conditions. A social lower middle stratum was economically, but not so much politically, active during the preindustrial era. Its internal structure, predominantly formed by independent peasants, corporate-guild artisans and shopkeepers, and the nature of its relationship to the rest of society was particularly different from the economically, socially and more politically active, lower middle class of primarily dependent clerks, independent peasants, technicians, professionals and small shop owners of capitalist society (2). From Marx to the present there have been few attempts to define the lower middle class because the main issue was not the Kleinburgertum's own historical, social and political particularities; but, the fact that the petite bourgeoisie conformed a "classes class". In Marxist terms, the lower middle class was a class in but not foritself. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was dependent on its own fate but not on its own existence. The lower middle class was torn, and it still may be today, between two possible outcomes: proletarianization or embourgeoisement (3). In the first one, the petite bourgeoisie is condemned to being proletarianized. In fact, during the early industrialization period of England the small artisans and some specialized technicians were dissolved or forced into the industrial working class (4). In the second scenario, they would integrate with the big bourgeoisie finally accomplishing a long social aspiration. It would, certainly, diminish the fears and concerns of being proletarianized and, lastly and possibly, would allow clerks and professionals to be the frontrunners of a classless postindustrial society (5). Accordingly, as Marx said in the XVIII Brumaire, the lower middle class should be viewed as a transitional class whose members would finally end up being part of the proletarians or the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the lower middle class has had a pivotal role in certain historically crucial events: revolutions and counterrevolutions. Marx attributed no apparent class-consciousness to the petite bourgeoisie, except in times of severe crisis. The lower middle class, following Marx, lacked its own class-consciousness because it was afraid to become proletarian and aspired to attain the bourgeoisie's style of living and class standing in society even though it also despised the big bourgeoisie's productive means and way of life. Marx, in a prophetic Freudian style analysis, would ascribe this apparent contradiction to the lower middle class own self-hate. Nevertheless, lacking its own class-consciousness did not mean that the petite bourgeoisie was not capable of generating its own separate culture, life-style and Weltanschauung. The problem was that it engendered its own ethos in direct opposition to the proletarian and bourgeoisie ones; affecting, then, its own cultural authenticity. All this said, the lower middle class may not have been self-conscious but it certainly was self-aware. It had distinctive class awareness (6). The interest of Karl Marx in the lower middle class was provoked by the role the author gave to it during the events that unfolded in France between February 1848 and December 1852, particularly the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in the ascendance to power of Louis Bonaparte in the coup d'état of December 1852. First of all, it is imperative to define how Marx understood the social composition of the lower middle class in mid-nineteen century France. Small independent peasants, clerks and small artisans and shopkeepers were Marx's main petty bourgeoisie members. All of them were part of this classless class because they lacked the property of the main means of capitalist production, that in mid-nineteen century France Marx attributed to the industrial, large-retail and financial sectors; and, because they were not even proletarians either because they were small owners (particularly small peasants and shopkeepers) or because their work did not constitute an intensive manual waged labor (artisans and specially State's clerks). Marx did not see in them any economic conditions of existence, under which they lived, that could separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes. Given this situation, the small peasants, clerks and shopkeepers were not in any hostile opposition (as a clearly defined class with its own interests, culture and mode of life) to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Marx did not witness any sense of class-consciousness in them. He only viewed a local interconnection among small peasants, shopkeepers and clerks; but there was no sense of identification of interests between all of them that could beget unity and political organization. But even if they did not conform a class on itself, they were aware of their own uncertain socio-economic circumstances: at any given moment the big bourgeoisie, either by the action of retail competition or that of bank executions of failed mortgage payments, could toss them into the proletarian class. This socio-economic fear of becoming part of a propertyless class put them in direct opposition with the working class and drove them into the arms of the big bourgeoisie in moments of severe political crisis. Only here did Marx perceive the existence of class-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie. In the XVIII Brumaire Marx distinguishes three moments where the lower middle class acted as a class in itself: in the February Revolution of 1848 when they rebelled, alongside sectors of the big bourgeoisie and the proletarians, against the Orleanist monarchy; in June 1848 when they actively collaborated with the big bourgeoisie in crushing the proletarian rebellion; and finally, in December 1852 when they endorsed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état against the bourgeoisie republic. In the first episode, Marx observes a revolutionary role embedded in the lower middle class. He recognizes a class-consciousness in them; a strive to enact political and social change in the wellbeing of their own interests. In June 1848, Marx assigns them a counter-revolutionary role. They react out of fear and misguided by the bourgeoisie. They are afraid that a proletarian revolution would forever kill their socio-economic aspiration to become part of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx they are right to be fearful. A proletarian revolution would lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat and to the end of all classes. Alas, their desire of a bourgeoisie life-style as a "heaven on earth" would be tromped. A classless society would take away from them what distinguished them from the proletariat and what would, eventually, provided them upwards-social mobility: small private property and better paid and socially-respected professional labor. It has to be added that Marx also makes the bourgeoisie responsible for the lower middle class actions in the June rebellion. The former convinced the latter not to support and even to fight the proletarians by guaranteeing them access to better social standing, better financial and trade benefits and inclusion into the higher middle class. These were all false promises, which lack of satisfaction led to the events of December 1852. The lower middle class, betrayed by the bourgeoisie and immersed in deeply economic despair (which they made the big bourgeoisie responsible for) decided to fully endorse Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état. Again, and maybe more than ever if Marx's argument is to be followed, the lower middle class acted as a fully conscious class and had a counter-revolutionary and, even more, a reactionary role against the French bourgeoisie republic. Why did the lower middle class support Bonapartism? According to Marx, Napoleon III was the only one that could represent the petty bourgeoisie's interests. They did not have any sense of class-consciousness, which meant that they were unable to express their interests in a collective way. Meaning, that they were, like Marx says, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name through a parliament or any other democratic convention or institution. The lower middle class needed, and were also longing for, a paternalistic, authoritarian and charismatic figure that would represent their interest and implement policies accordingly. Louis Bonaparte mirrored everything the lower middle class was pursuing: the protection of their interests by identifying them with France's interests; the understanding of France as an economically based petite bourgeoisie country in opposition to big bourgeoisie enterprises (banks and big retails companies); and, the conversion of the lower middle class's aspiration forgrandeur through the Second French Empire's expansionist foreign policy (7).Bonapartism protected them from the rapacious big bourgeoisie, assured their vital place in society as France's economic engine protecting small private property from socialist distribution of wealth drives coming from the working class and satisfied their sumptuousness desires by establishing a lower middle class based Empire as Europe's major power. Marx's perceptions and warnings on the lower middle class counter-revolutionary and reactionary roles in periods of political and economic crisis has been regarded, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, as an indication for future revolutionary moments and as a prophetic alert on future authoritarian regimes like fascism. Lenin himself defined the petite bourgeoisie as a "half-class" or "quasi-workers" or "quasi-bourgeois" class that would be more difficult to eradicate than the big bourgeoisie and that would be politically unreliable (8). The lower middle class unpredictable behavior and dislike for radical policies could produce a reactionary backlash that could only be prevented by a rapid proletarization of all society. Nevertheless, even if Lenin was afraid of the possibility of an authoritarian government led by Kornilov and backed by the petty bourgeoisie (9); he later acknowledged, particularly by implementing the New Economic Policy, the lower middle class economic importance and envisaged them as a transitory class towards a proletarian society (10). Lastly, several authors have taken the XVIII Brumaire in order to compare Bonapartisim to fascism, even affirming that Napoleon's III rule was the first fascist regime in history, or to seek the social origins of both kinds of regimes in the lower middle classes. Jacob Schapiro not only sees the origins of 20th century fascism in 19th century Bonapartist France, he even defines Bonapartism as a type of fascism based on Marx's description of the regime in the XVIII Brumaire (11). Jost Dulffer analyses such comparison and, even if similarities are found, completely rejects its. He actually trends the historical origins of such comparisons to Trotsky's and August Thalheimer's writings on Nazism during the 1920s and 30s (12). Finally, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized the notion that fascism, just like Bonapartism, was an expression of the lower middle class resentments. According to Lipset, fascism was politically transformed rage of independent artisans, shopkeepers, small peasants and clerks that found themselves squeezed between better organized industrial workers and big businessmen and were "missing the boat" within the rapid social and economic changes of modern society (13). However, Ian Kershaw, Robert Paxton and Thomas Childers empirically confirm that fascism was not only a lower middle class phenomenon and that without the acquiesce of the conservative elites and sectors of the big bourgeoisie it would never had have come to power (14). Even if the comparisons between Bonapartism and fascism are historically pointless it is worth noticing, like Arno Meyer did, that Karl Marx was the first one to tackle the problem of the lower middle class lack of class-consciousness (15). Marx is correct in pointing out the lower middle class's awareness of itself and its dysfunctional and contradictory relationship vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Even more so, Marx accurately identifies the social, political and historical role of the petty bourgeoisie: to gain consciousness in moments of crisis and pivotally function either as a revolutionary actor, alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, or as a counter-revolutionary one, against the proletariat, or as reactionary one against the big bourgeoisie. This is, maybe, Marx's most important and timeless legacy from The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.(1) Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780-1914, Rutledge, New York, 1998, pp. 16-38.(2) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. (3) See Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class, Random House, New York, 1963.(4) See Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1999. (5) See Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.(6) See, Zeldin, Theodore, The Political System of Napoleon III, Macmillan, London, 1958.(7) Lenin, V. I., "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics, University of the Pacific Press, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 9-52. (8) Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 60.(9) Ibid, pp. 93-149.(10) Schapiro, Jacob S., Liberalism and the Challenge to Fascism, McGraw Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 308-31.(11) Dulffer, Jost, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 109-128.(12) Lipset Seymour M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 127-182.(13) See, Childers, Thomas, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote",Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 17-42; Kershaw, Ian,"The Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; and, Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism, Random House, New York, 2004.(14) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu
Yerel demokrasi kavramı ile bağlantılı kavramlardan biri olan ve literatürde kimi zaman yerel demokrasi ile eşdeğer anlamda kullanılan "yerel özerklik" kavramı, en genel anlamıyla; bir yerel topluluğun, yerel nitelikteki işleri, kendi başına, kendi organları eliyle görebilmesi ve buna olanak verecek kaynaklara sahip olabilmesidir (Keleş, 2000: 49). Avrupa Yerel Yönetimler Özerklik Şartı'nın üçüncü maddesi, "özerk yerel yönetim" kavramını, "yasalar çerçevesinde kamu hizmetlerinin önemli bir bölümünü yurttaşlarının yararı doğrultusunda ve kendi sorumluluğunda yerine getiren, hukuki ve yönetsel yeteneklere sahip yerel tüzel kişilik" olarak tanımlamaktadır. Aynı maddenin ikinci fıkrasında ise bu hakkın, üyeleri serbest, gizli, eşit, doğrudan ve genel seçimle oluşturulan konseyler ya da meclisler tarafından kullanılacağı ifade edilmektedir (Mengi, 1998: 70).halkın karar alma süreçlerine katılımını çok büyük oranda sınırlayan katı merkeziyetçi yapılardan uzaklaşarak yerel yönetimlerin yetkilerinin artırılması ve katı, hantal, bürokratik bir anlayış yerine üretken, gerçek anlamda eşitlikçi halk katılımına dayanan bir anlayışın hâkim kılınması, küreselleşmenin ve neo-liberalizmin yıkıcı etkilerine karşı bir alternatif oluşturabilecektir. Öte yandan, yerel yönetimlerin yetkilerinin artırılması ve güçlendirilmesi özellikle Türkiye'nin en önemli sorunlarından biri olan Kürt sorununun çözümüne de önemli ölçüde katkı sunabilecek bir potansiyel taşımaktadır. Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca yerel yönetimler, özellikle de belediyeler, yerel demokrasinin sağlanmasından ziyade, yerel hizmetlerin etkin, verimli ve daha az maliyetle sağlanmasının aracı olarak görülmüştür. Ancak bu yaklaşım yerine, Fransa'nın 1951'den itibaren yaptığı gibi, ulus-devletin katı merkeziyetçi sistemini gevşeterek yerel yönetimlere anlamlı oranda yetki devri yapmak yoluyla hem ülke içinde eşitlikçi bir bütünleşme sağlanabilecek, hem bölgeler arası sosyo-ekonomik dengesizlikler aşılabilecek, hem de farklı yerelliklerin kendi farklılıklarını korumalarına olanak tanıyacak çoğulculuk sağlanabilecektir. Bu yolla halkın yönetimde yer alma olanaklarının geliştirilmesini sağlayacak mekanizmaların kurulması, yerel yönetimlerin toplumun bütün sorunları ile ilişkilendirilmesi, sosyal, ekonomik, tarihsel ve kültürel varlığın korunması ve geliştirilmesinde yerel yönetimlerin bir özne olarak değerlendirilmesi mümkün hale getirilebilecektir. Bu anlayışa ek olarak ise, söz konusu yerelliklerin hem gelişmişlik oranlarına göre denge sağlayıcı bir biçimde merkezi bütçe tarafından desteklenmesi, hem de kendi ekonomik kalkınmalarını sağlayabilmelerine imkân tanıyan olanakların (kooperatifleşme gibi) verilmesi, yani bir nevi ortaklaşma ve ürettiğini tüketebilme, kendine yetebilme imkânı tanınması, neo-liberal sistemin halk için değil sermaye için esas aldığı "küreselleşmeci yerelleşme" anlayışının alternatifi olabilecektir. Bu esaslara dayanan bir "yerel özerklik" anlayışı ile liberal yaklaşım tarafından savunulan yerel yönetimlerin merkezi yönetimin müdahalesinden uzak olması ile sınırlandırılmış olan "yerel özerklik" anlayışı arasındaki fark ise ortadadır. ; The concept of -local autonomy-, frequently used synonymously with local democracy, is broadly defined as `the possibility of a local community to independently handle its local tasks using its own means` (Keles, 2000: 49). The third entry in the European Charter of Self-Government defines the concept of self-government as `a local legal entity that owns legislative and governing capability to perform a significant quantity of public services within legal boundaries and under its own responsibilities in line with its public's interests`. The second article of the same entry, on the other hand, states that this capability is used by councils or assemblies whose members are elected via independent, confidential and direct general elections (Mengi, 1998: 70) As one of the frequently debated issues, the demand for more autonomous local governments is restricted to being repressed and independent of the central government by liberal approaches which aim to privatize local services, to increase the power of global capital flows by distributing public services, and to provide suitable conditions for the implementation of neo-liberal policies. In addition to ignoring general public participation, such an autonomy demand of localism seeks to adapt democracy to fit the needs of sovereign powers and to create a local governing platform where everything is subcontracted, transferred to the global capital via neo-liberal policies, and then left to the conscious of capitalism which, referring to Marx; -. cuts down the tree if its shadow cannot be sold-. Particularly today, an increasing promotion of global localization is witnessed while being moved away from the central government often equals to giving in to the wheels of the global capitalism and entering into a competitive localism with its global companies. However, this should threaten neither the existence of a local government as a self-governing unit nor the local public's right to participate in decision-making processes. The firm centralist approach, more or less like the neo-liberal approach, is an obstacle against local governments to become participatory autonomous units. Throughout the human history, all communities have been organized according to their own needs. Today, it is clear that self-governments are vital for the top-down expansion of democracy and the coordination of social development. In this respect, moving away from firm centralist bodies that cause obstructions and restrict the possibility of public participation in decision-making processes seems crucial to create an alternative against the destructive effects of globalization and neo-liberalism. This can be achieved by empowering the authority of local governments and by adapting a true egalitarian participatory approach rather than a firm, clumsy, bureaucratic method. However, increasing and empowering the authorization of local governments has the potential of contributing greatly to the solution of Kurdish issue as one of the important knots in Turkey. Throughout the history of the Republic, local governments and municipalities have been considered as effective tools in providing cost-efficient and prevalent public service rather than maintaining local democracy. Nevertheless, instead of adapting this approach, transferring significant amount of authority to local governments and loosening the firm centralist system of nation-state, as France has been doing since 1951, will not only create an integration in the country and reduce the unbalanced socio-economic conditions among the regions but it will also sustain the plurality by maintaining the differences of each local community. It will then be possible to establish mechanisms to enable public participation, to relate local governments with the problems of the whole society, and to include local governments in the protection and the development of social, economic, cultural, and historical assets. In addition, supporting local governments by the central budget in line with their growth rate, providing them with the autonomous possibilities of improving economically (e.g. becoming a cooperative); that is, giving them the opportunity to cooperate, consume what they produce, and be self-sufficient, could be an alternative for neo-liberal system's -global localization- approach adapted not for public but for the capital. The difference between such a -local government- and the one advocated by liberal approach repressed from central government is self-evident.
El proyecto europeo de la posguerra es inédito en la historia universal. Descansa sobre dos partes principales: la construcción institucional y la idea de Europa. La construcción institucional supone un complejo entramado jurídico y político. Por ejemplo, el Parlamento Europeo, la Comisión Europea, el Tribunal de Justicia o la moneda común (Euro) reflejan esa construcción (1). Por otro lado, la idea de Europa descansa en la posibilidad de articular un conjunto de modus vivendi que no reflejen solo ámbitos de convivencia sino de florecimiento. En parte, la moderna idea de Europa descansa en los escritos de Sir Isaiah Berlín y, contemporáneamente, en el escepticismo post-iluminista de John Gray.¿Cuándo comienza el milagro europeo? ¿Por qué Europa en algún momento de la historia consolidó un proceso de desarrollo estable en el mediano y largo plazo? Un estudio realizado por distintos autores para el Banco Mundial analiza por qué algunas naciones han podido desarrollarse y otras no, introduciendo brevemente el alcance histórico del "milagro europeo". Los países se desarrollan por una complementación entre variables geográficas, institucionales y comerciales: "In an authoritative study on the long-run geographic determinants of development, social ecologist Jared Diamond (1997) argues that Eurasia had large geographical advantages over the Americas and Africa, and that these lie at the heart of current income disparities. He argues that since plant and animal species spread most effectively within ecological zones, the east-west orientation of the Eurasian landmass made it easier to diffuse early human technologies across the continent. As a result, Eurasia enjoyed a larger diversity of plant and animal species, and thus easier domestication of useful species, than did societies in America and Africa—continents that are oriented north-south. High-productivity agriculture led to large, dense, stratified societies, with subsequent advances in technology (weaponry, oceangoing ships) and political organization. Another important causal factor widely studied in economic history is international trade, and hence access to sea-based trade and proximity to export markets.Recent econometric and case studies have shown that even when controlling for historical endogeneity, institutions remain "deep" causal factors, while openness and geography operates at best through them (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik 2003b; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002)."(2) La posición geográfica revela otra cuestión: en parte, el milagro europeo se explica porque la ubicación este-oeste del continente permitía a las personas comparar el desempeño de otros y copiar aquello que funcionaba y descartar las experiencias fallidas. Particularmente, la posibilidad de comparar se daba en la utilización de tecnología agrícola. Sin embargo, la geografía europea generaba los incentivos para la aparición de otra variable central: la competencia. "Each factor can potentially reveal valuable insights about the true causes of countries' development successes and failures. For instance, Western Europe benefited both from the geographical advantages of east-west continental orientation discussed by Diamond (1997), and from being predominantly a coastal region in the temperate ecozone (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). All of this made land scarce and valuable (Herbst 2000).Additionally, rugged mountainous relief effectively separated Western Europe into a system of "competing jurisdictions of decentralized power," constantly warring with one another, none being able to completely defeat and control the others (Landes 1998). These factors raised returns to innovation, discovery, and adoption of new warfare techniques, which later gave Europeans first-mover advantage over other parts of the world."(3)El punto desarrollado es introductorio pero central para comenzar a comprender el significado y alcance del milagro europeo. La idea de Europa contemporánea es consecuencia de un lento proceso de descubrimiento que hizo posible consolidar un capital humano, social e institucional inédito en la historia de la humanidad. El liberalismo es la filosofía política y ética donde descansa el proyecto europeo. Europa como idea y el liberalismo como filosofía política están histórica y analíticamente relacionados. ¿Cuando surgió el liberalismo? ¿En la ciudades italianas (Génova, Venecia o Florencia) en algún momento del siglo XV? ¿En el largo trayecto histórico que va desde la Carta Magna (1216) hasta el iluminismo escocés de Smith, Hume, Hutcheson o Ferguson (1700's), pasando por la "revolución gloriosa" (1688) y los pesos y contrapesos implementados a los Estuardo? ¿En los Países Bajos, donde la aparición del crédito y la moneda generó los primeros mercados de capitales institucionalizados? ¿En la antigua Grecia, donde la filosofía sistematiza el sentido de la individualidad? ¿En la escuela de Salamanca (1600's), donde los escolásticos tardíos reconcilian la fe religiosa y el ganar dinero como virtud? Finalmente, ¿Se consolida el liberalismo en la inédita experiencia contemporánea de las socialdemocracias escandinavas, donde la igualdad y la libertad han encontrado una manera virtuosa para interactuar?Es imposible determinarlo, no solo por razones de verificaron histórica sino porque el liberalismo es una concepción ética y política plural en tiempo, espacio y alcance. Es decir, asume un individualismo metodológico y construye modus vivendi donde la principal filosofía (aunque no la única) consiste en respetar las distintas formas de prosperar que construyen las personas, con la salvedad de no amenazar los distintos (y a veces opuestos) modus vivendi de terceros.El proyecto europeo ha contribuido a reconciliar la tradición de la libertad y la tradición de la igualdad. En parte, esta reconciliación entre igualdad y libertad ha comenzado a hospedarse en la nueva idea de Europa, que va desde el tratado de Roma de 1957 hasta la dinámica ampliación de la Unión, desde los 6 a los 12, de éstos a los 15 y de los 15 a los 27. La nueva Europa descansa en un proyecto inédito en la historia de la humanidad: el proyecto de la creciente convivencia no solo de distintos modus vivendi sino, en algunos casos, de modos opuestos de pensar y vivir una buena vida. El paradigma del proyecto europeo es particularmente liberal porque para consolidarse aspira a la creciente diversidad de sus partes. Es decir, su idea temporaria de todo es superior a la suma de sus partes en tanto descansa en la diversidad creciente de esas partes para consolidar una idea de todo plural, tolerante y pujante. Así, cuantos más modus vivendi se incorporan a este nuevo proyecto europeo, más consolidada se encuentra la idea de Europa. Mientras más diversos son esos modus vivendi, mas consolidado se encuentra aquello que John Gray ha denominado Liberal Project. (4) Esta idea del nuevo proyecto europeo que incipientemente se consolida en la Europa de los 27 refleja dos supuestos metodológicos fuertes. Hay una definición filosófica del proyecto que delimita su alcance y, al hacerlo, asume que el liberal Project carece de un telos universal pero, a la vez, define como valor a ser respetado (universalmente) el modus vivendi europeo de la existencia de derechos en el otro, tanto en su proyecto personal y grupal. Siguiendo a Gray, vemos que el proyecto europeo termina como aspiración política en las fronteras geográficas de la Unión, pero prosigue como idea mas allá de toda geografía, porque (con Berlin y Gray) ha aceptado tácitamente que no hay en él búsqueda de universalidad sino una búsqueda de consolidar buenas formas de vida particular. En palabras de Gray: "El Estado liberal se originó en la búsqueda de un modus vivendi. Los regímenes liberales contemporáneos son floraciones tardías de un proyecto de tolerancia que se inició en Europa en el siglo XVI. La tarea que heredamos consiste en reacondicionar la tolerancia liberal para que pueda guiarnos en la búsqueda de un modus vivendi en un mundo más plural. La tolerancia liberal ha contribuido inconmensurablemente al bienestar humano. No estando en parte alguna tan profundamente arraigada como para darla por descontada, es un logro cuyo valor no podría ser más alto. No podemos prescindir de ese ideal tardomoderno, pero tampoco puede ser nuestra guía en las circunstancias tardomodernas actuales porque el ideal de tolerancia que hemos heredado encarna dos filosofías incompatibles. Vista desde un ángulo, la tolerancia liberal es el ideal de un consenso racional sobre el mejor modo de vida posible. Desde el otro, es la creencia en que los seres humanos pueden florecer en muchas formas de vida. Si el liberalismo tiene un futuro, este reside en el abandono de la búsqueda de un consenso racional sobre el mejor modo de vida posible…" (5)Como sostiene el economista y filósofo político austriaco Friedrich Hayek, las instituciones más sólidas se construyen a través de un proceso de orden espontáneo. Es decir, a través de la interacción de personas que buscando un limitado fin en T1 alcanzan, sin quererlo, un objetivo mas amplio en T2, T3, Tn debido a la sistematización de determinados intercambios que, al haber sido crecientemente aceptados por su eficiencia, devienen normas informales y eventualmente formales (6).La construcción del proyecto europeo recupera para la filosofía política contemporánea esta concepción hayekeana: sin buscarlo, el acuerdo formal de Roma de 1957 comenzó un derrotero que culminaría (momentáneamente) con una idea de Europa, donde 27 países y naciones se complementan en una creciente armonía. Como marcamos, la principal idea sobre la que descansa el proyecto europeo es que distintas partes, con diversas expresiones inconmensurables, se suman y son más grandes que un hipotético todo. A su vez, este hipotético todo deviene inconmensurable, ya que la complementación armónica de partes (en algunos casos sumables y en otros no) da como resultado un todo articulado pero de difícil definición. Así, el orden espontáneo europeo es un ámbito de consenso creciente. Un ámbito del consenso se fortalece y enriquece cuando sus partes desarrollan sus potencialidades en un marco de respeto al desarrollo de las (distintas) potencialidades de los otros. Adquiere aquí una especial significación la existencia de un espacio público que no solo posee los mecanismos institucionales para respetar los derechos del otro sino también posee los valores, ideas y creencias morales como para respetar lo inconmensurable en ese otro. Aquí radica la importancia del "Value Pluralism" articulado por Sir Isaiah Berlin. Para Berlin "…pluralism (is) the recognition of an indefinite variety of cultures and systems of values, all equally ultimate, and incommensurable with one another, so that the belief in a universally valid path to human fulfillment is rendered incoherent…' …The object of this investigation is the almost endless plurality of total views of the world, and this precludes his espousing any exclusive vision of man and his condition…"(7). Es posible pensar que en el inarticulado programa de investigación de Sir Isaiah Berlin descansa un orden espontáneo para una idea de Europa. En un sentido analítico, Berlin toma el orden espontáneo de Hayek y lo introduce en el milagro europeo. Paso seguido, Gray asume el 'value-pluralism' de Berlin para definir los límites del Liberal Project. Al hacerlo, no solo sistematiza el liberal Project sino el papel que para su consolidación tiene el nuevo proyecto europeo. Es decir, los limites que supone la idea de Europa para el liberalismo no es para Gray una derrota analítica debido a la imposibilidad de aspirar a la universalidad. En cambio, es donde el liberalismo se asienta y convive con distintos modus vivendi dentro y fuera de su ámbito de influencia. Al hacerlo, demuestra su fortaleza y vitalidad. Cuando, siguiendo a Gray, el liberalismo redescubre sus límites no está necesariamente anunciando su decadencia. Por el contrario, anuncia y expresa los buenos valores (la buena vida) que tiene para ofrecer. El proyecto europeo expresa parte de ese modus vivendi.(1) Una Buena síntesis de las instituciones formales de la Unión Europea se encuentra enhttp://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm(2) "Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform", versión online http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/. Ver http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/Cnote1_EconomicGrowth.pdf, Country Note 1, Página 58. A su vez, ver el trabajo de Kenneth Pomeranz, "The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy", donde el autor sostiene que Europa Occidental no solo supone una geografía sino una construcción social, política y económica: "It should be noted here that "western Europe," for most authors, is a social, economic, and political construct, not an actual geographic entity: Ireland, southern Italy, and most of Iberia, for instance, did not have much of the economic development usually held to be characteristically European or western European. I will generally use the term in a geographical sense, while pointing out that the areas often taken to stand for "Europe" in these comparisons (e.g., the southern Netherlands, or northern England), might be better compared, in both size and economic characteristics, with such units as China's Jiangsu province, rather than with entire subcontinents such as China or India". Princeton University Press. 2000. Pagina 3.(3)http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/Cnote1_EconomicGrowth.pdf Obra citada, pagina 59.(4) Es necesario remarcar que, como mencionaremos mas adelante, Gray le da al concepto de Liberal Project una connotación analítica e histórica negativa. Gray desarrolla ampliamente esta concepción en un programa de investigación que puede tener su inicio a principios de los 80'. Por ejemplo, ver "Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy" (1989) y en "Post Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought" (1993), ambos publicados por Routledge. La filosofía política de John Gray y su relación con el proyecto europeo y la idea de Europa será desarrollada en posteriores trabajos.(5) Gray, John (2001): "Las dos caras del liberalismo. Una nueva interpretación de la tolerancia liberal". Paidos. Buenos Aires-Argentina. Pagina 11(6) La idea de orden espontáneo recorre gran parte de la obra de Hayek. Sin embargo, no se encuentra sistematizada en un texto en particular. Es posible pensar que un trabajo como "The Sensory Order" revela una incipiente articulación en los primeros años de elaboración científica del autor (este trabajo se encuentra en el campo de la psicología). Mas adelante, el joven economista Hayek deja paso al maduro filósofo político. Una versión de esta madurez se encuentra en The Constitution of Liberty (1960), publicado por University of Chicago Press. En 1974 gana el Premio Nobel en Economía por sus estudios sobre los ciclos económicos y el papel de los precios como información necesaria para la asignación eficiente de recursos (ver http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/press.html). La obra de Hayek es profusa en cuanto a su alcance (economía, filosofía, teoría del conocimiento, filosofía política, historia, psicología) y llega hasta el final de su vida (1899-1992).(7) Berlin, Isaiah: "The Proper Study of Mankind. An Anthology of Essays". Introducción. Página XXX y XXXIV. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York. 1997 *Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales, FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.Master en Filosofía Política, London School of Economics and Political Science.
The relationship between Australia and Indonesia has fluctuated sharply over the decades, since Indonesia first declared independence in 1945. After Suharto took power in 1966, aid began to flow to the country, after the new Indonesian leader transformed Indonesia's outlook to be proWest and anti-Communist. Events such as the annexation of East Timor in 1975 soured relations for a time, however the two nations had essentially converging interests up until the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Indonesia was heavily hit by the crisis, and the secession of East Timar in 1999, with heavy Australian involvement meant relations were at a new low. However, the tsunami disaster of 2004 marked a turning point, with a strong Australian aid response helping significantly in putting relations back on track. Despite this, people-to-people links in Australia are still weak, and there are high levels of mistrust and misunderstanding between the public in both nations. Culturally, the two nations could not be more different, although geographically they are close. Indonesian language programs are also falling away in Australia, as well as public diplomacy funding. From an economic standpoint, business links are weak also. However, the one positive in this regard are the strong elite and government-to-government relations that the two countries share. The relationship with Indonesia can be seen as one of Australia's most important relationships. Primarily, the gee-strategic location of Indonesia is perhaps the most important factor in this regard. The relationship is also translating into strong Indonesian support for Australia within vitally important regional forums, and Indonesia's current growth highlights its new found assertiveness on the diplomatic stage. Australia's policy priorities in regards to Indonesia include upholding Indonesia's territorial integrity, and upholding Australia's wider interests in matters of security and regional international politics. The rise of China and the advent of the 'Asia-Pacific century,' mean that it is a vital national interest for Australia to assist Indonesia in its economic recovery and development, in order for Australia to have strong partners in the region to face the challenges ahead. Foreign aid is one way of achieving this goal. Australia, as one of the 24 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country members, will provide an estimated $4.8 billion in total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 2011- 2012, reaching an estimated 0.35 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI). By 2015-2016, the Australian government has committed to increase Australia's ODA/GNI to 0.5 per cent. The Australian aid program has a strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region, but has recently expanded to encompass Central and South America. In terms of ODA expenditure by country, Indonesia is the top bilateral aid recipient, with Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Vietnam making up the remainder of the top 5. 2015 is also the date that has been set for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targets set by all United Nations (UN) members, and International Organisations (IOs) that outline eight goals that aim to reduce poverty throughout the world. AusAID sees the MDGs as a vital part of the aid program and its objectives. As well as this, AusAID have taken measures to improve the effectiveness of aid, establishing an Office of Development Effectiveness (OD E), and in the last few months, the Gillard government have established an independent review of the aid program, completed in late April 2011, which will assess future directions for the aid program, considering that the increase to 0.5 per cent of ODA/GNI by 2015-2016 will effectively double the aid budget to around $8-9 billion. Australia has a long history in providing aid to Indonesia, and the Australia Indonesia Partnership (AIP) is the current bilateral development partnership body responsible for the oversight of the distribution of aid to Indonesia. The AIP Country Strategy consists of 4 pillars, dealing with different area of aid distribution, which have been formulated in line with the Indonesian government Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN). The Australian aid program clearly outlines that its aid activities within Indonesia are undertaken with the national interest in mind, and the geographical spread of the overall program also reflects this. Indonesia, although recording impressive growth, in 2006 still had more than half of its population of approximately 246 million people living on under $2 a day. The UN Human Development Index (HDI) highlights this, ranking Indonesia 108th out of 169 countries. Despite the aforementioned impressive growth, Indonesia's HDI figures show a far slower rate of improvement in terms of poverty alleviation. The AIP strategy heralds a shift from 'traditional, stand-alone programs' of aid delivery to more governance and decentralisation activities, however this strong focus seems to taking the focus away from direct poverty alleviation activities. One reason for this occurrence can be seen in the aid policy debate that exists in Australia between the neo-liberal and social justice agenda. The government's national interests in security, economics and regional diplomacy are the drivers of aid policy, but neo-liberalism provides the framework for this. The strong promotion of activities such as 'good governance' within countries such as Indonesia can be seen to have an adverse effect on the alleviation of poverty, as those that promote the social justice agenda point out. However, the neo-liberal agenda is firmly fixed within Australian aid policy-making, and within both major political parties. This is due to pressures from businesses with interests in expanding into overseas markets, as well as the institutionalised executive level environment in which foreign aid policy is formulated. Although the social justice agenda has a strong public voice, it has little to no real influence on the final formulation of policy. This report finds that when it comes to Australian aid assistance within Indonesia and the balance between the national interest and the delivery of real outcomes for Indonesians, the balance is significantly weighted in the favour of the national interest. Although there have been recent improvements in direct alleviation activities in the health, education and environment sectors, it is clear that national interests are the driving force behind aid implementation within Indonesia. Considering Australia's gee-strategic location, and the challenges that it faces, it is vital and not surprising that a middle power such as Australia looks to use foreign aid to serve its own interests as well as others. However it must be recognised that too heavy a focus on governance activities can result in the poor being left behind as development continues apace. The report recommends that the projected doubling of the aid program by 2015-2016 offers an excellent opportunity to reconfigure this balance somewhat, by continuing the current activities in the same vein, yet using any new significant increases in funding exclusively to target and implement new poverty alleviation activities within the poorest provinces and districts of Indonesia.
Tocqueville's view that a virtuous and viable democracy depends on robust associational life has become a cornerstone of contemporary democratic theory. Democratic theorists generally agree that issue networks, recreational associations, support circles, religious groups, unions, advocacy groups, and myriad other kinds of associations enhance democracy by cultivating citizenship, promoting public deliberation, providing voice and representation, and enabling varied forms of governance. Yet there has been little work to show how and why different kinds of association have different effects on democracy--many supportive but others minimal or even destructive.This book offers the first systematic assessment of what associations do and don't do for democracy. Mark Warren explains how and when associational life expands the domain, inclusiveness, and authenticity of democracy. He looks at which associations are most likely to foster individuals' capacities for democratic citizenship, provoke political debate, open existing institutions, guide market activities, or bring democratic decision-making to new venues. Throughout, Warren also considers the trade-offs involved, noting, for example, that organizational solidarity can dampen internal dissent and deliberation even as it enhances public deliberation. Blending political and social theory with an eye to social science, Democracy and Association will draw social scientists with interests in democracy, political philosophers, students of public policy, as well as the many activists who fortify the varied landscape we call civil society. As an original analysis of which associational soils yield vigorous democracies, the book will have a major impact on democratic theory and empirical research
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In: The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics & related topics in contemporary Africa, Volume 44, Issue 3, p. 349-374
The World Bank legal review gathers this input from around the world and compiles it into a useful resource for all development practitioners and scholars. The subtitle of this volume, legal innovation and empowerment for development, highlights how the law can respond to the chal-lenges posed to development objectives in a world slowly emerging from an economic crisis. The focus on innovation is a call for new, imaginative strategies and ways of thinking about what the law can do in the development realm. The focus on empowerment is a deliberate attempt to place the law into the hands of the poor; to give them another tool with which to resist poverty. This volume shows some of the ways that the law can make an innovative and empowering difference in development scenarios. Development problems are complex and varied, and the theme of innovation and empowerment naturally has a broad scope. Consequently, this volume reaches far and wide. It considers the nature, promise, and limitations of legal innovation and legal empowerment. It looks at concrete examples in places such as Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, and Latin America. It considers developments in issues with universal application, such as the rights of the disabled and the effectiveness of asset recovery measures. The theme of legal innovation and empowerment for development complements substantive and institutional sensibilities in current development policy. Substantively, development policy discourse seems to have moved away from tacking hard toward statist policy or neoliberal policy. Although this brief introduction cannot do justice to the richness and complexity of these contributions, it does consider each focal point in turn.
In the future, maybe this week's action by the Louisiana State Senate to send SB 276 to Republican Gov. Jeff Landry's desk will help out the political prospects of Democrats bitterly opposed to it.
That bill makes the pair of drugs used for chemical abortions available by prescription only in Louisiana, as part of an effort that creates the crime of coerced abortion. By making these prescription-based, this makes more difficult obtaining these to induce nefariously ingestion by an unknowing pregnant female, as well as throws up a roadblock to those aiding and abetting in induction of abortions in Louisiana, which by law almost always is illegal.
Democrats raised all sorts of essentially phony objections to this, which marginally would change the ability to obtain these drugs, even to have an illegal abortion performed, and wouldn't materially alter the ability and alacrity in using these for other purposes. As GOP state Sen. Jay Morris noted during debate, the real but hidden objection was it could prevent a portion of these illegal abortions in the state that runs contrary to the abortion-on-demand philosophy of the political left.
Yet this becoming law, which Democrats may see as a defeat now, actually may reap them future political gains in Louisiana. Not anytime soon, but perhaps a generation away, despite themselves.
This is because of natality patterns in the aggregate globally, in the U.S., and among the states. For decades, fertility has fallen everywhere, where the global replacement rate has been 2.1 per female. It last reached that in the U.S. in 2007 and by the latest estimates is now close to 1.6, mirroring other economically-developed countries although it is higher than most, and even the entire global rate is estimated to have fallen to replacement rate.
That means at the current rate the planet's population will start shrinking in about four decades. Large-scale immigration, whether legally, into the U.S. may keep its population expanding but eventually that lack of domestic reproduction would catch up, and has negative consequences in various ways, such as solvency of pension funds like Social Security, inputs to continued economic growth, and dislocation in industries like education and construction.
Apparently, the culprit is a shift in attitudes towards more individualistic goals that deemphasize present enjoyment of raising children and future enjoyment of interacting with succeeding generations, But, it's not all uniform; indeed, within America the states show wide variation. The most fertile state, South Dakota, has a rate about 50 percent higher than the lowest, Vermont.
However, there's a very telling pattern in all of that. Of the 13 highest states – with Louisiana ranked fifth – all are "red" states. They reliably have voted Republican in the past few presidential elections, they all have GOP senators, and only one has a governor (Kansas; Nebraska officially is nonpartisan but clearly hews to the right in national voting behavior) not a Republican while all have both chambers of the legislatures in GOP hands, often by supermajorities.
By contrast, of the 13 lowest states, all but New Hampshire is a "blue" state where besides it all having just Democrats as senators (as does New Hampshire), only one governor not a Democrat (Nevada), and all legislatures controlled by Democrats. This shouldn't surprise given the different conceptualizations behind conservatism and liberalism: liberals see the world more atomistically and in zero-sum terms and place emphasis on symbolic policy representation that in objective terms tends to command and control of others that relieves them of greater responsibility for positive interactions into the lives of others, a selfishness that translates into reduced desire to have families.
There are disparate allied factors as well related to these different ideologies. Conservatives are more likely culturally desirous of children and larger families, often for religious reasons, as opposed to liberals. For their part, liberals are more likely caught up in fringe behaviors such as the cult of catastrophic anthropogenic global warming that acts as a disincentive to want children.
And then there's abortion. There's perhaps no more demonstrative act that a female could perform than killing her unborn child in the womb that affects the fertility rate, part of the cultural mosaic that so strongly affects that rate. Add to that the long-confirmed data point in political science that family political attitudes are the single most important factor in shaping a person's own political attitudes – partisanship strongly, specific issue preferences well, ideological identification somewhat – and that means as conservatives are much less likely than liberals to support abortion, then conservatives' values are passed along through child-rearing in a disproportionately-higher fashion by the numbers.
Or to put it more crassly, conservatives are replicating holders of their issue preferences into superior voting numbers while liberals are aborting their own into minority status, the data trend reveals. Perhaps this is one reason why the left, whose leaders must sense this coming, increasingly support policies that promote subservience and dependence, as a method to break this demography as destiny
So, when conservatives rightfully attack the moral evil of abortion and the attendant disrespect of life it encourages, they fight the good fight but ironically make matters more difficult for themselves politically in the future. SB 276 will save lives, both of pregnant females and the unborn, but then many of those children will become socialized into environments the values of which disrespect life and a responsible individualism which enhances it. That only reinforces something conservatives already know: life is a series of choices that demands prudence in decision-making for which the individual must take responsibility without exporting their consequences to others, and in this instance preservation and valuation of life is the most important goal.
Purpose. The purpose of the article is to define main directions and ways to legitimize philosophical ideas of self-determination as a fundamental global and valuable intention of Western culture in the context of its enlightenment paradigm. Methodology. The research is based on historical and logical methods, which allowed to theoretically reconstruct the cultural and historical context, as well as philosophical and theoretical principles of understanding and recognition of self-determination as a phenomenon of Western culture of the Enlightenment age. The authors have used their own theoretical model similar to the one of "ideal type" by. M.Weber based on the methods of generalization, abstraction and idealization, which allowed to present the phenomenon of individualism in the most general form as a system of value orientations of an individual, whose nature is seeking self-determination and originality. Originality. The historical and philosophical analysis has shoяк.wn how the philosophy of the Enlightenment age created moral principles of European culture advancement, especially through rationalization and the idea of political, economic and moral independence of a personality, recognition of rights for own initiative and sovereignty, individual identity as a public good. Thus, the idea of self-determination in this philosophy is related not only to the recognition of human rights, but also to the search of possible ways for a person to embrace current legislative system, harmony conditions and public interests. Conclusions. The philosophy of the Enlightenment has made a significant step toward further development of self-determination concept and its rationalization – separation of freedom and tyranny, new perception of necessary conditions for free self-determination of an individual as the ability to manage own passions and build own life on some rational principles, to refuse from excessive egoism, combining personal interests with the interests of others and public in generally these ideas were performed in the system of philosophical and legal liberalism, which emerged as a result of the synthesis of individualism and rationality concepts, and became an ideological basis for the modernization of Western civilization. ; Цель работы – определить основные направления и способы философской легитимации идеи личного самоопределения, как фундаментальной и сквозной ценностной интенции западной культуры, в контексте ее просветительской парадигмы. Методология. Основополагающими для данного исследования стали исторический и логический методы, использование которых позволило теоретически реконструировать культурно-исторический контекст и философско-теоретические способы осмысления и легитимизации идеи личного самоопределения как феномена западной культуры эпохи Просвещения. Автор при этом опирался на собственную теоретическую модель вроде "идеального типа" М. Вебера, созданную на основании методов обобщения, абстрагирования и идеализации, что позволило представить феномен индивидуализма в максимально обобщенном виде как систему ценностных ориентаций личности, сущностное ядро которой составляет стремление индивида к независимому самоопределению и неповторимости. Научная новизна. В ходе историко-философского анализа показано, как философия Просвещения создавала духовные основы модернизации европейской культуры, в частности, путем рационализации и распространения идеи политической, экономической и духовной независимости личности, признания ее прав на собственную инициативу и суверенность, ее индивидуального своеобразия как общественного блага. При этом идея самоопределяющейся личности в философии просвещения коррелирует уже не просто с признанием естественных прав человека, а с поисками путей ее включения в систему действующего права, условий гармонизации частных и общественных интересов. Выводы. В философии Просвещения был сделан очень важный, в плане дальнейшего становления идеи личного самоопределения, шаг по ее рационализации – разграничение свободы и произвола, осознание того, что необходимым условием действительно свободного самоопределения личности является умение управлять собственными страстями и строить свою жизнь на рациональных началах, способность отказаться от проявлений чрезмерного эгоизма, согласовывать свои интересы с интересами других, общества в целом. Все эти идеи нашли свое выражение в философско-правовой системе либерализма, которая, возникнув в результате синтеза концепций индивидуализма и рациональности, и стала мировоззренческой основой модернизации западной цивилизации. ; Мета роботи. Визначити основні напрями та способи філософської легітимації ідеї особистого самовизначення, як фундаментальної та наскрізної ціннісної інтенції західної культури, в контексті її просвітницької парадигми. Методологія. Основоположними для даного дослідження стали історичний і логічний методи, використання яких дозволило теоретично реконструювати культурно-історичний контекст та філософсько-теоретичні засади осмислення та легітимізації ідеї особистого самовизначення як феномена західної культури доби Просвітництва. Автор при цьому спирався на власну теоретичну модель на зразок "ідеального типу" М.Вебера, створену на підставі методів узагальнення, абстрагування та ідеалізації, що дозволило представити феномен індивідуалізму в максимально узагальненому вигляді як систему ціннісних орієнтацій особистості, сутнісне ядро якої складає прагнення індивіда до збереження власної неповторності та незалежного самовизначення. Наукова новизна. У ході історико-філософської реконструкції показано, як саме філософія Просвітництва створювала духовні засади модернізації європейської культури, зокрема, на шляхах визнання її прав на власну ініціативу і суверенність, її індивідуальної своєрідності як суспільного блага, раціоналізації та поширення ідеї політичної, економічної і духовної незалежності особистості. Істотно, що ідея самовизначення особистості в просвітницькій філософії корелює не лише з визнанням природних прав людини, а з пошуками шляхів її включення до системи чинного права, умов гармонізації приватних і суспільних інтересів. Висновки. У філософії Просвітництва був зроблений дуже важливий, у плані подальшого становлення ідеї особистого самовизначення, крок щодо її раціоналізації – розмежування свободи і сваволі, усвідомлення того, що необхідною умовою дійсно вільного самовизначення особи є вміння керувати власними пристрастями і будувати своє життя на раціональних засадах, здатність відмовлятися від проявів надмірного егоїзму, погоджувати власні інтереси з інтересами інших, суспільства взагалі. Всі ці ідеї знайшли своє вираження у філософсько-правовій системі лібералізму, яка, виникнувши внаслідок синтезу концепцій індивідуалізму і раціональності, і стала світоглядною основою модернізації західної цивілізації.
